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ABSTRACT 
 
The topic of this thesis is the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC 
states with the aim of offering a proposal for unifying the substantive and procedural 
rules for enforcing foreign arbitral awards under the ambit of the New York Convention 
for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, the Riyadh 
Convention, and the ICSID Convention to which all the GCC states are signatories. The 
significance of this thesis is its comprehensive comparison of the Shari’a, international 
arbitration agreements, and the arbitration laws of GCC states. 
 
The research argues that the weaknesses in the arbitral enforcement mechanisms 
of GCC states do not necessarily stem from the Shari’a, as most Western scholars 
suspect, but from the very same problems facing non-Islamic countries regarding the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. These include the failure to create an 
international consensus on the enforceability of a foreign arbitral award that has been 
previously set aside, overt judicial activism, and protectionist attitudes against foreign 
arbitral awards.   
 
As research into the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under the New York 
Convention have been shaped largely by the interpretation and analysis of Western 
scholars, this thesis gives voice to the perspectives of Shari’a scholars to address many 
of the uninformed criticisms lodged at the GCC states regarding arbitration as a whole 
and the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards more specifically.  
 
The methodologies employed in this thesis include both (1) a review and 
comparison of the existing literature, including scholarly works on the topic, cases in 
the GCC states and elsewhere, national rules and legislation in the GCC states, and 
regional/international agreements or conventions; and (2) a survey of those engaged in 
the field of arbitration in the GCC states, using survey methodology and Survey 
Monkey, an online survey design, collection and analysis tool. The survey measures the 
perspectives of practitioners engaged in the field of arbitration in the various GCC 
states. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0. Introduction 
 
This research examines the need to create a modern unified arbitration law with 
sufficient enforcement mechanism for the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of 
the Gulf (CCASG)1 or as it is often referred to as the “Gulf Cooperation Council” 
(GCC). 2  The thesis argues that existing GCC laws and practice of international 
arbitration,3 specifically with regards to the recognition and enforcement4 of foreign 
arbitral awards, are insufficient and must be updated to fully conform to modern 
international arbitration practice. The research examines and discusses hindrances to the 
enforcement of arbitral awards under current GCC laws by comparing the arbitration 
rules under Islamic Shari’a (which is also known and hereafter referred to as the 
“Shari’a”5), international and regional agreements, and the national arbitration laws of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 See generally, The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, Secretariat General, ‘Home’ 
!http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/" accessed 11 March 2014. 
2 See generally, The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, Secretariat General, ‘The 
Charter’ !http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/indexfc7a.html?action=Sec-Show&ID=1" accessed 11 March 
2014. (Article One states that “A Council shall be established hereby to be named The Cooperation 
Council for the Arab States of the Gulf hereinafter referred to as the Cooperation Council (GCC).”) 
3 This research generally covers only international commercial arbitration, and non-commercial 
arbitration such as those dealing with family law is beyond the scope of this research. 
4 For purposes of brevity, any reference to enforcement throughout the rest of this research also refers to 
recognition and enforcement unless otherwise stated.  
5 The word “Shari’a” in Arabic means “the right path.” See Ian Edge (ed), Islamic Law and Legal Theory 
(Dartmouth 1996) xvi-xvii. See also Essam Alsheikh, ‘Court Intervention in Commercial Arbitral 
Proceedings in Saudi Arabia: A Comparative Analytical Study of Shari’a Based Statutes and International 
Arbitral Practices’ (DPhil thesis, University of Portsmouth 2011) Ch 2, fn 2; Abd Ar-Rahman and 
Abdassamad Clarke, Shari’a Islamic Law (Ta-Ha Publishers 2008) 23 (stating that “the literal meaning of 
the word Shari’a in Arabic is ‘the way to a watering place’. More generally, it is taken to mean ‘the road 
to be followed’. Allah, the Creator, has revealed this path to mankind through the Prophet, His 
Messenger.”) For a full background discussion on the Shari’a, see Section 2.2.1. Islamic law is also 
known as the Shari’a. This thesis author disagrees with references to the Shari’a as “Shari’a law” since 
Shari’a in the Arabic sense also encompasses the meaning of the words “law” and “rule.” To say “Shari’a 
law” is in essence a misnomer and the same as saying “Law law.” For Islam, there is no distinction 
between Shari’a and any other law because the definition of Shari’a in Arabic is “law and rule” given by 
God, but a distinction later arose through use of the word Shari’a in the English language and some 
erroneously use the phrase “Shari’a law.” The more appropriate term is Islamic Shari’a or to simply refer 
to it as the Shari’a. However, since it is common practice to refer to Shari’a as “Islamic law” in the 
English lexicon and because many sources refer to the Shari’a as “Islamic law”, this thesis author may 
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GCC states. The research concludes that while the Shari’a affects the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards, the substantial number of potential challenges to enforcement in 
the GCC states stem from the domestic arbitration laws or practice, and not necessarily 
from the Shari’a. The domestic arbitration laws of GCC states, therefore, coupled with 
judges who have limited experience with Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 19586 (New York Convention) and the 
Model Law of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law for 
Arbitration7 (UNCITRAL Model Law) are the main culprits for the numerous cases that 
deny enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  
The study includes a survey conducted among practitioners in the field of 
arbitration in the GCC states, the results of which corroborate the conclusions drawn in 
the literature review. A full report of the survey results is included as Appendix II, 
while the pertinent results of the survey are discussed throughout the research wherever 
appropriate. 
Finally, the thesis proposes a set of rules relating to the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards, which balances the requirements of the Shari’a with the norms of 
international arbitration, to be included in a Uniform GCC Arbitration Law.  
 
1.1. Background of the Study 
 
Arbitration is an important means for resolving commercial disputes 
worldwide,8 and it is certainly needed in the GCC states due to the economic boom in 
the region, which has become one of the most attractive markets for foreign 
investments. Although oil still plays an important role in the economy, the GCC states 
are trying to diversify their economic base by becoming less dependent on oil as a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
have to refer to the Shari’a as “Islamic law.” For the rest of the research, however, this thesis author will 
refer to the Islamic Shari’a as “Shari’a.” 
6 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 June 1958, art V(2)(b), 
21 UST 2517, 330 UNTS 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]; see International Legal Framework, 
(1994) 1 World Arb Rep 1, 37 (listing accession dates for all New York Convention signatories). 
7 The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 with amendments as 
adopted in 2006.  
8 AFM Maniruzzaman, ‘A Rethink of Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ (30 May 2013) Kluwer 
Arbitration Blog !http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/05/30/a-rethink-of-investor-state-dispute-
settlement/" accessed 31 May 2013. 
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source of gross domestic product. In recent years, various GCC states have been 
working hard to diversify the resources of their national economy. This is particularly 
true, for example, in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) where businesses in 
construction,9 tourism,10 manufacturing and financial services have developed rapidly.11 
However, many foreign investors have largely remained reluctant to engage in 
arbitration in the GCC states because of the perception that arbitration in the region is 
still in its infancy.12 
Therefore, aligning arbitration in the GCC states with international arbitration 
norms will likely attract more foreign investments, and will dispel the notion that GCC 
states are incapable of becoming an international hub for arbitration.13 Substantive 
changes, therefore, should be made to the arbitration laws of the GCC states, especially 
as to the rules and procedures for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 An example is the construction in Dubai of the tallest building in the world, Burj Khalifa. Emaar, ‘Burj 
Khalifa’ (Emaar 2014) !http://www.burjkhalifa.ae/en/" accessed 15 February 2014. 
10 GCC states like Qatar and the UAE, for example, have pursued various strategies for increasing their 
tourism industry. Qatar has been granted the 2022 Football World Cup by FIFA, while the UAE has been 
granted the 2020 World Expo. Ian Traynor, ‘FIFA says there is little it can do about labour conditions in 
Qatar’ (The Guardian, 13 February 2014) !http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/13/fifa-labour-
conditions-qatar-world-cup" accessed 15 February 2014; Aarti Nagraj, ‘Dubai Wins Expo 2020 Bid’ 
(Gulf Business, November 2013) !http://gulfbusiness.com/2013/11/dubai-wins-expo-2020-
bid/#.Uv97jSgrjfM" accessed 15 February 2014. 
11 James Kwan, ‘Commentary: The New DIAC Arbitration Rules: Adopting International Best Practice in 
the Middle East’ (December 2007) 22 Mealey’s Int’l Arb Rep 12 (stating that arbitration’s “significance 
has increased in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) due to the economic boom in the region. A flexible 
fiscal regime, pro investment laws, and a stable business minded government has contributed to the influx 
of foreign investment in the UAE. In 2005, foreign direct investment inflow into the UAE achieved a 
record US$10 billion, amounting to nearly 34 per cent of the total foreign capital flow in the Arab region 
This figure puts the UAE as the number one Arab country for attracting foreign investment.”). The 
foreign direct investment inflow to the UAE reached US$13 billion by 2008, but then dropped 
significantly to US$4 billion in 2009 after the economic downturn and has again bounced back to US$9.6 
billion by 2012. The World Bank, ‘Data’ !http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD" 
accessed 14 March 2014. By 2013, the foreign direct investment inflow for 2013 was US$12 billion and 
is expected to be at US$14 billion by 2014. Abdul Basit, ‘UAE to attract $14.4billion foreign direct 
investment’ (Khaleej Times, 17 January 2014) 
!http://www.khaleejtimes.com/biz/inside.asp?section=uaebusiness&xfile=/data/uaebusiness/2014/Januar
y/uaebusiness_January196.xml" accessed 24 March 2014.  
12 George Smith and Matthew Marrone, ‘Recent Developments in Arbitration Law in the Middle East’ 
(Weinberg Wheeler, 15 September 2010) !http://www.wwhgd.com/news-article-71.html" accessed 10 
March 2014 (there is also the perception that the training of judges and lawyers lags far behind the rest of 
the world). 
13 Ahmed Almutawa and AFM Maniruzzaman, ‘The UAE’s Pilgrimage to International Arbitration 
Stardom – A Critical Appraisal of Dubai as a Centre of Dispute Resolution Aspiring to be a Middle East 
Business Hub’ (2014) JWIT 15, 193-244; Smith and Marrone (n 12) 2.  
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As an example, the UAE has so far taken major steps towards recognizing the 
important role of arbitration in economic development. In July 2006, the UAE acceded 
to the New York Convention,14 which has been in effect since 19 November 2006. The 
UAE is also a signatory to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Between States and Nationals of Other States 196515 (ICSID Convention). At present, 
legislative support for arbitration in the UAE consists of 20 provisions [Articles 203-
218 and Article 235-238] in the UAE Civil Procedure Code.16 However, the UAE plans 
to adopt a new UAE Federal Arbitration Law based on the UNCITRAL Model Law.17 
Furthermore, the UAE, like other GCC states, has witnessed the establishment of 
several modern arbitration centres, including the Dubai International Arbitration 
Centre 18  (DIAC), the Dubai International Financial Centre – London Court of 
International Arbitration (DIFC-LCIA) Arbitration Centre,19 the Abu Dhabi Centre for 
Commercial Conciliation and Arbitration (ADCCCA), 20  the Sharjah International 
Commercial Arbitration Centre (SICAC),21 and many other smaller institutions.22 All of 
them provide strong demonstrations for the importance of arbitration as a reliable !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Smith and Marrone (n 12) 2 (UAE became the 138th state to adopt the New York Convention). 
15 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 
opened for signature 18 March 1965, Doc ICSID/15 (10 Apr 2006), 17 UST 1270, 575 UNTS 159  
(entered into force 14 October 1996) !www.worldbank.org/icsid" accessed 11 March 2014 [ICSID 
Convention]. 
16 UAE Civil Procedure Code, Federal Law No (11) of 1992. It is important to note that the UAE Code 
does not govern disputes arising out of commercial contracts to which the Dubai Government or any of 
its subsidiary departments are a party. Such disputes, if submitted to arbitration, fall under other specific 
laws. See Mark Hoyle, ‘Topic in focus: demystifying UAE arbitration law’ (Lexology, 8 Nov 2013) 
!http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=fc4ff6d6-cafb-4063-8dc1-f20fc1544c9e" accessed 15 
January 2014 (stating that a “handful of Articles relating to arbitration…do not provide a template for a 
modern arbitration system”). 
17 On February 2, 2008 the UAE’s Ministry of Economy released a Draft Federal Law on Arbitration and 
the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, which is based closely on the UNCITRAL Model Law. Smith and 
Marrone (n 12) 10-11 (UAE became the 138th state to adopt the New York Convention). 
18 Dubai International Arbitration Centre, !http://www.diac.ae/idias/" accessed 15 February 2014. 
19 DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre, !http://www.difcarbitration.com/" accessed 15 February 2014. 
20 Most transactions with governmental entities based in Abu Dhabi prefer the ADCCCA as a dispute 
resolution hub. Khalil Mechantaf, ‘Abu Dhabi Arbitration Centre Issues its New List of Arbitration 
Rules’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 10 September 2013) 
!http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/09/10/abu-dhabi-arbitration-centre-issues-its-new-list-of-
arbitration-rules/" accessed 13 October 2013.  
21 SCCI Portal, ‘Sharjah International Commercial Arbitration Centre’ 
!http://www.sharjah.gov.ae/EN/OURSERVICES/AFFILIATES/Pages/SharjahInternationalCommercialA
rbitrationCentre.aspx" accessed 15 February 2014. 
22 Smith and Marrone (n 12) 2 (stating that these events have strengthened Dubai’s position to bid as the 
international center for arbitration). For a full discussion of arbitration in the UAE, see generally 
Almutawa and Maniruzzaman (n 13). 
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dispute resolution mechanism for the business community in the UAE. The Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia (KSA) has also taken major steps with the recent passage of the Saudi 
Arbitration Law of 2012, which generally puts KSA in line with international 
arbitration norms.23  
However, despite these positive indications, a full recognition of arbitration is 
still facing various challenges in the GCC states.24 This includes the difficulties facing 
the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in these states, which is largely due, as will 
be shown in this study, to the ambiguity of the procedures and the unpredictability of 
court practices. 25  In the survey,26  the respondents gave the Kingdom of Bahrain 
(Bahrain) and the UAE the highest rating at 7.44 out of 10 and 7.43 out of 10, 
respectively, when asked to rate the friendliness of GCC states towards the enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards. KSA, despite having recently passed the Saudi Arbitration 
Law of 2012, 27  was rated low at 3.44 out of 10. The Sultanate of Oman (Oman) 
received a rating of 6.25 out of 10, the State of Kuwait (Kuwait) was rated at 5.78 out of 
10, and the State of Qatar (Qatar) was rated at 5.74 out of 10.28 In other words, GCC 
arbitration practitioners see that much work is yet to be done with the GCC states to 
improve their enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, despite that all the GCC states are 
signatories to the New York Convention.  
The end goal of any arbitration proceeding is that an arbitral award should easily 
be enforced.29 The easy enforceability of arbitral awards is considered to be one of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Saudi Arbitration Law of 2012, Royal Decree No M/34, published in Official Gazette on June 8, 2012 
(KSA 2012). 
24 Smith and Marrone (n 12) 3. 
25 ibid. Ostensibly, the adoption of the New York Convention by 16 Middle Eastern countries -including 
Bahrain, Oman, KSA, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE- should provide for more straightforward 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in those states. The New York Convention severely restricts the 
grounds on which a county’s courts can refuse to enforce foreign arbitral awards. However, the New 
York Convention also contains an exception allowing courts to repudiate foreign arbitral awards that are 
“contrary to the public policy of that country.” Many Middle Eastern countries rely on this exception to 
deny enforcement of foreign arbitral awards that do not comply with the Shari’a. 
26 Appendix II, Survey Report on Arbitral Award Enforcement in the GCC, II(2.2.1.) [hereinafter 
“Appendix II, Survey Report”] 
27 ibid; Saudi Arbitration Law (n 23). 
28 Appendix II, Survey Report, II(2.2.1.). 
29 “But I think that the question of enforcement of [foreign] arbitral awards must be in the centre of our 
worries if we really look for the success of international arbitration.” Muhammad Huchan, ‘Untitled’ 
(Euro-Arab Arbitration conference, Tunisia, 1985), cited in Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab and Jalal El-Ahdab, 
Arbitration with the Arab Countries (3rd ed, Wolters Kluwer 2011) 665. See also Emelia Onyema, 
‘Formalities of the Enforcement Procedure (Article III and IV)’ in Emmanuel Gaillard and Domenico Di 
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main factors in the success of international arbitration.30 As Baamir stated, “arbitration 
loses its objective of settling disputes if arbitral awards lack enforceability.”31 The GCC 
states, therefore, should work towards a system where the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards is consistent with international arbitration norms.  
Through the survey this study shows that perhaps the lack of knowledge by the 
judiciary in international agreements may contribute to the challenges in enforcing 
foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states.32 Survey respondents perceive public policy 
as the main challenge to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards followed by the lack 
of knowledge of the judiciary in the GCC states and then by the failure of the arbitration 
statutes in the GCC states.33 The sources of these challenges may also relate to the 
nature, development and background of the arbitration systems in these states. This 
research will examine whether the perception of the survey respondents correspond 
with the review of the literature. 
It is known that the legal system in the GCC states is based upon the Shari’a, 
which has its own valuable features, the application of which may lead to different 
results if applied in the realm of international arbitration.34 With the Shari’a in mind, 
this research examines to what extent and in what phases the Shari’a affects the 
outcome of the enforcement of arbitral awards in the GCC states, especially while 
keeping in mind a comparative view of the international and regional arbitration 
agreements as well as the national arbitration laws of each of the GCC states. The study 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Pietro (eds), Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitral Awards: The New York 
Convention in Practice (Cameron May 2009) 597; Abdulrahman Baamir, Shari’a Law in Commercial 
and Banking Arbitration: Law and Practice in Saudi Arabia  (Ashgate 2010) 91 (“Arbitration loses its 
objective of settling disputes if arbitral awards lack enforceability.”); Abdullah Al-Kenain, Altahkeem fe 
AlShari’a Alislamiyah: Altakheem Al’am, wa Altakheem fe Alshiqaq Alzaouji (1st edn, Dar Alasimah 
2000)141-145; Michael Payton, ‘Security for and Enforcement of Arbitration Awards’ (London Maritime 
Arbitration Association, 50th Anniversary Conference)  
!http://www.lmaa.org.uk/uploads/documents/C50SecurityandEnforcement.pdf" accessed 10 May 2012. 
30 Abdullah Alenezi, ‘An Analytical Study Of Recognition And Enforcement Of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
In The GCC States’ (DPhil thesis, University of Stirling 2010). 
31 Baamir (n 29) 91; Al-Kenain (n 29) 141-145. 
32 Appendix II, Survey Report, II(2.2.2.). Survey Respondents view judges in the GCC as having low 
familiarity with international agreements, and especially so with the ICSID Conventions (3.78 out of 10) 
which has had very little history in the GCC states. The respondents also rated the judges’ familiarity 
with the New York Convention (5.86 out of 10) and the judges’ familiarity with the UNCITRAL Model 
Law (4.97 out of 10). 
33 Appendix II, Survey Report, II(2.3.). 
34 Smith and Marrone (n 12) 2. 
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shows through the literature review that the effect of the Shari’a as a potential source 
for challenging the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards through the public policy 
defence is exaggerated, and that the Shari’a is largely consistent with international 
arbitration norms. The same conclusion is supported by the responses to the survey 
questions aimed at determining how those in the field of arbitration in the GCC states 
perceive the effect of the Shari’a on the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.35 
 
1.2. Objectives and Scope of the Study  
 
1.2.1. General Objective 
 
The general objectives of this study are to examine the current state of 
international arbitration in the GCC states and to find a way to establish a bridge 
between arbitration in the GCC states and the current systems of international 
arbitration. This study aims to add to the general literature on arbitration by comparing 
the Shari’a, international conventions, and the arbitration laws of all GCC states, while 
examining the five potential sources of non-enforcement of a foreign arbitral award: (1) 
the distinction between domestic, foreign, and international arbitral awards, (2) the 
conditions to enforcement, (3) grounds for non-enforcement, (4) public policy, and (5) 
grounds for setting aside an arbitral award. The study generally examines current 
practices for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states, with the end 
goal of identifying specific challenges to enforcement, the root causes of the challenges, 
and then propose a set of rules relating to enforcement in a prospective uniform GCC 
arbitration law. 
 
1.2.2. Specific Objectives 
 
The specific objectives of this research are to address multiple issues necessary 
to fully understand the state of arbitration enforcement in the GCC states, and to 
eventually propose a system of enforcing foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Appendix II, Survey Report, II(2.6.). 
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is compatible with international arbitration norms. The specific objectives are as 
follows: 
 
(i) To examine the practice of applying modern international arbitration in the 
GCC states, and to determine whether harmonisation with the Shari’a is 
possible. 
 
(ii) To examine the application of international arbitration treaties and/or 
conventions, such as the New York Convention and the ICSID Convention; 
 
(iii) To identify the key legal and policy obstacles that may hinder the process 
for developing arbitration in the GCC states, specifically as to the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, and to propose a set of rules relating 
to enforcement in a prospective Uniform GCC Arbitration Law that takes 
into account the applicable international standards, such as the principles 
contained in the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
while harmonising it with the Shari’a; 
 
(iv) To provide a necessary understanding of the Shari’a for practitioners of 
international arbitration when they encounter the application of the Shari’a 
at the stage of enforcing foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states. 
 
1.3. Importance and Justification of the Study 
 
This research will attempt to recognize various challenges that may face the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states;36 and whether or not 
international arbitration rules and practices are recognized effectively by the arbitration 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Kristin Roy, ‘The New York Convention And Saudi Arabia: Can A Country Use The Public Policy 
Defense To Refuse Enforcement Of Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards?’ (1995) 18 Fordham Int'l LJ 920 
(discussing Saudi Arabia’s use of the public policy defense to avoid enforcing arbitral awards). 
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laws, the competent judicial authorities, and the arbitration practitioners in the GCC 
states.37 
Also the research focuses on the effect of the Shari’a on the application of 
international arbitration.38 The research looks at the various phases at which the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may face challenges with a comparative analysis 
of the Shari’a, international agreements, and the national laws of each of the GCC 
states. The research also examines the distinction between the terms “domestic,” 
“foreign,” and “international” arbitral awards. Further, it examines the conditions which 
the GCC states may require prior to the enforcement of an arbitral award. Additionally, 
the research discusses the various grounds upon which an arbitral award may face 
challenges based on non-enforcement and also based on a setting-aside application. The 
use of the public policy defence is a major subject examined in this research, 
specifically in Chapter Five.39 The main conclusion attempts to find flexible tools that 
may be available within the Shari’a, which could be used to harmonise with 
international arbitration norms.  
The importance of this research is to (1) identify challenges to the enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states; (2) determine the extent to which the 
Shari’a becomes the source for the challenges to the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards and whether alternatively the source may be judicial activism guised behind 
Shari’a public policy; (3) determine the possibility of harmonising rules for the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards between the Shari’a, international agreements, 
and the domestic legislation of GCC states; and (4) provide a proposal for overcoming 
the challenges through a uniform set of rules relating to enforcement in a prospective 
Uniform GCC Arbitration Law. 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Roy (n 36) 935 (“Each Middle Eastern Nation, in considering the adoption of international arbitral 
legislation, faces its own set of issues and problems. Many Middle Eastern countries, including Yemen, 
Oman, and Qatar, have not acceded to an international arbitration convention, finding the terms of these 
conventions contrary to their internal legal systems”). 
38 Faisal Kutty, ‘The Shari’a Factor in International Commercial Arbitration’ (2006) 28 Loy LA Int’l & 
Comp L 1, 1-3, (2009) 4 J of Arab Arb 63. 
39 See generally, Chapter Five. 
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1.4. Research Questions 
 
The following questions have been addressed in this study: 
 
Question One: How have arbitration and foreign arbitral awards been applied and 
developed in the GCC states? 
 
Question Two: To what extent does the Shari’a affect the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards in the GCC states, and does the Shari’a apply to domestic, foreign, and 
international arbitral awards? 
 
Question Three: Are there differences in interpreting the Shari’a among the GCC states, 
and how would these differences, if any, affect the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards? 
 
Question Four: Do international agreements like the New York Convention and the 
ICSID Convention harmonise the various arbitration principles of different legal 
systems? 
 
Question Five: How does public policy affect the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
in the GCC states? 
 
Question Six: What are the major challenges to the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards in the GCC states, and what are their sources? 
 
The above research questions are answered through a review of the literature, 
culminating in an analysis of each of the research questions in Chapter Seven as the 
concluding part of the thesis. Additionally, a survey was conducted to corroborate the 
conclusions reached regarding the research questions.  
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1.5. Research Methodology 
 
The study adopts both comparative and international law approaches to the issues 
concerned and includes a survey result on those issues.  
 
1.5.1. Comparative Methodology 
 
As far as comparative law is concerned, the research looks into the current 
international paradigm of unifying and harmonising the international arbitration system 
vis-à-vis the New York Convention. The research is also comparative because it 
compares arbitration in multiple legal systems (Shari’a and international arbitration in 
the GCC states and international arbitration), the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
in each system, the policies of arbitration in each system, the obstacles faced by both 
systems in creating an international arbitration system, the causal relationships between 
the arbitration paradigm in each of the two legal systems, and the legal evolution and 
current stage of international arbitration in each system.40 Finally, while previous 
scholars avoided a comprehensive comparison of particular legal systems, this research 
uses a methodology of comparative law analysis through the comparison of two or more 
legal systems vis-à-vis the Shari’a, the national legislation of GCC states, and 
international arbitration agreements, a specific comparison in international arbitration 
that has now become ripe and can contribute to contemporary discourse on this topic.41 
 
1.5.2. Survey Methodology42 
 
A survey was concluded with the results and the full analysis of which is 
attached to the study as Appendix II. The survey aimed to test the findings from the 
literature review by measuring the perception of: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Ronald Macdonald and Douglas Johnston (eds), The Structure and Process of International Law: 
Essays in Legal Philosophy Doctrine and Theory (Martinus Nijjhof 1983) 763-770. 
41 ibid. 
42 For the full report and analysis, see Appendix II, Survey Report. 
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(1) those with experience in the field of arbitration in the GCC states regarding 
the definition of domestic, foreign and international arbitral awards in their 
respective jurisdictions;  
(2) the same group on whether courts in the GCC states apply the same or 
different conditions to the enforcement of domestic and foreign arbitral awards;  
(3) the same group on what are the most likely reasons for the non-enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states, including the perception of the 
group on the extent to which judges in the GCC states are familiar with the New 
York Convention, the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the ICSID Convention;  
(4) the same group as to the role of the Shari’a in determining the public policy 
defence;  
(5) the same group regarding a perspective Uniform GCC Arbitration Law, and 
their opinion on potential language to be proposed for inclusion in the Uniform 
GCC Arbitration Law.  
The survey generally attempted to complement the findings in the literature 
review, including the divergent views of Western and GCC states practitioners with 
regard to the role and impact of the Shari’a on the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards. In short, the survey’s primary role is to explain and bolster the examination of 
the relevant international Conventions and arbitration rules in the GCC states. 
There were a total of 41 respondents to the survey out of more than 321 survey 
invitations sent via email and web link. Budgetary and time constraints were the main 
factors that limited the sample size, a limitation that was weighed with the explanatory 
and ancillary purpose of the survey results which are not intended to show and does not 
establish statistical significance. Of the 41 respondents, 87.5% directly practised in the 
field of arbitration, with the same percentage of 87.5% having experience with 
arbitration in the GCC states, and with 60% having 10 or more years of experience in 
arbitration.43 Such background experiences of the respondents make the survey reliable, 
especially with regard to open-ended questions. For a more in-depth discussion of the 
survey’s methodology and the specific results of each question, refer to Appendix II.44 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 See Appendix II, Survey Report, I(2.1.7.). 
44 Appendix II, Survey Report. 
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In order to achieve the goals set out above, the following steps have been taken: 
 
(a) A research carried out into the published literature, legal journals and academic 
works, and descriptions of the origins and developments in the field of 
arbitration especially in the Shari’a. The focus is on characterising the various 
arbitration practices and procedures prevalent in international arbitration and 
arbitration in the GCC states.  
 
(b) From the available literature, this study describes the major issues in arbitration 
practice and procedures, specifically the issue of the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards. This research, particularly in Chapters Two, begins by 
examining the distinction between “domestic,” “foreign,” and “international” 
arbitral awards, and the impact such a distinction makes for the enforcement of 
arbitral awards. Further, Chapter Two considers the impact of the Shari’a on 
“foreign” arbitral awards, keeping in mind the complicated jurisdictional reach 
of the Shari’a, which draws the line based on a person’s religion. The study 
proposes a way forward under the New York Convention on this issue. 
 
(c) The chapters that follow, specifically Chapters Three, Four, Five, and Six, 
examine the various potential sources of the challenges to the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states. The research tracks the various phases 
that a foreign arbitral award undergoes in the enforcement process. In this 
regard, the research examines the conditions which must be met prior to being 
granted the application for enforcement. The research then delves into the 
potential grounds that parties, or courts sua sponte [of one’s own accord], may 
rely upon to refuse enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. These grounds for 
non-enforcement are tied closely, and almost mirror, the grounds under which 
arbitral awards may be set aside, which occurs after an arbitral award has been 
granted but parties may seek to annul or set aside at some reasonable time after 
it has been granted. The grounds for setting aside will be examined separately. 
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(d) This research also examines the emerging norms and trends in international 
arbitration. For this purpose, this research highlights the existing principles of 
international arbitration law and subsequently summarizes and discusses the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in various conventions and agreements. 
The study undertakes an analysis of the New York Convention, which must be 
considered by the GCC states in formulating a Uniform GCC Arbitration Law.  
 
(e) The research also addresses as a separate issue the concept of public policy, not 
only under the New York Convention, but also under the Shari’a and the 
national arbitration laws of each of the GCC states. Keeping in mind that public 
policy has been seen, rightly or wrongly, by the international arbitration 
community as the most compelling obstacle to the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards in the GCC states, the research examines to what extent the 
Shari’a public policy diverges from the public policy as espoused and 
interpreted in the New York Convention. The research proceeds by examining 
both procedural and substantive public policy with the goal of identifying where 
the divergence may take place among the Shari’a, international and regional 
agreements, and the national arbitration laws of the GCC states. 
 
(f) The research identifies the major challenges to the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards in the GCC states, and the sources of these challenges. After 
critically examining other more comprehensive proposals for a Uniform GCC 
Arbitration Law, the thesis proposes a set of rules aimed at improving the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states, while aiming to 
harmonise the Shari’a with international arbitration norms.  
 
(g) Finally, a survey was conducted of arbitration practitioners in the GCC states, 
and a report and analysis of the survey data and charts are given in Appendix II. 
The survey bolsters the findings and conclusions from the literature review, and 
also tests the language of the rules proposed by the thesis to be included in a 
prospective Uniform GCC Arbitration Law. It is important to make clear at the 
outset that the survey does not intend to show or establish statistical 
significance.   
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1.6. Structure of the Study 
 
Chapter Two discusses the distinction between “domestic,” “foreign,” and 
“international” arbitral awards, and the complicated jurisdictional reach that the Shari’a 
creates when distinguishing between “domestic” and “foreign” award. Chapter Two 
analyses how the New York Convention’s definition for “foreign” and “non-domestic” 
awards, when analysed in light of the competing interpretations by Shari’a scholars of 
the definitions of these terms in the Shari’a fiqh [jurisprudence], could be harmonised 
with the Shari’a and that the New York Convention’s “non-domestic” arbitral award 
supersedes the Shari’a’s potentially troublesome distinction.  
Chapter Three compares the conditions for the enforcement of arbitral awards 
under the Shari’a, the international and regional agreements, and the national arbitration 
laws of each of the GCC states. Chapter Three also identifies where the conditions 
overlap and where there are inconsistent and/or additional conditions from any of the 
three sources of rules for the enforcement of arbitral awards in the GCC states. The 
purpose of Chapter Three is to identify whether the conditions for the enforcement of an 
arbitral award could be a source for the non-enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in 
the GCC states, especially when those awards are not enforced based on technical 
grounds.  
Chapter Four compares the potential challenges to the enforceability of foreign 
arbitral awards in the GCC states, between the Shari’a, international and regional 
agreements, and the national arbitration laws of each of the GCC states.  This chapter 
also examines whether the Shari’a provides for more sources for the potential 
challenges to the enforceability of foreign arbitral awards as compared to the New York 
Convention and the national arbitration laws.  
Chapter Five discusses the public policy defence that the GCC states have often 
been criticized for over-reliance. It, therefore, also examines the procedural and 
substantive sources for the public policy defence under the Shari’a, the international and 
regional agreements, and the national arbitration laws of each of the GCC states. 
Furthermore, it analyses to what extent Shari’a public policy diverges from the 
international norm.  
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Chapter Six discusses the grounds upon which arbitral awards may be set aside 
or annulled in the GCC states. It also discusses the general concepts in the Shari’a for 
the setting aside of an arbitral award, and takes a closer look at the grounds for setting 
aside under the New York Convention and the national arbitration laws of each of the 
GCC states. Furthermore, it determines to which extent the Shari’a allows for the 
setting aside of a foreign arbitral award, and whether foreign arbitral awards are set 
aside in GCC states because of unwarranted judicial activism.  
Chapter Seven provides some conclusions on the above issues discussed, 
answers the research questions posed in the introduction, proposes a set of rules relating 
to enforcement in a prospective Uniform GCC Arbitration Law, submits that the writer 
has succeeded to contribute substantively to the literature, and addresses additional 
issues beyond the scope of the research but may be relevant for further consideration. 
There are additional Appendices of most relevance to the research. Appendix I 
is a Chart of Conditions to Enforcement in the GCC States, which compares the 
conditions for enforcement between all the GCC states, the New York Convention, and 
the Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation (Riyadh Convention).45 This 
Chart should be useful for understanding the discussions set out in Chapter Three.  
Appendix II is the Report on the Survey of Arbitral Award Enforcement in the 
GCC States. This Appendix includes a detailed discussion of the survey methodology, 
ethical considerations, procedures followed, and the results of the survey with analysis 
and charts. The results of the survey are also discussed throughout the thesis wherever 
relevant.  
 
1.7. Contribution to the Field of Knowledge 
 
The contribution of this research is to show how international arbitration can be 
harmonised in the GCC states specifically, with international arbitration norms, in the 
backdrop of the Shari’a. This research identifies the specific and unique concerns of 
GCC states when it comes to the Shari’a and the public policies of GCC states. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Inter-Arab Convention for Judicial Cooperation of 1983 (6 April 1983) 
!http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b38d8.html" accessed 11 March 2014 [Riyadh Convention]. 
! 17 
Additionally, this study applies the New York Convention’s exception under Article 
V(2)(b)46 when analysing the public policies of GCC states. Finally, this thesis proposes 
a set of rules relating to enforcement in a Uniform GCC Arbitration Law. 
Issues relating to the challenges to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in 
GCC states have not been fully addressed by any leading scholarly materials and 
literatures identified. On the other hand, the leading scholarly articles and materials look 
at the Middle East as a whole. A view of arbitration in the context of the Shari’a will 
differ between GCC states and non- GCC states. Furthermore, there has been a gap in 
the literature in analysing the extent to which the Shari’a contributes to the challenges to 
the enforcement of foreign arbitral award in the GCC states. This research contributes to 
the knowledge by analysing the issue of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and 
demonstrating that the Shari’a can be harmonised with international norms for 
arbitration, and that such harmonisation is becoming more possible in the GCC states. 
The research then contributes to the knowledge by considering approaches taken 
towards this harmonisation, and then by proposing a set of rules relating to enforcement 
in a Uniform GCC Arbitration Law that balances the Shari’a with the New York 
Convention. Thus, these issues make this research very important, adding to the current 
literature. 
Additionally, a survey conducted in the study on the enforcement of arbitral 
awards in the GCC states adds greater value to the literature, as there has been no 
survey conducted on the issue of enforcement and with the aim of identifying what 
arbitration practitioners in the GCC states perceive as the source for challenges to the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 New York Convention, art V(2)(b). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
DEFINING THE SCOPE OF DOMESTIC, FOREIGN, AND INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRAL AWARDS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE GCC STATES  
 
2.0. Introduction 
 
This chapter primarily explains the interplay of the rules governing the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Delineating the scope of “domestic,” “foreign,” 
and “international” arbitral awards at the outset would make it easier to determine the 
overlap, if any exists, among the rules governing the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards in the GCC states, and to determine the common grounds among them. Part I of 
this chapter discusses the generally accepted distinction of domestic, foreign, and 
international arbitral awards in international arbitration. Part II discusses the concept of 
“foreign” arbitral award under the Shari’a, and the different views of the four Shari’a 
schools of thought on determining whether an arbitral award is foreign. Part III explains 
arbitration rules governing domestic, foreign, and international arbitral awards in the 
GCC states.  
Part IV analyses the New York Convention’s applicability in the GCC states, 
keeping in mind especially what the New York Convention classifies as a “non-
domestic” arbitral award,1 the same being discretionary, according to van den Berg,2 
and to be determined by the enforcing state. This thesis author argues that the non-
domestic award under the New York Convention is consistent with the Shari’a 
paradigm and the same ought to be harmonised by GCC states by creating a uniform 
rule for determining a non-domestic award, keeping in mind the Shari’a. Part IV also 
analyses when the ICSID Convention applies in the GCC states, and how the same 
avoids the problem inherent in the New York Convention’s definition of “foreign 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (10 June 
1958) 21 UST 2517, 330 UNTS 38 (entered into force 7 June 1959) art I, s 1. [The New York 
Convention]. 
2 Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘The New York Convention of 1958: An Overview’ in Emmanuel Gaillard & 
Domenico Di Pietro (eds), Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitral Awards– 
The New York Convention in Practice (Cameron May 2009) 39, 54. 
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award” under a supranational paradigm. Finally, part V discusses the more-favourable-
right provision of the New York Convention. 
 
PART I 
 
2.1. Commonly Accepted Distinctions of Domestic, Foreign, and International 
Arbitral Awards 
 
 Arbitral awards can be categorised according to the seat of the arbitration.3 
There are variations, however, in practice; and for purposes of this study, the variations 
will be analysed in this chapter, including the impact of the Shari’a on the distinctions 
between domestic, foreign, non-domestic, international, and ICSID arbitral awards. This 
section explains these distinctions and clarifies their scope. As stated by Redfern, “even 
states that make no formal distinction between “domestic” and “international” 
arbitrations in their legislation are compelled to recognise the distinction when it comes 
to the enforcement of arbitral awards.”4 A problem, however, is that “each state has its 
own test for determining whether an arbitral award is ‘domestic’ or ‘foreign.’”5 
 
2.1.1. Domestic Arbitral Award 
  
According to Hwang and Lee, “the lack of universality as to which awards the 
New York Convention applies to is derived from the differing definitions of what 
constitutes a domestic award, as well as the reservations made to the NYC. As a result, 
there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach.”6 An arbitral award is generally categorised and 
hence appropriately applied as domestic when it is made within one state, arises out of 
an arbitration agreement between parties who are all from the same state, and the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Simon Greenberg, Christopher Kee and J Romesh Weeramantry, International Commercial Arbitration 
An Asia-Pacific Perspective (Cambridge 2011) 400. 
4 Alan Redfern and others, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (4th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2005) 13, 1-23. 
5 Redfern and Hunter (n 4) 16 (explaining that this problem was recognised by the New York Convention 
and its approach to defining a “foreign” award). 
6 Michael Hwang and Shaun Lee, ‘Survey of South East Asian Nations on the Application of the New 
York Convention’ (2008) 25(6) J of Intl Arb 873–892. 
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dispute in question has little or no connection with another state.7 There are exceptions 
to this general definition depending on how one defines a domestic, foreign, or 
international arbitral award within the national legislation.  
In India, for instance, a previous rule was set out by the Supreme Court in 
Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S. A. & Anr,8 which held in Paragraph 23 that 
“relying on the definition of ‘domestic award’ in Section 2(7) of the Indian Act that 
foreign awards …are those awards which have been made pursuant to arbitration in a 
convention country, whereas the awards made outside India in an international 
commercial arbitration in a non-convention country is to be considered a ‘domestic 
award’ …”9 Under the former Indian approach, an arbitral award may be domestic even 
when it had been rendered outside of India if the seat of the arbitration is not a member 
of the New York Convention. This approach was overruled by the Indian Supreme 
Court in the Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services,10 where 
the Indian Supreme Court revisited the rule in Bhatia and held that the Indian 
parliament’s intention was not to give the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 
1996 extra-territorial application. The Bharat court held that the application of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law was limited to the territoriality principle and the seat of 
arbitration is the centre of gravity.11 Further, the court held that the omission of the 
word “only” did not mean that the Indian Parliament intended to depart from the 
territoriality principle.12 The Bharat decision clarified that arbitral awards passed in 
foreign seated arbitrations cannot be challenged under Article 34 (application for setting 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Greenberg, Kee and Weeramantry (n 3) 400. 
8 Bhatia International v Bulk Trading S A & Anr, Case No App (Civil) 6527 (13 March 2002). 
9 ibid. See also Bharat Aluminium Co Ltd v Kaiser Aluminium Technical, AIR 2005 Chh 21, 2006 (1) 
MPHT 18 CG (10 Aug 2005). 
10 Bharat Aluminum Co v Kaiser Aluminum Technical Services, Civil Appeal No 7019 of 2005. This case 
is held to be important for bringing India in line with international arbitration standard. Ashish Chugh, 
‘The Bharat Aluminum Case: The Indian Supreme Court Ushers in a New Era’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 
26 September 2012) ! http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/09/26/the-bharat-aluminium-case-the-
indian-supreme-court-ushers-in-a-new-era/" accessed 11 March 2014 (stating that the decision is “likely 
to go down the annals of arbitration reports as the watershed decision that heralded a new dawn for Indian 
arbitration”). 
11 Chugh (n 10). 
12 Shaun Lee, ‘Case Update: Bharat Aluminium Co v Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc’ 
(Olswang, 19 September 2012) !http://www.olswang.com/articles/2012/09/case-update-bharat-
aluminium/" accessed 05 May 2013. 
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aside an arbitral award) of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996.13 
Certain GCC states reserved the reciprocity exemption, which means that they 
require the foreign arbitral award to have been made in a Contracting State.  This 
includes Kuwait, KSA, and Bahrain.14 Those GCC states which made reservations for 
the reciprocity exemption, thus, will not enforce foreign arbitral awards from non-
Contracting States. Those arbitral awards would be considered a-national awards.15 The 
other three GCC states, the UAE, Oman, and Qatar did not reserve the exemption,16 and 
a foreign arbitral award from any state may be enforced in these three states. 
 
2.1.2. Foreign Arbitral Award 
  
Generally, a state would consider an arbitral award as foreign if it were made in 
a foreign state.17  This is, of course, tempered by a court’s interpretation of the non-
domestic prong of the New York Convention as discussed in the section below, and 
which, if one were to agree with van den Berg, would still have to be rendered under the 
procedural and substantive law of another state party to the New York Convention to be 
enforceable.18 The New York Convention defines a foreign arbitral award as an arbitral 
award “made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and 
enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between persons, 
whether physical or legal.”19 This territorial criterion20 means that the arbitral award 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Ashish Kabra, Payel Chatterjee and Vyapak Desai, ‘Enforcement of foreign awards becomes easier: 
‘patent illegality’ removed from the scope of public policy’ (Lexology, 19 July 2013) 
!https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4d6c99ad-4ab6-43f8-83e4-2d5d7c0cb4bf" accessed 
13 October 2013; Nicholas Peacock and others, ‘Bombay High Court applies BALCO principles to 
arbitration agreements pre-dating BALCO’ (Lexology, 5 February 2014) 
!http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=507c86e6-b160-4e0f-8bee-2051afec49cc" accessed 24 
February 2014 (for a discussion of a retroactive application of Bharat Aluminium). 
14 UNCITRAL, ‘Status: 1958-Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards’ <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html> 
accessed 3 May 2013. 
15 van den Berg, ‘An Overview’ (n 2) 41. 
16 Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab and Jalal El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (3rd edn, Wolters 
Kluwer 2011) 50. 
17 Greenberg, Kee and Weeramantry (n 3) 400. The Jordanian Act No 8, Article (2) states that a judgment 
(or award) is foreign when it is rendered by a non-Jordanian court. See also Iraq Act No 30, Article (1). 
18 Stephen Toope, Mixed International Arbitration: Studies in Arbitration between States and Private 
Persons (Grotius 1990) 126, citing Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘Non-domestic Arbitral Awards Under the 
1958 New York Convention’ (1986) 2 Arb Intl 191, 201. 
19 New York Convention, art I, s 1. 
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could have been made in any State other than the one where enforcement is being 
sought.21 An exception is when a state opts for the reciprocity exemption, wherein the 
New York Convention would only apply to foreign arbitral awards made in a foreign 
state that is also a signatory to the New York Convention. 
 
2.1.3. Non-Domestic Arbitral Award 
 
Even with a definition of “foreign arbitral award,” countries like France22 and 
the United States23 have also struggled with defining “foreign arbitral award” in relation 
to “non-domestic arbitral awards.” This is so because, as Senger-Weiss and van den 
Berg have noted, “the question of what constitutes a ‘nondomestic’ arbitral award 
within the meaning of the Convention has been recognized as one of the most 
complicated issue posed by this treaty.”24 According to Toope, a court will not 
necessarily consider an arbitral award “domestic” but would instead deem it “non-
domestic” even if the arbitral award was rendered in the same country as the enforcing 
court.25  
The New York Convention additionally26 applies to “arbitral awards not 
considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are 
sought,”27 a controversial addition among the delegates during the Conference as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘When is an Arbitral Award Nondomestic Under the New York Convention 
of 1958?’ (1985) 6 Pace L Rev 25. 
21 van den Berg, ‘An Overview’ (n 2) 40. 
22 Societe AKSA SA v Societe NORSOLOR SA (9 December 1980, Cour d’appel de Paris), reprinted in 
(1981) 20 ILM 887 (France); General National Maritime Transport Co v Societe Gotaverken Arendel AB 
(21 February 1980, Cour d’appel de Paris), reprinted in (1981) 20 ILM 884 (France). 
23 Bergesen v Joseph Muller Corp 710 F2d 928 (2nd Cir 1983). 
24 Elisabeth Senger-Weiss, ‘Enforcing Foreign Arbitration Awards’ in Thomas Carbonneau (ed), 
Handbook on International Arbitration and ADR (AAA JurisNet LLC 2006), citing van den Berg, ‘When 
is an Arbitral Award Nondomestic’ (n 20) 26.  
25 Toope (n 18) 125. 
26 van den Berg, ‘When is an Arbitral Award Nondomestic’ (n 20) (explaining that “the New York 
Convention always applies to the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award made in another State 
(that the first criterion), whilst it may, in addition, apply to the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral 
award made in the State where the recognition and enforcement are sought if such an award is considered 
nondomestic”). 
27 ibid; see also van den Berg, ‘An Overview’ (n 2) 40-42 [“in view of the second definition, the second 
definition is relevant only for an arbitral award made in the country where its recognition and 
enforcement are sought. Conceptually, an arbitral award made in another (Contracting) State can also be 
considered non-domestic, but for the purpose of the Convention’s scope this appears to be irrelevant”].  
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explained by van den Berg.28 Van den Berg has explained non-domestic arbitral awards 
as those that are made and enforced in the same country, but are not domestic.29  The 
second criterion under Article I(1) of the New York Convention, however, allows, but 
does not obligate30 a court to determine when and whether an arbitral award is non-
domestic. As explained by van den Berg, the non-obligatory nature of non-domestic 
arbitral awards under the New York Convention can be gleaned from the use of the 
word “considered.”31 The state where enforcement is sought has discretion to determine 
whether an arbitral award is domestic or non-domestic according to the laws of the 
enforcing state.32 After referring to the first two definitions under Article I(1) of the 
New York Convention, van den Berg explained the discretionary power of the 
enforcing court as follows: 
 
These two definitions exclude the Convention’s applicability to the 
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award made in an 
enforcement State which are considered domestic in that State…33 
  
Redfern pointed that the consequence of the New York Convention’s non-
domestic category is that “an award which one country considers to be ‘domestic’ 
(because it involves parties who are nationals of that state) might well be considered by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 van den Berg, ‘When is an Arbitral Award Nondomestic’ (n 20). The addition was proposed by a group 
of eight delegates who foresaw the possibility that an arbitral award made within the territory of a state 
where enforcement is also sought may qualify as a “foreign” arbitral award. 
29 van den Berg, ‘An Overview’ (n 2) 40; van den Berg, ‘When is an Arbitral Award Nondomestic’ (n 20) 
(emphasizing that  “the second criterion of the Convention's scope applies only to the recognition and 
enforcement of an arbitral award made in  the territory of the state where recognition and enforcement are 
sought”). 
30 van den Berg, ‘An Overview’ (n 2) 41. 
31 ibid. 
32 This proposition is supported by Article I(1) of the New York Convention. Under Article VII(1) of the 
New York Convention,  an interested party cannot be deprived of “any right he may have to avail himself 
of an arbitral award.” This means that if there is a choice between domestic law and the New York 
Convention, the party may choose the one that most favors enforcement of the arbitral award. In the 
Shari’a context, however, this “Most Favorable Right” provision is limited depending upon the enforcing 
court. Article VII(1) is indeed limited “to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the country 
where such award is sought to be applied.” In other words, the enforcing court, or better yet, the Shari’a 
has the ultimate say on whether an arbitral award is foreign or domestic.  See Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘The 
Relationship of the New York Convention with Other Treaties and with Domestic Law’ in Emmanuel 
Gaillard and Domenico Di Pietro (eds), Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and International 
Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention in Practice (Cameron May 2009) 70. 
33 van den Berg, ‘An Overview’ (n 2) 42. The author also notes that a country may unilaterally adopt the 
Convention’s system for enforcement and thus enforce an arbitral award irrespective of the country where 
it was made.  
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the enforcement state as not being domestic (because it involves the interest of 
international trade).”34 
The issue of non-domestic arbitral awards made in the US and also sought to be 
enforced in the US have also arisen between two foreign parties, a Swiss corporation 
and a Norwegian ship-owner.35 The Federal Appellate Court for the Second Circuit, 
reviewing the travaux preparatoires and finding no definition in the New York 
Convention for non-domestic, observed in Bergesen that the Convention deliberately 
omitted a definition for non-domestic arbitral awards “to cover a wide variety of 
eligible awards as possible, while permitting the enforcing authority to supply its own 
definition of ‘non-domestic’ in conformity with its national law.” 36 The Bergesen court 
held that an arbitral award that was made in the US between two foreign parties could 
be enforced under the New York Convention as a non-domestic arbitral award.37 Van 
den Berg, however, cautioned that the Bergesen decision may have gone too far in its 
pro-enforcement bias, and “troublesome for the question of what constitutes a non-
domestic award.”38 In contrast to Bergesen, the Federal District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois in Lander Co Inc v. MMP Investments Inc39 held that an arbitral 
award made in the US between two US parties was domestic even if the contract 
provision required performance in a foreign country.  
According to Toope, there is nothing that would prevent enforcement of a 
“procedurally delocalised award, whether rendered inside or outside the state where 
enforcement is sought.”40 This means that under the non-domestic prong of the New 
York Convention, there is no territorial requirement as there would be for the “foreign” 
award prong. Toope suggests that the New York Convention “allows for almost 
complete national discretion in determining what will be classified as a non-domestic 
award.”41 In essence, non-domestic arbitral awards are not rendered in another state, as 
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34 Redfern and Hunter (n 4) 16. 
35 Bergesen (n 23). 
36 ibid. 
37 ibid. 
38 van den Berg, ‘When is an Arbitral Award Nondomestic’ (n 20) (adding that “Muller also argued that 
the award in question could be considered a so-called "stateless award."). 
39 927 F Supp 1078 (ND Ill 1996). 
40 Toope (n 18) 125, 127 (stating that delocalized awards would certainly not be considered domestic in 
the enforcing state, but could be enforceable as a non-domestic award). 
41 Toope (n 18) 126. 
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would “foreign arbitral awards,” but instead are rendered in the same state as the 
enforcing court, and the enforcing court, keeping in mind the more-favourable-
provision of the Convention,42 would not deem domestic for various reasons.43  In 
General National Maritime Transport Co v. Societe Gotaverken Arendel AB,44 the Paris 
Court of Appeals stated that the arbitral award was not domestic because it had “no 
connection whatsoever with the French legal system” even if the arbitration was held in 
Paris. The New York Convention would also apply to a-national awards rendered in 
another Contracting State.45 In the end, this view of non-domestic arbitral award would 
allow the enforcement of international arbitral awards.  
For Hwang and Lee, non-domestic arbitral awards fall under the category of 
international arbitral awards, stating that “the other (potential) situation [in the New 
York Convention] is those of international arbitral awards, i.e., not strictly ‘foreign’ but 
not considered as domestic arbitral awards in the state where their recognition and 
enforcement are sought.”46 The New York Convention, however, unlike the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, does not define an international arbitral award,47 but “the 
provisions of the NY Convention are clearly meant to apply to awards that are not only 
‘foreign’ in the sense that they have been made in a state other than the enforcing state, 
but also to awards that have an international element.”48  
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42 Toope (n 18) 126. 
43 In Bergesen, the reason was that both parties were foreign. Bergesen (n 23). 
44 General National Maritime Transport Co v Societe Gotaverken Arendel AB, Cour d’appel de Paris (21 
February 1980), (1981) 20 ILM 884 (France). 
45 Toope (n 18) 129, discussing the effect of the holdings in Societe Europeenne d’Etudes et 
d’Entreprises v Yugoslavia (26 Oct 1973; Hoge Raad), reprinted in (1975) 14 ILM 71, 82 ILR (the 
Netherlands); Societe Europeenne d’Etudes et d’Entreprises c Republique de Yugoslavie, (13 November 
1984; Cour d’appel de Rouen), reprinted in [1985] Rev Arb 115 (no 1) (France). 
46 Hwang and Lee (n 5) 875. Toope had argued that the term “international” is more appropriate than 
“foreign” with regards to the New York Convention, especially because awards are enforceable under the 
New York Convention even when they are not “foreign.” See Toope (n 18) 99. 
47 Toope (n 18) Ch IV. 
48 Shahid Jamil, ‘The Pakistan Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign 
Arbitral) Awards Ordinance’ (Jamil & Jamil, 23 November 2005) ! http://jamilandjamil.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/11/recognitionandenforcement_021606.pdf" accessed 11 March 2014 [hereinafter 
REOA]. 
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2.1.4. International Arbitral Award 
 
 When the seat of arbitration is within a state, courts in that state could still 
consider the arbitral award as international. There is, however, no internationally agreed 
upon definition of “international.” 49 “A variety of factors influence whether or not an 
arbitral award is international in character inter alia the nationalities of the parties; 
venue of the arbitration; the subject matter of the arbitration.”50 According to Redfern, 
the terms international have been defined based on two factors: the nature of the dispute 
or the nationality of the parties. The UNCITRAL Model Law Article 1(3), however, 
adopted a combined approach51 and defines an arbitral award as international when (1) 
the parties to the arbitration have places of business in different states, (2) the location 
of one of the party’s places of business is in a foreign state,  (3) at least one of the 
party’s countries of business is different to the place where a substantial part of the 
commercial relationship’s obligations was performed, or (4) the parties agree that the 
subject matter of the arbitration agreement relates to more than one country.52 A 
country’s adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law may impact the distinction between 
domestic, foreign, and international arbitral award. According to Hwang and Lee, “the 
Model Law…draws the distinction, not between foreign and non-foreign awards, but 
between awards derived from domestic as opposed to international commercial 
arbitrations.”53 
The US adopted an even more expansive scope of international award than the 
UNCITRAL Model Law under 9 USC §202, with the phrase “reasonable relation with 
one or more foreign states.”54 The term “reasonable relation” could arguably be 
interpreted by a court to cover a large number of arbitral awards. 55  
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49 Redfern observes that the absence of a definition for “international” may pose problems for 
international arbitration. Redfern and Hunter (n 4) 16. 
50 Jamil, ‘REOA’ (n 48). 
51 Redfern and Hunter (n 4) 13-17. 
52 Greenberg, Kee and Weeramantry (n 3) 400; Jamil, ‘REOA’ (n 48). 
53 Hwang and Lee (n 6) 875. 
54 9 USC §202 
55  See generally, Toope (n 18) 17, fn2 (Toope explains the difference between the terms “international” 
and “delocalised”). The US approach allows for non-territorial application of the New York Convention, 
and would cover delocalised awards. Such determination of what constitutes an international arbitral 
award in the United States is left to the court applying 9 USC §202. 
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Other countries, however, may take a different approach to defining an 
international arbitral award. In Indonesia, the Supreme Court in Ascom Electro AG v. 
PT Mangala Mandiri Sentosa56 held that an “international award” referred only to 
arbitral awards made outside of Indonesia, thereby dismissing “an application to enforce 
as an international award an award issued in an arbitration seated in Indonesia between 
a local party and a foreign party.”57  
Jamil, in the context of Pakistan’s definition of “foreign arbitral award” stated 
the importance of having a clear line of what constitutes a domestic, foreign, or 
international arbitral award: “…determining the character of an award is important, 
since the practical consequence that flows is that a domestic award can be set aside by 
the Pakistani court under [section] 30 of the Arbitration Act [of] 194058 (and thus 
potentially be unenforceable in other NY Convention countries). However, if the award 
is considered foreign, then the powers of a Pakistani court are restricted to refusing or 
accepting the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under the 
[Ordinance] and the award can still potentially be enforced in other jurisdictions.”59  
In the end, the question of whether an arbitral award is international “will 
depend on the provisions of the relevant national law.”60 It is, therefore, important for 
the GCC states to create a uniform definition of a domestic, foreign, and international 
arbitral award that is consistent with their obligations to the New York Convention.61  
In the survey, the respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction with their 
country’s definition of domestic, foreign, and international arbitral awards.62 
Respondents from the six GCC states were most satisfied with their country’s definition 
of domestic arbitral award at 8.09 out of 10 or 80.9% satisfaction, less satisfied with 
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56 Ascom Electro AG v PT Mangala Mandiri Sentosa , Decision of 22 (Indonesia S Ct, September 1993). 
57 Greenberg, Kee and Weeramantry (n 3) 400. 
58 “A bill for the enactment of a new consolidated arbitration law based on the UNCITRAL Model Law 
was presented in the lower house of the Parliament, the National Assembly, on 27 April 2009. This bill is 
still pending before the National Assembly.” Norton Rose, ‘Pakistan’ 
!http://www.nortonrose.com/files/pakistan-26271.pdf" accessed 16 October 2013. 
59 Shahid Jamil, ‘International Commercial Arbitration in Pakistan, Navigating Between the New York 
Convention and the Draft Arbitration Act of 2005’ (ICC Arbitration conference, Karachi, Pakistan, 23 
November 2005). 
60 Redfern and Hunter (n 4) 17; Jamil 'REAO’ (n 48). 
61 GCC states should additionally consider their obligations under the ICSID Convention and enforce 
arbitral awards pursuant to the ICSID Convention’s supranational approach. See Section 2.1.5. 
62 Appendix II, Survey Report, II(2.2.4.). 
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their country’s definition of foreign arbitral award at 7.06 out of 10 or 70.6% 
satisfaction, and least satisfied with their country’s definition of international arbitral 
award at 6.16 out of 10 or 61.6% satisfaction.63 The survey suggests that the GCC states 
could improve their arbitration laws by adopting a uniform set of definitions, especially 
for international and foreign arbitral awards. What is surprising from the survey is the 
lower satisfaction rating for the definition of a “foreign arbitral award,” which ought to 
be consistent with the New York Convention’s definition. 
 
2.1.5. ICSID Arbitral Award 
 
Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention requires each Contracting State to 
recognize an arbitral award pursuant to the ICSID Convention as binding and to enforce 
the pecuniary obligations imposed by the arbitral award as if it were a final judgment of 
the State’s courts.64 Under Article 54(2) of the ICSID Convention, recognition and 
enforcement of the arbitral award may be obtained from the competent court of a 
Contracting State on simple presentation of a copy of the arbitral award certificate by 
the Secretary-General of the Centre.65  
At the enforcement stage, domestic courts still play a potentially important, 
albeit limited,66 role in investment arbitration.67 Under Article 54 of the ICSID 
Convention, arbitral awards are to be recognized as binding and their pecuniary 
obligations are to be enforced like final domestic judgments in all states parties to the 
ICSID Convention. Enforcement may be sought in any state that is a party to the ICSID 
Convention.68 In other words, the prevailing party may select a State where enforcement 
seems most promising. 
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63 ibid. 
64 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 
Mar 18, 1965, 17 UST 1270, 575 UNTS 159, art 54 (1) [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. 
65 ICSID Convention (n 64) art 54(2). 
66 ibid. 
67 August Reinisch, ‘Enforcement of Investment Awards’ in Katia Yannaca-Small (ed), Arbitration under 
International Investment Agreements (OUP 2010) 671-697. 
68 Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention provides in relevant part: “Each Contracting State shall 
recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary 
obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that 
State.” 
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Unlike the New York Convention, under the ICSID Convention, domestic courts 
are not empowered to review ICSID arbitral awards even during the enforcement 
process.69 Domestic courts cannot even review the arbitral award based on public 
policy.70 Greenberg, Kee and Weeramantry explained how the ICSID Convention 
arbitration process is insulated from domestic court interference from commencement 
up until the enforcement of the arbitral award, where an enforcement order is granted.71 
Additionally, a non-ICSID arbitral award will be subject to any setting aside 
proceedings that the national law of the place of the arbitration may provide.72 In 
contrast to the ICSID Convention, in proceedings before a domestic court for the 
foreign arbitral award’s enforcement, a foreign arbitral award under the New York 
Convention will be subject to the reasons for non-enforcement listed in Article V of the 
same.73 
The procedure for the enforcement of ICSID arbitral awards is governed by the 
law on the execution of judgments in each country. The Contracting States are to 
designate a competent court or authority for this purpose. Some countries have 
designated a single court or authority. Others have designated certain types of courts 
such as the locally competent district courts. Most designations refer to courts but some 
refer to executive authorities. Where courts have been designated, these are sometimes 
the courts of first instance or district courts and sometimes the respective supreme 
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69 Ivar Alvik, Contracting with Sovereignty: State Contracts and International Arbitration (Hart 2011) ch 
3. 
70 Christoph Schreuer, ‘Interaction of International Tribunals and Domestic Courts in Investment Law’ in 
Arthur Rovine (ed), Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation (The Fordham 
Papers 2010) !http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/interactions_int_tribunals_domestic.pdf" 
accessed 11 March 2014. 
71 Greenberg, Kee and Weeramantry (n 3) 400. 
72 Benvenuti & Bonfant  v Congo, Tribunal de grande instance, Paris, Order, 13 January 1981, 1 ICSID 
Reports 369; 108 Journal du Droit International 365/6 (1981); Cour d’appel, Paris, 26 June 1981, 1 ICSID 
Reports 369, 371; 108 Journal du Droit International 843, 845 (1981);  Benvenuti & Bonfant v  Banque 
Commerciale Congolaise, Cour de cassation, 21 July 1987, 1 ICSID Reports 373; 115 Journal du Droit 
International 108 (1988);  SOABI  v Senegal, Cour d’appel, Paris, 5 December 1989, 2 ICSID Reports 
337; 117 Journal du Droit International 141  (1990); Cour de cassation, 11 June 1991, 2 ICSID Reports 
341; 118 Journal du Droit International 1005 (1991);  LETCO v  Liberia, US Dist Ct, Order (SDNY 5 
Sept 1986), 2 ICSID Reports 384; Judgment, 12 December 1986, 2 ICSID Reports 387/8; US Dist Ct 
(DC 16 Apr 1987), 2 ICSID Reports 390; AIG Capital Partners Inc and Another v  Republic of 
Kazakhstan (National Bank of Kazakhstan Intervening), High Court, Queen’s Bench Division 
(Commercial Court), 20 October 2005, [2005] EWHC 2239 (Comm), 11 ICSID Reports 118. 
73 Schreuer, ‘Interaction of International Tribunals’ (n 70). 
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courts.74 
Article 54 of the ICSID Convention allows the domestic court determining the 
execution request to apply the “laws concerning the execution of judgments in force in 
the State in whose territory such execution is sought.”75 Article 55 further clarifies that 
“nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in force in any 
Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or any foreign State from 
execution.”76  State immunity, therefore, at the stage of execution remains in the hands 
of the domestic courts, and what Alvik calls the “clearest obstacle to the enforceability 
of ICSID Convention awards.”77 Schreuer calls this the “Achilles’ heel” of the ICSID 
Convention, explaining as follows: 
 
The self-contained nature of the procedure which excludes the 
intervention of the domestic courts does not extend to the stage of 
execution…The Convention does not enjoin the courts of the States 
parties to the Convention to enforce ICSID awards if this would be 
contrary to their law governing the immunity from execution of 
judgments and arbitral awards. Therefore, a State whose courts refuse 
execution of an ICSID award for reasons of State immunity is not in 
violation of Art. 54.78  
 
 Aside from state immunity, ultimately the ICSID Convention’s self-contained 
regime will depend on the municipal court’s compliance.79 As Alvik puts it, “the last 
word nevertheless necessarily remains with the municipal court confronted with a claim 
for recognition or enforcement.”80 While the municipal court has an international 
obligation to recognize and enforce such ICSID arbitral award, the municipal court may 
be faced with a dilemma concerning its international obligation under the ICSID 
Convention and its obligations to municipal procedures, substantive law, fundamental 
constitutional requirements, or even another equally compelling international 
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74 See ICSID, ‘Designations of Courts or Other Authorities Competent for the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Awards Rendered Pursuant to the Convention’ 
!http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/pubs/icsid-8/icsid-8-e.htm" accessed 5 December 2013. 
75 ICSID Convention (n 64) art 54. 
76 ICSID Convention (n 64) art 55. 
77 Alvik (n 69) 125. 
78 Christoph Schreuer and others, The ICSD Convention: A Commentary (CUP 2009). 
79 Alvik (n 69) 125. 
80 ibid. 
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obligation. Alvik even suggests that ICSID arbitral awards can conceivably be 
reopened81 or set aside by a municipal court regardless of what the ICSID Convention 
envisaged.82 
 
PART II 
 
2.2. The Concept of “Foreign” Arbitral Award Under the Shari’a 
 
 This section explains the concept of “foreign” arbitral award under the Shari’a. 
It discusses, first, the historical development of arbitration under the Shari’a followed 
by a discussion of what constitutes a “foreign” arbitral award under the Shari’a. 
 
2.2.1. Historical Development of Arbitration Under the Shari’a 
 
Discussing the development of arbitration under the Shari’a is necessary to get a 
proper foundation before attempting to compare and eventually reconcile Shari’a 
concepts of arbitration with that of modern international arbitration norms. This section 
gives background information on (1) the Shari’a, (2) statutory laws and the Shari’a, and 
(3) the development of arbitration under the Shari’a. 
 
  2.2.1.1. The Shari’a83  
 
To understand the arbitration system in the Shari’a, “one must first recognize the 
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81 An award could be challenged and reopened according to the forum state’s procedural law. Alvik (n 
69) 125. See also,  Edward Baldwin, Mark Kantor and Michael Nolan, ‘Limits to Enforcement of ICSID 
Awards’ (2006) 23(1) J of Intl Arb 8. 
82 Alvik (n 68) 125. 
83 The word “Shari’a” in Arabic means “the right path.” Ian Edge (ed), Islamic Law and Legal Theory 
(Dartmouth 1996) xvi-xvii; Essam Alsheikh, ‘Court Intervention in Commercial Arbitral Proceedings in 
Saudi Arabia: A Comparative Analytical Study of Shari’a Based Statutes and International Arbitral 
Practices’ (DPhil thesis, University of Portsmouth 2011); Abd Ar-Rahman and Abdassamad Clarke, 
Shari’a Islamic Law (Ta-Ha Publishers Ltd 2008) 23, stating that “The literal meaning of the word 
Shari’a in Arabic is ‘the way to a watering place’. More generally, it is taken to mean ‘the road to be 
followed’. Allah, the Creator, has revealed this path to mankind through the Prophet Muhammad, His 
Messenger” (PBUH). 
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important role that religion plays in Middle Eastern law and society.”84 One scholar 
stated the role of religion, “Islamic law pervades the commercial world, as well as a 
Muslim’s way of life. Islam is a complete way of life: a religion, an ethic and a legal 
system all in one.”85 There are four primary sources of the Shari’a: the Holy Qur’an,86 
the Sunna of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH),87 the Ijma,88 and the Qiyas.89  
 
A. Arbitration Sources from the Holy Qur’an 
 
The Holy Qur’an itself supports arbitration as a method of dispute resolution. 
There are many ayahs [verses] in the Holy Qur’an that supports arbitration in Shari’a. 
In Surah An-Nisa 4:35, the Holy Qur’an states as follows:  
 
If you fear a breach between them twain (husband and wife), appoint 
(two) arbitrators, one from his family and the other from her’s; if they 
wish for peace, Allah will cause their reconciliation. Indeed Allah hath 
full knowledge and is acquainted with all things.90 
 
Surah An-Nisa 4:35, however, has been interpreted to deal with mediation since the 
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84 ibid. 
85 ibid. See also Alsheikh (n 83) ch 2, fn 2; Taqi ad-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiya, Collections of Fatwa of Ibn 
Taymiya Al-Hanbali (1985) vol 11, 344-45, stating that “Islamic Shari’a is based upon the attraction of 
interests and harm prevention for human beings. This guiding principle is that everything of interest to 
human beings that does not cause harm is permissible (i.e. Halal) without regard to whether the thing is 
beneficial in whole or in part.” 
86 The Holy Qur’an is divided into 30 Juza (parts), 114 Surahs (chapters) and 6,236 Ayah (verses). As the 
first primary source of the Shari’a, Muslims consider the Holy Qur’an to be the revealed word of God in 
the Arabic language through the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) (570-632 AD). 
87 The second primary source of the Shari’a, the Sunna, constitutes the Prophet Muhammad’s (PBUH) 
sayings and traditions as recorded into what is known as the Hadith. The Sunna is deemed secondary 
sources just as the Holy Qur’an is held to be the literal word of God. 
88 Alsheikh (n 83) ch2, 22, fn 6. See also Arthur Gemmell, ‘Commercial Arbitration in the Islamic Middle 
East’ (2006) 5 Santa Clara J of Int’l L 169; Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Islamic Jurisprudence (Adam 
Publishers & Distributors 2006) 183.  The third source of the Shari’a, the Ijma,88 translated from Arabic 
as “consensus,” can only become a valid source of the Shari’a after there has been widespread 
consultation (Shu’ra) by Islamic scholars and the use of juristic reasoning (Ijtihad). 
89 The fourth source of the Shari’a, the Qiyas,89 consists of legal principles derived through analogy or 
analogical deduction so long as the logic used is based on the Holy Qur’an, Sunna or Ijma. An analogical 
reasoning that is not based on the recognized primary sources of the Shari’a cannot be part of the Qiyas. 
Though difficult, Qiyas is often used to apply Islamic principles to the problems and legal issues of the 
modern era. For more detailed discussion on Qiyas, see Kemal Faruki, Islamic Jurisprudence (National 
Book Foundation 1975) 63. 
90 The Holy Qur’an, An-Nisa 4:35, Yusuf Ali Translation. 
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parties are given the option for reconciliation with the non-mandatory language “if they 
wish for peace,” whereas arbitration is binding on the parties. Nevertheless, the 
reference to the appointment of an arbitrator is an obvious approval of arbitration (and 
mediation) as means of dispute resolution. 
In Surah Al-Imran 3:23, the Holy Qur’an,91 states as follows: 
 
Hast thou not turned Thy vision to those who have been given a portion 
of the Book? They are invited to the Book of Allah, to settle their dispute, 
but a party of them Turn back and decline (The arbitration). 
 
Additionally, Surah An-Nisa 4:58 is commonly cited to support arbitration since it 
states that “and when you judge between people to judge with justice.”92 
 
B. Arbitration in the Sunna  
 
Since the Sunna is the sayings and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad 
(PBUH), it is a strong source for support of arbitration, especially since the Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH) himself acted as an arbiter of disputes. Shari’a scholars can, thus, 
look to the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) as an example of a great arbitrator, to look at 
what he did as an arbitrator, and to refer to his sayings about arbitration. 
However, since the Sunna is the second primary source in the Shari’a, different 
schools of thought in Islam will give different weight or significance to the Sunna as a 
source of arbitral decision-making. Others may give equal or more weight to Qiyas, for 
example, as further described in the next section.  
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91 The Holy Qur’an, Al-Imran 3:23, Yusuf Ali Translation.  
92 The Holy Qur’an, An-Nisa 4:58, Sahih International Translation. See also The Holy Qur’an, An-Nisa 
4:65, Yusuf Ali Translation; The Holy Qur’an, An-Nisa 4:105, Yusuf Ali Translation (about the 
neutrality of the arbitrator); The Holy Qur’an, Al-Ma’ida 5:42, Sarwar Translation; The Holy Qur’an, Al-
Ma’ida 5:95, Yusuf Ali Translation (In a dispute between Ali and Maawiya, the phrase “as adjudged by 
two just men among you” in the verse, Al-Ma’ida 5:95, was relied upon to support the argument that man 
can be an arbitrator.); The Holy Qur’an, Sad 38:22, Yusuf Ali Translation; The Holy Qur’an, Sad 38:26, 
Ahmed Ali Translation; The Holy Qur’an, Al-Anbiya 21:78, Yusuf Ali Translation; The Holy Qur’an, 
Al-Imran 3:55; The Holy Qur’an, Al-Baqara 2:213. 
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C. Muslim’s Major Schools/Groups 
 
There are two major schools of thought that compete in the interpretation of 
Islam: The Sunni93 and the Shi’a.94 While Sunni and Shi’a Muslims share in common 
the most fundamental Islamic beliefs and articles of faith, their differences in 
interpretation stem from their belief in the leadership of Islam after the death of the 
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).95 This section briefly provides a background on each of 
the Shari’a schools of thought, including the Sunni and the Shi’a schools. 
 
i. Sunni Schools 
 
Beside the Sunni/non-Sunni division, the Sunni branch has four major schools of 
thought that interpret the Shari’a, each varying in its doctrinal approach to dispute 
resolution: the Maliki School, the Hanafi School, the Shafi’i School, and the Hanbali 
School.96 “Arbitration differs from one jurisprudence school [within the Sunni branch] 
to another.”97 It is not disputed, however, that all four schools of the Sunni branch 
recognize arbitration as a means of dispute resolution.98 Still, it is important to consider 
the differences in approach of each of the Sunni schools, and to later examine how each 
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93 The word “Sunni” (Al-Sunna in Arabic) means a group of people who follow the traditions of the 
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). The word Sunna refers to the sayings and traditions of the Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH). 
94 Similar to the common law, there is no single unified interpretation of the Shari’a, and Shari’a will vary 
from country to country. See John Donboli and Farnaz Kashefi, ‘Doing Business in the Middle East: A 
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95 Sunnis selected Prophet Muhammad’s (PBUH) close friend and advisor, Abu Bakr Al Sadeeq, as the 
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96 See Alsheikh (n 83), stating that Muslims today “belong to one of four Islamic Schools, which are most 
important at present – Hanafi’h, Malaki’h, Shafi’i and Hanbali’h.”  See also Ar-Rahman and Clarke (n 
83) op cit,  131-67. In the survey, the respondents were asked which Shari’a school is followed by the 
majority of judges and lawyers in their respective country. The majority of respondents at 30% indicated 
Maliki as followed by the majority in their jurisdiction. This was followed with Hanbali at 17.50%, 
Hanafi at 15%, and Shafi’i at 2.50%. As a word of caution, however, these figures have not been tested 
for statistical significance. See Appendix II, Survey Report, II(2.1.7.). 
97 Alsheikh (n 83) 23.  
98 Rodney Smith and Omar Ibrahem, Arbitrating at the Crossroads of East and West: An Overview of 
Prominent Arab National Arbitration Laws, unpublished, electronic copy available at 
!http://ssrn.com/abstract=1654008" accessed 10 May 2013. 
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school’s tradition may vary in enforcing a foreign arbitral award. 
The Maliki School99 relies on “the Ijma of the Medina legal scholars, local 
Medina customs, the Holy Qur’an, and the Sunna and Qiyas.”100 For the Malikis, the 
notion of public opinion is a valid jurisprudential principle. One unique feature of the 
Maliki School is that, unlike the other three schools, “an arbitrator cannot be removed 
after the commencement of the arbitration proceedings.”101 
Under the Hanafi102 School, an arbitral award more closely resembles 
conciliation than a court judgment. Thus, Hanafis stress the close connection between 
arbitration and conciliation,103 and give lesser force to arbitration than a court judgment. 
Hanafi scholars focus on “the contractual nature of arbitration, and arbitral awards are 
characterized by the use of subjective opinions.”104 Thus, “a disputing party is obliged 
to abide by the arbitral award because the agreement to resort to arbitration binds the 
parties like any other contract.”105 Hanafis analyse new legal and factual issues through 
the use of analogy or qiyas, using reason and equitable principles.106 According to 
Saleh, while Hanafis give priority to the Holy Qur’an and the Sunna, they anticipate and 
examine new problems through qiyas, though without insisting on rigid analogy and by 
permitting modest flexibility in the use of human reasoning or judgment.107 
Shafi’i108 teaching is eclectic, borrowing from the Hanafis and the Malikis, and 
often appears to be torn between logic and traditional teaching. Shafi’i stress upon the 
importance of both, the Holy Qur’an and the Sunna, but select the Sunna more critically 
than the Malikis. Unlike the Hanafis, there is little use of qiyas in the arbitral process. 
Shafi’i arbitration is a legal practice; however, the position of arbitrators is inferior to 
that of judges since arbitrators under this School, unlike the Malikis, may be removed 
by the parties up to the time of the issuance of the arbitral award. 
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The most “conservative” of the four schools is the Hanbali School.109 Hanbali 
teachings are deeply centred on the Holy Qur’an, and uncritically accept the 
authenticity of the Sunna, even those rejected by other schools. The Hanbalis make few 
concessions to personal reasoning (ra’y), or equity. According to the Hanbali School, a 
decision made by an arbitrator has the same binding nature as a court judgment. Thus, 
the arbitral award made by an arbitrator (who must have the same qualifications as a 
judge) carries a res judicata effect or finality upon both of the parties since it was they 
who chose him. 
While the four Sunni schools may have varying opinions on specific issues 
relating to arbitration,110 the most significant differences between the schools relate to 
the nature and purpose of arbitration.111 The Hanafi and Shafi’i schools view arbitration 
as a form of conciliation, similar to mediation, where decisions are not binding on the 
parties.112  On the other hand, the Maliki and Hanbali schools treat arbitral decisions to 
have the same binding force as judicial decisions.113  
Notably, “despite some difference between the schools, modern Islamic scholars 
agree that arbitration is a valid and legal method of dispute resolution and can be 
binding under the Shari’a.”114  Shari’a does not prohibit the adoption and application of 
modern-day international arbitration. The differences among the four Sunni schools, 
especially as to the binding effect of an arbitral decision, however, may be significant 
enough that it can affect the enforcement of an arbitral award. Other issues may affect 
the outcome of an arbitration proceeding. These differences can also be viewed by those 
foreign to the Shari’a arbitral tradition as a sign of inconsistency in the Shari’a and their 
application of arbitration rules. A reconciliation of Shari’a arbitration with international 
arbitration must begin with an understanding of these differences among the Sunni 
schools, and must take these differences into account when considering the 
enforceability of a foreign arbitral award in the GCC states.  
It is also just as important to realize that the jurisprudences of each of the four 
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Sunni schools are flexible and not rigid.115 These doctrines are not only subject to 
interpretation, but also to argumentation.  
 
ii. Non-Sunni Schools 
 
The non-Sunni branch has two major schools of thought that interpret the 
Shari’a, each varying in its doctrinal approach to dispute resolution: the Shi’a and the 
Khawarej schools. The differences between the non-Sunni branches are significant, and 
may affect the outcome of an arbitration proceeding. The Shi’a branch can also be 
classified into various schools like the Ithna Asharis School, the Zaydi School, the Ibadi 
School, the Isma’ilis School, and many others.116 A detailed discussion of these Shi’a 
schools, however, is beyond the scope of this research, which focuses on the GCC 
states, a predominantly Sunni region. 
There are differences in the Sunni and Shi’a views on arbitration. In general, the 
Shi’a accepts the principle of resorting to arbitration, even in political disputes, like 
their first leader, the Ali ibn Abi Talib. The Shi’a consider the Holy Qur’an and the 
Sunna as the main source of law, but the Sunna is not recognized unless ratified by the 
Imams.117 Further, use of reasoning such as qiyas [deductive analogy] or ijtihad 
[independent reasoning] are prohibited, unlike the Sunni schools.118 The Shi’a, 
however, do not say that arbitration is haram or prohibited. The Shi’a, thus, may accept 
arbitration as a fair and acceptable form of dispute resolution under their doctrine of the 
Shari’a.  
The Khawarej, another group in Islam, accepts arbitration as a form of dispute 
resolution, but limit its use only to the area of individual rights.119 Further, the Khawarej 
do not accept arbitration or acknowledge it as a God-given right.120 Also, they do not 
accept arbitration as a nation’s right, which it is, in political disputes, especially if the 
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dispute is about Muslim blood.121 In addition, the Khawarej refuse to resort to 
arbitration with anyone that they have a disagreement with, such as those who regard 
them as infidels and renegades, even if the arbitration is to be with some Muslims.122 
 
2.2.1.2. Statutory Laws and the Shari’a 
 
The influences of secular European statutory laws like Roman or French civil 
codes and the English common law in the Middle East also adds another layer of 
challenge to understanding arbitration in the GCC states in light of the Shari’a. The 
mixture of Islamic and European norms mostly since the 20th century mostly resulted in 
new legal paradigms that at first appeared Western, but yet remained inherently based 
on Shari’a principles.123 The result of the blending of European and Islamic norms can 
be seen in the constitutions and legislations of Shari’a countries, some of which, like 
Yemeni statutes, skilfully combine Shari’a with Egyptian statutes.124  
Statutory laws in most Islamic countries, despite adopting secular statutes that 
often emulated European civil law codes, is still largely considered a conglomeration of 
divine laws and principles revealed by God and eternally recorded in the Holy Qur’an. 
In this sense, the Shari’a is still the highest form of law, and non-Shari’a statutes are 
only intended to allow governments to have administrative and organisational authority 
in areas where the Holy Qur’an has not addressed.  
Modern Islamic countries, thus, maintain two separate bodies of law: Shari’a 
and non-Shari’a (secular statutory) laws. The Shari’a, or statutes derived therefrom, still 
governs issues of family law and inheritance. International trade and commerce, 
however, has forced Islamic countries to enact a new body of commercial laws 
regarding arbitration, foreign investment, labour, commercial transactions, corporate 
taxation, business organization, and intellectual property. 
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Ushered by the fast onset of globalization,125 Shari’a countries, in response to 
the need for more secular statutes especially relating to international commerce, created 
secular courts to address disputes arising from this newly created area of the law. There 
is, thus, a dichotomy of Shari’a courts and secular courts. For example, secular courts 
today hear cases relating to commercial codes that were created by legislation. Secular 
courts will usually have jurisdiction over commercial and civil disputes (particularly 
those involving foreigners), while Shari’a courts will usually have jurisdiction over 
family law and civil disputes strictly affecting national citizens.126 There is often, 
however, a difference in the application of the Shari’a to nationals and the application 
of a different set of rules and regulations to foreigners. 
When issues arise regarding international commerce, Shari’a countries 
especially in the GCC states resolve them by legal principles adopted from international 
treaties or organizations. As part of this trend, GCC states have taken the lead in 
adopting these international treaties. It is also in GCC states like the UAE and Bahrain 
that the movements toward an international arbitration system have taken the strongest 
root. 
 
2.2.1.3. Development of Arbitration in the Shari’a 
 
The Islamic world has had centuries of commercial and trading history. In fact, 
“Islam has always been a religion of trade and of world traders and that the Prophet 
[Muhammad’s (PBUH)] wife was herself a trader whose earnings permitted the Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH), to conduct his proselytizing efforts.”127 As a legal, social, and 
religious system closely tied to trade, it is not surprising that the Islamic world has had a 
method of dispute resolution since the times of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Long 
before the appearance of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula, tahkim [arbitration] had 
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already been used as a method of dispute resolution.128 Pre-Islamic Arabs used 
arbitration as the most prevailing means of dispute resolution.129 Islam through the 
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) continued to recognize the validity of pre-Islamic 
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.130 More importantly, the Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH) took the role of hakam [arbitrator].131 There are two notable 
examples in the literature showing the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) as hakam.132  
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The Prophet Muhammad’s (PBUH) commitment to the arbitral process was such 
that, not only did the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) gave great importance to being 
appointed by the believers as a hakam,133 but his subsequent authority as a political and 
military leader resulted in the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) becoming a “Prophet-
Lawgiver.”134 This arbitral practice of the hakam continued as a dispute resolution 
practice even after the death of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). 
Yet, despite the Prophet Muhammad’s (PBUH) and the Holy Qur’an’s support 
for the arbitral process and despite that “Bahrain has been an international commercial-
arbitration centre long before Paris and London,”135 modern international arbitration, 
since the late nineteenth century, and particularly since World War II, perhaps for legal, 
political, and religious reasons, has been difficult for the Islamic world. In most Islamic 
countries, modern international arbitration has long been viewed with doubt and 
scepticism,136 though the recent developments137 in the GCC states seem to show a 
trend towards acceptance of modern international arbitration.138 Historically, Islamic 
countries have had national legislation that has been unfavourable to international 
arbitration, especially as to the enforcement of arbitral awards, and Islamic courts all 
too often impermissibly interfere with international arbitration cases and foreign arbitral 
awards.139 
While the historical backdrop behind international arbitration in Islamic 
countries seems marked with scepticism against modern international arbitration as 
conceptualized in Western legal systems, there seems to be a present trend towards the 
realization of the importance and hence a growing acceptance of modern international 
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arbitration, especially as it relates to commercial disputes.140 
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2.2.2. “Foreign” Arbitral Award Under the Shari’a  
 
An important issue in the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the Shari’a 
based countries like the GCC states is the definition of “foreign”,141 the same being 
critical to a comparative discussion of how enforcement of a foreign or international 
arbitral award may be perceived and practically applied by judges and practitioners of 
international arbitration who are trained in the Shari’a. A discussion of the Shari’a 
perspective towards defining a foreign, and for that matter international, arbitral award 
is imperative towards a harmonisation of the GCC states’ rules for defining domestic, 
foreign, and international arbitral award and the enforcement of the same. This section 
explains that Shari’a scholars142 such as Imam Malik, Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Shafi’i, 
and Imam Ibn Hanbal took different approaches than international arbitration in 
defining a foreign arbitral award. This study argues that the Shari’a approach, however, 
could be reconciled and harmonised with the concept of an arbitral award under the 
New York Convention and the ICSID Convention. 
Although the word “foreign” under the traditional Western arbitration practice 
refers to arbitral awards made outside of a country where the arbitral award is being 
enforced, as described more fully above, the definition of “foreign” arbitral award under 
the Shari’a can become more complicated in its jurisdictional reach because of the 
religious aspects of the Shari’a. According to El-Kadi and El-Ahdab, “as soon as a 
Muslim becomes a party to the contract, Islamic Law governs the contract and one must 
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take into account such rules of Islamic law.”143 However, just because an arbitral award 
is foreign does not automatically mean that it violates the Shari’a without a further look 
into what fundamental notion of Shari’a is actually violated. 
Saleh, however, has proposed that the definition of a “foreign” arbitral award 
under the Shari’a as “an award made under a law other than the Shari’a.”144 He further 
explains that an arbitral award is foreign if it does not meet one of the conditions of the 
Shari’a. This thesis respectfully disagrees with Saleh on this point as it would 
essentially turn current international arbitration practice on its head. For instance, an 
arbitral award made within an Islamic country but is deemed to violate a condition of 
the Shari’a could then be argued as constituting a foreign arbitral award, and then 
confusingly enforced under the New York Convention as a “non-domestic” arbitral 
award. Instead, a more careful analysis should be made as to when Shari’a must be 
applied to an arbitral award, and thereafter consider whether the Shari’a can be 
reconciled with the New York Convention and international arbitration norms.  
Some lawyers and judges in the GCC states misunderstood foreign arbitration 
thinking it against the Shari’a, based on the opinion that foreign arbitration was 
essentially a device to oust the application of the Shari’a. This view was not universally 
held and it became necessary for the judiciary to clarify the situation. A defendant 
brought a suit before the Abu-Dhabi Court of Appeal challenging the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards rendered under foreign law claiming a violation of the principle 
of Shari’a. The Abu-Dhabi Court of Appeal ruled in A.A Commercial Co. v. S. Motors 
Ltd Co. and D. Industrial Ltd Co.,145 that it is a widespread error in the UAE to presume 
that applying a foreign law or international treaty is violating the Shari’a just because it 
is foreign. Without manifest evidence by the defendant that the foreign law violated any 
precepts of Shari’a, the court dismissed the challenge. The court came to the conclusion 
that arbitration, which takes place outside the UAE under foreign law, is not contrary to 
the Shari’a unless there is a clear indication of a violation of the Shari’a.  
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Further, in G. Steel Industry Co. v. International Steel and Contractors Co.,146 
the Federal Supreme Court ruled that an agreement to submit a dispute to arbitration 
outside the UAE did not represent a violation of the Shari’a where the arbitral award 
was within the scope of the Shari’a. 
The Abu-Dhabi Court of Appeal emphasised the evolutionary nature of the 
Shari’a stating as follows: “Shari’a has the capacity to accommodate the arbitration 
rules, because of its ability to develop to satisfy the needs of the developing society.”147 
El-Kadi further explains that “the attitude of Islamic Law towards foreign judgments 
and awards is based on the principle providing that non-Muslims are free to enter into 
contracts and to have business relations that are valid according to their own religions 
without the need to take into account the concept of prohibition and authorization in 
Islamic Law.”148  
To the contrary, some scholars like El-Ahdab note that the Shari’a should 
govern as soon as one of the parties to the contract is a Muslim since the prohibitions 
and authorizations of the Shari’a apply thereto.149 In other words, a “foreign” arbitral 
award is an arbitral award that is not governed by the Shari’a. The applicability of the 
Shari’a, however, follows the person’s religion. A Muslim could potentially remain 
governed by the Shari’a regardless of physical location. This is a key distinction 
between the jurisdictional applications of the Shari’a as opposed to the jurisdictional 
reach of secular laws that normally follow the geographically defined borders of a 
sovereign. Therefore, to determine whether an arbitral award is “foreign” under the 
Shari’a, the first concern is whether the arbitration, and hence the arbitral award, took 
place within or outside of an Islamic country.150 
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2.2.2.1. Arbitration and Arbitral Awards Taking Place Within an 
Islamic Country 
 
If the arbitral award was made within an Islamic country, an issue arises when 
none of the parties is Muslim. According to Rashid, “an arbitral award is considered 
foreign if both parties are non-Muslims, even if both are residents of the state in which 
the arbitration is being held.”151 Abu Zakaria Al-Ansari agrees to Rashid’s view, taking 
the position that “if arbitration takes place within an Islamic country, it is deemed 
foreign if all the parties are non-Muslims (foreigners or non-Muslim citizens) provided 
that the subject of the dispute is legal with respect to their respective religions.”152 In the 
view of Rashid and Al-Ansari, an arbitral award involving only non-Muslims is foreign 
because the prohibitions and authorizations of the Shari’a do not apply to non-
Muslims.153 Under this view, such an arbitral award would be similar to being deemed 
non-domestic under the New York Convention.154 
There is an opposing viewpoint as explained by El-Ahdab that an arbitral award 
involving only non-Muslims is domestic, and thus not foreign, because it took place 
within an Islamic country.155 In the opinion of Abu Yussef, as translated and explained 
by El-Ahdab, “Islamic law must apply to all parties residing within the jurisdiction of 
an Islamic court, regardless of their nationality or religion.”156 Abu Yussef’s position 
seems to be consistent with the framework of the New York Convention, which draws 
the line between foreign and domestic based on where the award was made.  
The New York Convention, however, does not obligate157 courts to find an 
arbitral award “non-domestic” as it leaves it to the courts to make the determination. So, 
application of “non-domestic” awards should therefore be clearly covered by national 
rules or legislation. Such clarity is needed in the aim of harmonizing the Shari’a based 
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151 Rashid (n 142) 95. 
152 Abu Zakaria Al-Ansari, Asl Al Mataleb Fi Charh Raud El Taieb, vol IV, 204 et seq, also cited by El-
Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (n 16) 50. 
153 ibid. This is true regardless of whether the person is a foreigner or local non-Muslim.  
154 This type of award is regarded as “a-national.” van den Berg, ‘An Overview’ (n 2) 41. 
155 Abdel El-Ahdab, ‘Arbitration by Reconciliation under the Islamic Shari’a’ (2nd Islamic Conference on 
Shari’a and Law: Arbitration in Light of the Shari’a, Makassed Philanthropic Islamic Assoc, 1st edn 
2000) 180-182; El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (n 16) 50. 
156 Yussef (n 142). 
157 van den Berg, ‘An Overview’ (n 2) 40. 
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arbitration of GCC states with that of international arbitration, while still taking into 
account the Shari’a. 
 
2.2.2.2. Arbitration and Arbitral Awards Taking Place Outside an 
Islamic Country 
 
There is a larger division among Shari’a scholars on the definition of a “foreign” 
arbitral award when the arbitral award took place outside of an Islamic country.158 
According to El-Ahdab, “when arbitration takes place outside an Islamic country, the 
situation is less clear...”159 There are three competing views on this issue.160 The first 
view, held by the Malaki school according to Imam Malik,161 Hanbali school according 
to Imam Ibn Hanbal,162 and Shafi’i school according to Imam Shafi’i,163 is that an 
arbitration, hence an arbitral award, that took place outside an Islamic country is foreign 
only if none of the parties is Muslim, but domestic if one of the parties is Muslim.164 The 
second view is that an arbitration that took place outside an Islamic country is foreign 
even if one of the parties is Muslim, but domestic if both parties are Muslims.165 
According to Abu Yussef, “arbitration between Muslims held abroad in civil or 
commercial matters is not considered to be foreign.”166 “The third view, which is held 
by the Hanafi,167 deems an arbitration that took place outside an Islamic country as 
always foreign even if a Muslim is involved.168 Rashid agrees with the Hanafi view 
because according to him “the [arbitral] award is also considered foreign if the 
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158 El-Ahdab, ‘Arbitration by Reconciliation’ (n 155) 180-182. 
159 El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (n 16) 50; Abu Hanifa (n 142) 132 and et seq; Yussef 
(n 142); Malik (n 142) 355; Shafi’i (n142) 358; Hanbal (n 142) 439; Al Kabir (n142). 
160 El-Ahdab, ‘Arbitration by Reconciliation’ (n 155). 
161 Malik (n 142) 355; El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (n 16) 50. 
162 Hanbal (n 142) 439; El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (n 16) 50. 
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166 El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (n 16) 50. 
167 Abu Hanifa (n 142) 132 and et seq; El-Ahdab, ‘Arbitration by Reconciliation’ (n 155) 181. 
168 ibid. 
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arbitration took place outside of an Islamic state.”169 
The first and second approaches to defining a “foreign” arbitral award under the 
Shari’a contradict with the New York Convention and the ICSID Convention. As 
mentioned above, the New York Convention, according to van den Berg, defines a 
foreign arbitral award as an arbitral award “made in any other State”170 without regard 
to nationality or religion, while the first and second view considers an arbitral award 
domestic whenever it occurs outside of an Islamic country and one or both of the parties 
to the arbitration are Muslims. This thesis author agrees to the third view of the Hanafi 
School and to Rashid that an arbitral award should be considered foreign if the 
arbitration took place outside of an Islamic country, as this approach would be 
consistent with obligations of the GCC states to the New York Convention.  
Even pursuing the arguments in the first and second approach of interpreting 
“foreign” under the Shari’a, arbitral awards made in another state but considered as 
domestic in the enforcing state, according to van den Berg, remain foreign under the 
New York Convention’s non-domestic criterion. Van den Berg clarified this point when 
he stated that “the rule that the New York Convention is always applicable to the 
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award made abroad applies even if the award 
made in the other country is considered domestic by the enforcing court.”171 Likewise, 
even if Shari’a scholars were to apply the first and second view of the fiqh to the 
definition of a “foreign” arbitral award, they must apply the New York Convention 
regardless because the determination that an arbitral award made outside of an Islamic 
country (in other words in another state other than the enforcing state) remains within 
the purview of the New York Convention’s definition of “foreign” arbitral award.  
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169 Rashid (n 142) 95. 
170 van den Berg, ‘An Overview’ (n 2) 2. 
171 van den Berg, ‘When is an Arbitral Award Nondomestic’ (n 20), referring to Law of Mar 15, 1961, § 
2, Bundesgesetzblatt  [BGBI] II, 121 (W Ger) (van den Berg used as an example the West German law 
which applies the New York Convention to an award made abroad even if it would have been deemed 
domestic for having employed German procedural law).  
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PART III 
 
2.3. Rules Governing Domestic, Foreign, and International Arbitral Awards in 
GCC States 
 
After discussing the general rule and the competing interpretations of the rule 
for the definition of a “foreign” arbitral award under the Shari’a, this section discusses 
the rules in the GCC states governing domestic, foreign, and international arbitral 
awards. 
  
2.3.1. Domestic Arbitral Awards 
 
There are two sets of rules that govern domestic arbitral awards in the GCC 
states: the Shari’a, and the domestic laws of GCC states.  
The Shari’a is governing law in all GCC states, but the interpretation of the 
Shari’a depends largely on how a GCC state expressed the Shari’a as the “source of 
law” or the “primary source of law.” For example, the KSA follows the Shari’a as the 
source of law in the KSA, while the UAE follows the Shari’a as the primary source of 
law. Accordingly, in the KSA, all laws must strictly follow the Shari’a. As to 
legislatively enacted rules regarding the enforcement of arbitral awards, the Shari’a is 
incorporated into the enacted rules. In the UAE, on the other hand, the Shari’a acts as a 
guiding principle for enacting rules on the enforcement of arbitral awards. Once the 
legislature has consulted the Shari’a as a primary source of law and enacted a set of 
rules governing, say, the enforcement of domestic arbitral awards, the enacted rules are 
able to stand on their own. The extent to which the Shari’a will influence rules on the 
enforcement of domestic arbitral awards depends on a specific GCC state. 
Having stated the extent to which the Shari’a will impact rules on the 
enforcement of arbitral awards, all GCC states have enacted their own arbitration acts or 
law with rules on the enforcement of arbitral awards. These national rules and 
legislations on arbitration provide a secular definition of what is a domestic arbitral 
award. The interplay of these arbitration rules and legislations with the Shari’a varies, 
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and there are differences from the rules of one GCC state to another. The national rules 
and legislation of each of the GCC states will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 
Three. 
As a rule of thumb, judges in GCC states that apply the Shari’a as the source of 
law will tend to define domestic arbitral awards as those involving at least one Muslim 
party. On the other hand, judges in GCC states that apply the Shari’a, as the primary 
source of law will tend to define domestic arbitral awards as those that took place 
within an Islamic country - the majority view in the GCC states. In this regard, it is 
worth noting again that the survey, in which the respondents were asked about their 
satisfaction with the definition of domestic arbitral award in their countries, the majority 
at 8.09 out of 10 or 80.9% stated that they were satisfied.172 
 
2.3.2. Foreign Arbitral Awards 
 
The rules governing foreign arbitral awards can be divided into arbitral awards 
that took place in an Arab country that is a signatory to the Inter-Arab Convention on 
Judicial Co-operation of 1983173 (“Riyadh Convention”) and/or the GCC Convention 
for the Execution of Judgments, Delegations and Judicial Notifications (“GCC 
Convention”),174 on the one hand, and arbitral awards that took place in a non-Arab 
country, on the other. For purposes of clarifying this distinction, it is worth noting here 
that all GCC states and almost all Arab countries are signatories to the Riyadh 
Convention.  An arbitral award that took place in an Arab country that is also a 
signatory to the Riyadh Convention and/or the GCC Convention would almost always 
be covered under the regional agreements, while arbitral awards that took place in a 
non-Arab country can only be covered under an applicable international agreement for 
the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award like the New York Convention.  
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172 Appendix II, Survey Report, II(2.2.4.). 
173 Inter-Arab Convention for Judicial Cooperation of 1983, 6 April 1983 
!http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b38d8.html" accessed 22 March 2014 [Riyadh Convention]. 
174 The nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council entered into GCC Convention for the Execution of 
Judgments, Delegations and Judicial Notifications in Oman in 1995 (known as the GCC Convention), 
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2.3.2.1. Regional Agreements 
 
There are two regional agreements that are pertinent to the enforcement of a 
foreign arbitral award in the GCC states: the Riyadh Convention and the GCC 
Convention.175  The GCC Convention and the Riyadh Convention have provisions that 
require it to not to contravene against any international treaty obligation to which a 
signatory state is a party. Therefore, in all GCC states, the GCC Convention and the 
Riyadh Convention have been superseded by the New York Convention except when a 
foreign arbitral award was made in a country that is not a signatory to the New York 
Convention and at the same time is party to the Riyadh Convention such as Libya, Iraq, 
and Yemen, the only remaining Middle Eastern countries that have not yet joined the 
New York Convention. The GCC Convention’s application may perhaps be possible 
under the New York Convention’s more-favourable-right provision if the GCC 
Convention permits enforcement of an arbitral award but the New York Convention 
does not.   
 
A. The Riyadh Convention176 
 
The Riyadh Convention is one of the most commonly used treaties in the Middle 
East for the recognition and enforcement of both court judgments and arbitral awards 
between Arab nations.  Since all Arab nations that are party to the Riyadh Convention 
are Islamic countries, the Riyadh Convention would always be applicable to arbitral 
awards where one or more of the parties are Muslims. Therefore, there is no confusion 
regarding the definition of a foreign or domestic arbitral award under the Riyadh 
Convention.    
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175 The 1995 Protocol on the Enforcement of Judgments, Letters Rogatory, and Judicial Notices issued by 
the Courts of the Member States of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC Protocol”) does not apply 
to the enforcement of arbitral awards.  
176 The signatory States to the Riyadh Convention are: Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, 
Oman, the KSA, Syria, Tunisia, the UAE, and Yemen. Most Arab countries have signed on to the Riyadh 
Convention. Alec Emmerson and Keith Hutchison, ‘Dubai Eyes on New York Convention award upheld 
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! 52 
In terms of grounds for non-enforcement, what makes the Riyadh Convention 
compatible and consistent with Islamic countries like the GCC states, and what makes it 
different from the New York Convention, is that the Riyadh Convention allows non-
enforcement of an arbitral award that is contrary to the Shari’a. Under the Riyadh 
Convention, an arbitral award may be refused if it is “contrary to Shari’a or the 
constitution, public policy or good morals of the country in which enforcement is 
sought.”177 Thus, “enforcement of a foreign arbitration award in [the KSA] is made 
easier if the foreign country is also a signatory to the Riyadh Convention.”178  
 
B. The GCC Convention179 
 
It is also worth mentioning that all six of the GCC states have long ago entered 
into their own agreement to recognize and enforce arbitral awards within the GCC 
states.180 The GCC Convention covers the recognition and enforcement of both court 
judgments and arbitral awards between the GCC states without re-examination of the 
merits.181 
Under the GCC Convention, GCC states are required to execute the final 
judgments issued by courts of any member state in civil, commercial and administrative 
cases and the personal affairs cases in accordance with the procedures as provided 
under the agreement. One of the features of the GCC Convention is that the execution 
of a judgment may be rejected completely or in part if the judgment violates the Shari’a, 
the Constitution, or public order of the enforcement state. The GCC Convention 
provision regarding the Shari’a is similar to the Riyadh Convention. The GCC 
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178 M Payton, ‘Security for and Enforcement of Arbitration Awards’ (London Maritime Arbitration 
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Convention also allows the enforcement state to refuse enforcement if execution of the 
judgment is in conflict with international conventions and protocols in which the 
executing state is a party. 
 
2.3.2.2. International Agreements 
 
If arbitral awards were sought to be enforced exclusively to and from GCC 
states, there would practically be no need for other conventions for the enforcement of 
arbitral awards since that would be covered by the Riyadh Convention and the GCC 
Convention. The globalized business world, however, has made it possible for arbitral 
awards to be made in a non-Arab country, and sought to be enforced in an Arab 
country. Arab countries in turn have felt compelled to ratify international agreements 
and to enforce these non-Arab arbitral awards if they sought to attract foreign investors 
into their country.  
 
A. The New York Convention182 
 
The New York Convention applies only to the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. “Enforcement of arbitration awards is mandatory in all New 
York Convention signatory states. If a party wishes to contest the award, it bears the 
burden of proof.”183 The New York Convention requires that foreign arbitral awards are 
recognised by the courts in the signatory States.184 Further, “unlike the pan Middle East 
treaties, there is no condition that a competent court in the country which is the ‘seat’ of 
the arbitration gives leave to enforce the award.” 185   
A foreign arbitral award, however, may be refused if contrary to the public 
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182 Most Middle Eastern and North African countries that are members of the Arab League of Nations 
have become signatories to the New York Convention. Essam Al-Tamimi, The Practitioner’s Guide to 
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policy of the enforcing states,186 a defence that have been used by the GCC states to 
refuse enforcement if the arbitral award does not comply with the Shari’a. The view, 
however, that the Shari’a and the New York Convention are incompatible arises from a 
misunderstanding of the New York Convention and the Shari’a. The key to 
understanding the issue is to look deeper into what constitutes a public policy and what 
constitutes a foreign arbitral award under both.  
 
B. ICSID Convention 
  
All GCC states have become signatories to the ICSID Convention.187 In order for 
ICSID Convention arbitration to apply, three essential jurisdictional requirements must 
be met under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention: (1) there must be consent from the 
parties that their dispute will be submitted to ICSID Convention arbitration, (2) the 
dispute must be between a Contracting State, or their authorized agencies or 
subdivisions, and a national of another Contracting State, and (3) and the dispute must 
directly arise out of an investment.188  
As to the consent requirement, the consent must be an unambiguous one, as 
indicated by the tribunal in Mobil Corporation and Others v. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela,189 which found in that case that there was insufficient evidence of an intent 
to provide “consent to ICSID Convention arbitration in the absence of a BIT.”190 The 
requirement for consent by the state cannot be overridden by any contractual agreement 
by a subdivision or agency, as illustrated in the ICSID Convention award in Hamester v. 
Ghana.191 In Hamester, the joint venture agreement states that “the dispute shall be 
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referred to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes,”192 but 
Ghana never gave consent that the Board was a subdivision or agency as required under 
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. The ICSID Secretariat rejected the claimant’s 
request for arbitration under Article 25 in the absence of the required consent by 
Ghana.193 
State responsibility can also arise where the conduct in question is directed or 
controlled by the state. This is dealt with in Article 8 of the ICSID Convention, which 
states that “The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a 
State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the 
conduct.”194 International law applies a high threshold here, in the form of the “effective 
control” test as exemplified by Nicaragua v. United States (Contra Case).195 Clear 
evidence of actual control or direct influence by public officials would be needed to 
discharge the evidential burden. 
As to the requirement that the dispute must be between a Contracting State, or 
their authorized agencies or subdivisions, and a national of another Contracting State, in 
Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates,196 an ICSID Convention case involving the UAE-
Italy BIT was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the claimant failed to prove his 
Italian nationality. 
Further, the ICSID Convention requires that the case must involve an investment 
dispute. In Mitchell v. The Democratic Republic of Congo,197 an ICSID ad hoc 
annulment committee set aside an ICSID Tribunal award because it did not establish 
that the Mitchell’s interest constituted an investment for the purposes of the ICSID 
Convention. The Committee in essence required that the definition of “investment” be 
met both in the bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”) and the ICSID Convention. The ad-
hoc Committee considered only four interdependent characteristics of an investment as 
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196 Soufraki v United Arab Emirates, ICSID Case No Arb/02/07. 
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identified by ICSID [Convention] case law: “(i) commitment by the investor; (ii) 
duration of the project; (iii) assumption of risk; and (iv) a contribution to the economic 
development of the host state. It was the last element that was critical to the ad-hoc 
Committee’s considerations.”198 In the end, the Committee found that Mitchell’s 
investment did not contribute to the economic development of the host state and 
therefore did not constitute an investment.  
A similar definition was given by the ICSID Tribunal in Toto Costruzioni 
Generali SpA v. The Republic of Lebanon, where the tribunal stated that “the underlying 
concept of investment…implies an economical operation initiated and conducted by an 
entrepreneur using its own financial means and at its own financial risk, with the 
objective of making a profit within a given period of time.”199 
On the other hand, the ICSID Tribunal in Malicorp Ltd. v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt,200 seemed to have stretched201 the definition of “investment” when it stated as 
follows: “The fact of being bound by that Contract implied an obligation to make major 
contributions in the near future. That commitment constitutes the investment; it entails 
the promise to make contribution in the future for the performance of which that party is 
henceforth contractually bound. In other words, the protection here extends to 
deprivation of the revenue the investor had a right to expect in consideration for 
contributions that it had not yet made, but which it had contractually committed to make 
subsequently.”202 
There is also a distinction between contractual and non-contractual ICSID 
Convention arbitration. Traditionally, ICSID Convention arbitration arose out of 
investor-state contracts where the contract expressly refers to the ICSID Convention for 
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dispute resolution, jurisdictional limits are met, and the host state and the investor’s 
home state are ICSID Convention members.203 The non-contractual ICSID Convention 
arbitration arose out of a state’s consent to ICSID Convention arbitration via (1) a host 
State’s national investment laws, (2) a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between a host 
state and the investor’s home state, or (3) a Multilateral Investment Treaty (MIT) or 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between or among countries that include the host state 
and the investor’s home state. The recent proliferation of BITs has been the primary 
reason behind the substantial growth of non-contractual ICSID Convention arbitration. 
ICSID Convention arbitration can also be based upon the national investment 
legislation of the host state where the host state offers to submit investment disputes to 
ICSID Convention jurisdiction. Once the foreign investor either accepts the state’s offer 
to arbitrate or files a claim, the consent becomes effective. The host state can withdraw 
its consent by either amending or repealing the investment legislation. By adopting laws 
that include consent to arbitration, host states can limit the matters that can be arbitrated 
by the ICSID. 
Additionally, the ICSID Convention provides for a supranational arbitration 
regime, which includes a specific and compulsory mechanism for review of arbitral 
awards thereby removing such review from national courts’ jurisdiction.204 There is no 
seat of arbitration that would trigger the applicability of national arbitration law and the 
ICSID Convention under Article 26 expressly excludes recourse to “any other remedy” 
available under national laws.205 Section 6 of the ICSID Convention also provides for 
an independent regime of setting aside and/or enforcement of ICSID Convention 
awards. Thus, enforcement of an ICSID Convention award is governed exclusively by 
the ICSID Convention. Under Article 54 of the ICSID Convention, each contracting 
state must “recognize an award rendered pursuant to the ICSID Convention as binding 
and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it 
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were a final judgment of a court in that State.”206   
Article 54 of the ICSID Convention has three implications: (1) there is no 
ground for non-enforcement of an ICSID Convention award, (2) ICSID Convention 
awards must be enforced in the same way and under the same laws as applicable to the 
execution of court judgments, and (3) enforcement of the award is limited to monetary 
awards.207 Monetary damages could, however, be used to award moral damages such as 
the award in Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic of Yemen208 of $1 million in “moral 
damages” against Yemen and in favour of an Omani company.209 However, moral 
damage was not awarded in an LCIA case between a Syrian national and a US 
company, in Dr. Alla Chafic Dib v. F &F International Ltd,210 because under English 
law, the chosen law of the parties, such arbitral award can be recovered only in 
exceptional circumstances. 
 
2.3.3. International Arbitral Awards 
 
 International arbitral awards could be governed by the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
the national law of a GCC state, and implicitly by the New York Convention as a non-
domestic arbitral award. Most GCC states, however, have not expressly addressed 
international arbitral awards. Only Bahrain and Oman have national legislation 
specifically covering and defining international arbitral awards. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the majority of respondents in the survey only gave a 6.16 out of 10 or a 
61.6% satisfaction when asked to rate their country’s definition of international arbitral 
award.211 
 The Saudi Arbitration Law of 2012 does cover domestic and international 
arbitration. It defines an international arbitration along the lines of the definition in 
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Article 1(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law (Article 3), but does not distinguish 
between domestic and international arbitration.212 These GCC states have adopted into 
legislation, whether in part or in full, the UNCITRAL Model Law and so have also 
adopted the Model Law’s provisions regarding international arbitral awards. Article 
1(3) of UNCITRAL Model Law (2006 Amendment) defines “international arbitration” 
as follows: 
 
An arbitration is international if:  
(a) the parties to an arbitration agreement have, at the time of the conclusion 
of that agreement, their places of business in different States; or 
(b) one of the following places is situated outside the State in which the 
parties have their places of business: 
(i) the place of arbitration if determined in, or pursuant to, the 
arbitration agreement; 
(ii) any place where a substantial part of the obligations of the 
commercial relationship is to be performed or the place with 
which the subject matter of the dispute is most closely connected; 
or 
(c) the parties have expressly agreed that the subject-matter of the arbitration 
agreement relates to more than one country.213 
 
 Bahrain follows the UNCITRAL Model Law definition of international arbitral 
awards. Oman’s definition, however, slightly differs from the UNCITRAL Model Law 
definition. Omani law defines an “international” arbitral award under Article 3 of the 
Arbitration Law 47/97 as follows:  
 
The arbitration shall be considered as international… provided the 
subject matter of the dispute is related to international commerce under 
the following circumstances:  
(1) in case, the principal business centre of either party to the arbitration 
is located in two different countries at the time of execution of the 
arbitration agreement… 
(2) In case, both parties to the arbitration have agreed to have recourse to 
either a permanent arbitration organization or arbitration centre located 
either in the Sultanate of Oman or abroad.  
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(3) If the subject matter of the dispute, which comes under the arbitration 
agreement is linked with more than one country.  
(4) If the main business centre of either party to the arbitration is based 
in the same country at the time of execution of the arbitration agreement 
while one of the following places are based outside such country:  
(a) the place of arbitration, as stipulated in the arbitration agreement 
or there exists a reference regarding the mode of its selection;  
(b) the place where execution of the substantial part of the 
obligations, arising from the commercial relationship between the 
parties, has to be carried out;  
(c) the place which is very much relevant to the subject matter of the 
dispute.214 
 
PART IV 
 
2.4. Applicability of the New York Convention or ICSID Convention 
  
After reviewing the potential rules that would govern the enforcement of a 
foreign arbitral award, this section analyses the applicability of the New York 
Convention or the ICSID Convention given the nexus between Muslim and non-Muslim 
parties, and an arbitral award that takes place within or outside an Islamic country. Most 
Islamic countries and especially the GCC states have leaned towards deciding the issue 
of which rule to apply based on where the arbitral award took place, following the New 
York Convention, and not whether any of the parties is a Muslim under the Shari’a.215  
 
2.4.1. Treaty Obligations and the Shari’a 
 
One of the questions that arbitration practitioners in the GCC states continue to 
grapple with, deals with the reconciliation of a treaty obligation as with the New York 
Convention and the Shari’a. In the survey, the respondents were asked which would 
prevail if there is a conflict between the New York Convention and the Shari’a. The 
respondents were generally split on this question with 53.13% choosing the New York 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
214 Omani Arbitration Law 47/97, art 3, 
215 Al-Tamimi, The Practitioner’s Guide (n 181)194; see Section 2.2.2.2. 
! 61 
Convention and 46.88% choosing the Shari’a,216 and there were those who explained 
further their choice, and only two comments correctly stated that there ought to be no 
conflict between the two, as discussed more fully below.217 
Accession to the New York Convention poses different challenges for Islamic 
countries in terms of reconciling the same with the Shari’a. “The constitutions of the 
Arab States prescribe the Shari’a as a source of legislation (Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE); in 
some (Qatar, and since1980, Egypt) - it is the main source of legislation.”218 In the 
KSA, Article 1 of its Basic Law declares that the constitution of KSA is the Holy 
Qur’an and Sunna (Traditions) of the Messenger (PBUH).219 Generally speaking, the 
public policy of KSA arguably may be intended to be the obligation to follow the basic 
laws and the constitution of the country. Kuwait, on the other hand, where the Shari’a is 
a source of legislation and not the main source, faced little difficulty acceding to the 
New York Convention. Kuwait acceded to the New York Convention in 1978.220 Roy 
explains that “this accession…did not pose a conflict for Kuwait because Kuwait’s 
general rule of civil procedure was to recognize international arbitration agreements and 
to subordinate the Kuwaiti legal system to the rules of the arbitration tribunal.”221 In 
KSA, enforcement of a foreign arbitral award requires compliance with the Shari’a “as 
enforced in Saudi Arabia.”222 This is true even with the enactment of the Saudi 
Arbitration Law in 2012.  
The core instrument for interpreting treaties is the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties223 (Vienna Convention), to which virtually all countries are 
adherents.224 Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention states that treaties should be 
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interpreted in good faith225 and in light of “any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties.”226 The GCC states that have joined the 
New York Convention,227 or any other treaty like the ICSID Convention, would also be 
bound to meet their obligations under the treaty pursuant to the international law 
principle of pacta sunt servanda228 [agreements must be kept] and the Holy Qur’an, 
which requires all Muslims to follow their contractual obligations. The Holy Qur’an 
states, “O ye who believe! fulfil (all) obligations.” [Ya’ayuh al-ladh!n a man" awf" bil-
‘uq"d], enjoining Muslims to commit to fulfilling their contractual obligations.229 In 
disputes where one party is a non-Muslim, choosing a non-Islamic Shari’a system is 
recognized by the Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali Schools as valid.230 Recourse to a non-
Islamic Shari’a system is valid as long as the rules to be applied on the contract do not 
violate express provisions of the Holy Qur’an and Sunna.231 
As stated by Hoyle, for example, “there has been a long tradition of freedom of 
contract for non-Muslims in Muslim countries, and there is no tension between the 
principles that Muslims are forbidden, for example, to deal in pork, but (again for 
example) Christians are permitted to do so. While subtle arguments could pertain 
regarding a contract between a Christian and Muslim concerning pork, two Christians 
contracting for something which would be forbidden to a Muslim would, generally, 
have their contracts upheld, unless there was overriding public policy. This might occur 
if the agreement was analogous to the two Christians setting out to sell pork to Muslims. 
Equally, therefore, if there was a question about arbitration of such a dispute, the 
outcome could either be a refusal to arbitrate by Muslim judges, or a declaration by the 
Muslim arbitrators that the contract was unenforceable.”232 
In this context, the GCC states must meet their treaty obligation under the New 
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York Convention and the ICSID Convention. They must not interfere with 
supranational arbitral awards under the ICSID Convention, except at the execution 
stage, to determine such defence as State Immunity. They must also follow the New 
York Convention’s straightforward definition of a “foreign” arbitral award as an award 
“made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and 
enforcement of such awards are sought.”233 This definition of the New York 
Conventions is not controversial. Yet, there remains uncertainty regarding the second 
definition in the New York Convention covering non-domestic arbitral awards. This is 
especially true when a GCC state simply refers to the New York Convention as a whole 
in its implementing arbitration legislation, since the New York Convention itself does 
not define non-domestic arbitral award and leaves it to the domestic court to “consider” 
whether an arbitral award is non-domestic. These arbitral awards, in essence, are 
arbitral awards that are made within a GCC state but that a domestic court would deem 
non-domestic.  
 
2.4.2. Arbitral Awards Taking Place in an Islamic Country 
  
As stated previously, an issue theoretically arises under the Shari’a in an arbitral 
award made within an Islamic country when all the parties are non-Muslims. In an 
arbitration that was made in an Islamic country involving two non-Muslims, there are 
two competing views on whether the arbitral award is foreign or domestic. Al Ansari234 
and Rashid235 categorize such an arbitral award as foreign, going as far to say that the 
result would be the same even if the parties were both residents. This view among 
Shari’a scholars, El-Ahdab explains, is supported by the proposition that it is not 
domestic because it is not subject to the prohibitions and authorizations of the 
Shari’a.236  
It is foreseeable that a judge in a GCC state could take the Al-Ansari/Rashid 
position and hold that an arbitral award made within an Islamic country and between 
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two non-Muslims is a foreign arbitral award. Such a position could arguably be 
consistent with the New York Convention taking lead from the Bergesen court in the 
United States. In Bergesen, the court held that the arbitral award was foreign, making 
the New York Convention applicable, because it involved two non-US parties: a 
Norwegian and a Swiss party. According to van den Berg, “what really motivated the 
court of appeals to hold the award to be non-domestic was the foreign nationality of 
both parties involved (Norwegian and Swiss).”237 Bergesen, however, involved the 
parties’ nationality (non-US citizens) and not the parties’ religion (being non-Muslims). 
One cannot assume that non-Muslims parties are also not citizens or residents since 
there are non-Muslims residents and citizens in Islamic countries, including the GCC 
states.238  
Further, van den Berg criticized the Bergesen court’s misplaced reliance on the 
parties’ nationality, stating as follows: 
 
…the legal basis is scant. Neither the text nor the legislative history of 
the Convention indicate that recognition and enforcement of an award 
made between two foreign parties under the arbitration law of the 
country in which recognition and enforcement are sought should be 
deemed to fall under the Convention…a legal basis can be found only if 
the text of the second criterion is read in isolation.239 
 
Still, the Bergesen case continues to stand for the rule that in an arbitration 
between foreign nationals, an arbitral award falls under the New York Convention as 
non-domestic. Such a situation could apply to an arbitral award made in an Islamic 
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country between non-Muslims if both non-Muslims are concurrently foreign nationals. 
If both non-Muslim parties are nationals of the place where the arbitral award was 
made, the New York Convention would not apply according to van den Berg as 
supported by the legislative history of the New York Convention.240 
The opposing view held by Abu Yussef, that the Shari’a applies not only to 
Muslims but to all who reside within the jurisdiction of an Islamic court regardless of 
their nationality or religion, would render an arbitral award between non-Muslims 
domestic.241 The Abu Yussef view would generally not conflict with the New York 
Convention, assuming both parties are also nationals of the place where the arbitral 
award was made. As a result, the Shari’a actually provides more opportunity for the 
New York Convention to enforce an arbitral award. According to van den Berg, “if 
enforcement of the arbitration agreement under the Convention would be more difficult 
than enforcement under domestic law (for instance, because the arbitration agreement 
does not comply with the formal requirements of the Convention), a party can still rely 
on domestic law by virtue of the Convention’s more-favourable-right-provision.”242 
Unfortunately, no published case law is yet available to appraise the positions of these 
scholars. 
There are still exceptions to what constitutes a domestic arbitral award, of 
course, as was seen in the first UAE case wherein the Dubai Appeals Court upheld the 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under the New York Convention.243 In that 
case, the arbitral award was actually made in Dubai, but was rendered a foreign arbitral 
award because the arbitration clause made London the seat of arbitration.244 In other 
words, an arbitral award that was made within the same country where enforcement was 
sought was rendered by a Dubai court as a foreign arbitral award. Still, the New York 
Convention would apply under the second sentence of Article I (1) of the New York 
Convention, which allows enforcement of arbitral awards not deemed a domestic 
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arbitral award in the state where enforcement was sought.245 
The facts in Lander Company, Inc. v. MMP Investments, Inc.,246 would classify 
the arbitral award in that case as “non-domestic” because the arbitration held in New 
York between two American companies involved a contract for distribution of products 
in Poland. 
 
2.4.3. Arbitral Awards Taking Place in a Non-Islamic Country 
 
Generally, when the arbitral award took place in a non-Islamic country, most 
GCC states will likely deem the arbitral award to be foreign.247 This is consistent with 
the New York Convention under the territorial criterion.248 Additionally, the New York 
Convention “allows, in theory, two nationals of the same nationality to arbitrate abroad 
on a domestic transaction.”249  
Shari’a scholars have three competing camps on the issue of arbitral awards 
made outside of an Islamic country:250 the Malaki/Hanbali/Shafi’i camp (first 
approach), the Abu Yussef camp (second approach), and the Hanafi camp (third 
approach). The first and second approaches contradict with the New York Convention 
and the ICSID Convention. As you may recall above, the New York Convention, 
according to van den Berg, defines a foreign arbitral award as an award “made in any 
other State”251 without regard to nationality or religion, while the first and second 
approaches considers an arbitral award domestic whenever it occurs outside of an 
Islamic country and one or both of the parties to the arbitration are Muslims. This thesis 
author agrees with the third view by the Hanafi School that an arbitral award should be 
considered foreign if the arbitration took place outside of an Islamic country, as this 
approach would be consistent with obligations of GCC states to the New York 
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Convention.  
Even pursuing the arguments in the first and second Islamic approach, arbitral 
awards made in another state but considered as domestic in the enforcing state, 
according to van den Berg, remain foreign under the New York Convention’s non-
domestic criterion. Van den Berg clarified this point when he stated that “the rule that 
the New York Convention is always applicable to the recognition and enforcement of 
an arbitral award made abroad applies even if the award made in the other country is 
considered domestic by the enforcing court.”252 Likewise, even if Shari’a scholars were 
to apply the first and second view of the fiqh as to the definition of a “foreign” arbitral 
award, they must apply the New York Convention because the determination that an 
arbitral award made outside of an Islamic country, in other words in another state, 
remains within the purview of the New York Convention’s definition of “foreign” 
arbitral award.  
In the context of an ICSID arbitral award, which is supranational,253 the 
distinction made by Shari’a scholars would be irrelevant as domestic courts would not 
have the opportunity to refuse enforcement of the arbitral award or to even set aside the 
arbitral award since ICSID arbitral awards are taken out of the hands of domestic courts 
until the execution stage. While annulment of ICSID arbitral awards is “the primary 
avenue the [ICSID] Convention provides any disputing party to challenge an [arbitral] 
award” it must be done “within the context of the ICSID [Convention] system; and it 
limits such relief to specific and narrow grounds.”254 These features differ from those 
applicable under other types of arbitration regimes, which may allow for review of 
arbitral awards before national courts at the seat of arbitration based on applicable 
domestic law, and which provide for enforcement pursuant to the New York 
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Convention. In Saipem SpA v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh,255 for example, the 
domestic Bangladeshi court interfered with the ICC arbitration by not allowing the ICC 
Tribunal to continue, calling the ICC arbitration a “nullity,” and the ICSID Tribunal 
held that the interference by the court amounted to expropriation.256 The Saipem 
decision is another confirmation of the supranational nature of ICSID arbitral awards. In 
other words, ICSID arbitral awards will never be categorized as either domestic or 
foreign, the way a New York Convention arbitral award would.   
  
2.4.4. State Entity as a Party to the Arbitration 
 
An issue that further complicates this situation is the application of the New 
York Convention and the ICSID Convention on public or state-controlled entities.    
In regards to the New York Convention enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, 
as opposed to a court judgment, is relatively straightforward. However, as to public 
entities, the New York Convention permits states to decline enforcement on public 
policy grounds or if the dispute is not considered arbitrable under the law of the state 
where enforcement is sought.257  Some GCC states have included in their arbitration 
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legislation that an arbitral award cannot be enforced against the state.258 In other words, 
arbitral awards against a public entity would not be arbitrable. The outcome differs 
when the arbitral award is from an ICSID Tribunal in which all GCC states are 
signatories. 
The ICSID Convention, under Article 25(1), applies only to those investment 
disputes that are between a contracting state and a “national”259 of another contracting 
state.260 As such, disputes between or among states will not fall under the ICSID 
Convention. In the Westland Helicopters Ltd v. Arab Organisation for 
Industrialisation,261 a case involving an arms manufacture agreement among Egypt, 
KSA, Kuwait, the UAE, and Oman, the ICSID Convention was held to have had no 
jurisdiction in the matter as the case was not between a private contracting party and a 
state.  
For claims submitted to ICSID Convention arbitration by state-controlled or 
public entities, arbitral tribunals consistently have found that such entities meet the 
“national” requirement under Article 25(1), often without analysis of how investor-state 
and state-to-state disputes should be distinguished under the provision.262 In 
#eskoslovenská Obchodní Banka, A.S. [CSOB] v. The Slovak Republic,263 the tribunal 
first observed that Article 25(2) defines “National of another Contracting State” to 
include both “natural” and “juridical” persons, but that neither of those terms is 
“defined as such in the Convention.” The tribunal then turned to “the accepted test”264 
for analysing the “national” requirement with respect to a “mixed economy company or 
government-owned corporation”: whether the entity acts as an agent for the government 
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or discharges an essentially governmental function.265 Applying that test, 
the CSOB tribunal concluded that, so long as a state-controlled claimant’s activities are 
commercial in nature, the claim does not give rise to a state-to-state dispute, even if the 
claimant’s activities are “driven by” governmental policies and even if the entity is 
controlled by the state such that it is “required” to do the state’s “bidding.” According to 
the CSOB tribunal, the purpose (as distinguished from the nature) of a state-controlled 
claimant’s activities is not relevant when determining whether the claimant meets the 
“national” requirement under Article 25(1).266 Under the ICSID Convention, however, 
“states acting as investors have no access to the Centre in that capacity.”267 
In La Generale des Carrieres et des Mines v. F.G. Hemisphere Associates 
LLC,268 the Privy Council considered whether La Generale, a Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) State-owned corporation, was directly liable for debts which the DRC 
owed to F.G., which had purchased two substantial arbitration awards against the DRC 
which it sought to enforce against La Generale. The question was whether La Generale 
was a state entity or an organ of the DRC. Considering the test set forth in Trendtex 
Trading Corp v. Central Bank of Nigeria269  (Trendtex) to determine if the state-owned 
entity could be considered an ‘alter ego or organ’ of the government because of the 
control exercised by the state over the entity and the entity’s constitution, the Privy 
Council rejected the Trendtex test in favour of a more nuanced approach.  
First, separate juridical entities established by a state are presumed to be 
separate from states. An entity’s constitution, control and function remain important, 
but constitutional and factual control, and the exercise of sovereign functions do not, 
without more, convert a separate entity into an organ of the state. Where a separate 
juridical entity is formed by the state for what are, on their face, commercial or 
industrial purposes, with its own management and budget, the strong presumption is 
that its separate corporate status should be respected, and that the state forming it should 
not have to bear the other’s liabilities. It would take ‘quite extreme circumstances’ to 
displace this presumption. The presumption may be displaced if in fact the entity has, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
265 ibid at 17. 
266 ibid at 21. 
267 Schreuer, ICSID (n 78) 161. 
268 La Generale des Carrieres et des Mines v FG Hemisphere Associates LLC [2012] UKPC 27. 
269 Trendtex Trading Corp v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] 1 QB 529. 
! 71 
despite its juridical personality, no separate existence.270 
There may be particular circumstances in which the state has so interfered or 
behaved towards a state-owned entity that it would be appropriate to look through or 
past the entity to the state. However, any remedy should be tailored to meet the 
particular circumstances. Merely because a state’s conduct makes it appropriate to lift 
the corporate veil to enable a third party or creditor of a state-owned corporation to look 
to the state does not automatically entitle a creditor of the state to look to the state-
owned corporation. Lifting the veil may mean that a corporation is treated as part of the 
state for some purposes, but not others.271 In the end, the Privy Council found that La 
Generale was not an organ of the DRC and that its assets could not be answerable for 
the DRC’s debts. 
Maniruzzaman clarifies the issue further by viewing sovereign immunity 
according to the approaches taken by different jurisdictions.272 A few jurisdictions take 
a structuralist view of sovereign immunity,273 which presumes that the creation of a 
separate entity separates it from the state; while the majority and recent trend follow a 
functionalist approach or restrictive immunity, which examines whether the state 
enterprise performs an act of a private or commercial nature.274  
In the Jan De Nul arbitration case,275 the issue was whether the actions of the 
Suez Canal Authority (‘SCA’) could be attributed to Egypt, and the tribunal concluded 
that the Suez Canal authority was not an organ of the state, applying a ‘structural test’. 
The authority had been created to take over a nationalised activity - management and 
operation of the Suez Canal, overseeing and administering shipping traffic and transit, 
which the tribunal noted were public in nature.276 However, from a structuralist 
perspective the law establishing the authority required it to follow commercial methods 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
270 Donald Robertson and Leon Chung, ‘Enforcing awards against states and state-owned entities’ 
(Lexology, 27 July 2012) !http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=142f6f26-2de8-4784-a9ce-
bc7d61993078" accessed 11 March 2014. 
271 Robertson and Chung (n 270). 
272 AFM Maniruzzaman, Sovereign Immunity and the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards against 
State Entities – Recent Trends in Practice, in AAA Handbook on International Arbitration Practice (Juris 
Publishing, Inc 2010) ch 28, 335-350. 
273 Also sometimes referred to as “absolute” sovereign immunity. 
274 Maniruzzaman (272) 337-339. 
275 Jan de Nul NV Dredging International NV v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/04/13 
(November 2008). 
276 ibid. 
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of management and exploitation, and it was to do so without any direction from the 
Egyptian state, with its own budget, and consisting of purely private funds. 
With the restrictive immunity approach, the issue of how to determine whether a 
state entity is immune remains an ongoing debate.277 According to Maniruzzaman, 
restrictive immunity uses various tests depending on the jurisdiction.278 Some 
jurisdictions look at the nature of the transaction or agreement, an analysis that rests on 
whether the transaction falls under private or public law contract;279 while others apply 
the purpose approach to determine whether the contract is commercial in nature. The 
two approaches have been combined to create a nature/purpose approach.280 
Additionally, another test examines whether only a sovereign can perform the 
transaction.281 Ultimately, there has not arisen a definitive test, creating a cloud of 
uncertainty in an area of ICSID arbitral award enforcement that remains its Achilles’ 
heel.  
 
PART V 
 
2.5. More-Favourable-Right Provision  
 
The “more favourable right” provision in Article VII of the New York 
Convention is aimed at resolving conflicts between the New York Convention,282 and 
any other potential applicable law.283 This provision allows a party seeking enforcement 
to avail itself of whichever choice is best suited for enforcement, whether under 
domestic law, regional agreement, or under the New York Convention.284 Additionally, 
if an arbitral award is later set aside and not enforced in one country (i.e. the country 
where the arbitral awards was made) for reasons under Article V of the New York 
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277 Maniruzzaman (272) 340. 
278 Maniruzzaman (272) 340-343. 
279 Maniruzzaman (272) 341. 
280 Maniruzzaman (272) 341, referring to the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of 
States and Their Property (2004). 
281 Maniruzzaman (272) 342. 
282 Gaillard (n 32) 76. 
283 New York Convention, art VII; Gaillard (n 32) 70. 
284 Gaillard (n 32) 70. 
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Convention (i.e. public policy defence), the arbitral award may still be enforced under 
Article VII’s more favourable right provision in a different country where enforcement 
is sought if the domestic law of that country allows enforcement.285  
Following the more favourable right provision, an arbitral award which was (1) 
made within an Islamic country, (2) deemed non-domestic because it was between non-
Muslims, (3) applied the New York Convention, and (4) was not enforced in the same 
Islamic country under Article V(2)(b), could later be enforceable in another country 
where the domestic law would deem it enforceable.  
The more favourable right provision under Article VII does not override the 
definition contained under Article I(1) of the New York Convention, nor does it 
override the discretionary power of domestic courts to determine whether an arbitral 
award is domestic or foreign. The more favourable right provision, thus, does not allow 
re-enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in the same country, though practically 
speaking it would be futile to try. Article VII instead gives would be enforcers of a 
foreign arbitral award another chance to enforce the foreign arbitral award in a more 
favourable setting, and also to shop for a better forum for enforcement.  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter aimed to clarify and pave the way for the underlying premise 
behind the thesis of this research that a set of rules on enforcement in a Uniform GCC 
Arbitration Law is necessary and can be accomplished through a harmonisation of the 
Shari’a with the New York Convention and the ICSID Convention. This chapter 
explains that Shari’a trained judges in courts of GCC states determine whether an 
arbitral award is foreign or domestic, and in so doing will be influenced by the Shari’a. 
It is, therefore, important to examine the Shari’a concept of “foreign.” In addressing the 
definition of “foreign” arbitral award under the Shari’a, one is able to clarify whether 
the Shari’a distinction between domestic and foreign, as expressed by different scholars, 
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285 Gaillard (n 32) 76-87 (European courts seem to be on consensus about the interplay between Article V 
and Article VII of the New York Convention, allowing for the most favorable right provision to play out 
in favor of enforcement, but US courts seem to more skeptical and are likely to hold that an award that 
was already held unenforceable in another country, especially where it was made, will not be given a 
second chance at enforcement in the US). 
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whether from the Maliki, Hanbali, and Shafi’i or Hanafi schools. This chapter 
concludes that the New York Convention’s definition of foreign and non-domestic 
arbitral awards is compatible with the Shari’a. In light of this chapter, the chapters that 
follow will discuss the concept of conditions for enforcement and challenges to 
enforcement under the Shari’a, the New York Convention, and domestic arbitration 
laws of the GCC states. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
CONDITIONS FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS IN THE 
GCC STATES 
 
3.0. Introduction 
 
 The end goal of any arbitration proceeding is that an arbitral award be easily 
recognized and enforced.1 While most arbitral awards are complied with by losing 
parties to the dispute, a party who has been granted an arbitral award would seek 
enforcement of the arbitral award where the losing party fails or refuses to comply with 
arbitral award voluntarily.2 This situation is called non-compliance with the arbitral 
award.  
The party to whom an arbitral award was granted would have to seek out the 
assets of the non-complying party. According to Onyema, “enforcement of an arbitral 
award is typically sought before the relevant courts in the State where assets of the party 
against whom the award was sought to be enforced [are] located.”3 Once the assets have 
been identified, the enforcing party would have to rely on the applicable enforcement 
rule of the place where the asset is located,4 and would have to follow the applicable 
conditions and/or procedures of the enforcing state. 
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1 “But I think that the question of enforcement of arbitral awards must be in the center of our worries if 
we really look for the success of international arbitration.” Muhammad Huchan, ‘Speaker’ (Euro-Arab 
Arbitration Conference, Tunisia, 1985); Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab and Jalal El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the 
Arab Countries (3rd edn, Wolters Kluwer 2011) 666. See also Emilia Onyema, ‘Formalities of the 
Enforcement Procedure (Article III and IV)’ in Emmanuel Gaillard and Domenico Di Pietro, 
Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention in 
Practice (Cameron May 2009) 597; Abdulrahman Baamir, Shari’a Law in Commercial and Banking 
Arbitration: Law and Practice in Saudi Arabia,  Ashgate (2010) 91(“Arbitration loses its objective of 
settling disputes if arbitral awards lack enforceability.”); Abdullah Al-Kenain, Altahkeem fe AlShari’a 
Alislamiyah: Altakheem Al’am, wa Altakheem fe Alshiqaq Alzaouji (1st edn, Dar Alasimah 2000)141-
145; Michael Payton, ‘Security for and Enforcement of Arbitration Awards’ (London Maritime 
Arbitration Association, 50th Anniversary Conference)  
!http://www.lmaa.org.uk/uploads/documents/C50SecurityandEnforcement.pdf" accessed 10 May 2012; 
Abdullah Alenezi, ‘An Analytical Study Of Recognition And Enforcement Of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
In The GCC States’ (DPhil thesis, University of Stirling 2010). 
2 See Onyema (n 1) 601.    
3 Onyema (n 1) 602.  
4 ibid. 
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This chapter is about the conditions necessary for the proper enforcement of an 
arbitral award. Not meeting the required conditions can be a basis for an enforcing court 
to refuse enforcement or to render the arbitral award null.5 In Egypt, for example, the 
Cairo Court of Appeals for the Seventh Commercial Circuit annulled two arbitral 
awards because both awards failed to state the “grounds supporting the findings and 
lacked most of the particulars, i.e., the addresses and nationalities of the parties and a 
copy of the arbitration agreement.”6 The plaintiff in the said case relied on Article 43, 
paragraph 3 of Egyptian Law No. 27 of 1994, which requires that the “arbitral award 
must include the names, addresses, nationalities and capacities of the parties, a copy of 
the arbitration agreement, a summary of the parties’ claims, statements and documents, 
the text of the ruling, the date and place of issue and the reasons therefore when noting 
such reasons is mandatory.”7   
This chapter discusses the conditions required by GCC states for enforcing an 
arbitral award and argues that domestic arbitration laws set more conditions to 
enforcement than the Shari’a, the New York Convention, and the ICSID Convention, 
making domestic arbitration rules the most likely source for the non-enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. 
Part I of this chapter discusses the different viewpoints among Shari’a scholars 
with regards to the conditions for enforcement of an arbitral award. Part I argues that 
even under the Shari’a, there are conflicting interpretation and application of arbitration 
rules in general and rules covering the conditions for the enforcement of arbitral awards.  
GCC states may interpret and apply the Shari’a on the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards, differently. For example, the application of the Shari’a differs between the KSA 
and the UAE.8 The legal system of the KSA is based on the Shari’a, while the legal 
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5 Cairo Court of Appeals, Seventh Commercial Circuit, Case No 114/124 – 2 December 2008, in [2010] J 
of Arab Arb 126, 126-127. 
6 ibid. 
7 Egyptian Law No 27 of 1994, art 43, para 3. For an example of a case, which shows how the court 
considers each of the conditions prior to enforcing an arbitral award, please see The Eleventh Court of 
First Instance of Damascus, Main Case No 336, Decision No 39/2010, dated June 30, 2010. 
8 Faisal Kutty, ‘The Shari’a Factor in International Commercial Arbitration,’ (2006) Loy LA Int’l & 
Comp L 1, 1-3, [2009] J of Arab Arb 63, 86. 
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system of the UAE is influenced by the Shari’a.9 Kutty explains that “the UAE 
arbitration law, unlike its Saudi counterpart, has done away with some of the stringent 
restrictions such as stipulating the religion and gender of the arbitrator.”10 Additionally, 
even within the same country, there may be conflicting interpretation and application 
the Shari’a depending on which Islamic school of thought one consulted, and there is 
even conflicting opinions within the same school. According to Baamir, for example, 
the “Hanafis have two opinions regarding the scope of arbitration.”11 
Part II discusses the conditions for enforcement of arbitral awards under the 
New York Convention and the ICSID Convention, and argues that the conditions for 
enforcement in the Shari’a are largely consistent with international agreements.  
Part III discusses the conditions for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
that are based on the domestic legislation of GCC states. The domestic legislations of 
GCC states have the strictest sets of conditions for the enforcement of arbitral awards as 
compared to the Shari’a and the New York Convention. The likelihood that an arbitral 
award will fail should be attributed to the country specific rules in these GCC states, 
more particularly protectionist requirements that are subjectively decided by one 
designated authority, usually the President of the Court, when reviewing requests for 
leave to enforce an arbitral award.12 This chapter argues that conditions placed prior to 
the enforcement of arbitral awards are uniform throughout the GCC states during the 
enforcement stage, but substantially diverge when a designated authority reviews the 
request for leave to enforce.  
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9 Central Intelligence Agency, ‘The World Factbook’ !https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook" accessed 6 February 2014 (follow “Select a Country or Location” drop-down menu; 
then select both “Saudi Arabia” and “United Arab Emirates”); Nathan Oman, ‘How to Judge Shari’a 
Contracts: A Guide to Islamic  Marriage Agreements in American Courts’ [2011] Utah L Rev 287, fn 
157. 
10 Kutty (n 8) 85; see also UAE Civil Procedure Code, Federal Law No (11) of 1992, art 206(1). 
11 Baamir (n 1) 75-76. 
12 See AFM Maniruzzaman, ‘International Commercial Arbitration in the Asia Pacific: Asian Values, 
Culture and Context’ (2002) 30 Int’l Bus Lawyer 11, 512 (showing that there are many factors that 
contribute to the difficulty in enforcing arbitral awards “non-cooperation tendencies and the anti-
arbitration bias of local courts…inefficiency in handling the matters, and a serious lack of understanding 
of international arbitration rules and conventions…”). 
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PART I 
 
3.1. Conditions for Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under the Shari’a 
 
The Shari’a has its own rules on the conditions for enforcement of arbitral 
awards.13 For arbitration enforcement proceedings where the Shari’a may also be 
applicable, there may arise a conflict between Shari’a conditions to enforcement of 
arbitral awards, and conditions to enforcement dictated by domestic legislation, or 
regional and international agreements. Even assuming arguendo that no conflict de jure 
exists involving the Shari’a because an international agreement such as the New York 
Convention trumps the Shari’a, courts in GCC states would likely remain influenced by 
the Shari’a. As Saleh stated, “behind the statutes of most Arab countries and in the mind 
of an Arab party, counsel or arbitrator, lies a rich layer of Shari’a.”14 In essence, the 
Shari’a does “form the basis for most arbitration regulations in most Muslim countries 
nowadays.”15 It remains important to consider the Shari’a, its conditions for 
enforcement of an arbitral award, and then to compare those conditions with the 
conditions for enforcement provided by regional and international agreements, and 
domestic legislation. 
This section begins by discussing the conditions for enforcement of arbitral 
awards in the Shari’a. Next the section discusses the necessary contents of an arbitral 
award under the Shari’a, and then the necessary conditions under the Shari’a relating to 
form and substance of the award. This section generally sets the foundation for the 
argument that Shari’a conditions for enforcement of arbitral awards are largely 
consistent with the New York Convention. 
It is also possible for the Shari’a to apply even to foreign arbitral awards made 
outside of an Islamic country (whenever one party is a Muslim).16 Baamir explains that 
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13 Essam Alsheikh, ‘Court Intervention in Commercial Arbitral Proceedings in Saudi Arabia: A 
Comparative Analytical Study of Shari’a Based Statutes and International Arbitral Practices’ (DPhil 
thesis, University of Portsmouth 2011); Kutty (n 8) 63; Baamir (n 1); El-Ahdab (n 1). 
14 Samir Saleh, Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East (UK Hart Publishing 2006) 1. 
15 Baamir (n 1) 93. 
16 Baamir (n 1) 77. 
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“Islamic law pays no attention to states, borders and other concepts such as nationality 
and domicile; it only recognizes two main categories of legal subjects, Muslims and 
non-Muslims. With regard to Muslims, Shari’a is a personal law and is applicable 
regardless of whether the Muslim travels or resides in or outside Islamic territory. In 
other words, Shari’a applies extraterritorially to Muslims.”17 In such an instance where 
the Shari’a is applicable, the conditions for enforcement of arbitral awards would have 
to consider the Shari’a, depending of course on the status and role of the Shari’a within 
the enforcing state’s domestic legislation.18  
Finally, this section lays the foundation for the argument that the domestic laws 
of GCC states require even stricter conditions than the Shari’a for the enforcement of 
arbitral awards. The more likely reasons for the non-enforcement of arbitral awards, 
therefore, will not likely come from the Shari’a, but rather from the domestic laws of 
the GCC states and the application of these conditions by the judiciary. 19  
 
3.1.1. Enforcement Conditions Under the Shari’a 
 
Most Shari’a scholars are in agreement that an arbitral award20 is enforceable on 
its face.21 Baamir states that “an award is enforceable and binding on the parties from 
the moment it becomes final and has the same effect and power as a court judgment.”22 
An arbitrator or an arbitral tribunal, however, has no authority to enforce an arbitral 
award, making it necessary for a court to carry on the enforcement.23 In enforcing the 
arbitral award, the court generally cannot revisit the merits of the arbitral award or 
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17 Baamir (n 1) 77. 
18 Kutty (n 8) 86. 
19 In Egypt, for example, despite an arbitral award not strictly meeting the conditions for enforcement of 
an arbitral award, the Cairo Court of Appeals explained that the omission of particular conditions or an 
error in all or part of them would not necessarily result per se and principally in annulment, as long as it is 
possible to provide the missing information or to correct the error that vitiated the arbitral award from the 
rest of the arbitration documents. Cairo Court of Appeals, Seventh Commercial Circuit, Case No 50/128j 
(4 January 2012). Such stance by the Cairo Court, unfortunately, is not common practice among the GCC 
states’ judiciary.  
20 “The objective of an arbitral award is to settle the dispute and put an end to the conflict between the 
parties, known as ‘raf alneza’ in Arabic.” Baamir (n 1) 91. 
21 El-Ahdab (n 1) 49. 
22 Baamir (n 1) 91. 
23 El-Ahdab (n 1) 49. 
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challenge the reasoning of the arbitrator.24 In other words, the enforcing court cannot re-
arbitrate the arbitral award. The court’s realm is generally limited to examining whether 
the party seeking enforcement has met the necessary conditions before the court can 
enforce the arbitral award in question. According to Al-Kenain, Hanbali scholars have 
required that a judge ratify or approve the arbitral award before it can be enforced.25  
 
3.1.2. Contents of the Arbitral Award 
 
Under the Shari’a, the arbitral award must contain four distinct parts:  
(1) a sufficient description of the merits of the dispute;  
(2) the findings of facts substantiated by the Shari’a rules of evidence;  
(3) the reasoning of the arbitral award with reference to the Shari’a 
source; and  
(4) the decision itself.26  
An arbitral award that lacks the finding of fact under the rules of evidence of the 
Shari’a or the reasoning with reference to Shari’a sources cannot be enforced.27 These 
four requirements will certainly create difficulties in international arbitration when an 
arbitral tribunal or a non-Islamic court deciding the enforceability of an arbitral award is 
to apply the substantive Shari’a. These requirements, thus, at the outset create 
difficulties in international arbitration cases involving the Shari’a. 28 In the view of the 
author of this thesis, the requirements that the content of the arbitral award include the 
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24 Alsheikh (n 13). 
25 Al-Kenain (n 1) 141-145. 
26 Baamir (n 1) 91; George Smith and Matthew Marrone, ‘Recent Developments in Arbitration Law in the 
Middle East’ (Weinberg Wheeler, 15 September 2010) !http://www.wwhgd.com/news-article-71.html" 
accessed 10 March 2014.  
27 Baamir (n 1) 91. In a domestic arbitral award, an arbitrator has the right to make corrections to the 
award to make it compliant as long as he does so before the award is referred to the court.  
28 British judges in Sheikh Abu Dhabi v Petroleum Development, Ruler of Qatar v International Marine 
Oil Company, Saudi Arabia v Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO ),  Beximco Pharmaceuticals v 
Shamil Bank of Bahrain, and Musawi v Re International, for example, when faced with such a choice of 
applying Shari’a law, have refused to do so. Sheikh Abu Dhabi v Petroleum Development (1952) ICLQ 
247; Ruler of Qatar v International Marine Oil Company, 18 ILR (1951) 144; Saudi Arabia v Arabian 
American Oil Company (ARAMCO), 27 ILR (1958) 117, 120; Beximco Pharmaceuticals v Shamil Bank 
of Bahrain, [2004] EWCA Civ 19; Musawi v Re International, [2007] EWHC 2981 (Ch) 14 December 
2007. 
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finding of facts substantiated by the rules of evidence of the Shari’a and include the 
reasoning of the arbitral award with reference to Shari’a sources are the most troubling 
with respect to international arbitration. These two conditions will now be discussed in 
more detail.  
 
3.1.2.1. Finding of fact substantiated by the Shari’a rules of evidence  
 
This requirement is troublesome from the perspective of international arbitration 
because it requires a review of the finding of facts, which in turn would be a review of 
the merits of the arbitral award, the “double exequatur” that the New York Convention 
eliminated.29 Second, that the finding of facts must be substantiated by the Shari’a rules 
of evidence presupposes knowledge of the Shari’a, and by implication that the arbitrator 
is Muslim and/or a Shari’a scholar. This would be consistent with the view that the 
arbitrator must be Muslim whenever one of the parties is a Muslim,30 yet none of the 
GCC states requires that the arbitrator must be a Muslim.31 A non-Muslim arbitrator, 
however, will likely have difficulty in applying the rules of evidence of the Shari’a and 
referencing its reasoning to Shari’a sources.  
 
3.1.2.2. The Reasoning of the Arbitral Award 
 
The decision of the Cairo Court of Appeals in Case No. 114/124 is an example 
of an arbitral award deemed null by the court for failing to give the reasoning of the 
arbitral award.32 The court took the same approach as the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
which adopted the principle of justifying the arbitral award under Article 31(2).33  
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29 Gabriel Moens and Roger Jones (eds), International Trade and Business Law Review, vol XII (1st edn, 
Routledge-Cavendish 2009) 156; Charles Brower and Jeremy Sharpe, ‘International Arbitration and the 
Islamic World: The Third Phase’ (2003) 97 AJIL 643. 
30 Muhammad Al-Shafi’i, Al-Um (Al-Maktabah Al-Azhariyyah 1961) vol 8, 305. See however, Alsheikh 
(n 13) (stating that there is no evidence that the arbitrator must be Muslim). See also discussion below in 
Section 3.1.3.3. 
31 Alsheikh (n 13); see also discussion in Chapter Two generally, and in Section 3.1.3.3. 
32 Cairo Court of Appeals, Case No 114/124. 
33 UNCITRAL Model Law, art 31(2); Cairo Court of Appeals, Case No 114/124; Customs Law Number 
66 of 1966, art 57 [Egypt]; Egyptian Law Number 27 of 1994, art 43, para 2; Alsheikh (n 13) 50. Both the 
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While the majority of Shari’a scholars have not addressed the issue of justifying 
an arbitral award,34 some scholars like the Shafi’i view that the Shari’a, by analogy to 
court judgments, requires the arbitrators or arbitral tribunal to state the rationale for the 
arbitral award.35 According to Moses, the Shafi’i School does require the arbitrator to 
give reasons for the arbitral award, and failure to do so will render the arbitral award 
unacceptable.36 Likewise, according to Al-Ramli, some Shafi’i scholars37 have rendered 
an arbitral award null, just as in the Egyptian case, for failure to justify the arbitral 
award.  
One could argue that the requirement of a rationale or “motivation of the arbitral 
award” seems to contradict one of the very essences of arbitration, which is the ability 
of the parties to maintain confidentiality regarding the dispute, its factual circumstance, 
and the subject of the dispute.38 The reason for the arbitral award would not be made 
public, however, but remains confidential to the eyes of the reviewing judges. 
Additionally, Mourre goes further and argues that “the public interest in the 
development of arbitral case law, in the enhancement of the quality of arbitration, and in 
providing transparency and predictability to the business community overrides the 
principle of confidentiality as far as the publication of arbitration awards is 
concerned.”39 According to Moses, some arbitration laws in the West have even 
considered the importance of arbitral award rationalization.40 
One could also argue that the rationale requirement should no longer be 
necessary for enforcement since the parties already had the opportunity to raise such 
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UNCITRAL Model Law and the Egyptian law in Article 57 of the Customs Law Number 66 of 1966 and 
Article 43 of Egyptian Law Number 27 of 1994, paragraph 2, allow the parties to waive the requirement. 
34 Alsheikh (n 13) 50-52.  
35 El-Ahdab (n 1) 47; Muhammad Al-Ramli, Nihayat Al-Muhtaj Ela Sharah Almenhaj (Mustafa Al-
Halabi Printing Press, 1966) vol 8. See also Omar El-Kadi, L’Arbitage International entre le Droit 
Musulman et le Droit Francais et Egyptien (DPhil thesis, University of Paris 1984) 190-191; Alsheikh (n 
13) 50-52.  
36 Margaret Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (Cambridge 
University 2012); Alan Redfern and others (eds), Law and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration (4th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2005) 304; Alsheikh (n 13) 50. 
37 ibid; Al-Ramli (n 35) 240. 
38 See Alexis Mourre, ‘Precedent and Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration: The Case 
for the Publication of Arbitral Awards’ in Emmanuel Gaillard and Yas Banifatemi (eds), Precedent in 
International Arbitration (IAI Series on International Arbitration No 5, Juris Publishing Inc 2008) 58-65. 
39 Mourre (n 38). 
40 Moses (n 36) 184. 
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issues during the arbitral proceedings. Article 52 of the English Arbitration Act and 
Section 31 of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, both issued in 1996, allowed 
the rendition of an arbitral award without reasoning, if the parties have so agreed.41  
While the content of an arbitral award will not usually be a surprising issue in 
practice for purely domestic arbitral awards, it is another and very significant matter 
whenever a Muslim is involved in an arbitral award which was made outside of an 
Islamic country.42 Since such an arbitral award may be treated as a domestic award 
under the Shari’a, it must comply with the “contents” requirement. An arbitral award 
decided in a non-Islamic country by non-Muslim arbitrators, however, will not likely 
include a factual finding under the rules of evidence of the Shari’a, nor will it likely 
include references to Shari’a sources in its reasoning. It is even possible for an arbitral 
award to fail to include a description of the merits. The “contents” requirements is 
another example of a situation where the distinction between domestic (Muslim) or 
foreign (non-Muslim) arbitral award under the Shari’a significantly impacts the 
enforceability of an arbitral award.  
 
3.1.3. Specific Conditions for the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under 
the Shari’a 
 
There are also conditions relating to the form and substance before arbitral 
awards may be enforced under the Shari’a. An arbitral award must meet the following 
conditions before it can be enforced: (1) the arbitral award must be in writing, (2) there 
must be a valid arbitration agreement or a valid agreement to arbitrate, (3) the arbitral 
award must have been made by a majority or all of the arbitrators, (4) the arbitral award 
must deal with the subject of the dispute, (5) the subject of the dispute must be capable 
of settlement by arbitration, (6) there was no flagrant error or injustice, and (7) it is not 
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41 English Arbitration Act 1996, art 52; Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 31; Mohamed 
Chalghoum, ‘The Judicial Annulment of the Arbitral Award in Light of Islamic Law’ (2012) Int’l J of 
Arab Arb, vol 4, No 1. But see, El-Ahdab (n 1) 49 (arguing that a “judge is not empowered to review the 
merits of the dispute nor the reasoning of the arbitrator”). 
42 See generally Chapter Two. 
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contrary to public policy.43  
 
3.1.3.1. Writing requirement 
 
According to El-Ahdab, an arbitral award, by analogy to court judgments (both 
of which are subject to the same rules), must be in writing under the Shari’a but only if 
the arbitral award was issued by a court other than the enforcing court.44 As El-Ahdab 
puts it, “writing was only required as a proof when the judgment is not enforced by the 
court that issued it, but by another court.”45 The written arbitral award evidences the 
arbitral award of the other court.  
Additionally, the Holy Qur’an states the following regarding written 
documentation: “When you deal with each other, in transactions involving future 
obligations in a fixed period of time reduce them to writing. Let a scribe write down 
faithfully as between the parties.”46 So in practice, court judgments were made in 
writing. Even then, the written court judgment was not by itself sufficient for proof, and 
witnesses, called “witnesses of the judge,”47 were needed, according to Farhun, to state 
that a judge drafted a particular document.  
By analogy, it is possible for courts enforcing an arbitral award to also require 
witnesses to state that the arbitrators in fact, drafted a particular arbitral award 
document. If such a witness was needed for court judgments, it is even more necessary 
to have a witness for arbitral awards that take place outside of the court. In practice, a 
written arbitral award would likely suffice as evidence of an arbitral award as long as it 
is duly authenticated and certified. As Alshiekh notes, “all of the Hanafis, Shafiaiyyah 
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43 El-Ahdab (n 1) 49.  “Under Sharia, an arbitration must meet the following conditions if the arbitral 
award is to be upheld: ‘(a) The dispute must have already arisen (that is future disputes cannot be covered 
in anticipation), and the dispute is to be defined clearly. . .; (b) There must be an arbitration agreement;  
(c) The arbitrator must be appointed by name. . .; and (d) The arbitrator must be mentally and physically 
competent.’” See Elana Levi-Tawil, ‘East Meets West: Introducing Shari’a Into The Rules Governing 
International Arbitrations at The BCDR-AAA’ (2011) 12 Cardozo J of Conflict Resolution 619; Khalid 
Rashid, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Context of Islamic Law’ (2004) 8 Vindobona J Int’l Com 
L 95. 
44 El-Ahdab (n 1) 47. 
45 ibid. 
46 The Holy Qur’an, Al-Baqara 2:282, Yusuf Ali Translation. 
47 Ibrahem Farhun, Tabsirat al Hukkam (Cairo, 1958) vol II, 9. 
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and Hanabilah state that the arbitrator’s award must be attested in the court or testified 
through two just witnesses.”48 These three schools argue that the arbitrator’s power 
terminates with the issuance of the arbitral award and so, as proof of the arbitration or 
that of a statement from the arbitrator vis-à-vis the disputing party, attestation is 
necessary.49  
 
3.1.3.2. Valid Arbitration Agreement or Arbitration Clause 
 
Another requirement under the Shari’a is that there must be a valid agreement to 
arbitrate.50 Alsheikh narrows the arbitration agreement requirement to its very essence, 
and considers the offer and acceptance as “two essential pillars of contract in general 
[and hence arbitration specifically] under Shari’a.”51 Baamir explained the arbitration 
agreement requirement through the Majalla, stating the conditions as follows: (1) the 
dispute must already have arisen and be clearly defined (ripeness); (2) the parties must 
have agreed to arbitration by a reciprocal offer and acceptance and they must say the 
following to the arbitrator - ‘arbitrate between us because we have appointed you as 
arbitrator’; (3) the arbitrator must be appointed by name; and (4) the arbitrator must 
have the capacity to be a witness.52  
The most difficult requirement for a valid arbitration agreement is the first one, 
requiring an existing dispute. This requirement seems counterintuitive to the purpose of 
modern arbitration agreements. However, the requirement implies that arbitration under 
the Shari’a was envisioned not as a future mechanism to settle disputes, but as an 
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48 Alsheikh (n 13). 
49 Alsheikh (n 13) 41-45; Muhammad Al-Sarkhasi, Usul Al-Sarkhasi (Dar alketab Alrabi 1952) vol 21, 
63; Muhammad Al-Bahwati, Kashaf Al-Qina’ ‘an Matn Al-Iqna’ (Dar Al-Fikr 1982) vol 6, 303; Shams 
al-Din Al-Dasuqi, Hashiyat Ad-Dasuqi Ala As-Shar’h Al-Kabeer (Dar Al-Fikr nd) vol 4, 135; 
Mohammed Ibn Abdeen, Hashyet Ibn ‘Abdeen (2nd edn, Dar Al-Fikr 1956) vol 4, 349; Muwaffaq ud-Din 
Ibn Qudamah, Rawdhat An-Nather (3rd edn, Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University 1983) vol 11, 452; 
Muhammad Ash-Shirbini, Mughni Al-Muhtaj Ela Marifat maani Al-Minhaj (Mustafa Al-Halabi Printing 
Press 1985) vol 4, 379; Arthur Gemmell, ‘Commercial Arbitration in the Islamic Middle East’ (2006) 5 
Santa Clara J of Intl L 169, 184. 
50 Baamir (n 1) 73; Alsheikh (n 13) 41. 
51 Alsheikh (n 13) 41. 
52 Baamir (n 1) 73; Abdul Hamid El Ahdab, Altahkeem Ahkamouh wa Masaderouh (1st edn, Naoufal 
Publications 1990) 26. See also Ali Haidar, Durer al Hukkam Fi Sharh Madjallat Al-Ahkam, art 1848, vol 
4, 642. In general, the arbitration agreement will be treated just as a contract and the Shari’a would apply. 
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alternative to litigation at the time the dispute arises. The invalidity of an arbitration 
agreement to settle future disputes also stems from the prohibition on gharar [an 
uncertain subject matter].53 In Shari’a, a contract whose subject matter did not exist at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract is not valid.54 In this sense, an arbitration 
clause, according to Baamir, could be challenged if it might involve uncertainty or 
gharar.55 As discussed in Chapter Five, however, all GCC states recognise arbitration 
agreements as falling outside the prohibition on gharar. 
In Claimant (Mr. X Successors) v. Defendant (Government of D Country),56 an 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) case with an Islamic country’s laws 
governing the contract, thus invoking the Shari’a, the defendant argued that the 
arbitration agreement was invalid because it violated numerous points under the Shari’a. 
While the ICC arbitrator stated that the customary law of the Islamic country applied to 
commercial cases and not the Shari’a, the arbitrator, interestingly, went on to discuss 
the arguments under the Shari’a, stating that the agreement would have been 
enforceable under the Shari’a. The arbitrator found that there was no violation of the 
prohibition on gharar because there is “nothing wrong with having two conditions in 
one contract, provided the whole contract does not thereby become excessively 
uncertain.”57 
An alternative view on the existing dispute requirement arose regarding the 
arbitration clause. This view came from the Hanbali School, which is strict on most 
matters but very flexible with regards to commercial and financial transactions.58  
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53 Mark Wakim, ‘Public Policy Concerns Regarding Enforcement of Foreign International Arbitral 
Awards in the Middle East’ (2008) 21 NY Int’l L Rev 1, 47. 
54 Final Award No 7063 (1993) reprinted in [1997] 22 YB Comm Arb 87, IADR Ref No 112; David Karl, 
‘Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia: What Foreign Attorneys Should Know’ (2002) 25 Geo Wash J Int’l L & 
Econ 131, 164 (stating that contracts providing for solutions to a future dispute should be unenforceable 
under the principle of gharar). 
55 Baamir (n 1) 74. See Muhammad Wohidul-Islam, ‘Dissolution of Contract in Islamic Law’ (1998) 
Arab Law Quarterly 13. 
56 Claimant (Mr X Successors) v Defendant (Government of D Country), ICC Award Case No 8677/FMS, 
reported in (2009) 4 J of Arab Arb 334. 
57 ibid. Interestingly, when it came to the issue of the prohibition on riba [interest], the arbitrator found 
that the contractual provision for interest would not be enforceable and in the end the arbitrator did not 
award interest, not because of the Shari’a, but rather because the arbitrator deferred the issue of interest to 
the judiciary. 
58 Baamir (n 1) 74-75. 
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According to Baamir, the Hanbali School recognized the validity of an arbitration 
clause or any other contractual clauses so long as they are not contrary to public order 
and do not permit an action prohibited under the Shari’a.59  
In light of the Hanbali School, this thesis argues that the requirement of a valid 
arbitration agreement should be an issue determined during the arbitral proceedings. 
The first requirement for a valid arbitration agreement should be replaced with the 
Hanbali view, substituted with the inquiry on whether the arbitration agreement or 
arbitration clause violates public order or involves an act prohibited by the Shari’a. The 
rest of the requirements for a valid arbitration agreement could be met during the 
arbitration proceedings. 
An issue, however, remains regarding the method of proving the requirement for 
a valid arbitration agreement at the enforcement stage. This is especially true of arbitral 
awards made outside of an Islamic country, where the specific requirement of capacity 
and name appointment, even if complied with, may not have been put on record. At the 
very least, an inquiry into the validity of the arbitration agreement would delay the 
enforcement of an arbitral award and would re-litigate an issue that had been settled at 
the arbitration proceeding.  
It should be noted that, in Baamir’s view, the Shari’a requires that the arbitration 
agreement should be documented in writing to prevent any future disputes regarding the 
arbitration.60 The Yemeni Supreme Court in Commercial Circuit, Panel A, Commercial 
Challenge No. 35642,61 addressed the Shari’a requirement that an arbitration agreement 
must be in writing and must define the subject matter. The Yemeni court stated that the 
Yemeni statute had adopted the writing requirement in Article 15 of Yemen Arbitration 
Law No. 22/1992, as modified by Law No. 22/1997, that the arbitration agreement is 
null if not made in writing and if it fails to define the subject matter of arbitration. The 
writing requirement under the Shari’a, therefore, has been adopted into legislation by 
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59 ibid. 
60 Baamir (n 1) 73; Abdullah Al-Kenain, ‘Tadween Almorafa’a Alqadaiyah’ (1999) Al-Adl Journal 2, 76-
115. The Holy Qur’an states as follows: “When you deal with each other, in transactions involving future 
obligations in a fixed period of time reduce them to writing. Let a scribe write down faithfully as between 
the parties.” The Holy Qur’an, Al-Baqara 2:282, Yusuf Ali Translation. 
61 Yemen Supreme Court, Commercial Circuit, Panel A, Commercial Challenge No 35642 (16 January 
2010). 
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Islamic countries. The same is true for the GCC states. In modern practice, a copy of the 
arbitration agreement must be submitted.62  The Shari’a, however, has also been 
interpreted to mean that any way of concluding an arbitration agreement (writing, oral, 
or any other means) is acceptable as long as it is applied and approved by customs that 
are acceptable under the Shari’a.63  And since the Islamic Fiqh Academy has endorsed 
the use of electronic communication to form a contract,64 then an arbitration agreement 
would also likely be valid via email or by other electronic means.  
 
3.1.3.3. An Arbitral Award Must Have Been Made by a Majority or 
All Arbitrators 
 
While the Shari’a allows multiple arbitrators, the Shari’a also requires that the 
arbitral award be made by a majority or all of the arbitrators.65 In pre-Islam, multiple 
arbitrators were unheard of since sole arbitrators settled disputes.66 Today, according to 
Al Kenain, all Shari’a schools permit multiple arbitrators67: the Shafi’i allowing two 
arbitrators like the case between Ali and Muawiyyah68 and the other schools allowing 
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62 Egyptian Law of Arbitration, art 41. See also, Egyptian Court of Cassation, Civil and Commercial 
Circuit, Challenge No 98 of 79 (24 December 2009) (stating that the requirement of submitting a copy of 
an arbitration agreement is an essential requirement, and the court affirmed the prior annulment of the 
arbitral award by the lower court because the arbitration agreement was not attached, and attaching it to 
the arbitration case exhibits is not a sufficient remedy for the fundamental requirement). Though one 
could argue that the easiest solution is for the enforcing court to defer to the arbitrators’ finding of 
validity during the arbitration proceedings, such an argument is difficult to propose when the arbitrator is 
not considered to have capacity to interpret and apply Shari’a. An alternative approach is to view the 
requirement as having been waived if neither party had raised the necessity for the requirement during the 
arbitration proceedings. In this regard, the enforcing court could take judicial notice of the validity of the 
arbitration agreement; any challenges to it thereby having been waived. 
63 Abdullah Al-Qaradghi, ‘The General Principles of Arbitration in Islamic Fiqh’ (Symposium of 
Arbitration in Islamic Shari’ah, Dubai, 2001) 15. 
64 The Islamic Fiqh Academy, ‘Decision No 52(3/6) about Concluding Contracts by Modern Means 
Communications’ ( 1990) 2 (6) The Islamic Fiqh Academy Journal 785. 
65 See Alsheikh (n 13) 46; Muhammad Ash-Shirbini, Al-Igna’ Fi Hal Alfath Abi Qina, vol 2 (Dar Ehia 
Al-Kutob, Al-Arabia, Cairo) 615; Syeikh Zain ad-Din Al-Malibary, Fat’h Al-Muain (Dar Alulu’m, 
Beirut) vol 4, 220; Muhammad Al-Jawy, Nihayat Az-Zain (Dar Al-Fikr, Beirut) 367. See also Baamir (n 
1) 83 (stating that a majority is all that is required). 
66 Baamir (n 1) 83. 
67 See also Alsheikh (n 13) 46 (“it is permissible for the disputing parties to select more than one 
arbitrators”). 
68 According to Alsheikh, the arbitration case between Ali and Muawiyyah involved two arbitrators. See 
Alsheikh (n 13) 46. 
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more than two arbitrators.69 While the Shari’a does not require an odd number of 
arbitrators,70 the Hanbali School does not recommend an even number of arbitrators 
because of the difficulty of arriving at a majority vote.71 Baamir opines that the majority 
of the scholars72 agree that a majority of the arbitrators is sufficient for an arbitral award 
to be fair and just,73 as long as there is consensus among them.74 Alsheikh, however, 
explains that the Hanafis discussed the issue of majority vote, and that “in the event of a 
disagreement among the arbitrators, the decision should be passed by the majority.”75 
Alsheik further differs from Baamir in their explanation of the majority vote rule, 
Alsheik clarifying that “a consensus of all of the arbitrators” is required when “there are 
more than three arbitrators.”76 What is essential is the proof that the arbitrators 
themselves gave the arbitral award “by the agreement of all of them,”77 and so the 
signatures of the arbitrators on the arbitral award are essential.78   
In discussing the rule under Article 760 of the Procedure Law of Libya,79 
Supreme Court Judge Al Werfalli compares the ICC rule that provides that “…an award 
is given by a majority decision. If there be no majority, the award shall be made by the 
chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal alone.”80 The Libyan and ICC rules allow for a 
majority of the arbitrators to agree if all of the arbitrators cannot arrive at a unanimous 
vote.81  
A difficulty may arise, however, if one of the arbitrators does not meet the 
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69 Al-Kenain (n 1) 105-106. 
70 Alsheikh (n 13) 46. Al Rowaad Advocates & Legal Consultancy, ‘Appointing arbitrators’ (Lexology, 
19 January 2014) !http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7771e67c-bc03-4d11-924c-
51ff05b990f4" accessed 24 February 2014 (stating that the UAE requires an odd number of arbitrators). 
71 Baamir (n 1) 83. 
72 Ash-Shirbini (n 65) 615; Al-Malibary (n 65) 220. 
73 Baamir (n 1) 93 (explaining that the Hanbali treatises give four methods for dealing with the problem 
of unanimity in the arbitrators’ decision).  
74 Alsheikh (n 13) 46. 
75 See Alsheikh (n 13) 47. 
76 ibid; Haidar (n 52) 642. 
77 See Alsheikh (n 13) 46; Ash-Shirbini (n 65) 615; Al-Malibary (n 65) 220; Al-Jawy (n 65) 367. 
78 Libya Rule of Commercial and Civil Procedure, art 760 (requires that the arbitral award “must include 
the reasons of the award, its merits, place and date of its render and the signature of the arbitrators”); 
Mohamed Al-Werfalli, ‘Substantive and Formal Conditions of the Arbitration Award Pursuant to the 
Libyan Law of Commercial and Civil Procedure’ (2010) J of Arab Arb, vol 2, No 1, 12. Al-Werfalli is a 
Supreme Court Judge in Libya. 
79 Libya Rule of Commercial and Civil Procedure, art 760. 
80 Werfalli (n 78) 11-14.  
81 ibid. 
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capacity requirements of the Shari’a, as when an arbitrator is a female, or a non-Muslim 
and a Muslim is a party to the dispute. According to Alsheikh, there is ample support in 
the Shari’a to allow a woman to act as an arbitrator, and that “there is no proof in the 
Shari’a that a woman is prohibited from being an arbitrator.”82 In Kuwait, for example, 
the Judicial Arbitration Court of Appeal in Ruling No. 445, ruled that a woman may be 
appointed as an arbitrator.83 The Malaki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali Schools, however, do take 
the position that a woman cannot act as an arbitrator, leaving only the Hanafi School, 
which allows a woman to act as an arbitrator.84  
The Saudi Arbitration Act of 2012 has abandoned the old rule requiring an 
arbitrator to be male. As Hachem explained, “Under the old law, arbitrators of a Saudi 
arbitral tribunal were required to be Muslim and male, with experience and a good 
reputation. The new law no longer places a requirement that the arbitrators are male, but 
they must hold a university degree in either Shari’a or law. However, where the 
arbitrators form part of a panel, this requirement extends only to the head of the 
panel.”85 
As regards the requirement that the arbitrator be a Muslim, most Islamic jurists, 
according to Alsheikh, agree that it would not be appropriate for a non-Muslim to act as 
an arbitrator whenever one of the parties is a Muslim.86 In the Shari’a, there is a rule 
that the testimony of a non-Muslim is inadmissible against a Muslim,87 which derives 
from the Holy Qur’an, which states: 
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82 Alsheikh (n 13) 32. 
83 Kuwaiti Judicial Arbitration Court of Appeal, Ruling No 445 (28 June 1999) in (2000) J of Arab Arb 
No 1. 
84 Abu Al-Walid Al-Baji, Al-Muntaqi Shar’hu Muwatta’ Malik, vol 4 (Al-Saadah Printing Press, Egypt) 
113; Malik ibn Anas Al-Asbahi, Al-Mudawanah Al-Kubra, vol 5 (Dar Sader, Beirut 1984) 49; Ali Ibn 
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I-II, 625. 
85 Wissam Hachem, ‘The new Saudi arbitration law: a step towards international norms’ (Lexology, 4 July 
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international arbitration.  
86 Alsheikh (n 13) 29, Othman Al-Zailai, Tabyn Al-Haqaiq Sharh Kanz Aldqaeq (2nd edn, Dar Al-
Maa’rifa, Beirut, Lebanon) 193; Ahmad Ad-Dardir, Al-Shar’h Al-Kabeer, vol 4 (Dar Al-Fikr, Beirut nd) 
135; Farhun (n 47) 56; Ahmad Al-Qalyubi, Hashiyat Al-Qalyubi, vol 4 (Dar Al-Fikr for Printing, 
Publication & Distribution, Beirut Lebanon) 298; Saleh (n 21) 29. See generally, Chapter Two. 
87 Al-Shafie (n 30); Alsheikh (n 13) 29-30. 
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...And never will Allah grant to the Unbelievers a way (to triumph) over 
the Beleivers88 
 
This verse has been broadly interpreted by Shari’a jurists to mean that an 
arbitrator must be Muslim whenever one of the parties to the dispute is a Muslim.89 
Whenever all the parties are non-Muslims, then a non-Muslim can act as an arbitrator, a 
position held by the Hanafis.90 Alsheikh, however, argues that “there is no evidence 
whatsoever, either in the Holy Qur’an or in the Sunna, of a provision stipulating that the 
arbitrator be a Muslim.”91 Regardless, one can anticipate the scenario when a judge, 
asked to enforce a foreign arbitral award constituting non-Muslim arbitrators and a 
Muslim party, could view that the arbitral award violates the Shari’a.  
 Some scholars argue that a non-Muslim can be an arbitrator if appointed by 
Muslims.92 According to Saleh, the distinction is whether the arbitration occurs within 
or outside an Islamic society, and that the arbitrator must only be Muslim within dar al-
Islam [Muslim territory].93 However, according to Al-Siyabi, the Hanafis believe that 
non-Muslims can be an arbitrator over disputes within Islamic society.94 According to 
Baz, even the Majalla does not require that a judge or arbitrator be a Muslim.95 One 
could, therefore, conclude, as has Al-Siyabi, that “if Muslims consent to refer a dispute 
to a non-Muslim private individual [as opposed to non-Muslim sovereignty], it may be 
permitted.”96  
 Likewise, in Shipowners v. Charterers,97 the Fujairah Federal Court of First 
Instance enforced a foreign arbitral award under the New York Convention, where the 
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88 The Holy Qur’an, An-Nisa 4:141, Yusuf Ali Translation. 
89 Al-Shafie (n 30). 
90 Al-Shafie (n 30). 
91 Alsheikh (n 13) 31; Al-Shafie (n 30) 305. David and Solomon, Peace Be Upon Them, acted as 
arbitrators even before the advent of Islam. See The Holy Qur’an, Al-Anbiya 21:78, Yusuf Ali 
Translation.  
91 Alsheikh (n 13) 31; Baamir (n 1) 83; El-Ahdab (n 1). 
92 Mohamed Al-Siyabi, ‘A Legal Analysis of the Development of Arbitration in Oman with Special 
Reference to the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards’ (DPhil thesis, University of Hull 2008)  
123; Muhammad Al-Sheybani, Al-Sair Al-Kabir (Cairo) vol 1, 363-364. 
93 Saleh (n 5) 436. The concept of dar Al-Islam is generally no longer applicable in the modern world.  
94 Al-Siyabi (n 92) 123. 
95 Salim Baz, Shark Ahkam al-Majalla (3rd edn, Dar al-kutub al-‘ilmiyya, Beirut, Lebanon, 1923) art 
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sole arbitrator was appointed with no conditions of religion and gender. Even in the 
KSA, the strictest adherent to the Shari’a, the Saudi Court of Appeal has upheld 
arbitration proceedings involving Saudi parties but before non-Muslim arbitrators 
because the parties had agreed to resolve their disputes by arbitration in the US, France, 
and Austria.98  
In modern practice, the religion of the arbitrators and the parties remain 
undisclosed, and no GCC state requires as a condition99 a statement as to whether the 
parties or arbitrators are Muslims.100 This likely means that most practitioners and 
Shari’a jurists today would agree to Alsheikh’s position that the religion of the 
arbitrators or parties is irrelevant.101  
 
3.1.3.4. An Arbitral Award Must Deal With the Subject of the 
Dispute 
 
The Shari’a also requires that the arbitral award must deal with the subject of the 
dispute, which would have been defined under the valid arbitration agreement 
requirement.102 In other words, the enforcing court wants to make sure that an arbitral 
award is not given for a different dispute, whether or not it relates to the actual subject 
of the dispute. This requirement limits the scope of the arbitral award to those subjects 
that the parties have agreed to settle by arbitration. This requirement, however, would 
seem unnecessary in modern contracts where the arbitration agreement covers the entire 
contractual agreement as a subject, or “any” dispute that may arise from the contractual 
agreement would be subject to the arbitration agreement unless otherwise prohibited by 
law.  
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98 The 4th Review Committee, Decision No 43/T/4 (Saudi Arabia 1995); The 4th Review Committee, 
Decision No 18/T/4 (1992); The 3rd Review Committee, Decision No 15/T/4 (Saudi Arabia 2002). 
99 The issue of capacity of an arbitrator also becomes a defence to an arbitral award enforcement 
proceeding, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, Section 4.1.2. 
100 Alsheikh (n 13). 
101 For a discussion on the issue with regards to the challenges to enforcement, see Chapter Four, Section 
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3.1.3.5. Arbitrability or the Subject of the Dispute Must be Capable 
of Settlement by Arbitration 
 
The Shari’a is not unique in declaring that some types of disputes are not 
arbitrable.103 Generally, disputes arising out of contract or commercial matters are 
arbitrable, but some other types like bankruptcy and the validity of intellectual 
property104 are not. Until the mid 1980s, for example, antitrust or competition law was 
not arbitrable in the US.105 According to Baamir, “unlike Western laws, Shari’a does 
not restrict arbitration to commercial matters only.”106 Yet, the four Shari’a schools 
disagree as to the scope of arbitration in the Shari’a.107 The Hanafis have two different 
viewpoints on the issue: (1) arbitration is allowed in all subject matters except Hodoud 
[crimes with pre-established punishments] and Qissas [revenge crimes], and (2) 
arbitration is allowed in Qissas but not in Hodoud.108 The Malikis limit arbitration to 
commercial matters only.109 The Shafi’i have three views on this issue: (1) denies the 
validity of arbitration if there exist a court in the town, (2) deems arbitration as equal to 
litigation, and (3) allows arbitration to proceed in all subject matter except in criminal 
cases.110 Finally, the Hanbalis give arbitrators the same scope as court judges, limited 
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sometime from criminal matters, but otherwise the same as litigation.111  
In this regard, the Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy issued Resolution No 
91/8/9, Concerning the Principle of Arbitration in Islamic Fiqh,112 and stated as follows: 
 “No arbitration is permissible in matters that are exclusively divine 
rights such as Hudud (matters for which a specific punishment is already 
defined in the Quran), nor in matters for which a verdict is dependent on 
the establishment or rebuttal of another verdict concerning a third party 
over whom the arbitrator has not trusteeship, such as “Li’aan” (cursing 
somebody), in view of its impact on the child’s right; Nor is arbitration 
permissible in matters that fall within the exclusive realm of jurisdiction. 
Any arbitration in matters that are not eligible for arbitration is null and 
void.” 
 
3.1.3.6. Flagrant Error or Injustice 
 
The requirement that there was no flagrant error or injustice113 in the arbitral 
award is tied directly to the requirement that the arbitral award should include a 
rationale for the granting of the arbitral award. According to El-Ahdab, the general 
statement of the reason “is necessary in order to control the award and to know whether 
or not it contains any flagrant injustice.”114 This requirement relates to the ability of 
courts to review the arbitral award and to determine whether there was any flagrant 
error or injustice.115 It is sufficient, according to El-Khadi and El-Ahdab, that the 
rationale be a general statement of the reasons.116 In some instances, the enforcing judge 
may ask to interview the arbitrator regarding the rationale for the arbitral award.117  
Avoiding flagrant error or injustice should not be a condition for recognition of 
an arbitral award, but may be a condition for enforcement. As a condition for 
enforcement, however, this thesis author argues that the burden of proof for raising the 
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111 Al-Kenain (n 1) 49. 
112 Islamic Fiqh Academy, Resolutions and Recommendations of the Council of the Islamic Fiqh 
Academy (1st edn, Islamic Development Bank 1985-2000), Resolution No 91/8/9 (Abu Dhabi, UAE 9th 
session) 1-6 April 1995. 
113 El-Ahdab (n 1) 49; Muhammed Al-Hattab, Mawaheb Al-Jalil (3rd edn, Dar Al-Fikr, Cairo 1992) vol 
6, 112. 
114 El-Ahdab (n 1) 47. 
115 ibid. 
116 ibid, El-Kadi (n 35) 190-191. 
117 ibid. 
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requirement should not be on the enforcing party, but on the disputing party. This 
would, in essence, render the flagrant error or injustice inquiry as a defence and not a 
condition for enforcement. 
 
  
3.1.3.7. Public policy118 Under the Shari’a 
 
The concept of public policy under the Shari’a, according to El-Ahdab, is based 
on the general spirit of the Shari’a and the sources of law of the Shari’a: the Holy 
Qur’an, the Sunna, the Ijma, and the Qiyas.119 It is also based on the principle that 
“individuals must respect their clauses, unless they forbid what is authorized and 
authorize what is forbidden.”120  
 
3.1.4. Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards 
  
Shari’a scholars agree that an arbitral award is final.121 Malaki scholars deem an 
arbitral award as final as long as it does not violate the main sources of Shari’a.122 
Hanbali scholars view arbitral awards as final just like court judgments.123 Hanafi 
scholars view arbitral awards as final and can revoke them only if they violate the rules 
of a disputing party’s mathhab [school].124  
The Shafi’i scholars also view arbitral awards as final but they are divided into 
two camps: whether an arbitral award has a jurisdictional or contractual character. The 
majority view is that an arbitral award is jurisdictional, while the minority view is that it 
is contractual in nature.125 Under the jurisdictional view, the arbitrator’s authority is 
elevated, like that of a judge, and the arbitral award is seen as independent from that of 
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118 The public policy defence will be treated in more depth in Chapter Five. 
119 El-Ahdab (n 1) 49. 
120 ibid. 
121 El-Ahdab (n 1) 47-48; Wakim (n 53) 22.  
122 Baamir (n 1) 92. 
123 ibid. 
124 ibid. 
125 ibid. 
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the will of the parties.126 In other words, the parties are bound to the arbitral award as 
soon as it is made.  
The minority view, by contrast, deems arbitral awards as contractual in nature 
and sees the agreement of the parties as the basis for the arbitral award.127 As a 
consequence, a contractual view of arbitral awards also requires the consent of the 
parties for its enforcement.128 In effect, the subject matter of the arbitration is res 
judicata, but its enforcement is only res judicata if the parties also consent to it.  
As both views were derived from Imam Shafi’i, it is easier to reconcile these 
two views. It is practical to state that the majority view will likely prevail, not only 
because it is the majority view, but also because it is the most reasonable. The minority 
view seems to be flawed in one important respect: it fails to consider that the parties 
have already consented to enforcement (1) when they entered into the arbitration clause 
and (2) when they proceeded with the arbitration process. It would be unreasonable to 
argue that one entered into an arbitration clause and continued with the arbitration 
proceeding knowing that any arbitral award rendered therefrom would be unenforceable 
anyway absent consent to enforce the arbitral award. 
Smith and Marrone observed that Islamic countries will often ignore the parties’ 
choice of law or procedure to be applied to the arbitration, and consistently mandate 
that for an arbitral award to have res judicata effect [finality], it must be approved by a 
court.129  According to Smith and Marrone, “[t]his system of court review means that 
the rendering of an arbitration award does not ‘necessarily bring finality to a dispute 
between the parties. Sufficient room is left, procedurally, for either expeditious judicial 
management or judicial meddling, procrastination, and delay.’”130 The court approval 
requirement for choice of law and procedure is in principle, generally incompatible with 
international arbitration norms.  
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126 ibid; see also Al-Mawirdi (n 84) vol II, 382.  
127 El-Ahdab (n 1) 47-48. 
128 ibid; see also Baamir (n 1) 91 (stating that an award is enforceable and binding once it becomes final 
despite that some scholars require the parties’ approval). 
129 Smith and Marrone (n 26). 
130 ibid. 
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PART II 
 
3.2. Conditions for the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Under the New 
York Convention and the ICSID Convention 
 
The New York Convention and the ICSID Convention have a different set of 
requirements for a party seeking enforcement of a foreign arbitral award than the 
Shari’a and the domestic laws of each GCC states. This section addresses the conditions 
for enforcement under the New York Convention and the ICSID Convention.  
 
3.2.1. Conditions for the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Under 
the New York Convention 
 
 The New York Convention severely restricts the grounds upon which courts 
may refuse to enforce foreign arbitral awards based on their domestic law.131 According 
to Brower and Sharpe, “[p]rior to their accession to the New York Convention, states 
such as Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia required petitioners seeking enforcement of 
their foreign arbitral awards to survive domestic court review of the entire merits of the 
dispute; the foreign award was simply one element of proof of the parties’ rights and 
obligations. Even when parties were not forced to re-litigate the merits of their disputes, 
national courts often subjected foreign arbitral awards to the same invasive scrutiny 
with which they examined domestic awards. Indeed, the laws of many Islamic states 
failed even to distinguish between international and domestic arbitration.”132 
The enforcement conditions and procedures of the New York Convention are set 
out under Article III and Article IV.133 Once the assets of a losing party to a foreign 
arbitral award are located within any Convention State, then Articles III and IV 
apply.134 According to Onyema, both of these articles are drawn in positive and 
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131 Brower and Sharpe (n 29); Smith and Marrone (n 26). 
132 ibid. 
133 New York Convention, art III & IV. 
134 In this sense, the court at the seat of arbitration is transformed into an enforcing court, and the arbitral 
award may be enforced in multiple Convention States where the assets of the non-complying party may 
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mandatory language and Conventions States may not deviate from these articles in their 
implementing statutes.135 Additionally, disputing parties cannot opt out of these articles 
in their arbitration agreement.136 Disputing parties, however, according to Onyema, can 
always avail themselves of a more favourable enforcement regime under Article VII.137 
 
3.2.1.1. Article III 
 
Article III of the New York Convention138 imposes an obligation on Contracting 
States to enforce foreign arbitral awards. Further, Article III also makes a clear 
distinction between “conditions” for the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award and 
“rules of procedures” to be applied to the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award.139 In 
other words, the New York Convention only states the necessary conditions and it is up 
to the Contracting State where the foreign arbitral award is sought to be enforced to 
apply the procedures of their courts.140  
Finally, Article III does not allow Contracting States to impose more onerous 
conditions than the conditions used for the recognition or enforcement of domestic 
arbitral awards.141 In other words, Contracting States cannot add more conditions than 
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be located. Onyema (n 1) 597; Julian Lew, Loulas Mistelis, Stefan Kroll, Comparative International 
Commercial Arbitration  (Kluwer 2003) 704. See also Redfern and Hunter (n 36) 434 (“[r]ecognition and 
enforcement are concerned with giving effect to the award, either in the state in which it was made or in 
some other state or states”). 
135 Onyema (n 1) 597.   
136 Onyema (n 1) 597, 598. 
137 ibid. 
138 New York Convention, art III. “Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and 
enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, 
under the conditions laid down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed substantially more 
onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to 
which this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral 
awards.” 
139 Onyema (n 1)  597.   
140 The New York Convention also leaves it to the Convention States to designate in its implementing 
legislation the court or courts that has jurisdiction over the recognition and/or enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards, thereby giving that court the power to determine the procedures to apply to the 
recognition and enforcement of the award.  It is possible for one court to be given jurisdiction over 
recognition and another court to be given jurisdiction over enforcement, as in Brazil. See generally 
Onyema (n 1) 598, fn 7, 602.   
141 Albert van den Berg, ‘New York Convention of 1958 - Consolidated Commentary - Cases Reported in 
Volumes XXII (1997) - XXVII (2002)’ (2003) XXVIII YB Com Arb 562, 648 [hereinafter ‘New York 
Convention’]; Onyema (n 1) 599 generally and fn 12.  
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those set in Articles III and IV whenever the New York Convention applies to a foreign 
arbitral award. 142  
To the contrary, Contracting States may apply stricter conditions for non-New 
York Convention arbitral awards, which are arbitral awards the Contracting State 
“considers” domestic and purely domestic arbitral awards.143 By implication, since 
Contracting States have the discretion144 to determine which arbitral awards are foreign 
or domestic, it is theoretically possible for the GCC states to circumvent the conditions 
of Articles III and IV, and thereby apply stricter conditions, by ruling that an arbitral 
award is domestic and not foreign. In the context of the GCC states and the Shari’a, this 
situation could apply whenever one of the parties is Muslim.145  
 
3.2.1.2. Article IV 
 
According to van den Berg, Article IV of the New York Convention146 is 
designed to place the most minimal conditions for the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards.147 An error of fact or law cannot be a ground for the refusal of enforcement.148 
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142 ibid. 
143 See generally Chapter Two; Onyema (n 1) 599, fn 12.   
144 ibid. 
145 See generally Chapter Two.  
146 New York Convention, art IV. Article IV states as follows: 
“1. To obtain the recognition and enforcement mentioned in the preceding article, the party applying for 
recognition and enforcement shall, at the time of the application, supply:  
(a) The duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof; 
(b) The original agreement referred to in article II or a duly certified copy thereof. 
2. If the said award or agreement is not made in an official language of the country in which the award is 
relied upon, the party applying for recognition and enforcement of the award shall produce a translation 
of these documents into such language. The translation shall be certified by an official or sworn translator 
or by a diplomatic or consular agent.” 
147 See Albert van den Berg, ‘Why Are Some Awards Not Enforceable?’ in Albert van den Berg (ed), 
New Horizons in International Commercial Arbitration and Beyond, ICCA Congress Series No12 
(Kluwer 2005) 299, 323 (“Art. IV is set up to facilitate enforcement by requiring a minimum number of 
conditions to be fulfilled by the party seeking enforcement….”). See also Klaus Berger, Private Dispute 
Resolution in International Business: Negotiation, Mediation, Arbitration (Kluwer 2006) vol II, 591-599 
(“All a party seeking enforcement of an award needs to do under the system of the New York Convention 
is to submit the original of the arbitration agreement or a certified copy of it and a duly authenticated 
original of the award or a certified copy.”) 
148 Berger (n 147) 597-598, quoting International Standard Electric Corp v Bridas Sociedad Anonima 
Petrolera, Industrial y Comercial, 745 F Supp 172, 177 (SDNY 1990) (“‘The whole point of arbitration 
is that the merits of the dispute will not be reviewed in the courts, wherever they be located…’  [and] 
‘…that the Courts should review arbitrations for procedural regularity but resist inquiry into the 
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An enforcing party must produce two primary documents under Article IV: (1) the 
arbitration agreement, which evidences the consent of the parties to arbitrate; and (2) 
the final arbitral award, which evidences the decision of the arbitrators.149  
The Lebanese court in Civil Court of Appeal, Beirut, First Chamber, Decision 
No. 718/2011,150 stated that the non-existence of an arbitration agreement or the 
existence of a void arbitration agreement can result from (1) the refusal of the party who 
is challenging the arbitral award by means of annulment to resort to arbitration, (2) the 
fact that the clause is not written, (3) the non-inclusion therein of the appointment of the 
arbitrator or of the method for his appointment, (4) the fact that it relates to a non-
arbitrable dispute, or (5) the nullity of the original contract containing it.  
 
3.2.1.3. Specific Conditions for the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards under the New York Convention 
 
A. Final Arbitral Award Requirement 
 
The first condition for the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under Article 
III and IV is that the foreign arbitral award is final (has res judicata effect)151 before it 
can be enforced.152 The New York Convention, however, does not define “final award” 
in any of its provisions, and it is also silent on what law would determine whether an 
arbitral award is final.153  
Since the arbitral award evidences the “entitlement of the party seeking 
enforcement,”154 it must be a “duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
substantive merits of the award, is clear from the notes on this subject by the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations…’”). 
149 Onyema (n 1) 605.   
150 Civil Court of Appeal, Beirut, First Chamber, Decision No 718/2011 (23 May 2011). 
151 Lew, Mistelis, and Kroll (n 134) 699. 
152 Onyema (n 1) 600.   
153 ibid; Sup Ct Queensland, 29 October 1993, Resort Condominiums Int’l Inc v Bolwell, 9(4) Int’l Arb 
Rep A-1 (1994) in (1995) XX YB Com Arb 628. The award does not have to be labelled “final,” so long 
as the award is a final decision of the substantive issues. 
154 Lew, Mistelis, and Kroll (n 134) 704; Martin Platte, ‘An Arbitrator’s Duty to Render Enforceable 
Awards’ (2003) 20(3) J Int’l Arb 307, arguing that an arbitrator has a duty to render enforceable awards. 
See however, Christopher Boog, The Lazy Myth of the Arbitral Tribunal’s Duty to Render an Enforceable 
101 
!
thereof.”155 The enforcing court relies on the arbitral award to determine what it was 
that the arbitral tribunal had awarded, and what it must order the defaulting party to 
comply with. Cases have shown that the arbitral award requirement is compulsory, and 
courts in Italy and Hague have refused enforcement unless there is a complete duly 
authenticated original or a duly certified copy of the arbitral award.156  
 
B. Valid Arbitration Agreement Under Article II: Written 
and Arbitrable 
 
The next requirement under Article IV (b) is the original arbitration 
agreement.157 It is possible for an enforcing court to refuse enforcement if the 
arbitration agreement does not meet the validity requirements of Article II.158 Other 
courts with a pro-enforcement view, however, have enforced the foreign arbitral award 
by finding a valid arbitration agreement,159 or in the absence of an arbitration agreement 
based on a waiver160 by failing to raise the issue during the arbitration proceedings, or 
by allowing the Applicant to cure the defects later. Still, other courts require the 
production of the arbitration agreements at the time of application.161  
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Award, (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 28 January 2013) 
!http://kuwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/author/christopherboog/" accessed 01 June 2013 (arguing that 
there is very little evidence that an arbitrator has a duty to render enforceable awards to the extent 
claimed). 
155 New York Convention, art IV(1)(a). 
156 Weinstein Int’l Corp v Nagtegaal NV, (1980) V YB Com Arb 269 (Rechtbank The Hague, 23 June 
1972); Oberlandesgericht Koln, 10 June 1976, (1979) IV YB Com Arb 258; CA Bologna, 4 February 
1993, (1994) XXI YB Com Arb 700; H & H Hackenberg GmbH v NCS di Sbrolli Franco & C Inc, 
(1996) XXI YB Com Arb 587 (CA Florence, 29 November 1991); WTB v Costruire Societa cooperative 
a responsibilita limitata – CREI, (1996) XXI YB Com Arb 590 (CA Bologna, 4 February 1993). 
157 New York Convention, arts II and IV; Onyema (n 1) 606.   
158 Moscow Dynamo v Ovechkin, 412 F Supp 2d 24 (DDC  2006) (a US court refused enforcement 
because the arbitration agreement failed to meet the requirements of Article II of the New York 
Convention as required by Article IV(1)).  
159 China Three Gorges Project Corp v Rotec Industries, Inc, No Civ A 04-1510 JJF, 2005 WL 1813025 
(D Del Aug 2, 2005).  
160 L’Aiglon S/A v Textil Uniao S/A, SEC 856-EX (2005/0031430-2); Mauricio Ferriera dos Santos, 
‘Arbitration in Brazil - 1st Decision Regarding Recognition Of A Foreign Award After 2004 Judiciary 
Reform’ (2005) Int’l Arb Rep 63; Lauro Gama Jr, ‘Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Brazil: 
Recent Developments’ (2005)16(1) ICC Bull 71. 
161 Vicere Livio v Prodexport, (1982) VII YB Com Arb 345 (Corte di Cassazione, 26 May 1981, No 
3456); Jassica SA v Ditta Gioacchino Polojaz, (1992) XVII YB Com Arb 525 (Corte di Cassazione, 12 
102 
!
Enforcing courts, thus, may look at whether the arbitration agreement is valid 
under Article II of the New York Convention. In so doing, enforcing courts can revisit 
the validity of the arbitration agreement, including, pursuant to Article II, whether (1) it 
was in writing162 and (2) whether the subject matter is capable of settlement by 
arbitration (“arbitrability”).163  
In Comandate Marine Corp v. Pan Australia shipping Pty Ltd,164 the Full 
Federal Court of Australia held that this writing requirement may be satisfied by clear, 
mutual documentary exchange showing the terms of, and the parties’ assent to the 
arbitration agreement. Thus, the scope of “in writing” in Australia is sufficiently broad 
to include the situation in which a formal agreement has not yet been printed and signed 
by the parties.165 The Swiss Supreme Court’s position is consistent with the Australian 
position.166 Interestingly enough, the new French Arbitration law (Decree dated 13 
January 2011) has got rid of the formal requirement of an arbitration agreement in 
international arbitration (Article 1507).167 It may herald the modern international 
arbitration practice.  
It is necessary to note that scholars like van den Berg, taking the pro-
enforcement view, argue that the enforcing party need not comply with Article II(1) 
because “the original or certified copy of the document is prima facie an arbitration 
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February 1987, No 1526); Lezina Shipping Co SA v Casillo Grani Inc, , (1996)XXI YB Com Arb 585 
(CA Bari, 19 March 1991). 
162 Article II(2) provides as follows: “The term “agreement in writing” shall include an arbitral 
clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an 
exchange of letters or telegrams.” New York Convention, art II(2). 
163 Article II(1) of the New York Convention states as follows: “Each Contracting State shall recognize an 
agreement in writing, under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences 
which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether 
contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.” New York 
Convention, art II(1). 
164 Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia shipping Pty Ltd, [2006] FCAFC 192. 
165 ibid; Toby Landau, ‘The Requirement of A Written From for An Arbitration Agreement: When 
“written” means “Oral”’ in Albert van den Berg (ed), International Commercial Arbitration Important 
Contemporary Question, 19 ICCA Congress Series No 11 (Kluwer 2003) 24. 
166 Compagnie de Navigation et Transport SA v MSC- Mediterranean Shipping Company SA., (1996) 
XXI YBCA 690, 697 (Switzerland, The Supreme Court 1995). 
167 Decree No 2011-48 dated January 13, 2011 !http://www.parisarbitration.com/French-Law-on-
Arbitration.pdf" accessed 21 March 2014 (Trans by Emmanuel Gaillard, Nanou Leleu-Knobil and 
Daniela Pellarini). 
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agreement…”168 An enforcing court which reads the language of Article IV(b) 
otherwise would proceed with an analysis of Article II. The Supreme Court of Slovenia, 
however, in Slovenia: Vrhovno sodi!"e Republike Slovenije, Sklep Cpg,169 stated, “the 
Contracting States of the NYC are bound by Article II to recognize a written arbitration 
agreement.” 
There is also the signature requirement under Article II(2), requiring the 
signature of parties on the arbitral clause or arbitration agreement. In an arbitral clause, 
the validity of the arbitration agreement would depend on the validity of the main 
contract itself in which the arbitral clause relies.170 In an arbitration agreement, 
however, that is separate from the main contract (i.e. the severability doctrine of the 
arbitration agreement), the issue becomes more complicated. The Swiss Supreme Court 
in G. SA v.  T. Ltd.171 held that a general reference to a separate arbitration agreement 
suffices even without a signature on the arbitration agreement.172 English courts in 
Trygg Hansa Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Equitas Ltd.173 and AIG Europe (UK) Ltd. v. 
Ethniki,174 however, hold that the main contract and the arbitration agreement must be 
signed unless they are included in an exchange of letters or telegrams. The court in 
Ruler of Qatar v.  International Marine Oil Co. Ltd.175 held that exchange of letters or 
telegrams that are unsigned176 satisfies the requirement of Article II(2) as an alternative 
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168 van den Berg, ‘New York Convention’ (n 141) 648.  
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173 Trygg Hansa Insurance Co Ltd v Equitas Ltd, [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 439 (QB Comm Ct). 
174 AIG Europe (UK) Ltd v Ethniki, [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 65( CA). 
175 Ruler of Qatar v  International Marine Oil Co Ltd, (Arbitral Award, 1953) in (1957) 20 Int’l Law Rep 
534. 
176Overseas Cosmos, Inc v NR Vessel Corp, 1997 US Dist LEXIS 19390 (SDNY 1997); Earthtrade, Inc v 
Gen Brands Int’l Corp, 1996 US Dist LEXIS 1520 (SDNY 1996); Dixie Aluminium Prod Co v Mitsubishi 
Int’l Corp, 785 FSupp 157 (NDGa 1992). Although the Italian court in Finangrain Compagnie 
Commerciale Agricole et Financière SA v Patano snc, (1996) XXI YBCA 571, 572-573 (Italy, Court of 
Appeal of Bari 1989), required a signature.  
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to the signature. Courts have extended this rule to modern electronic communications 
like the fax and email.177  
While the New York Convention permits the enforcing state to determine the 
validity of the arbitration agreement between the parties, the enforcing court can only 
do so “under the law that the parties have chosen” and if the parties have failed to so 
choose, then “the law of the state where the award was made.”178 In this regard, GCC 
courts could apply the Shari’a only if the parties have chosen the Shari’a to determine 
the validity of the arbitration agreement.179  
According to Carbonneau and Jaeggi, “the enforcing state is empowered to 
decide the arbitrability of the dispute under its local standard” 180 that in the context of 
the GCC states would also include arbitrability under the Shari’a. Further, “if the 
grounds of a dispute cannot be settled by arbitration under domestic law, a court may 
refuse to enforce an award granted through a foreign arbitration panel.”181 The same 
defence was raised and successfully barred enforcement of a foreign arbitral award 
against Libya in Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahirya,182 where Libya argued that nationalization was not subject to arbitration. 
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181 ibid. 
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C. Authentication and Certification 
 
Article IV(1) of the New York Convention requires prior to enforcement “the 
duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof.”183 “Authentication” 
refers to the attestation of the signature as genuine while “certification” refers to the 
attestation of a copy of a document as a true copy of the original. If a duly certified 
copy was submitted, there is no need to authenticate the signatures, as the certified copy 
was an alternative provided by the New York Convention. In Civil Court of Appeal, 
Beirut, First Chamber, Decision No. 718/2011,184 the Lebanese court had to address the 
request for annulment because the arbitral award was not signed by all members of the 
arbitral tribunal, but only by two arbitrators. Therefore, according to the Lebanese Civil 
Court, if the arbitral award does not feature the signature of the minority as a result of 
refusal to sign, the majority should mention this and sign in confirmation thereof so that 
the arbitral award will be considered as signed by all the arbitrators.   
The more interesting issue is what law governs the validity of the authentication 
and certification.  Some enforcing courts have stated that either the law of the forum 
(where the arbitral award is enforced) or the law of the origin (where the arbitral award 
was made) could govern the issue.185 Another position, taken by Lew and Platte, is that 
the law of the forum governs the issue of the validity of the authentication and 
certification.186 Still another position, held by Onyema, argues that the law of the origin 
makes the most sense, since it creates uniformity and would eliminate the need for 
authentication and certification at each place where the arbitral award is to be 
enforced.187 This thesis author agrees to the law of the origin approach because it is the 
most sensible in terms of policy and the purpose behind the New York Convention. 
GCC courts ought to adopt this view since it would also likely create uniformity among 
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183 The authentication requirement of Article IV(1) ought not be confused with the signature requirement 
of Article II(2), the first covering the arbitral award, which is the main concern of this chapter, while the 
second covering the arbitration agreement. 
184 Civil Court of Appeal, Beirut, First Chamber, Decision No 718/2011 (23 May 2011). 
185 Oberster Gerichtshof, 11 June 1969, II YB Com Arb 232 (1977). 
186 See Lew, Mistelis, and Kroll (n 134) 704; Platte (n 154) 307( preferring the law of the place of 
enforcement). 
187 Onyema (n 1) 609-610.   
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the GCC states, and eliminate needless arguments over formalities. It is very likely in a 
GCC state that a court may not enforce a foreign arbitral award because one of three 
signatures is not properly authenticated.188 
 
D. Translation 
 
Article IV(2) of the New York Convention, for obvious practical reasons, 
requires that the Applicant submit a duly certified translation of the foreign arbitral 
award if the foreign arbitral award is not in the official language of the enforcing court’s 
country. Some arbitration centres like the Abu Dhabi Commercial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Centre (ADCCAC) provide that foreign arbitral awards shall be issued in 
Arabic and in the other language adopted in the arbitration proceedings.189 This 
requirement does not seem to create any controversy as the translation can be made by 
anyone and anywhere so long it is duly certified.190 Domestic courts, however, can add 
to this requirement and demand translation of a foreign law, as the Dubai Court of 
Cassation required an English claimant to present after arguing that English law permits 
the execution of foreign arbitral awards made in the UAE to establish reciprocity.191 
The Dubai Court of Cassation rejected the appeal because the English claimant failed to 
provide the provisions of the English law translated into Arabic as material evidence.192  
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188 SODIME - Societa Distillerie Meridionali v Schuurmans & Van Ginneken BV, (1996) XXI YB Com 
Arb 607 (Corte di Cassazione, 14 March 1995, No 2919) (Court refused enforcement of award with only 
two of three arbitrators properly authenticated).   
189 Khalil Mechantaf, ‘Abu Dhabi Arbitration Centre Issues its New List of Arbitration Rules’ (Kluwer 
Arbitration Blog, 10 September 2013 !http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/09/10/abu-dhabi-
arbitration-centre-issues-its-new-list-of-arbitration-
rules/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+KluwerArbitrationBlog
Full+%28Kluwer+Arbitration+Blog+-+Latest+Entries%29" accessed 13 October 2013.  
190 Onyema (n 1) 610-611.   
191 Dubai Court of Cassation Judgment, Case No 17 of 2002 (10/08/2001), ‘GCC Commercial Arbitration 
Bulletin’, Issue 20/21 (December 2001 and March 2002) 16. 
192 ibid. 
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3.2.1.4. The Public Policy Exception in the New York Convention 
 
The New York Convention has an exception that has created controversy in the 
context of international arbitration in the Islamic world: the New York Convention 
allows courts to repudiate foreign arbitral awards that are “contrary to the public policy 
of that country.”193 Carbonneau and Jaeggi stated it aptly: 
 
This clause has the effect of relegating the ultimate decision on the 
efficacy of the Convention to the good faith of the Contracting States... 
Basically, the judge may refuse recognition and enforcement if he finds 
that it would be contrary to the public policy of his country.194 
 
Courts in the GCC states have rejected foreign arbitral awards on domestic 
public policy grounds, including grounds claiming a violation of the Shari’a.195 The 
issue of public policy will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five. 
 
3.2.2. Conditions for the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Under 
the ICSID Convention196 
 
The rules concerning the forms and content of the arbitral award under the 
ICSID Convention, or in other words the conditions required to enforce an arbitral 
award “do not differ substantially from other international commercial arbitration 
rules.”197 The ICSID Convention requires the arbitral award to be in writing and signed 
by the tribunal.198 Additionally, the ICSID Convention requires the arbitral award to 
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193 Smith and Marrone (n 26); Kristin Roy, ‘The New York Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can a Country 
Use The Public Policy Defence To Refuse Enforcement of Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards?’ (1995) 18 
Fordham Int’l LJ 920, 923-924. 
194 Carbonneau and Jaeggi (n 178) 173. 
195 Roy (n 193). 
196 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 
ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, Doc. ICSID/15 (10 April 2006) and posted on the website of 
the ICSID !www.worldbank.org/icsid" [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. 
197 Lucy Reed, Jan Paulsson and Nigel Blackaby, Guide to ICSID Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer 2010) 89.  
198 Andrew Smolik, ‘The Effect of Shari’a on the Dispute Resolution Process Set Forth in the Washington 
Convention’ (2010) J Disp Resol 151, 162; ICSID Convention (n 196) art 48(2). 
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deal with every question presented.199 In other words, the arbitral award must address 
the entire scope of the arbitration agreement. Like the Shari’a, which according to El-
Ahdab requires the arbitrators to state in the arbitral award the reasons upon which the 
arbitral award was based,200 the ICSID Convention also requires the tribunal to state in 
the arbitral award “the reasoning upon which [the arbitral award] was based.”201 For 
example, in Mitchell v. The Democratic Republic of Congo,202 an ad hoc committee set 
aside an ICSID arbitral award because the tribunal failed to state its reasons for the 
arbitral award.203 
The ICSID Convention provides in Article 54(1)204 that arbitral awards and 
pecuniary obligations stemming from arbitral awards are to be recognised by each state 
“as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.”205 In this regard, the main 
advantage of the ICSID Convention, according to Bowman, is that it is largely self-
contained,206 and leaves very little room for state and enforcing courts to review the 
arbitral award, with the prominent exception of the state immunity defence.207 
According to Smolik, Article 53(1) of the ICSID Convention limits the parties from 
challenging the arbitral award by resorting to national courts208 because parties cannot 
resort to “any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention.”209 It is 
likewise mandated under Article 26 that the “review regime” of the ICSID arbitral 
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199 Smolik (n 198); ICSID Convention (n 196) art 48(3). 
200 El-Ahdab (n 1) 47; Al-Ramli (n 35); El-Kadi (n 35); Alsheikh (n 13) 50-52. See also ch 3, s 4.1.2. 
201 Smolik (n 198)162; ICSID Convention (n 196) art 48(3). 
202 Iain Maxwell, ‘ICSID award annulled because claimant’s business did not constitute an investment’ 
(Lexology, 2 February 2007) !http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=10c1807e-2a45-43f3-
ba83-670c3d54785b" accessed 21 March 2014. 
203 Maxwell (n 202). 
204 ICSID Convention (n 196) art 54(1). 
205 Antonio Parra, ‘The Enforcment of ICSID Arbitral Awards’ (24th Joint Colloquium on International 
Arbitration, Paris, 16 November 2007); ICSID Convention (n 196) art 54(1). 
206 John Bowman, ‘Dispute Resolution Planning for the Oil and Gas Industry’ (2001) 16 ICSID Rev 
Foreign Inv L J 332, 367. 
207 AFM Maniruzzaman, ‘Sovereign Immunity and the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Against State 
Entities: Recent Trends in Practice’ in American Arbitration Association, Handbook on International 
Arbitration Practice (JurisNet LLC 2010) ch 28, 335 (According to Maniruzzaman, the state can 
irrevocably waive state immunity by consenting to the arbitration, though a simple “undertaking to 
arbitrate” is not by itself consent amounting to a waiver under Article 55).  
208 Smolik (n 198)163. 
209 ICSID Convention (n 196) art 53(1). 
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award is exclusive to the ICSID tribunal.210  
However, under Article 49 of the ICSID Convention, either party may file 
within 45 days from the rendering of the arbitral award, a request that the tribunal 
decide on an issue it omitted or that the tribunal rectify a “clerical, mathematical, or 
similar error.” The ICSID ad hoc committee in Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. 
and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic,211 stated that rectification is meant to 
provide parties with an opportunity to review the arbitral award and alert the tribunal to 
obvious mistakes, though it is not meant as a mechanism to reconsider the merits. In 
other words, the rectification mechanism is a process where conditions for enforcement 
of an arbitral award can be tested.  
According to Parra, enforcement of the arbitral award may be obtained from the 
competent court of a Contracting State under Article 54(2) of the ICSID Convention on 
simple presentation of a copy of the arbitral award certified by the Secretary-General of 
the Centre.212 In this regard, the ICSID Convention in comparison to the New York 
Convention has opted for a “simplified” enforcement procedure, as so recognized by 
courts in the Benvenuti & Bonfant case and the Societe Ouest Africaine case.213 The 
courts in Benvenuti & Bonfant and Societe Ouest Africaine pointed out the “simplified” 
regime for enforcement adopted by the ICSID Convention,214 and also distinguished the 
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210 Smolik (n 198) 164; ICSID Convention (n 196) art 26. 
211 Compania de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal SA v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No ARB/97/3, Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Request for Supplementation and Rectification 
of its Decision Concerning Annulment of the Award (28 May 2003) para 11.  
212 Parra (n 205); ICSID Convention (n 196) art 54(2); Georges Delaume, ‘ICSID Arbitration and the 
Courts’ (1983) 77 Am J of Int’l L 784, 785 (stating that “under the Convention, the role assigned to 
domestic courts relates to the recognition and enforcement of ICSID awards. As discussed below, that 
role is one of judicial assistance intended to promote the effectiveness of such awards.”). 
213 SARL Benvenuti & Bonfant v Republic of the Congo, Decision of 13 January 1981 of the Tribunal de 
Grande Instance, Paris, (1981) 108 J du Droit Int’l 365; 1982 Revue de l’arbitrage 206; English 
Translation of French original in (1984) 65 ILR 91, (1993) l ICSID Rep 368; Decision of 26 June 1981 of 
the Court of Appeals, Paris, (1981) 108 J du Droit Int’l 843; 1982 Revue de l’arbitrage 207; English 
translation of French original in (1981) 20 ILM 878; (1993) 1 ICSID Rep 369 (explaining that the ICSID 
Convention provided for a “simplified” enforcement procedure); Societe Ouest Africaine des Bretons 
Industriels v Senegal, Decision of Dec 5, 1989 of the Court of Appeal, Paris, (1990) 117 J du Droit Int’l 
141; 1990 Revue de l’arbitrage 164; English Translation of French original in (1990) 5 ICSID Rev - FILJ 
135; (1990) 29 ILM 1341; (1994) 2 ICSID Rep 337; Decision of 11 June 1991 of the Court of Cassation, 
France, (1991) 6 ICSID Rev - FILJ 598; (1991) 118 J du Droit Int’l 1005; 1991 Revue de l’arbitrage 637; 
English Translation of French original in (1991) 30 ILM 1169; (1994) 2 ICSID Rep 341.  
214 Decision of 26 June 1981 of the Court of Appeals, Paris, (1981) 108 Journal du droit international 843; 
1982 Revue de l’arbitrage 207; English translation of French original in (1981) 20 ILM 878; (1993) 1 
110 
!
concept of enforcement versus execution, the latter of which is beyond the reach of the 
ICSID Convention.215 According to Parra, “execution is, in accordance with Article 
54(3) of the Convention, governed by the law on the execution of judgments in force in 
the country where the execution is sought.”216 However, according to Reed, Paulsson 
and Blackaby, while states are mandated under the ICSID Convention to recognize 
arbitral awards, ultimately, investors have very little recourse if states “refuse to 
recognize, enforce, and execute ICSID awards in spite of their Convention 
obligations.”217 
 
PART III 
 
3.3. Conditions for the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the GCC States 
 
3.3.1. Overview of Conditions for Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in GCC 
States 
 
A general comparison of the conditions placed by the six GCC states on an 
arbitral award prior to its enforcement shows a consistency among the GCC states, and 
may mean that enforcement could become predictable.218 The six GCC states have 
much more in common with each other than differences in terms of the conditions they 
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ICSID Rep 369 (explaining that the ICSID Convention provided for a “simplified” enforcement 
procedure); Decision of 11 June 1991 of the Court of Cassation, France, (1991) 6 ICSID Rev – FILJ 598; 
(1991) 118 J du Droit Int’l 1005; 1991 Revue de l’arbitrage 637; English Translation of French original in 
(1991) 30 ILM 1169; (1994) 2 ICSID Rep 341.  
215 Parra (n 205). 
216 Parra (n 205); ICSID Convention (n 196) art 54(3). 
217 Reed, Paulsson and Blackaby (n 197) 109. 
218 It is also interesting to note that the conditions for recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award 
placed by GCC states is not substantially different from the conditions placed by the UK, where the 
requirements of an enforceable award stem from a combination of statute (Arbitration Act of 1996), 
common law, party autonomy, and any applicable rules. In the UK, requirements can be divided into 
formal and substantive requirements. The formal requirements include (1) writing and signature, (2) 
identification of the parties, (3) recitals, (4) reasons for the award, (5) date, (6) statement of the seat, (7) 
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completeness, (3) certainty, (4) finality, (5) enforceability, (6) jurisdiction, (7) legality, (8) possibility, (9) 
consistency, and (10) compliance with submission. For a more detailed discussion of these UK 
requirements, see Ray Turner, Arbitration Awards: A practical approach (Blackwell Publishing 2005) 8-
13. 
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place prior to the enforcement of an arbitral award.219 As a tool for comparison, this 
thesis author has created a Chart of the conditions, cross referenced with the respective 
GCC states, the Shari’a, and the New York Convention.220 
After careful review and study of the Chart, this thesis author has created three 
general categories of conditions required by the arbitration laws of GCC states prior to 
the enforcement of arbitral awards: (1) conditions relating to the form and content of the 
arbitral award, (2) conditions relating to documents that must accompany the arbitral 
award, and (3) conditions relating to the request for leave to enforce.  Of the first two 
categories of conditions, GCC states, for the most part, share the same requirements 
save for minor differences in formalities.221 It is the third category of conditions where 
GCC states, though still sharing substantial similarities, begin to show variations.222  
 
3.3.2. Specific Conditions for the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in GCC 
States 
 
3.3.2.1. Conditions Relating to the Form and Content of the Arbitral 
Award 
 
These conditions relate to the arbitral award itself.223 Though these conditions 
may be easily dismissed as mere formalities, there are reasons for their inclusion in the 
arbitration laws of GCC states, usually relating to jurisdiction, or the authenticity and 
validity of the arbitral award.224  These conditions include the following: 
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219 See generally El-Ahdab (n 1); Appendix I, Chart; Essam Al-Tamimi, Practitioner’s guide to 
arbitration in the Middle East and North Africa (JurisNet LLC 2009); Herbert Smith LLP, ‘Guide to 
Dispute Resolution in the Middle East’ (Herbert Smith, 2010/2011) 
!http://www.herbertsmith.com/NR/rdonlyres/EBFC4E7F-223C-41CE-941E-
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March 2014. 
220 See Appendix I, Chart. This Chart was based largely on the books by El-Ahdab, Al-Tamimi, and other 
various sources already referenced throughout this research.  
221 See generally El-Ahdab (n 1); Appendix I, Chart. 
222 See Appendix I, Chart. 
223 El-Ahdab (n 1). 
224 ibid. 
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(1) the arbitral award itself; 
(2) the arbitral award must be in writing; 
(3) the arbitral award must be signed by a majority of the arbitrators; 
(4) the findings of the arbitral award; 
(5) the reason for the arbitral award; 
(6) the date of issuance of the arbitral award; 
(7) the place of issuance of the arbitral award; and  
(8) the name and addresses of the parties and arbitrators, including the 
nationalities and capacities of the arbitrators.225   
The only factor where GCC states are split as to its requirement is in regards to 
the names and addresses of the parties and arbitrators.226 Failure to include this factor in 
Oman,227 KSA,228 and the UAE229 would render the arbitral award unenforceable. 
In Bahrain, the Court of Cassation in Challenge No. 259/2009, Second Circuit (4 
May 2010),230 held that in a challenge to the arbitral award because the arbitral award 
failed to fulfil the conditions requiring an arbitration agreement in writing and that 
relates to the subject matter of the dispute, the arbitral award was still enforceable 
because of confirmation of the arbitration agreement in writing and the determination of 
the subject matter of the dispute in a memoranda during the proceedings. While the 
Bahraini court’s ruling in this case seems too liberalized, the case is an example that 
particular judges may apply the conditions strictly or liberally.231  
In Nahed Showa v. Bab el Faraj Company, First Civil Court of Appeal in 
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225 See generally El-Ahdab (n 1); Appendix I, Chart. The condition in point 8 applies only in half of the 
GCC states.  
226 For example, see the Egyptian case where the arbitral award was nullified for failing to state the name 
and address of the parties. Cairo Court of Appeals, Seventh Commercial Circuit, Case No 114/124 (2 
December 2008), (2010) 2 J of Arab Arb 126-127. 
227 El-Ahdab (n 1) ch 11. 
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230 Court of Cassation, Second Circuit, Challenge No 259/2009 (4 May 2010) in (2011) Int’l J of Arab 
Arb, vol 3, No 4.  
231 For comparison, see Damascus First Civil Court of Appeal, Main Case No 2, Decision No 11 (21 
January 2010) (the court rejected the request to grant leave for enforcement of the arbitral award because 
it did not mention at the beginning the names of the parties to the arbitration, did not include a copy of the 
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Aleppo, Decision rendered 23 Dec 2010,232 the Syrian court refused to enforce an 
arbitral award when the majority of the arbitral tribunal rendered an arbitral award but 
did not reply in the arbitral award to the dissenting arbitrator’s opinion. The court stated 
the condition requiring reply to a dissenting opinion is a matter of public policy and 
well settled law, which a court can raise ex officio.  
There are also differences regarding the signature requirements of arbitrators. 
While all of them require a majority of the arbitrators, Oman, KSA, Bahrain, and 
Kuwait require the arbitral award to indicate the refusal to sign by any arbitrator.233 
Additionally, Kuwait requires the majority to sign the refusal, and Oman requires that 
the arbitral award state the reason for the refusal.234 In the UAE, according to Federal 
Supreme Court, Petition No 32, 23rd Judicial Year, Article 212 (5) of the UAE Code of 
Civil Procedures provides that the arbitral award should be signed by the arbitrators, 
should have a summary of the litigants’ statements, evidence, grounds for the decision, 
and the date and place of the arbitral award.235 The Dubai Court of Cassation, Petition 
No 233/2007, judgment dated 13 January 2008,236 clarified this rule and held that the 
signature of the chairman is not sufficient in cases where several arbitrators are hearing 
the dispute. Moreover, the arbitrators shall sign both the reasoning and the dispositif; 
otherwise the arbitral award is deemed void.237 However, in Dubai Court of Cassation, 
Petition No 88/2001, the Court of Cassation has held that the presence of the signatures 
of all the arbitrators on the arbitration minutes is not a prerequisite for the validity of the 
arbitral award.238  
The reasoning for the arbitral award, just like in the Shari’a,239 is required in all 
GCC states, but may be waived by the parties in Oman and the UAE.240 What 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
232 Nahed Showa v Bab el Faraj Company, First Civil Court of Appeal in Aleppo, Decision rendered 23 
December 2010, citing Case No 489/2006 in (2006) J of Arab Arb, No 11-12, 75; (2013) Int'l J of Arab 
Arb, vol 5, No 1. 
233 See Appendix I, Chart; El-Ahdab (n 1). 
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238 Dubai Court of Cassation, Petition No 88/2001, Judgment of 29 April 2001. 
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constitutes sufficient reasoning will depend on the facts of the case, but as the Jordanian 
court has held in Court of Appeal, Request for Annulment No. 203/R/2009,241 
examining the claims, pleas and defences of both parties, and discussing and analyzing 
the evidence submitted by the parties constitute sufficient reasoning. In Kuwait, the 
place of issuance of the arbitral award is essential, the lack of which would prevent 
enforcement, as it determines whether an arbitral award is foreign or domestic.242  
 
3.3.2.2. Conditions Relating to Documents That Must Accompany 
the Arbitral Award 
 
Another set of conditions relate to documents that must be attached to the 
arbitral award prior to submitting it to the designated court for a request for leave to 
enforce.243 These conditions allow the enforcing court to review the substance of the 
arbitral award before granting an enforcement order.244 While the enforcing courts in 
the GCC states are generally not allowed to examine the merits of the arbitral award, the 
enforcing court would need to review the substance of the arbitral award to determine 
the other conditions such as a public policy violation or whether an arbitral award is 
arbitrable in the country where enforcement is sought.245 These documentary conditions 
include (1) a copy of the arbitration agreement; (2) summary of the parties’ statements, 
contentions, or arguments; and (3) supporting documentary evidence.246 The Appendix I 
Chart shows that the GCC states are in agreement on these requirements.247 
Article 212(5) of the UAE Civil Procedure Code requires that the arbitral award 
should contain a copy of the arbitration agreement.248 The Dubai Court of Cassation, 
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248 Supreme Federal Court, Petition No 438, 23rd Judicial Year, Judgment of 12 July 2004; Federal 
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Petition No. 103/2011,249 reversed the appellate court’s annulment of an arbitral award 
stating that the contested decision misapplied the law regarding the inclusion of the 
arbitration agreement. Instead, the Court of Cassation stated that Article 212(5) does not 
provide that the arbitral award should initially contain the entire arbitration agreement 
but should only mention its content. According to the Court of Cassation, the 
legislator’s purpose behind the requirement to confirm such particulars, i.e. the copy of 
the arbitration agreement, in the same arbitral award, is to make sure the arbitral award 
is used within the limits of the arbitrator’s power under the arbitration agreement.250 
While it is a fundamental requirement for the validity of the arbitral award, the 
requirement to have a copy of the arbitration agreement included in the arbitral award 
does not equate with the quoting of the exact provisions of the agreement; it is sufficient 
to state the content thereof including the agreement on arbitration but without changing 
the meaning.251  
 
3.3.2.3. Conditions Relating to the Request for Leave to Enforce 
 
The last set of conditions relate to the request for leave to enforce, and the basis 
on which the court may deny the granting of an enforcement order, despite that the first 
two sets of conditions above have been met.252 It is in these sets of conditions that GCC 
states begin to diverge on the rules.253 These conditions relating to the request for leave 
to enforce can be further divided into four categories: (1) public policy requirements, 
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251 For comparison, see Tunisia Code of Arbitration, Article 80(2), which provides that “the party relying 
on the award or applying for its enforcement agreement shall supply the duly authenticated original award 
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(2) formalistic requirements, (3) protectionist requirements, and (4) miscellaneous 
requirements.  
It should be noted that in a request for a leave to enforce, the court is not 
supposed to examine the merits of the case. The Moroccan court in Commercial Court 
of Appeal of Casablanca, Commercial Court First Chamber, Order No 679/2010,254 on 
this point, made clear that the president of the court does not have the right to examine, 
in any way, the merits of the case on the occasion of the request to grant leave for 
enforcement of the arbitral award.  
 
A. Public Policy Requirements 
 
All the GCC states require that the designated authority, usually the President of 
the Court,255 deny the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award if the foreign arbitral 
award violates the public policy of the country where the foreign arbitral award is 
sought to be enforced. To be clear, in addition or aside from the public policy defence 
under Article V(2) of the New York Convention,256 the domestic legislation of each of 
the GCC states has also formulated its own public policy “requirements” prior to 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. The New York Convention, therefore, uses 
public policy, not as a condition, but as a basis for non-enforcement.257 These domestic 
public policy provisions, on the other hand, are aimed as conditions for enforcement 
and are stated in varying degrees and wording, generally more expansive than the New 
York Convention’s narrowly interpreted public policy defence.  
The challenge that the public policy requirement has created is the difficulty in 
defining it. Each country, and sometimes each judge, may have a different idea of 
public policy. As Ezrahi puts it, “the Shari’a compliance requirement, therefore, appears 
to provide yet another layer in addition to the exception to enforcement of a foreign 
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arbitration award as found in the New York Convention.”258 El-Ahdab further clarified 
the complexity in the context of Yemen’s public policy condition: “the award must 
comply not only with public policy but also with the provisions of the Islamic Shari’a. 
A distinction seems to be made between public policy and Shari’a. Therefore, such 
requirement would have a wide scope of implementation.”259  
In other words, there are three layers of public policy in the GCC states, the 
domestic legislation which could require “public order” and/or “good morals” as a 
condition to enforcement, the Shari’a with its much wider scope and varying 
interpretations according to the school of thought, and the New York Convention’s 
narrowly construed public policy defence for non-enforcement. Public policy can easily 
become an unpredictable obstacle for the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, 
depending on how a country, or better yet a judge, determines what constitutes public 
policy. This thesis author suggests that the GCC states should arrive at a consensus on 
what public policy they recognize as obstacles to the enforcement of a foreign arbitral 
award.  
 
B. Formalistic Requirements 
 
The formalistic requirements are shared by all the GCC states,260 as are 
conditions placed on the designated authority before approving a leave and issuing an 
order to enforce the arbitral award. This thesis author argues that these formalistic 
requirements will not likely be a hindrance to the enforcement of a foreign arbitral 
award because they are mere formalities that a party seeking enforcement of a foreign 
arbitral award could easily meet. These conditions include the requirement to provide 
(1) an original and signed copy of the arbitral award, (2) a copy of the arbitration 
agreement, (3) a translation of the foreign arbitral award if it is in a language other than 
the official language of the enforcing court, (4) some proof that a leave to enforce has 
been registered or filed with the designated authority, and (5) that there has been no 
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prior execution or judgment on the same subject or claim covered by the arbitral 
award.261  
The UAE Federal Supreme Court, Petition No 32, 23rd Judicial Year,262 for 
example, stated that a foreign arbitral award must include a photocopy of the arbitration 
agreement before it can be ratified and enforced. In the High Federal Court of Abu 
Dhabi, Annulment Case No 891, Commercial Cassation,263 the court rejected the 
recourse to set aside the arbitral award because the court found that the arbitral award 
met the conditions, mainly that the arbitral “award has indeed included the arbitration 
agreement signed by both the respondent to annulment and the arbitrator and dated 
13/5/2000. The arbitral award then had been sent to the claimant for annulment who had 
refused to sign it, which was referred to in the award.”264 Since the arbitral award met 
the conditions for enforcement, the mere fact that the other part refused to sign the 
arbitral award did not render the arbitral award void.  
If the arbitration agreement is not in writing, the arbitral award may be nullified 
on this point.265 This was the argument by the appellant in an Omani case in the Court 
of Appeal, 19 October 2010, where the appellant did not sign the contract containing the 
arbitration clause, and the court found that there was no arbitration without consent 
evidenced by a signed agreement.266 In Kuwait, the Court of Cassation267 held that for 
limited liability companies, the manager may sign on agreements which contain an 
arbitration clause without having any power of attorney or delegations. However, said 
manager’s name should be stated in the articles of association of the limited liability 
company. 
Of the aforementioned formalistic requirements, only KSA differs in regards to 
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two issues. First, KSA does not require proof that a leave to enforce has been registered 
or filed with the designated authority.268 Second, KSA not only required an arbitration 
agreement, it also requires that the arbitration agreement is valid.269 This requirement is 
consistent with the Shari’a. This could be one reason that KSA is considered by Roy 
and other scholars and practitioners 270 as a difficult country to enforce a foreign arbitral 
award. It is worth noting, however, that the New York Convention also requires a valid 
arbitration agreement, though the requirements for a valid arbitration agreement under 
the New York Convention differ from those in the Shari’a, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter.271  
One formalistic requirement that has caused a stir among the arbitration 
community in the GCC states is the requirement that the arbitral award be made in the 
name of “His Highness the Emir.” Cases such as these have caught much attention in 
Qatar,272 Kuwait,273 and Bahrain.274 
 
C. Protectionist Requirements 
 
While the GCC states are similar with the formalistic requirements, differences 
among the GCC states arise on the protectionist requirements.275 The author of this 
thesis categorises these requirements as protectionist because they were likely added by 
the GCC states to protect themselves from the perceived shortcomings of the court or 
arbitral tribunal/arbitrators that granted the foreign arbitral award. These conditions 
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cover concerns regarding due process, notice, reciprocity, and arbitrability in the 
country where the arbitral award was made. Because these conditions vary from country 
to country, it is more practical to list the GCC states with these types of conditions for 
enforcement: Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait.  
Prior to the recognition or enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, Oman 
requires seven additional conditions. Two of the additions, public policy and no prior 
execution or judgment on the same subject or claim covered by the arbitral award, have 
been addressed under the first two sets of requirements discussed above. The remaining 
five include the following: (1) Oman has no jurisdiction as to the merits of the arbitral 
award, (2) the arbitral award is not based on fraud, (3) the parties have been notified and 
represented, (4) the request must be presented in legal action form, and (5) 
reciprocity.276 
Like Oman, Qatar also requires seven protectionist conditions prior to the grant 
of a leave to enforce a foreign arbitral award.277 Likewise, two of the conditions on 
public policy and no prior execution or judgment on the same subject or claim covered 
by the arbitral award, have been addressed above. Of the remaining five, Qatar only 
shares two in common with Oman: (1) that the arbitral award is not in the exclusive 
jurisdiction of Qatar, and (2) that there is reciprocity.278 Otherwise, the requirements for 
(1) res judicata effect [finality] in the country of origin, (2) a leave of enforcement from 
the country of origin, and (3) that due process be followed are not required in Oman, but 
are required in Qatar.279   
Bahrain requires five protectionist conditions prior to the enforcement of a 
foreign arbitral award. These requirements are similar to Qatar in three aspects, one of 
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which is the only similarity with Oman. Bahrain, like Qatar and Oman, requires that the 
arbitral award does not fall within its jurisdiction.280 Bahrain, like Qatar, also requires 
that the foreign arbitral award is deemed final at the place where it was made, and that 
due process was followed.281 In addition, Bahrain requires that the foreign arbitral 
award is arbitrable in Bahrain, and that there is notice of the leave to enforce.   
The conditions for Kuwait also differ from the conditions in the other three GCC 
states above, but do share some commonality.282 Like Bahrain and Qatar, Kuwait 
requires that (1) there should be notice and representation as to the foreign arbitral 
award, and (2) that the foreign arbitral award has res judicata effect [finality] in the 
country of origin.283 Like Bahrain only, Kuwait requires that the foreign arbitral award 
is also arbitrable in Kuwait.284 The only other condition for Kuwait is that the foreign 
arbitral award be also enforceable in the country of origin. 
 
D. Miscellaneous Requirements 
 
Aside from the conditions set out above, there are also miscellaneous conditions 
as well. The first one is applicable only to the KSA, Qatar, and Kuwait.285 It is a general 
requirement that there should be no obstacle against enforcement.286 KSA additionally 
states that the arbitral award must not violate a statute.287 The KSA also does not allow 
enforcement if (1) the arbitrator exceeded its authority, or (2) if there was a defect in the 
constitution of the tribunal.288 These two requirements, however, are consistent with the 
Shari’a.289 Additionally, a challenge to the capacity of the arbitrator is waived if not 
raised before the granting of the arbitral award.290 Kuwait also has one minor 
miscellaneous requirement: that the arbitral award is not governed by a summary 
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enforcement proceeding.291  
 
3.4. The Conditions for an Enforceable Arbitral Award Under the New York 
Convention as Compared to the Riyadh Convention, the ICSID Convention, and 
the GCC States 
 
3.4.1. Recapitulating and Reconciling the Conditions in the Shari’a 
 
 There are conditions in the Shari’a that are consistent with the New York 
Convention, the Riyadh Convention, and that of all the GCC states, including the 
writing requirement, the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, and the request for 
leave to enforce. The conditions under the Shari’a that diverge with international 
arbitration norms relate to the content requirement: the condition relating to the finding 
of facts, that the content of the arbitral award be substantiated by the rules of evidence 
of the Shari’a, and that the reasoning cite to Shari’a sources. These conditions are 
inconsistent and difficult to reconcile with international arbitration norms. The only 
GCC state that requires a finding of fact is the KSA.  
Additionally, the Shari’a condition relating to the validity of the arbitration 
agreement may be difficult to reconcile with international arbitration norms, 292 but only 
as to the prohibition on gharar and the riba. Although, as discussed more fully in 
Chapter Five relating to public policy, these prohibitions under the Shari’a have 
somewhat been reconciled by most GCC states by creating exceptions, for example, to 
the prohibitions on the riba. Most GCC states courts enforce an award of interest 
included in an arbitral award. Like all GCC states, the Shari’a also requires the 
summary of claims and the reason for the arbitral award, which is not required under the 
New York Convention.   
The New York Convention, likewise, has conditions absent from the Shari’a. 
These include the signature of arbitrators, the finding of an arbitral award, and that the 
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arbitral award has res judicata effect [finality]. Interestingly, GCC states are consistent 
with the New York Convention on these conditions. 
The pertinent question is whether the Shari’a conditions will prevail over 
regional and international agreements, and the domestic legislation of the GCC states. 
The answer to this question is not simple. First, the New York Convention prevails in 
the GCC states, or one should aptly say should prevail. Whether the New York 
Convention actually prevails in practice is another matter. While there have been recent 
trends, for example in the UAE, to apply the New York Convention without resorting to 
the conditions of the Shari’a, practitioners remain apprehensive.  
There would not be any conflict with the Shari’a as the Riyadh Convention 
expressly incorporated the Shari’a within its rules. Therefore, the requirements in the 
Shari’a that the arbitral award be in writing, the reason of the arbitral award, the 
summary of claims, and the finding of facts are also expressly incorporated into the 
Riyadh Convention. Lacking published case law, it is difficult to state with certainty the 
effect of the Shari’a on the Riyadh Convention, but it is very likely that a court would 
interpret the conditions of the Shari’a as conditions additional to the conditions stated in 
the Riyadh Convention. 
Shari’a conditions trump domestic legislation in GGC states like the KSA where 
the Shari’a is the source of law. In GCC states like the UAE, where the Shari’a is a 
primary source of law, Shari’a conditions will prevail if the condition is considered a 
fundamental part of the Shari’a, which Islamic scholars may disagree upon depending 
on the school of thought. Overall, none of the GCC states have adopted the “content” 
requirement of the Shari’a, specifically the referencing to the Shari’a, in its commercial 
arbitration laws. Additionally, the GCC states allow interest in the arbitral award. Still, 
what happens in practice remains unpredictable; therefore making it necessary for the 
GCC states to harmonise their view on this issue, and to create a uniform set of rules 
covering the conditions for the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award.   
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3.4.2. Recapitulating and Reconciling the Conditions in the Riyadh 
Convention 
 
 The Riyadh Convention remains consistent with the Shari’a, which is expressly 
embodied in the Riyadh Convention. At the same time, the Riyadh Convention 
explicitly subjects itself to the international obligations of the member states. So, 
whenever a conflict arises between the Riyadh Convention and the New York 
Convention, the latter prevails. The condition under the Riyadh Convention, for 
example, requiring a certified arbitral award is inconsistent with the New York 
Convention, and the latter would prevail.  
Generally, the Riyadh Convention remains consistent with the New York 
Convention since it only lacks in two conditions that the New York Convention 
requires: the writing requirement and the signature of the arbitrators. By reference to the 
Shari’a, however, the Riyadh Convention arguably also has the writing requirement.  
Further, the Riyadh Convention could arguably have a conflict with the New 
York Convention if it adopts the following additional Shari’a requirements that are 
absent from the New York Convention: the reason of the arbitral award, the summary of 
claims, and the finding of fact.  Such a situation creates a quagmire for the Riyadh 
Convention since, on one hand, it expressly adopts the Shari’a which has a set of these 
additional conditions, but, on the other hand, those conditions are in conflict with the 
New York Convention to which all the GCC states are members and as expressly stated 
in the Riyadh Convention such conflict with an international convention would give the 
international obligations the priority. No published case law that the author of this thesis 
is aware of has addressed this potential quagmire.  
 
3.4.3. Recapitulating and Reconciling the Conditions in the ICSID 
Convention 
 
The ICSID Convention is the least problematic when it comes to the conditions 
for enforcement. The ICSID Convention is consistent with GCC states and the New 
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York Convention with regard to its conditions for enforcement. In comparison, the GCC 
states and the New York Convention have imposed additional conditions for 
enforcement. This means that the ICSID Convention is more enforcement-friendly in 
comparison, especially against the domestic legislations of GCC states. The additional 
requirements present in the GCC states or in the New York Convention, however, 
would not bar enforcement of an ICSID arbitral award since enforcing states are 
mandated to treat such an arbitral award as final and binding, subject only to the state 
immunity defence in their respective jurisdictions.  
 
3.4.4. Recapitulating and Reconciling the Conditions in the Domestic 
Legislations of the GCC States 
 
It should initially be noted that all the GCC states have an obligation to follow 
the enforcement rules of the New York Convention. In practice, however, courts in 
most GCC states continue to apply rules from their domestic legislations and require 
applicants to meet additional conditions before enforcement, a practice that violates the 
New York Convention. In this regard, this chapter compared the similarities and 
differences in the conditions for enforcement set out in the domestic legislation of the 
GCC states and the New York Convention. 
It is worth mentioning that in the survey conducted, respondents were asked 
whether domestic and foreign arbitral awards should have the same or different 
conditions for enforcement. The majority of respondents at 62.50% prefer that the 
conditions for enforcement for domestic and foreign arbitral awards be the same, while 
only 37.50% prefer different conditions for enforcement.293 This view suggests that the 
majority of arbitration practitioners in the GCC states favour an enforcement procedure 
that treats both domestic and foreign arbitral awards equally. When the respondents 
were asked whether conditions for enforcement of domestic arbitral awards equally 
apply in practice to foreign arbitral awards, the majority of the respondents at 75% 
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answered “No”, while only 25% answered “Yes.”294 The GCC states not only have 
different conditions from one another, but also between domestic and foreign arbitral 
award enforcement.  
The domestic legislation of the GCC states and the New York Convention are 
generally similar with regard to the following preliminary conditions: writing 
requirement, the signature of arbitrators, the existence of an arbitration agreement, the 
finding of an arbitral award, that the arbitral award has res judicata effect [finality], and 
that there is a request for leave to enforce. The only apparent differences are with regard 
to the signature of arbitrators since some GCC states require that the refusal of an 
arbitrator to sign be noted.295 The New York Convention has no such requirement, and 
in case of a conflict, the New York Convention ought to prevail.   
The GCC states also added preliminary conditions not found in the New York 
Convention. Oman, the UAE, and the KSA require the names and address of the parties 
and arbitrators. Oman and the UAE296 go further and require the nationality and 
capacity of arbitrators, while the KSA additionally requires the domicile of the parties. 
Further, the GCC states uniformly added the following preliminary conditions: reason 
of the arbitral award, date of the arbitral award, place of the arbitral award, summary of 
claims, and evidence/documents used in the arbitration proceedings. Because these 
additional preliminary conditions are absent from the New York Convention, they in 
essence conflict with the New York Convention. In such a conflict, the New York 
Convention ought to prevail, but local judges may refuse enforcement without these 
conditions.  
The GCC states are only uniformly consistent with the Shari’a as to some 
preliminary conditions: writing requirement, reason for the arbitral award, existence of 
a valid arbitration agreement, summary of claims, and request for a leave to enforce. 
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Only the KSA is consistent with the Shari’a in requiring a finding of facts, while other 
GCC states deviate in this regard. The GCC states additionally have preliminary 
conditions that are absent from the Shari’a: names and addresses of parties and 
arbitrators, signature of arbitrators, finding of an arbitral award, date and place of the 
arbitral award, evidence and documents used, and res judicata effect [finality].  
The GCC states also added country specific formalistic, substantive, and 
miscellaneous conditions that are absent in the Shari’a, the Riyadh Convention, and the 
New York Convention. That domestic legislation of the GCC states imposes a more 
stringent set of conditions than the Shari’a explains that the Shari’s is not the primary 
obstacle to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  
Some additional formalistic and substantive conditions present in the GCC states 
are consistent with the New York Convention. Formalistic requirements that are 
uniformly required in all GCC states and the New York Convention include conditions 
of an original and signed copy of the arbitral award, a copy of the arbitration agreement, 
and a translation of the arbitral award. The New York Convention, however, does not 
require proof of registration for leave to enforce, that the period of appeal has expired, 
no prior or parallel proceedings, and notice of leave to enforce. It should be noted that 
the double exequatur requirement has been abolished in the New York Convention, but 
continues in practice in the UAE and Bahrain.  
The GCC states and the New York Convention converge with only one 
substantive condition: public policy. The New York Convention converge with some 
GCC states, though not all, on substantive conditions that the foreign arbitral award be 
arbitrable in the country of enforcement which is expressly required in Bahrain and 
Kuwait, and that the foreign arbitral award be final which is a condition only in Qatar, 
Bahrain, and Kuwait. None of the other formalistic, substantive and miscellaneous 
conditions present in the GCC states are present in the New York Convention. 
Therefore, the GCC states conflict with the New York Convention whenever they 
refuse enforcement based on these additional conditions. The New York Conventions 
ought to prevail whenever such a conflict arises, but in practice local judges may 
continue to insist on the additional domestic conditions. A harmonisation of the GCC 
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states’ rules for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards must take into account that 
the GCC states cannot impose additional conditions in light of the New York 
Convention. The author of this thesis proposes the elimination of these additional 
conditions that conflict with the New York Convention. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter showed that the conditions for the enforcement of arbitral awards 
under the Shari’a, though potentially expansive in some areas like public policy when 
applied by an enforcing court, is not burdensome. There are, in fact, fewer conditions 
placed by the Shari’a than by the domestic laws of the GCC states.   
In other words, domestic courts and legislation is more likely the culprit in the 
non-enforcement of foreign arbitral awards through additional conditions that are 
protectionist in nature, or that are motivated by distrust of other countries’ legal systems 
and procedures. The source of this distrust, within the context of the GCC states is often 
misplaced on the Shari’a, but a careful analysis of the specific conditions that each GCC 
state places on foreign arbitral award enforcement is too often unrelated to the Shari’a.  
After analysing the conditions placed by each of the GCC states prior to the 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, it is possible to conclude that the conditions 
placed by each of the GCC states are much more restrictive and more of an impediment 
to enforcement than the Shari’a itself and the New York Convention. In this regard, the 
additional conditions placed by the GCC states are likely the reason for the non-
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. When domestic courts have looked at the New 
York Convention as a guide to enforcement, instead of focusing solely on the domestic 
legislation, there seems to be more success in enforcement. On the other hand, failure 
by domestic courts to adhere to the pro-enforcement bias of the New York Convention, 
rather to take a protectionist stance in favour of domestic concerns lead to the non-
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Courts could perhaps take note of the position 
of the Cairo Court of Appeals in the Seventh Commercial Circuit, Case No. 50/128j (4 
January 2012), which explained that failure to meet certain conditions ought not to 
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automatically lead to non-enforcement or annulment, especially taking into account the 
possibility that one of the parties may have proceeded with the arbitration and waived 
such defects in the conditions.  A more liberal and flexible stance by the GCC states’ 
judges with regards to the conditions, which look toward the bias in favour of 
enforcement, would be a positive step forward for international arbitration in the region. 
This thesis proposes that the GCC states can find commonality in their laws 
relating to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. By doing so, the GCC states may 
be able to arrive at a set of conditions that are more in line with the New York 
Convention, but still take into account the Shari’a and the conditions for enforcement 
common to the GCC states. They can perhaps agree at a Unified GCC Arbitration Law 
for determining the proper conditions to be met in order to enforce a foreign arbitral 
award.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO THE ENFORCEABILITY OF FOREIGN 
ARBITRAL AWARDS IN THE GCC STATES 
 
4.0. Introduction  
 
Assuming that the party who prevails in an arbitration proceeding is able to meet 
the conditions for enforcement,1 the losing party may still be able to evade enforcement 
of the foreign arbitral award as specified under the New York Convention by invoking 
one of the grounds for the non-enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. The same is true 
under the domestic legislations of the GCC states that may add their own particular 
grounds for refusing the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. Part I of this chapter 
discusses the grounds for challenging the enforcement of arbitral awards under the 
Shari’a, which in essence generally prohibits the enforcement of arbitral awards that 
violate the fundamental principles of the Shari’a.  
Part II discusses the grounds for challenging the recognition or enforcement of 
arbitral awards, specifically foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention 
and arbitral awards under the ICSID Convention. First, part II discusses the grounds 
enumerated in Article V of the New York Convention. There are seven grounds that the 
New York Convention recognizes: (1) the absence of a valid arbitration agreement, (2) 
the lack of a fair opportunity to be heard, (3) the foreign arbitral award exceeds the 
scope of the submission to arbitration, (4) improper composition of the tribunal, (5) the 
foreign arbitral award is not binding, (6) the subject matter is not arbitrable, and (7) the 
public policy of the forum. Finally, part II discusses the automatic enforcement 
mechanism of the ICSID Convention.  
Part III examines grounds for non-enforcement that have been used in the GCC 
states’ context whether or not the non-enforcement was consistent with the New York 
Convention and/or the UNCITRAL Model Law. This section examines the provisions 
in each of the six GCC states and clarifies the specific grounds upon which the 
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enforcement of arbitral awards, specifically foreign arbitral awards, may be challenged.  
Part IV recapitulates and reconciles the challenges to the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards in the GCC states. Part V explains the results of the survey on the 
reasons for the non-enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states.  
Finally, this chapter argues that some of the potential challenges to the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention encourage non-
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states by giving national courts 
discretion to interpret some provisions. In essence, this chapter argues that the GCC 
states’ rules for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and the grounds upon which 
enforcement may be challenged are consistent with international arbitration norms. The 
chapter posits that the Shari’a does not add any more grounds for challenging the 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award than allowed under the New York Convention. 
In fact, the Shari’s does not even provide for an express set of grounds for challenging 
the enforcement of an arbitral award. What this means is that the Shari’a is far from 
being the culprit in the non-enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  Instead, the 
likelihood that a court in a GCC state will refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral award may 
be based on a party’s failure to meet the conditions for enforcement;2 or because the 
foreign arbitral award may be set aside under local rules that are not derived from the 
Shari’a.3 This chapter, however, limits the discussion to the potential challenges to the 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award in the GCC states, which generally follow the 
international arbitration norms and that this thesis proposes should unify the 
enforcement rules in a Uniform GCC Arbitration Law.  
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PART I  
 
4.1. Potential Challenges to the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under the 
Shari’a 
 
 The enforceability of an arbitral award under the Shari’a is based primarily on 
the concept of its binding nature. The majority of the Shari’a schools view arbitration as 
a contract,4 and which must be performed and executed like a contract under the Holy 
Qur’an, which says: “O ye who believe? Fulfill (all) obligations.”5 
 The Shafi’i, however, deem an arbitral award as binding only if the arbitral 
award is accepted by all the disputing parties, since in their view the parties must agree 
to enter into the arbitration and must, hence, also agree as to the arbitral award made 
afterwards. Al-Sheik argues that the majority position is more useful than the Shafi’i 
position because the majority view is consistent with contemporary life.6 Further, 
Alsheikh considers that the concern of the Shafi’i school is diminished since the 
arbitrator has the duty to make every effort to arrive at an enforceable award.7 The 
majority of Shari’a jurists, therefore, view that an arbitral award is binding on the 
parties once issued and the parties must comply with it, “provided that the award does 
not contradict [the] Shari’a.”8 According to Baamir, Hanbali scholars require 
ratification from a judge before enforcing any arbitral award.9 The judge would 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Essam Alsheikh, ‘Court Intervention in Commercial Arbitral Proceedings in Saudi Arabia: A 
Comparative Analytical Study of Shari’a Based Statutes and International Arbitral Practices’ (DPhil 
thesis, University of Portsmouth 2011) 51. 
5 The Holy Qur’an, Al-Ma’ida 5:1, Yusuf Ali Translation. 
6 Alsheikh (n 4) 51, citing UNCITRAL Model Law, ch 7, art 34(1). Baamir agrees with this position. 
Abdulrahman Baamir, Shari’a Law in Commercial and Banking Arbitration: Law and Practice in Saudi 
Arabia,  Ashgate (2010) 91. 
7 Alsheikh (n 4) 51; Martin Platte, ‘An Arbitrator’s Duty to Render Enforceable Awards’ (2003) 20(3) J 
Int’l Arb 307. See however, Christopher Boog, ‘The Lazy Myth of the Arbitral Tribunal’s Duty to Render 
an Enforceable Award’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 28 January 2013) 
!http://kuwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/author/christopherboog/" accessed 01 June 2013 (arguing that 
there is very little evidence that an arbitrator has a duty to render enforceable awards to the extent 
claimed). 
8 Alsheikh (n 4) 51. Al-Siyabi points out that it is binding even if it is based on the weakest point. 
Mohamed Al-Siyabi, ‘A Legal Analysis of the Development of Arbitration in Oman with Special 
Reference to the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards’ (DPhil thesis, University of Hull 2008) 
77; Samir Saleh, Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East: A Study in Shari’a and Statute Law 
(Graham & Trottman 1984) 390. 
9 Baamir (n 6) 91. 
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presumably review whether the arbitral award meets the conditions of the Shari’a as 
previously discussed in Chapter Three. However, Saleh does not think that a qadi 
[judge] must confirm an arbitral award because an award already has the characteristics 
of a court judgment.10  In practice, nevertheless, “if the opposing party is not willing to 
enforce the [arbitral] award, the confirmation by a qadi [judge] must be sought.”11  
 It is interesting to note that the KSA created an Enforcement Judge to replace 
the old system of enforcing an arbitral award before the Grievance Board, and the 
Enforcing Judge must follow Shari’a principles in the course of enforcement under 
Article 2 of the Enforcement Law, making the Shari’a rules on enforcement very 
relevant in the KSA.12 Further, the KSA courts have recognised foreign arbitral awards 
between a Saudi and a foreign party under the Shari’a.13  
 Aside from the discussion of the basis on which arbitral awards are enforceable 
under the Shari’a, there is scant discussion14 regarding the express grounds on which the 
enforcement of an arbitral award may be challenged other than the generalized 
statement, as made by Al-Sheikh, that the arbitral award should not contradict the 
Shari’a.15 As such, the grounds upon which an arbitral award may be refused 
enforcement under the Shari’a are those that would violate the fundamental principles 
of the Shari’a. In the survey, for example, the 48.39% of respondents answered that 
judges and arbitrators should apply the Shari’a in determining public policy only when 
a violation of a fundamental Shari’a principle has been established.16  
 Generally, however, the grounds for non-enforcement of an arbitral award under 
the Shari’a would be similar to the grounds for setting aside an arbitral award, and in 
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10 Samir Saleh, Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2006) 66. 
11 Yusuf Giansiracusa and others, ‘The New Enforcement Law of Saudi Arabia: an additional step toward 
a harmonized arbitration regime’ (Lexology, 4 September 2013) 
!http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4940d46e-2a5f-4e15-a694-ec52f5edf7d8" accessed 16 
October 2013. 
12 Giansiracusa and others, ‘The New Enforcement Law’ (n 11). The Enforcement Judge was created 
pursuant to the new Saudi Enforcement Law, Judiciary Regulation, Royal Decree No M/78 of 19/1428 (1 
October 2007). 
13 The 4th Review Committee, decision No 43/T/4 (Saudi Arabia 1995); The 4th Review Committee, 
decision No 187/T/4 (Saudi Arabia1992); The 4th Review Committee, decision No 208/T/4 (Saudi 
Arabia 1997). 
14 Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab and Jalal El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (3rd edn, Wolters 
Kluwer 2011); Alsheikh (n 4); Baamir (n 6); Al-Siyabi (n 8). 
15 The same is true regarding the specific grounds for setting aside an award as will be discussed in 
Chapter Six. 
16 See Appendix II, Survey Report, II(2.6.2.). 
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most cases would overlap with the conditions necessary for enforcement of an arbitral 
award. The grounds would include the following: (1) there must be a valid agreement to 
arbitrate, (2) the agreement to arbitrate must be in writing, (3) the parties must have 
capacity to enter into an agreement to arbitrate, (4) the arbitrators must be competent, 
(5) the arbitrators must follow the applicable law including the scope of the agreement, 
(6) the procedure must follow the mandates of the Shari’a, and  (7) the subject matter 
must be arbitrable under the Shari’a.17 The requirements that there is a valid arbitration 
agreement, that the arbitral award be in writing, that the arbitrator must follow the 
applicable law and scope of the arbitration agreement, and that the dispute be arbitrable 
under the Shari’a have all been covered in Chapter Three, regarding conditions for 
enforcement. These grounds will therefore not be repeated here.  
 This section, furthermore, discusses the capacity of the parties, the capacity of 
the arbitrator, and the procedural grounds as basis to challenge the enforcement of an 
arbitral award, since they were not separately required conditions for enforcement. Of 
course, a court, on its own, may always challenge the enforcement of an arbitral award 
because it fails to meet the conditions necessary for the enforcement of an arbitral 
award as previously discussed in Chapter Three. The grounds discussed in this chapter, 
different from the conditions for enforcement in Chapter Three, are those that the party 
must invoke and bring to the attention of the court for it to refuse enforcement. 
 
4.1.1. Capacity of the Parties as a Challenge to Enforcement Under the 
Shari’a 
 
 Under the Shari’a, the parties must have capacity to enter into an arbitration 
agreement. Therefore, the same rules for the capacity of parties to enter into contract 
apply to arbitration agreements.18 Those who are “minors, the insane, bankrupts, and in 
some versions the disabled and terminally ill”19 have no capacity to enter into an 
agreement to arbitrate under the Shari’a. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Al-Siyabi (n 8) 120-130. 
18 Al-Siyabi (n 8) 122. 
19 ibid. 
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4.1.2. Capacity of the Arbitrator as a Challenge to Enforcement Under the 
Shari’a 
 
 There are requirements under the Shari’a regarding the characteristics of the 
arbitrator, who should have the same general traits as a judge.20 According to Al-Siyabi, 
although it is preferred that the arbitrator has a background in the Shari’a, it is not 
necessary that the arbitrator is an expert in Islamic fiqh [jurisprudence].21 The Saudi 
Arbitration Law of 2012, however, now requires an arbitrator to hold a university 
degree in the Shari’a,22 a requirement that is unique to the KSA among all the GCC 
states, and that applies to both domestic and international commercial arbitration under 
Article 2.23 Another issue is whether a non-Muslim can be an arbitrator whenever a 
Muslim is a party to the dispute. 24  
 
4.1.3. Due Process or Procedural Challenge to Enforcement Under the 
Shari’a 
 
 The Shari’a requires several procedural rules25 to be followed, including the 
right to equal treatment, the right to present a case and defences or the right to be heard, 
the right to present evidence which must be consistent, and the principle of substantive 
truth must be adhered to and outweigh judicial technicalities.26 The Shari’a also has 
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20 The UAE, for example, under UAE Civil Procedure Code, Federal Law No (11) of 1992, art 206, 
requires that the arbitrator cannot (1) be a minor, (2) have a criminal conviction, (3) have been bankrupt 
(without having been rehabilitated), and (4) be legally incapacitated (such as being placed under 
guardianship). Al Rowaad Advocates & Legal Consultancy, ‘Appointing arbitrators’ (Al Rowaad, 19 
January 2014) !http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7771e67c-bc03-4d11-924c-
51ff05b990f4" accessed 24 February 2014.  
21 Al-Siyabi (n 8) 123. 
22 Saudi Arbitration Law of 2012, Royal Decree No M/34, published in Official Gazette on June 8, 2012 
(KSA 2012), art 14(3). 
23 ibid art 2 (stating that “the provisions of this Law shall apply to any arbitration regardless of the nature 
of the legal relationship subject of the dispute, if this arbitration takes place in the Kingdom or is an 
international commercial arbitration taking place abroad and the parties thereof agree that the arbitration 
be subject to the provisions of this Law”). 
24 For a discussion on this issue as a condition to enforcement, see Section 3.1.3.3. 
25 The Shari’a conditions to enforcement does not provide for a procedural requirement, which is left to 
the enforcement challenge and setting aside process. The procedural requirements of due process under 
the Shari’a is clearly included as part of Shari’a procedural public policy as will be discussed in Chapter 
Five. See generally, Chapter Five.  
26 Saleh (n 8) 383; Al-Siyabi (n 8) 124. 
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evidentiary rules that need to be considered, including the classification and priority of 
witnesses.27  
  
PART II 
 
4.2. Potential Challenges to Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Under 
International Conventions 
 
 After discussing the grounds for challenging the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards under the Shari’a, it is necessary to discuss the grounds for challenging the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention and the ICSID 
Convention.28  
   
4.2.1. Potential Challenges to Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
Under the New York Convention 
 
 The grounds for which the courts may refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral award 
are listed in Article V of the New York Convention. The court in Int’l Trading and 
Industrial Investment Company v. Dyncorp Aerospace Technology et al29 emphasized 
the consensus among US courts that “the grounds for relief enumerated in Article V of 
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27 Al-Siyabi (n 8) 124. This category in essence gives priority and more weight to the testimony of 
believers over non-nonbelievers, and male over female. The weight of testimony of believers and non-
believers is expressly stated in The Holy Qur’an, An-Nisa 4:141, Yusuf Ali Translation. The weight of 
the testimony of women is expressly stated in the Holy Qur’an, Al-Baqara 2:282, Yusuf Ali Translation, 
that “And bring to witness two witnesses from among your men. And if there are not two men [available], 
then a man and two women from those whom you accept as witnesses - so that if one of the women errs, 
then the other can remind her.” The above Surah, however, which remains controversial and subject to 
different opinions, has been said to apply only to financial transactions, and that women may testify 
equally as men in other matters. WISE, ‘Testimony in Court’ 
!http://www.wisemuslimwomen.org/currentissues/testimonyincourts/" accessed 20 March 2014.  
28 The ICSID Convention has little relevance because it has created an automatic enforcement 
mechanism, thereby removing the process from national courts. 
29 Int’l Trading and Industrial Investment Company v Dyncorp Aerospace Technology et al, US Dist Ct 
for the Dist of Col (21 January 2011), reprinted in (2011) Int’l J of Arab Arbitration, vol 3, No 3, 131-
147; Yusef Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v Toys “R” Us, Inc, 126 F3d 15, 20 (2d Cir 1997); Int’l Standard 
Elec Corp v Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Industrial Y Comercial, 745 F Supp 172, 181-182 
(SDNY 1990); Brandies Intsel Ltd v Calabrian Chems Corp, 656 F Supp 160, 167 (SDNY 1987); 
TermoRio SA ESP v Electranta SP, 487 F3d 928, 935 (DC Cir 2007). 
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the Convention are the only grounds available for denying recognition or enforcement 
of a foreign arbitral award.” Article V separates the types of grounds into two 
categories: five listed grounds, (a) to (e), under part (1) that the disputing party has the 
burden of proving; and two grounds (a) and (b) under part (2) that a court may apply 
sua sponte [on its own accord]. 
 
  4.2.1.1. Lack of Valid Arbitration Agreement 
 
 A valid arbitration agreement is necessary because “courts should not enforce an 
award against a party that never agreed to arbitrate.”30 Article V(1)(a) of the New York 
Convention states that enforcement may be refused if the agreement “referred to in 
Article II…is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing 
any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made.”31 
Article V(1)(a), thus, should be read in conjunction with Article II, which states that a 
court should enforce an arbitration agreement “unless it finds that the said agreement is 
null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.”32 
 
A. The Existence, Validity, and Operability of an Arbitration Agreement 
 
 The law governing an arbitration agreement is not as clearly addressed as the 
law governing a foreign arbitral award.33 As stated previously, however, Article II does 
explicitly govern the existence, validity and operability of the arbitration agreement.34 
Under the New York Convention Article V(1)(a), the arbitration agreement is valid 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Elisabeth Senger-Weiss, ‘Enforcing Foreign Arbitration Awards’ in Thomas Carbonneau and Jeanette 
Jaeggi (eds), American Arbitration Association, Handbook on International Arbitration and ADR 
(JurisNet LLC 2006) 170 (noting that the validity of this defence has not been reported in any U.S. court 
and has been restrictively defined by US courts, leaving such decision to the arbitrator and not the court); 
Prima Paint Corp v Flood & Conklin Manufacturing, 388 US 395 (1967). 
31 New York Convention, art V(1)(a). 
32 New York Convention, art II(3). The Convention leaves the terms “null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed” undefined. Carolyn Lamm and Jeremy Sharpe, ‘Inoperative Arbitration 
Agreements Under the New York Convention’ in Emmanuel Gaillard and Domenico Di Pietro, 
Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention in 
Practice (Cameron May 2009) ch 10, 298. 
33 Lamm and Sharpe (n 32) 301. 
34 ibid. 
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according to the law that the parties have chosen,35 but if there was no choice of law 
provision then the law of the country of origin, or where the foreign arbitral award was 
made. Parties, however, usually fail to include a choice of law provision covering the 
arbitration agreement.36 By default, thus, the arbitration agreement is usually governed 
by the law of the country where the foreign arbitral award was rendered.37 In the period 
before the tribunal is formed, however, courts will often apply the law of the forum to 
determine the existence, validity, or operability of the arbitration agreement.38 
Where the parties’ intention as to the governing law remains unclear, the Tokyo 
High Court in Japan Education Corp. v. Feld,39 stated that “we must presume, as it is 
the nature of arbitration agreements to provide for given procedures in a given place, 
that the parties intend that the law of the place where the arbitration proceedings are 
held will apply.” The Tokyo High Court follows the law of the seat of arbitration to 
determine the substantive validity of the arbitration agreement that is consistent with the 
position of English law under the English Arbitration Act.40 The English Commercial 
Court in Black-Clawson v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG,41 clarified the 
English position, stating that “it would be a rare case in which the law of the arbitration 
agreement was not the same as the law of the place or seat of arbitration.” 
It is also important to note the seminal judgement of Sulamerica Cia nacional de 
Seguros SA and Ors. v. Enesa Engenharia SA and Ors.,42 where the court set out 
traditional conflict of law principles to determine the law governing the arbitration 
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35 The Convention confirms the principle of “party autonomy” by allowing parties to designate the law 
applicable to the arbitration agreement. The principle of party autonomy is affirmed by the English 
Arbitration Act 1996, s 103(2)(b). XI Insurance Ltd v Owens Corning [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 500, [506] 
(QB Comm Ct). 
36 Lamm and Sharpe (n 32) 301. See also Richard Hill, ‘The Writing Requirement of the New York 
Convention Revisited: Are There Black Holes in International Arbitration?’ (1998) 13(11) Int’l Arb Rep 
17.  
37 See The 1961 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, art VI(2), done at 
Geneva, on 21 April 1961, 484 UNTS 364, No 7041 (1963-64). 
38 Lamm and Sharpe (n 32) 303. 
39 Japan Education Corp v Feld, (1995) XX YB Comm Arb 745, 747 (Japan, Tokyo High Court 1994). 
40 English Arbitration Act 1996, s 103 (2)(b). See also Channel Tunnel Group v Balfour Beatty Ltd, 
[1993] A C 334, [357] (HL). 
41 Black-Clawson v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG, [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 446 [483] (QB 
Comm Ct). See also C v D [2007] EWCA (Civ) 1282, [2008] I Lloyd’s Rep 239; Weissfisch v Julius, 
[2006] EWCA Civ 218, [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 716; West Tankers v RAS (the Front Comor) [2007] UKHL 
4, [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 391. 
42 Sulamerica Cia nacional de Seguros SA and Ors v Enesa Engenharia SA and Ors, [2012] EWCA Civ 
638. 
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agreement as follows: 
1. Whether there was an express choice of the parties with regards to the law 
applicable to the arbitration agreement, 
2. If there is no express choice, then whether an implied choice has been made 
by the parties, 
3. If there is no express and implied choice of the parties with regards to the 
law applicable then the law with the closest and most real connection with 
the arbitration agreement.  
Following these principles set out in Sulamerica, the High Court of Justice in 
Arsanovia Ltd. & Ors. v. Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings,43 held that the parties in a 
London seated LCIA arbitration had chosen Indian law to govern the arbitration 
agreement. Where the parties’ choice is unclear, the approach in Sulamerica had 
previously been applied in an ICC arbitral award44 using the “most significant 
relationship” or “closest connection” test. In arbitration, however, unlike determining 
the law governing the contract, determining the law that is of closest connection can be 
difficult.45   
The ICSID Tribunal in SOABI v. Republic of Senegal,46 where there was a 
contract between the investor and the Government of Senegal, applied Senegalese law 
because the project was located in Senegal and Senegalese parties were involved. The 
SOABI ruling could also be interpreted to mean that any contractual nexus between the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Arsanovia Ltd & Ors v Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings, [2012] EWHC 3702 (Comm); see also Habas 
Sinai Ve Tibbi Gazlar Istihsal Andustrisi AS v VSC Steel Company Ltd [2013] EWHC 
4071 (Comm); Chris Ross and Jonathan Cary, ‘Commercial Court confirms principles on law governing 
arbitration Agreements’ (ILO, 18 February 2014) ! 
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=b6b1aed0-1fc1-4700-ace3-
e230657aaf0e" accessed 20 March 2014; Harry Ormsby, ‘Governing law of the arbitration agreement: 
Importance of Sulamérica case reaffirmed where choice of seat was agreed without actual authority’ 
(Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 29 January 2014) 
!http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/01/29/governing-law-of-the-arbitration-agreement-
importance-of-sulamerica-case-reaffirmed-where-choice-of-seat-was-agreed-without-actual-
authority/comment-page-1/" accessed 24 February 2014. 
44 Seller v Buyer, (1995) XX YB Comm Arb 41 (Interim Award, ICC Case No 6149, 1990). 
45 AFM Maniruzzaman, ‘International Commercial Arbitration: The Conflict of Law Issues in 
Determining Applicable Substantive Law in the Context of Investment Agreements’ (1993) 40 
Netherlands Int’l L Rev 201, Issue 2; W Al-Jerafi, ‘Yemen’s Ratification of the New York Convention: 
An Analysis of Compatability and the Uniform Interpretation of Article V(1)(A) and V(2)(B)’ (DPhil 
thesis, University of Leicester 2013). 
46 SOABI v Republic of Senegal, ICSID Case No ARB/82/1. 
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investor and the host State triggers the application of the domestic law of the host state. 
In Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,47 the 
ICSID Tribunal applied domestic Venezuelan law because the dispute was contractual, 
and stated that international law plays a corrective and supplementary role but not more. 
Finally, even with a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) based dispute, the ICSID 
Tribunal in Asian Agricultural Products v. Sri Lanka,48 stated that a BIT may 
incorporate domestic law and thus render the source of law supplementary to 
international law.   
In the context of the GCC states, the law of a GCC state or the Shari’a would 
determine the validity of an arbitration agreement if the parties have chosen these laws 
to determine validity, or if the arbitral seat is a GCC state. However, choice-of-law rules 
simply do not exist in the Shari’a,49 and English courts50 have not been too friendly to 
parties choosing the Shari’a as the governing law.  
  
B. “Null and void” arbitration agreements 
  
 “Null and void” agreements are intrinsically defective, or affected by some 
invalidity right from the beginning.51 Examples of null and void agreements are those 
involving misrepresentation, fraud, duress, illegality, unconscionability, mistake, lack of 
capacity, or undue influence.52 The US Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit explained 
the scope of “null and void” agreements under Article II(3) as follows: 
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47 Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No ARB/00/5. 
48 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No ARB/87/3. 
49 Al-Jerafi (n 45) 61; Faisal Kutty, ‘The Shari’a Factor in International Commercial Arbitration’ (2006) 
Loy LA Int’l & Comp L R 565, (2009) J of Arab Arb 63. 
50 Petroleum Dev (Trucial Coast) Ltd v Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, (1995) 1 ICLQ 247, 250-251; Ruler of 
Qatar v  International Marine Oil Co Ltd (Arbitral Award, 1953) in (1957) 20 Int’l Law Rep 534; Shamil 
Bank of Bahrain EC v Beximco Pharm Ltd, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 19, [2004] 1 WLR 1784, [1787]. 
51 Lamm and Sharpe (n 32) 300; Albert van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: 
Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation (Kluwer 1981) 156. 
52 Lamm and Sharpe (n 32) 300;  Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration - Commentary and 
Materials (2nd edn, Kluwer 2001) 160; Elaine Wong, ‘Procedural Issues Resulting From a Fraud Claim 
in International Commercial Arbitration: An English Law Perspective’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 24 
January 2014) !http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/01/24/procedural-issues-resulting-from-a-
fraud-claim-in-international-commercial-arbitration-an-english-law-perspective/" accessed 24 February 
2014 (discussing illegality and fraud as a challenge to the enforcement of arbitral awards in the UK); 
Nigel Peter Albon v Naza Motor Trading SDN BHD [2007] EWHC 665 (Ch) (dealing with forgery); 
Astrazeneca UK Ltd v Albemarle International Corporation [2010] EWHC 1028 (Comm) (dealing with 
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an agreement to arbitrate is ‘null and void’ only (a) when it is subject to 
an internationally recognized defence such as duress, mistake, fraud, or 
waiver [references omitted], or (b) when it contravenes fundamental 
policies of the forum State. The “null and void” language must be read 
narrowly, for the signatory nations have jointly declared a general policy 
of enforceability of agreements to arbitrate.53 
 
The court in Buckeye Check Cashing Inc. v. Cardegena,54 held that the doctrine 
of autonomy applies and that the party making the challenge must prove that the 
arbitration agreement itself, and not just the main contract, is null and void under one of 
any invalidity defence. The modern approach to determining invalidity is through a 
prima facie verification. The Indian Supreme Court in Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. v. Aksh 
Opticfibre Ltd.,55 reasoned that the modern prima facie [in its face] approach is 
advantageous because it meets the basic requirements of expeditiousness at the pre-
reference stage and a fair opportunity to contest the arbitral award after the full trial. 
Courts today are more willing to refer disputes to arbitration after just a prima facie 
review.  
In an ICSID Convention case in Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. 
v. Arab Republic of Egypt,56 Egypt contended that the arbitration agreement was null 
and void because the Egyptian officials violated procedures prescribed by Egyptian law, 
and the ICSID Tribunal held that because the decisions were “cloaked” with the mantle 
of governmental authority and communicated as such to foreign investors who relied on 
them in making their investments, they could not be avoided. Egypt, however, continues 
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duress); Akciné Bendrové Bankas Snoras v Antonov and another [2013] EWHC 131 (Comm) (dealing 
with criminality); Soleimany v Soleimany [1999] QB 785 (dealing with illegal smuggling); Westacre 
Investments Inc v Jugoimport-SPDR Holding Co Ltd [2000] QB 288 (dealing with illegality); Abhinav 
Bhushan and Niyati Gandhi, ‘The Back and Forth of the Arbitrability of Fraud in India’ (Kluwer 
Arbitration Blog, 13 February 2014) !http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/02/13/the-back-and-
forth-of-the-arbitrability-of-fraud-in-india" accessed 24 February 2014; Nicholas Peacock and Vikas 
Mahendra, ‘Indian Supreme Court upholds ability of arbitrators to decide issues of fraud’ (Lexology, 30 
January 2014) !https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1516bdb1-e903-4515-bdae-
566cc391d817" accessed 24 February 2014. 
53Rhône Méditerrannée Compagnia Francese di Assicurazioni (Italy) v Achille Lauro, et al (Italy), (1984) 
IX YBCA 474, 481 (US Ct of App 3rd Circuit 1982).  
54 Buckeye Check Cashing Inc v Cardegena, 126 SCt 1204 (2006). 
55 Shin-Etsu Chemical Co v Aksh Opticfibre Ltd, Sup Ct India, 12 Aug 2005, XXXI YB Comm Arb 747 
(2006). 
56Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/84/3), 
Award of 20 May 1992, 8 ICSID Rev 328 (1993), 32 ILM 933 (1993). 
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to use the same invalidity argument as recently as the case in Ministry of Civil Aviation 
v. Malicorp Ltd, where the Cairo Administrative Court put forth an argument along the 
same vein.57 
 
C. Inoperative58 arbitration agreements 
  
“Inoperative arbitration” agreements are those that have become inapplicable to 
the parties and their dispute at the time the court is asked to refer the parties to 
arbitration because of the actions of one or more parties.59 A classic example is the 
arbitration clause in Shanghai Foreign Trade Corp v. Sigma Metallurgical Co.60, of 
which the court stated that a “settlement agreement without [an] arbitration clause 
rendered [the] arbitration clause in [the] earlier agreement ‘inoperative.’” The 
following, however, are not inoperative agreements:61 (1) agreements that are 
inconvenient, expensive,62 or burdensome to implement,63 (2) that an arbitral award 
may not be enforceable, (3) by framing a contract claim in tort,64 (4) a clause 
contemplating the possibility of litigation and arbitration,65 (5) the risk of multiple 
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57 Ministry of Civil Aviation v Malicorp Ltd, Council of State, Cairo Administrative Court, 6th Cir, Case 
No 18628 of 59j (10 February 2006). 
58 Lamm and Sharpe argue that the word “inoperative” has no meaning in the English language; and a 
leading commentary argues that the word has no meaning in English law. Lamm and Sharpe (n 32) 300; 
Michael Mustill and Stewart Boyd, Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, Buttersworth 1989) 464. 
59 Lamm and Sharpe (n 32) 300. 
60 Shanghai Foreign Trade Corporation v Sigma Metallurgical Co Pty Ltd, Pang Kee Lee and Chi Ju 
Chan, (1997) XXII YBCA 609, 614 (Australia, NSW S Ct 1996). 
61 Lamm and Sharpe (n 32) 306-310. 
62 German courts have held that lack of funding renders an arbitration agreement incapable of being 
performed. Lamm and Sharpe (n 32) 300; Julian Lew, Loukas Mistelis, Stefan Kroll, Comparative 
International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer 2003) 345. 
63 Courts view these risks as inherent. See Paczy v Haendler & Natermann GmbH [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
302 (CA), (1984) IX  YB Com Arb 445, 448; Dodwell & Co (Australia) Pty v Moss Security (1994) XIX 
YB Com Arb 615, 618 (Fed Ct Australia, 11 April 1990); National Iranian Oil Co v Ashland Oil, Inc, 
817 F2d 326, 328, 335 (5th Cir 1987); Tennessee Imports, Inc v Filippi, 745 F Supp 1314 (MD Tenn 
1990), (1992) XVII YB Com Arb 620, 632. 
64 Kabushiki Kaisha Ameroido Nihon v Drew Chemical Corp (1983) VIII YB Com Arb 394, 396 (Dist Ct 
Yokohama, 3 May 1980).  
65 Westfal-Larsen & Co A/S v Ikerigi Compania Naviera SA [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 424, 425 (QB Com 
Ct); Khalil Mechantaf, ‘Overriding an agreement to arbitrate, a DIFC Court of First Instance rejects an 
application to grant a stay’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 15 May 2012) ! 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/05/15/overriding-an-agreement-to-arbitrate-a-difc-court-of-
first-instance-rejects-an-application-to-grant-a-stay/" accessed 16 May 2012 (discussing a Dubai Court’s 
refusal to grant a stay of litigation in the Dubai Courts when there is a clause allowing for the possibility 
of arbitration in the LCIA). DIFC Law of 2008, art 7 was later amended to allow for a stay in proceedings 
143 
!
conflicting decisions,66 and (6) an imperfect reference to arbitration.67 
In determining whether an arbitration agreement is inoperative, courts will look 
at the intent of the parties.68 In doing so, courts may look at the specific or general 
intent of the parties. If the courts can determine the specific intent, the court can direct 
the parties to the method of arbitration they supposedly meant to designate. However, if 
courts cannot determine the specific intent, courts look into the general intent of the 
parties and refer the parties to ad hoc or institutional arbitration. Failing to determine 
either types of intent, a court will likely render the arbitration agreement “null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed.”69 
The question of when an arbitration agreement becomes inoperative boils down 
to whether any party to the agreement has waived the right to arbitrate disputes and 
rendering the arbitration agreement inoperative. Waiver of the right to arbitrate disputes 
can occur (1) by acquiescence to litigation or if the party begins arbitration proceeding 
and fails to request for a stay of the litigation, (2) by failing to invoke the arbitration 
agreement in the manner stated by the arbitration agreement, (3) by modifying the 
arbitration agreement whereby the parties agree to forgo arbitration in favour of 
litigation, or (4) by prosecuting related claims in court.70 In Spain, however, the 
Supreme Court held that “an application to a state court for interim protective measures 
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under DIFC Laws Amendment Law No 1 of 2013, which came into force on 15 December 2013. Article 
7 now provides that Article 13 of the DIFC Law of 2008 (concerning the recognition of arbitration 
agreements) applies (1) where the seat of arbitration is the DIFC; (2) where the seat is other than the 
DIFC; and (3) where no seat is designated or determined. There can now be no doubt that the DIFC 
Courts will stay proceedings in favour of an agreement to arbitrate, irrespective of what seat, if any, is 
stated in the agreement. This brings the law into compliance with the New York Convention on this issue. 
Robert Karrar-Lewsley, ‘Amendments to DIFC Arbitration Law: staying proceedings in favour of 
foreign-seated arbitration’ (Lexology, 23 January 2014) 
!http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=97cc0192-fa70-4734-a1c3-a0c04bcad532" accessed 23 
February 2014. 
66 Kaverit Steel & Crane Ltd v Kone Corp, , (1992) 85 Alta LR (2d) 287 (CA Alberta, 16 January 1992), 
(1994) XIX YB Com Arb 643, 651.  
67 W Laurence Craig, William Park, Jan Paulsson, International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration  (3rd 
edn, Oceana/ICC 2000) 130. 
68 See generally, Lamm and Sharpe (n 32) 310. 
69 Lamm and Sharpe (n 32) 310. 
70 Lamm and Sharpe (n 32) 314; Mechantaf (n 65) (where Dubai Court’s refusal to stay litigation so a 
party can proceed with arbitration in LCIA under an option to arbitrate clause could theoretically render a 
case an arbitration agreement inoperative if the party proceeds with litigation in Dubai courts). 
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did not constitute a waiver of arbitration.”71 Additionally, the New South Wales 
Supreme Court held that “an application for document production, although invoking 
the arbitration agreement, did not constitute a waiver.”72 
 
D. Arbitration Agreements Incapable of Being Performed 
  
Agreements that are incapable of being performed are incapable of being set into 
motion73 because of various reasons including (1) the arbitration clause is too vague or 
indefinite referred to as pathological agreements,74 (2) dissolution of the chosen 
arbitration institution, (3) problems with the constitution of the tribunal which could 
include problems in the appointment process or an undetermined place of arbitration, 
(4) the arbitrator refuses to act despite a valid arbitration agreement, (5) there is a 
problem with the place of arbitration, (6) there is insufficient funding to participate in 
the arbitration, or (7) the arbitrators are unable to resolve all the issues, especially in a 
multiparty situation.75   
In general, courts are allowed under the New York Convention to review 
whether an arbitration agreement is incapable of being performed, although courts will 
usually only apply a prima facie [on its face] review.76 The meaning of “incapable of 
being performed” will be determined by the law of the country where the arbitration 
was made.  A proposed test for determining whether this defence applies is whether 
“the arbitration proceedings can be effectively set into motion even without the 
cooperation of the other party.”77  
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71 Scandlines, AB (Sweden) and others v Ferrys del Mediterráneo, SL (2007) XXXII  YBCA 555,  562 
(Spain, Supreme Court 2002). 
72 ACD Tridon, Inc v Tridon Australia Pty Ltd, (2004) XXIX YBCA  533, 550 (Australia, Supreme Court 
of New South Wales 2002). 
73 Lamm and Sharpe (n 32) 300; van den Berg (n 51) 159. 
74 Michael McIlwrath, ‘The Gang of Four Rides Again: Pathological Clauses’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 
30 July 2013) !http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/07/30/the-gang-of-four-rides-again-
pathological-clauses/" accessed 14 October 2013. 
75 Stefan Kroll, ‘The “Incapable of Being Performed” Exception in Article II(3) of the New York 
Convention’ in Emmanuel Gaillard and Domenico Di Pietro, Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and 
International Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention in Practice (Cameron May 2009). 
76 Kroll (n 75) 323. 
77 Kroll (n 75) 326. 
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In National Iranian Oil Co v. Ashland Oil, Inc,78 where the defendant refused to 
participate in the arbitration proceedings in Iran in 1979 because it was dangerous for 
Americans at the time, the US court held the circumstances insufficient to render the 
agreement incapable of being performed despite “the political atmosphere in Iran...” and 
despite “the maelstrom of chaos and confusion engendered during the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran.” 
Some courts, however, seem too liberal and give life even to pathological 
arbitration agreements that seem too vague. In Lucky-GoldStar v. Ng Moo Kee 
Engineering, the Hong Kong High Court held valid an arbitration agreement that did 
not specify a country but only provided for arbitration in a “third country, under the rule 
of the third country and in accordance with the rules of procedures of the International 
Commercial Arbitration Association.” 79 
 
4.2.1.2. Incapacity Defence80 
   
The other provision of Article V(1)(a) allows for the refusal of enforcement 
upon proof that “[t]he parties to the agreement referred to in Article II were, under the 
law applicable to them, under some incapacity.”81 The New York Convention does not 
define the term “incapacity” and the concept may vary from jurisdiction to 
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78National Iranian Oil Co v Ashland Oil, Inc, 817 F2d 326, 328, 335 (5th Cir 1987). 
79 Lucky-GoldStar v Ng Moo Kee Engineering, High Ct Hong Kong [1993] 2 HKLR 73 (5 May 1993), 
(1995) XX YB Comm Arb 280. See, however, Francisco Málaga, ‘Defective arbitration clauses’ (Kluwer 
Arbitration Blog, 25 February 2014) !http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/02/25/defective-
arbitration-clauses/" accessed 26 February 2014, referring to Palencia Court of Appeal (Audiencia 
Provincial) on 10 April 2000; Cantabria Court of Appeal on 23 July 2007; Madrid Court of Appeal (10th 
panel) of 31 May 2005; Castilla y León High Court (Tribunal Superior) of 24 November 2011. 
80 The defence has a curious history, and was controversially added to the Convention at the last minute, 
and was neither fully debated nor explained. See C Ignacio Suarez Anzorena, ‘The Incapacity Defence 
Under the New York Convention’ in Emmanuel Gaillard and Domenico Di Pietro, Enforcement of 
Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention in Practice 
(Cameron May 2009) ch 22, 616-620 (explaining that the adopted text was proposed by Prof. Sanders of 
the Netherlands on the last day, and after a failed opposition from the Soviet Union, a protest from 
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81 New York Convention, art IV(1)(a). This is known as the incapacity defence. The lack of capacity by a 
party to enter into an arbitration agreement is also known as subjective arbitrability. See Piero Bernardini, 
‘The Problem of Arbitrability in General’ in Emmanuel Gaillard and Domenico Di Pietro, Enforcement of 
Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention in Practice 
(Cameron May 2009) ch 17, 504. 
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jurisdiction.82 There seems to be a general notion of capacity, however, in international 
law. The notion is that a person should enter into contracts or binding legal relationships 
out of their own free will or on his or her own name and account.83 Otherwise, 
incapacity of the person would exist. The incapacity defence under the New York 
Convention seems to cover the issue of whether a certain party had the requisite 
capacity at the time of the execution of the arbitration agreement.84 A clear example is 
when the person is insane at the time of entering into the agreement. Yet, the concept of 
incapacity does not only apply to physical persons but has also been held to apply to 
legal entities whether private85 or public.86 
Article V(1)(a) states that the capacity of the parties should be determined 
according to “the law applicable to them.”87 The New York Convention, however, does 
not specify the applicable law. In this regard, it is possible for the Shari’a to apply when 
determining the capacity of parties especially in the GCC states, and the grounds for 
incapacity under the Shari’a, as discussed previously in Sections 4.1.1. and 4.1.2., may 
differ from non-Shari’a jurisdictions.88  
In most jurisdictions, the capacity of a natural person could depend on the 
person’s place of usual residence, or on the person’s nationality.89 For business entities, 
the capacity could depend on the usual place of business or where the legal entity 
practices its business.90 The phrase “to them” creates difficulty in determining the 
applicable law. In interpreting this phrase, courts have used either the personal law 
approach or the law of the seat approach. Under the personal law approach, courts 
consider the nationality, domicile, or residence of the physical person and the place of 
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82 Anzorena (n 80) 621. 
83 ibid. 
84 ibid 632. 
85 On rare occasions, incapacity would apply if a national court applied the virtually extinct ulta vires 
doctrine or when one of the companies is a non-existent company. ibid 623-624. 
86 Italy, Spain, Russia, Germany, and the US are examples of countries that have applied the incapacity 
defence to legal entities. Its application to public entities would apply if there is legislation that prohibits 
government entities from entering into arbitration agreements. Some countries like Syria have 
alternatively used the public policy defence. ibid 623-627. 
87 New York Convention, art V(1)(a). 
88 Al-Siyabi (n 8) 123; see Sections 4.1.1. and 4.1.2. 
89 van den Berg (n 51) 171. 
90 ibid. 
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incorporation or the seat of administration of a legal entity.91 A simpler approach 
followed by the UNCITRAL Model Law is to rely on the law of the forum to determine 
capacity whether or not the law of the forum applies the personal law approach.92  
Incapacity may be raised as a defence when there is legislation that prohibits 
governmental entities that perform governmental functions to enter into arbitration 
agreements. An Italian court, for example, in Societe Arabe des Engrais Phosphates et 
Azotes-SAEPA v. Gemanco srl,93 denied enforcement of an arbitral award because the 
two Tunisian government owned companies where public entities and were not 
permitted to enter into arbitration agreements under Tunisian law. As GCC states like 
the KSA have such similar limitations on government entities, the scenario could arise 
in the GCC states.  
 
4.2.1.3. Lack of Due Process 
 
Article V(1)(b) incorporates a basic notion of due process into the New York 
Convention.94 This provision has been considered by eminent authors as “the most 
important ground for refusal under the New York Convention (and the [UNCITRAL] 
Model Law)…”95 Article V(1)(b) allows the court to refuse enforcement if “the party 
against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of 
the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his 
case.”96  
The phrase “otherwise was unable to present his case” covers instances where a 
party is prevented from presenting a case at the arbitral proceedings due to force 
majeure [acts of nature] or other causes. The phrase acts as a catchall provision for any 
reasonable justification for a party’s inability to attend the arbitral proceedings to avoid 
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91 Bernardini (n 81) 505 (“it is generally accepted that the law applicable to a party’s capacity to conclude 
an arbitration agreement is that party’s personal law, i.e., its national law”). 
92 This approach is suggested by Anzorena. See Anzorena (n 80) 634. 
93 Societe Arabe des Engrais Phosphates et Azotes –SAEPA v Gemanco srl, (1997) XXII YB Comm Arb 
737. 
94 Senger-Weiss (n 30) 171(arguing that the word “proper” seem to have been inserted to cover situation 
when the defendant is under some legal incapacity). 
95 Alan Redfern and others (eds), Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (4th edn, 
Sweet and Maxwell 2005) 448. 
96 New York Convention, art V(1)(b). 
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ex parte arbitration proceedings. Courts, however, have not always liberally construed 
this catchall provision.97 
 
A. Definition of Due Process  
 
The concept of due process, though considered of paramount importance, may 
not necessarily mean the same in all national laws.98 The Canadian Supreme Court in 
Corporacion Transnacional de Inversiones, SA de CV v. STET International SpA and 
STET International Netherlands NV99 [hereinafter “STET”], recognized that there is no 
single, universal definition for due process. Though, there is a sense of a basic set of 
requirements for what process is due. The STET court states that due process, which 
pertains to public policy, implies a fundamental principle, that the parties have an equal 
opportunity to be heard.100 This principle demands that each party must have been 
effectively offered such an opportunity.101 Bernardini listed three fundamental 
principles of due process under international conventions: “(1) the right to be heard (at 
least in writing); (2) ‘audi alteram partem’ [i.e. make each party aware of its opponent’s 
case and allow it to rebut the same]; (3) the right to be treated alike.”102   
 
B. Narrow Interpretation of Due Process 
  
Despite the lack of a unified definition for due process, courts in various 
countries are in agreement that the due process defence ought to be interpreted 
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97 See for example, Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co v Societe General de l’Inudstrie du Papier 
(RAKTA), 508 F2d 969 (2d Cir 1974) (rejecting argument of due process for refusal to accommodate a 
witness’ speaking schedule); Biotronik Mess- und Therapiegerate GmbH & Co v Medford Medical 
Instrument Co, 415 F Supp 133 (DNJ 1976) (rejecting argument that rights and liabilities under 
agreement had not matured).  
98 Herman Verbist, ‘Challenges on Grounds of Due Process Pursuant to Article V(1)(B) of the New York 
Convention’ in Emmanuel Gaillard and Domenico Di Pietro, Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and 
International Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention in Practice (Cameron May 2009) ch 24, 683-
686 (explaining different definitions in Canada, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the US).  
99 Corporacion Transnacional de Inversiones, SA de CV v STET International SpA and STET 
International Netherlands NV, Sup Ct Canada (3 May 2001). 
100 ibid. 
101 ibid. 
102 Piero Bernardini, ‘The Role of the International Arbitrator’ (2004) 20(2) Arb Int’l 113, 117; Verbist (n 
98) 682. 
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narrowly.103 Courts in Germany, Italy, Spain, and the US have applied a narrow 
interpretation. Further, courts distinguish between domestic and international public 
policy when determining due process, and courts tend to apply the forum state’s 
standard for due process.104 The Hamburg Court of Appeal made such a distinction and 
held that only in extreme cases, where a party had not been able to present his case in an 
arbitration held abroad, would the basic principles of German due process be 
violated.105  
 
   C. Types of Due Process Challenges 
 
 It is important to note that most challenges to enforcement based on due process 
have been unsuccessful.106 This is perhaps due to the New York Convention’s pro-
enforcement policy, but also because the process was actually due.  
 Notice is one of the most important requirements of fairness and due process. 
The notice should be proper, and should give the party sufficient knowledge and time to 
prepare a case.107 In Sesostris SAE v. Tranportes Navales SA and M/V Unamuno,108 the 
US District Court of Massachusetts refused enforcement of a foreign arbitral award 
because a third party mortgagee in possession of the ship used for carriage of goods had 
not received proper notice of the arbitration proceedings. A mere letter stating, “it is our 
understanding that arbitration proceedings are presently being pursued in Madrid, 
Spain”109 was deemed insufficient notice by the court. 
It would also be a violation of due process if a party was not given the names of 
the arbitrator and a party cannot challenge the fairness of the chosen or designated 
arbitrator. The German Court of Appeal110 refused enforcement of a foreign arbitral 
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103 Verbist (n 98) 687. 
104 Verbist (n 98) 687. 
105 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, 3 April 1975, (1977) II YB Comm Arb 241. 
106 Ninety percent of cases where due process was invoked as a defence resulted in enforcement. Verbist 
(n 98) 693 and 701; Albert van den Berg, ‘Refusals of Enforcement under the New York Convention of 
1958: the Unfortunate Few, in Arbitration in the Next Decade’ (1999) ICC Pub No 612E 75, 78. 
107 Verbist (n 98) 694; Seostris SAE v Transportes Navales SA and M/V Unamuno, 727 FSupp 737 (D 
Mass 1989), (1991) XVI YB Com Arb 640, 643-44. 
108 Sesostris SAE (n 107). 
109 ibid. 
110 Oberlandesgericht Koln, 10 June 1976 (1979) IV YB Comm Arb 258, 259-260. 
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award because the German party was not informed of the names of all the arbitrators. In 
the KSA, such requirement will be crucial, as the Saudi Arbitration Law of 2012 
requires, in addition to the requirements set out in the 1983 Law, that arbitrators be 
holders of at least a university degree in Shari’a. This is an important practical 
consideration when appointing an arbitrator given that the foreign arbitral award cannot 
contravene the Shari’a. The Dubai Court of Cassation, Action No. 128 of 2008 (15 June 
2008),111 however, stated that a challenge to the appointment of an arbitrator will not be 
successful if the arbitrator has already issued an arbitral award or if the proceedings 
have been closed, meaning that the right to challenge the appointment of an arbitrator 
could be waived by the parties by not raising it during the arbitral proceedings. 
 One of the essences of due process is to give the parties sufficient and 
reasonable time to present a case. One-week time to submit a statement of defence, 
according to the Spanish Supreme Court in Holargos Shipping Corporation v. Hierros 
Ardes SA,112 was an inadequate amount of time to prepare a case, and refused 
enforcement. It is interesting to point out that the growing popularity of fast track 
arbitration may raise concerns of due process especially that a respondent may not have 
sufficient time to prepare a proper defence.113 The defendant should also be informed of 
the arguments made by the claimants because preparing a defence would be impossible 
otherwise. 114  
 A foreign arbitral award would also be refused enforcement if a party did not 
receive copies of documents submitted by another to the arbitral tribunal. The 
Amsterdam Court of Appeal in GWL Kersten & Co BV v. Societe Commerciale Raoul-
Duval & Cie,115 found that the arbitration held in London violated the due process right 
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111 Dubai Court of Cassation, Action No 128 of 2008 (15 June 2008). 
112 Holargos Shipping Corporation v Hierros Ardes SA, (1986) XI YB Com Arb 527, 528 (Tribunal 
Supremo, 3 June 1982). 
113 Sunil Abraham, ‘Fast track arbitration an idea whose time has come?’ Arbitration News (March 2010) 
vol 15, No 1, 24.  
114 Verbist (n 98) 696; Landgericht [Ct First Inst] Bremen, 20 January 1983, (1987) XII YB Com Arb 
486, 487; Ajay Kanoria and Others v Tony Francis Guinness, [2006] EWCA Civ 222 (court upheld the 
refusal of enforcement as Mr. Guinness was not given proper notice of an allegation of fraud). 
115 GWL Kersten & Co BV v Societe Commerciale Raoul-Duval et Cie, (1994) XIX YB Com Arb 708, 
709 (Gerechtshof [CA] Amsterdam, 16 July 1992); see however, Gujarat NRE Coke Limited v Coeclerici 
Asia (Pte) Ltd [2013] FCAFC 109 (Australian court rejecting a party’s argument of being unable to 
present a case because such argument would succeed only in extreme cases and not in this case where the 
parties who owed debt tried to buy time); Timana Hattam, ‘Australian Courts Aligned with the UK in 
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to be heard when the claimant submitted documents to the arbitral tribunal without 
communicating them to the defendant and when the arbitral tribunal likewise failed to 
provide a copy to the defendant. The same is true regarding expert reports, a copy of 
which must be given to the other party with sufficient time to comment.116  
 
4.2.1.4. Arbitration Scope 
 
The defence under Article V(1)(c) is consistent with the principle of Article 
V(1)(a) that a foreign arbitral award should not be enforced against a party unless the 
party agreed to  arbitrate the subject matter.117  Article V(1)(c) states that a court may 
refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral award if “[t]he award deals with a difference not 
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it 
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration...”118 A 
foreign arbitral award, thus, should stay within the limits of the scope of submission to 
arbitrate. A separate part of a foreign arbitral award, however, can be enforced as long 
as it deals with a dispute within the scope of the submission.119  
The Article V(1)(c) defence, where there is a valid arbitration agreement and the 
issue is the scope of the arbitrator’s actions, should be distinguished from the Article 
V(1)(a) defence, where there is no valid arbitration agreement and the arbitrator cannot 
act. Under Article V(1)(c), there are two issues that arise. The first is when the 
arbitrators act beyond the scope of a valid arbitration agreement by issuing a foreign 
arbitral award that relates to disputes beyond the agreement. The second is when the 
arbitrators act within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement, but exceed their 
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Reluctance to Depart from Decisions of the Seat Court on Asserted Procedural Defects when Enforcing 
Foreign Arbitral Awards’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 25 October 2013) 
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to-depart-from-decisions-of-the-seat-court-on-asserted-procedural-defects-when-enforcing-foreign-
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116 Verbist (n 98) 700; Paklito Investment Ltd v Klockner East Asia Ltd, (1994) XIX YB Com Arb 664, 
668-72 (Sup Ct Hong Kong, High Ct, 15 January 1993).  
117 Senger-Weiss (n 30) 171. 
118 New York Convention, art V(1)(c). 
119 Senger-Weiss (n 30) 171; Ramona Martinez, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral 
Awards Under the United Nations Convention of 1958: The Refusal Provisions’ 24 Int’l Law 487, 501-
502 (1990). 
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authority by addressing claims that the parties have not submitted to them.120  
 
4.2.1.5. Irregularity in the Arbitration Process  
 
Article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention allows a court to refuse 
enforcement of the foreign arbitral award if “[t]he composition of the arbitral authority 
or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, 
failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the 
arbitration took place.”121 In practice, there are relatively few cases where enforcement 
was refused under this defence.122 It is important to note here that party autonomy 
governs and then the law of the country where the arbitration proceeding was held.123  
In the GCC states, the Shari’a or the law of any GCC state regarding the 
composition of the arbitral tribunal and the arbitral proceedings would only apply if 
there was no party agreement covering this issue, the arbitration proceeding took place 
within a GCC state, and the New York Convention applies. Theoretically,124 such a 
situation could cover non-domestic arbitral awards, classified as such because 
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120 Anzorena (n 80) 641. Scholars are divided on whether the claims and counterclaims submitted by the 
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arbitration occurs in the same country where enforcement is sought but exclusively 
involving non-Muslims or foreign nationals, and foreign arbitral awards involving an 
arbitration that took place in a GCC state or a country that follows the Shari’a.   
Consistent with the principle of party autonomy, the New York Convention 
allows parties to determine and agree as to the composition of the tribunal and the 
arbitral procedure.125 A related issue is when there is a non-agreement on the 
appointment of one or more arbitrators. The Egyptian court in Cairo Court of Appeal, 
Seventh Commercial Circuit, Case No. 38 of 126/j, Commercial Arbitration,126 stated 
that Article 17 of the Egyptian Arbitration Law authorizes the party who has an interest 
in the case to request the intervention of the court to compose the arbitral tribunal. The 
Egyptian court saw such tactic as possibly used to delay the arbitral proceedings, stating 
that the law does not allow a party to procrastinate or to have, as a pretext, the non-
selection of an arbitrator to threaten the other party.   
Regarding the “arbitral procedure,” the term is to be interpreted broadly.127 
However, only serious or material procedural violations or when the violation 
substantially prejudices a party are covered by the defence.128 A more reasonable 
approach is to allow any procedural violation to bar enforcement if the violation 
affected the outcome of the foreign arbitral award.129 Most cases that rely on this 
defence for non-enforcement, however, resulted in finding that the irregularity in 
procedure was not proven. Most courts take a pro-enforcement view, and construe the 
defence restrictively.  
  
  4.2.1.6. The Foreign Arbitral Award is not Binding 
 
  Under Article V(1)(e), the court may refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral award if 
“[t]he award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or 
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, 
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125 Jarvin (n 122) 730. This agreement may be oral or written, implied or explicit. 
126 Cairo Court of Appeal, Seventh Commercial Circuit, Case No 38 of 126/j, Commercial Arbitration (8 
June 2010). 
127 Jarvin (n 122) 730. 
128 This is the position of many authors. Jarvin (n 122) 742. 
129 Gaillard and Savage (n 121) 989. 
154 
!
that award was made.”130 “This provision was actually a response to concerns that the 
[foreign arbitral] award should not be given binding effect in one country when it is not 
binding under the law where it is made.”131  
Article V(1)(e) can be divided into two categories. The first category covers 
foreign arbitral awards that have not yet become binding. Under the New York 
Convention, the word “binding” means there is no further arbitral appeal available.132 In 
Shell Egypt West Manzala GmbH v. Dana Gas Egypt Ltd.,133 the court considered an 
arbitration clause provision which stated that the arbitral tribunal’s foreign arbitral 
award “shall be final, conclusive and binding on the parties.” The court rejected the 
defendant’s argument that the provision excluded any rights of appeal under section 69 
of the Arbitration Act 1996 because clear words were necessary to exclude rights of 
appeal, and the words “final and binding” alone were not enough.  
The second category is a complicated defence that has created controversy and 
competing approaches by New York Convention signatories. It covers foreign arbitral 
awards that a court has set aside or suspended in the country where the foreign arbitral 
award was made. The basis for courts setting aside a foreign arbitral award in the 
second category is (1) the law of the place of arbitration, which may be more liberal in 
allowing the non-enforcement of foreign arbitral awards; and (2) even if the foreign 
arbitral award is rendered in another country, the law of the place of arbitration may 
have been chosen by the parties to apply as substantive law in the choice of law 
provision.134 The setting aside of a foreign arbitral award by the place of origin, 
however, has not prevented or deterred enforcement in countries like France, relying 
upon national legislation.135 A discussion on setting aside will be made in Chapter Six.  
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130 New York Convention, art V(1)(e). 
131 Senger-Weiss (n 30) 172. 
132 Senger-Weiss (n 30) 173 (stating that holding otherwise would validate a means for a losing party to 
evade enforcement by brining, in a foreign court, a post arbitral action to set aside the award). 
133 Shell Egypt West Manzala GmbH and anor v Dana Gas Egypt Ltd, [2009] EWHC 2097 (Comm). 
134 Dana Freyer, ‘The Enforcement of Awards Affected by Judicial Orders of Annulment at the Place of 
Arbitration’ in Emmanuel Gaillard and Domenico Di Pietro, Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and 
International Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention in Practice (Cameron May 2009) ch 26, 760; 
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135 Freyer (n 134) 760. Belgian courts allow enforcement despite the set aside if the connection to the 
country was minimal.  
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  4.2.1.7. Lack of Arbitrability 
 
 The provisions under Article V(2) differ from the previous five provisions 
because the two defences under Article V(2) are based on the respect for the authority 
of the country where the foreign arbitral award is sought to be enforced. The provisions 
under Article V(2), therefore, have the most applicability in terms of challenging 
foreign arbitral awards based on the laws of the Shari’a and/or the domestic laws of 
each of the GCC states.  
 
   A. The Problem of Arbitrability in General  
 
Article V(2)(a) states that enforcement may be refused if “[t]he subject matter of 
the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that 
country.”136 In other words, the enforcing state may decide the arbitrability of the 
dispute using its domestic laws. 137 In the GCC states, this means that GCC states can 
use their national arbitration laws and/or the Shari’a to determine the arbitrability of a 
dispute.  
 
   B. Subjective v. Objective Arbitrability 
  
It must be noted here that there is a distinction between subjective arbitrability 
and objective arbitrability. Subjective arbitrability deals with issues covered by Article 
V(1)(a) relating to the incapacity of a party to enter into an arbitration agreement. This 
type of arbitrability deals with the aptitude of the party to enter into an agreement, 
lacking such aptitude thereby renders the agreement null and void for lack of consent. 
This is arbitrability ‘ratione personae.’ Such an issue arises in relation to a state’s or a 
public entity’s capacity to conclude an arbitration agreement. The Paris Court of Appeal 
in Gatoil v. National Iranian Oil Co,138 rejected Gatoil’s argument that the agreement 
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136 New York Convention, art V(2)(a). This is also known as objective arbitrability. 
137 Senger-Weiss (n 30) 173 (“If the grounds of a dispute cannot be settled by arbitration under domestic 
law, a court may refuse to enforce an award granted through a foreign arbitration panel.”). 
138 Gatoil v National Iranian Oil Co, 1993 (2) Rev Arb 281 (CA Paris, 17 December 1991). 
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was invalid because it lacked the necessary parliamentary authorisation. 
Article V(2)(a) deals with objective arbitrability, a ‘reatione materiae,’ which 
concerns whether the subject matter is capable of arbitration. Under objective 
arbitrability, the agreement is deemed null and void, not because of consent, but 
because its object is contrary to law.139  
Under objective arbitrability, it is not the parties that determine whether a 
subject matter is arbitrable. Instead, it is the prerogative of the state and its legislature to 
determine what subject matter is arbitrable. In the context of the GCC states, this area 
could be ripe for challenges to the enforceability of foreign arbitral awards based on the 
Shari’a, depending on the status of the Shari’a in a GCC state’s constitutional 
framework.  
 
   C. Applicable Law 
 
 There are two possibilities regarding who will determine the applicable law to 
the arbitrability of the arbitration agreement: the arbitrator(s) or the state court.140 The 
arbitrator will determine the law applicable to the arbitration agreement whenever the 
parties have designated so in the agreement, a paramount characteristic of party 
autonomy. It is, however, rare for parties to provide for the law applicable to the 
arbitration agreement in the arbitration clause.141  
Regardless, when an arbitrator does decide which law applies to the arbitration 
contract, the arbitrator has three options: the law governing the contract, the law of the 
seat, or a-national rules.142 An arbitrator can look at the choice of law provision of the 
contract to see if the parties also intended to apply the choice of law to the arbitration 
agreement.143 The most common practice is for arbitrators to apply the law of the seat of 
the arbitration whenever the parties are silent as to the applicable law.144 Some 
arbitrators have applied an a-national approach to determining the applicable law by 
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139 Bernardini (n 81) 504. 
140 ibid 509-517. 
141 ibid 511 (“In this author’s experience, very few arbitration clauses contained in a contract provide for 
the applicable law.”). 
142 ibid 512-514. 
143 ibid 512. 
144 ibid 513. 
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looking at an internationally accepted standard.145 
Courts could also determine the law applicable to the arbitration agreement at 
the setting aside stage or at the enforcement stage. For purposes of this chapter, the 
focus will be on the enforcement stage. At the enforcement stage, Article V(2)(a) seems 
to be clear that the law of the lex fori is exclusively the applicable law as the provision 
states that objective arbitrability is to be determined under “the law of that country” 
where enforcement was sought.146 This is the view of van den Berg and the majority of 
relevant authorities.147 Bernardini argues, however, that it is theoretically possible to 
challenge the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award not under Article V(2)(a), but 
under Article V(1)(a).148 In such a situation and under Article V(1)(a), the law 
determined by the parties, or absent such choice, the law of origin or where the foreign 
arbitral award was made, could apply and determine arbitrability. In other words, the 
foreign arbitral award has to be arbitrable at the place where the foreign arbitral award 
was made under Article V(1)(a) and at the place where the foreign arbitral award is 
being enforced under Article V(2)(a).  
In the context of the GCC states, it is possible to apply the law of arbitrability of 
a GCC state when a foreign arbitral award is sought to be enforced in a GCC state and a 
challenge is made under Article V(2)(a), or when a foreign arbitral award is made in the 
GCC states, enforced outside of the GCC states, and challenged under Article V(1)(a). 
 
   D. Arbitrable Dispute 
 
 The determinations of what subject matter is arbitrable will differ from country 
to country as arbitrability depends on “the applicable national laws.”149 For this reason, 
the answer to the choice of law is very important. Parties can agree to arbitrate 
arbitrability. In Schneider v. Kingdom of Thailand,150 the US Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that because Walter Bau AG and Thailand clearly and unmistakably 
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147 See van den Berg (n 51) 289. 
148 Bernardini (n 81) 516-517. 
149 Bernardini (n 81) 517. 
150Schneider v Kingdom of Thailand, US Ct of App, Second Circuit, Docket No 11-1458-cv (8 August 
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agreed to arbitrate issues of arbitrability - including whether the toll way project 
involved “approved investments” - Thailand is not entitled to an independent judicial 
redetermination of that same question. For purposes of this study, this thesis author will 
only address the arbitrability of a subject matter within the GCC states and the Shari’a 
framework. This issue of arbitrability, however, will be discussed in Chapter Five with 
a more thorough coverage of specific subject matters that are not arbitrable in the GCC 
states and/or the Shari’a.  
 
  4.2.1.8. Public Policy 
 
 The most popular and also the most controversial provision allowing for the 
refusal to enforce a foreign arbitral award is the public policy defence under Article 
V(2)(b). This provision, however, also relates to other provisions in the New York 
Convention,151 namely Article V(2)(a),152 among others, that also allow a limit on the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards based on public policy arguments.153 That a 
subject matter is not arbitrable, for example, is also an issue of a state’s public policy. 
The concept of public policy will be discussed more fully in Chapter Five.  
 
4.2.2. Potential Challenges to Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
Under the ICSID Convention 
 
 The ICSID Convention does not leave much room for challenging the 
enforcement of an arbitral award.154 In fact, the ICSID Convention provides for 
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151 Bernard Hanotiau and Olivier Caprasse, ‘Public Policy in International Commercial Arbitration, in 
Emmanuel Gaillard and Domenico Di Pietro, Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and International 
Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention in Practice (Cameron May 2009) ch 27, 798 (“[public 
policy] is implicitly present in other provisions [of the New York Convention]”). 
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that imply the public policy defence, including Article V(1)(a), Article V(1)(b), Article V(2), Article 
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153 Hanotiau and Caprasse (n 151) 787 (“Public policy is thus central to the law of arbitration: first, 
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182-184. 
159 
!
automatic enforcement under Article 54(1).155  
 While the mandate of Article 54 for automatic enforcement seems clear, 
Argentina, on multiple occasions, unsuccessfully argued that Article 54 requires a 
successful claimant to first obtain enforcement of ICSID arbitral awards against it in the 
Argentine courts.156 In Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic,157 the ad 
hoc committee denied Argentina’s arguments that “it would be necessary for 
Continental to follow the formalities applicable to enforcement in Argentina of final 
judgments of Argentine courts” stating that the position of Argentina is “inconsistent 
with Argentina’s obligations under Article 53 of the ICSID Convention to carry out 
without delay the provisions of the award without the need for enforcement action 
under Article 54.”158   
While enforcement has been insulated from review by national courts, such is 
not the case with regards to execution on specific assets. The ICSID Convention does 
not obligate Contracting States to execute on assets that could not be executed through a 
final judgment in its own courts. Falling under this category would be the sovereign 
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155 ICSID Convention, art 54(1).  Article 54(1) states as follows: “Each Contracting State shall recognize 
an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed 
by that award within it territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. A Contracting 
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156 Luke Peterson, ‘Argentine Crisis Arbitration Awards Piled Up, But Investors Still Wait for a Payout’ 
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157 Continental Casualty Company v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/0, Decision on 
Argentina’s Application for a Stay of Enforcement of the Award (23 October 2009), para 12;  Reed, 
Paulsson & Blackaby (n 154) 182-184. 
158 See also Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, LP v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
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Decision on the Claimants’ Second Request to Lift Provisional Stay of Enforcement of the Award (Rule 
54 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules) (20 May 2009), para 23-29; Compana de Aguas del Aconquija SA and 
Vivendi Universal SA v Argentine Republic, ICSDI Case No ARB/97/3, Decision on the Argentine 
Republic’s Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award rendered on 20 Aug 2007 (Rule 
54 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules) (4 Nov 2008), para 45; Sempra Energy International v Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/02/16, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Request for a Continued 
Stay of Enforcement of the Award (Rule 54 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules (5 March 2009), para 103-
104. Article 54(2) of the ICSID Convention does require the party seeking recognition and enforcement 
to provide a certified copy of the award to the competent court or other authority designated by the State 
where enforcement is sought. Some States like the UK have taken it upon themselves to elaborate on the 
procedure by providing detailed instructions for parties applying for recognition, enforcement and 
execution in their territory. However, most Contracting States have provided little, if any, guidance at all.  
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immunity defence, which may and have prevailed to avoid execution. Article 55 further 
clarifies the matter as follows: “Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating 
from the law in force in any contracting state relating to immunity of that State or of 
any State from execution.”159  
In Benvenuti and Bonfant v. Congo,160 the court stated that it could not execute 
against the assets of the Congo located in France without the court’s prior authorization 
because those assets might be protected by sovereign immunity. On appeal, the Paris 
Court of Appeals held that the lower court exceeded its authority relating to execution 
when it was only asked to enforce the ICSID arbitral award.161  In AIG v. Kazakhstan,162 
the English High Court held that under the 1978 UK State Immunity Act the London 
assets were at all times the property of Kazakhstan and so are immune from the 
enforcement process of the UK courts even though the National Bank of Kazakhstan 
had possession of the assets. 
Aside from the immunity from execution discussed in the Benvenuti and 
Bonfant case above, courts distinguish between immunity from execution and immunity 
from jurisdiction.163 In immunity from jurisdiction cases, the arbitration agreement 
usually constitutes waiver of jurisdiction; while in immunity from execution cases, the 
arbitration agreement, even with the New York Convention and the ICSID Convention, 
do not usually constitute a waiver.164  
Urbas summarised French case law on waiver of immunity as follows: “(i) a 
state’s agreement to arbitrate is sufficient to remove immunity from jurisdiction; (ii) this 
agreement can include the exequatur process, which is to be distinguished from 
execution proceedings; (iii) a waiver of immunity from jurisdiction is different from a 
waiver of immunity from execution; and (iv) an agreement to arbitrate is not sufficient 
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to constitute a waiver of immunity from execution.”165 In Creighton Ltd. v. Qatar, 
however, the French Court of Cassation held that Qatar waived immunity from 
execution, stating as follows: 
 
...the undertaking of the state having signed the arbitration clause to 
execute the award in the terms of Article 24 of the Rules of Arbitration 
of the International Chamber of Commerce implied its waiver of 
immunity from execution. 166 
 
However, a state’s general waiver of immunity may still be insufficient, as 
courts may require a waiver of specific assets.167 In NML Ltd et al. v. the Republic of 
Argentina,168 the French Supreme Court held that a waiver of immunity from execution 
had to be express and specific by mentioning the assets or the category of assets over 
which the waiver is granted.  
A question that arises in relation to sovereign immunity is whether the party 
claiming such immunity is a “separate entity” of a foreign State and whether the 
proceeding concerns an area of law where the immunity defence does not apply. The 
same issue was addressed by the Australian High Court and the Federal Court in PT 
Garuda Indonesia Ltd v. Australian Competition & Consumer Commission,169 where 
the court held that Garuda was a separate entity of the Republic of Indonesia under 
Section 11(1) of the Australian Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth), which states 
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that foreign States and “separate entities” of foreign State are immune from jurisdiction 
except in cases of commercial transactions, employment contract or personal injury. 
Since the Garuda case involved allegations of anti-competitive conduct in relation to 
commercial freight services to Australia, a case of commercial transaction and business 
character, the court held that Garuda could not claim immunity. 
Finally, despite the ease at which an ICSID arbitral award may be enforced, 
investors are in reality left with very little recourse whenever a Contracting State 
refuses to recognize, enforce, and execute an ICSID arbitral award. Under Article 64 of 
the ICSID Convention, the investor must rely on its own state to bring action on its 
behalf against the defaulting Contracting State in the International Court of Justice.  
 
PART III 
 
4.3. Potential Challenges to the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the GCC States 
 
 In the survey, the respondents were asked to rate in a scale of 0-10, the 
friendliness of the six GCC states towards enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.170 
The respondents gave Bahrain and the UAE the highest rating with 7.44 out of 10 and 
7.43 out of 10, respectively.171 The KSA, despite its passage of the Saudi Arbitration 
Law of 2012, was still rated the least friendly toward the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards with a rating of 3.44 out of 10.172 Oman was rated with 6.25 out of 10, Kuwait 
with 5.78 out of 10, and Qatar with 5.74 out of 10.173 It is interesting to see in this 
section whether the ratings of the GCC states’ friendliness toward the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards are tied directly with the GCC states’ rules on challenges to the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  
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 4.3.1. Challenges to the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in Oman 
 
Oman divides its laws for enforcement of an arbitral award under domestic 
arbitration and international arbitration. In domestic arbitration, after the domestic 
arbitral award has met the conditions for enforcement and has been deposited, the leave 
for enforcement cannot be granted until after three months.174  
Under Article 58 of Sultanate Decree No 47/97, “leave for enforcement of the 
arbitral award is not subject to means of recourse.”175 Omani law limits the ability of 
parties to challenge the enforcement of domestic arbitral awards, and sets only three 
grounds for denying enforcement of the domestic arbitral award:  
 (1) does not contradict a judgment previously rendered by the Omani courts on 
the subject-matter of the dispute;  
(2) does not violate Omani public policy;  
(3) was properly notified to the parties against whom it was rendered.  
El-Ahdab notes that the Omani law exceeds the UNCITRAL Model Law and the 
New York Convention in making it easier to enforce arbitral awards because the 
additional grounds176 listed in the UNCITRAL Model Law to challenge the 
enforcement of an arbitral award are not available in Oman. El-Ahdab, however, 
criticizes the Omani law for making it possible to enforce an arbitral award that is 
obviously invalid. 177 
Oman generally follows the New York Convention on the enforcement of 
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174 Sultani Decree No 47/97, art 58(1), Issuing the Act on Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
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foreign arbitral awards.178 The enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under Royal 
Decree No. 13/97 is governed by a different set of rules than domestic arbitral 
awards.179  
Sultani Decree 29/2002 provides the grounds for refusing enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. It should be noted here that Oman has separate grounds for 
setting aside an arbitral award under Article 53 of Sultani Decree No 47/97.180 The 
grounds for refusing enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Oman are as follows: (1) 
not being issued by a competent body, (2) non-compliance with Omani law or court 
decision, (3) improper notice and legal representation, (4) non-arbitrability of the 
dispute, (5) non-enforceability of the foreign arbitral award in the country where it is 
made, (6) non-final arbitral awards, and (7) against public policy and rules of 
morality.181 It is worth noting here that the Omani law, unlike the New York 
Convention,182 does not explicitly consider the invalidity of arbitration agreement, the 
incapacity of the parties to conclude the arbitration agreement, the wrong composition 
of the tribunal or the excess of the jurisdiction of the tribunal, as grounds for refusing 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award.183 
Under Article 352(1), read in conjunction with Article 353, of Sultani Decree 
29/2002,184 a foreign arbitral award cannot be enforced in Oman, if it is not issued by a 
competent arbitration tribunal according to the law of the country where it is made.185  
In this sense, the Omani law is more restrictive than the New York Convention. Omani 
courts, however, recognize the competence-competence principle. The Omani court in 
Commercial Circuit Muscat, Appeal No. 199/2008,186 held that “the arbitral tribunal 
will have the competency to settle the claim of annulling the contract in which the 
arbitration condition is included. This is known by the principle of competence-
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competence ...” However, Oman is not the most restrictive state in the GCC. Bahrain,187 
which follows the Article 298(1) of the Egyptian Code of Civil and Commercial 
Procedure,188 go even further by requiring that foreign arbitral awards are not 
enforceable if a domestic court in their country also had jurisdiction over the dispute.  
Under Article 352(3) of Omani Decree 29/2002, a foreign arbitral award that 
breaches an Omani law shall not be enforced.189 This provision is problematic, not only 
because it goes beyond the New York Convention’s requirement of not violating the 
enforcing country’s mandatory rules, but also because it is fraught with vagueness as to 
what type of laws must not be breached.190 
Additionally, Oman raises the issue of joint jurisdiction, where a foreign arbitral 
award that contradicts a prior sentence or order issued by a domestic court in Oman 
would not be enforceable.191 Prior Omani judgments, therefore, are given priority of 
enforcement over foreign arbitral awards. Bahrain,192 Qatar,193 and the UAE194 have 
similar provisions regarding the non-enforcement of a foreign arbitral award that 
contradicts a prior domestic court judgment. 
Under Article 352(2) of Sultani Decree 29/2002, a foreign arbitral award is not 
enforceable unless both parties have been summoned to appear and are legally 
represented.195 According to Al-Siyabi, “although the Omani rule does not explicitly 
express equal treatment, fair hearing, full and proper opportunity for the parties to 
present their case and having access to the other party’s documents as conditions for the 
enforcement of a foreign award, it can be interpreted as prohibiting most types of failure 
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187 Bahraini Law No 12 of 1971 on Civil and Commercial Procedures, art 252. 
188 Egyptian Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, art 298(1).  
189 Sultani Decree 29/2002 (Oman), art 352(3). 
190 Al-Siyabi (n 8) 256. It is unclear whether breach of mere ordinary rules would trigger non-
enforcement. 
191 Sultani Decree 29/2002, art 352 (d). This rule follows the Egyptian rule in the Egyptian Code of Civil 
and Commercial Procedures 13/1968, art 298(4); Al-Siyabi (n 8) 257-258. According to Al-Siyabi, prior 
Omani judgment must have already been made, and not just begun, prior to the commencement of an 
arbitral proceeding. 
192 Bahraini Law No 12 of 1971 on Civil and Commercial Procedures; Jalila Ahmed, ‘Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments in Some Arab Countries - Legal Provisions and Court Precedent: Focus on Bahrain,’ 
(1999) 14 Arab L Q 169, 175. 
193 El-Ahdab (n 14). 
194 UAE Civil Procedures Code, art 235. 
195 Sultani Decree 29/2002 (Oman), art 352(2). 
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to comply with fairness in arbitration proceedings.”196 For instance, the arbitral 
tribunal’s refusal to hold a hearing requested by one of the parties may be regarded as a 
violation of due process, and thus a ground for denying enforcement of the foreign 
arbitral award.197  
Article 353 of Sultani Decree 29/2002 provides that a foreign arbitral award is 
not enforceable unless the subject matter of the dispute is arbitrable under Omani 
law.198 This requirement is consistent with Article V(2)(a) of the New York 
Convention.199 Kuwait and Bahrain are the two other GCC states that allow for the 
challenge of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards on the ground of non-
arbitrability.200 
Oman requires that a foreign arbitral award is also enforceable in the country of 
origin before it can be enforced in Oman under Article 353 of Sultani Decree 
29/2002.201 While the New York Convention allows for the refusal to enforce a foreign 
arbitral award that has been set aside at the country of origin, the Omani law goes 
further and is more restrictive than the New York Convention. The latter requires the 
foreign arbitral award to be binding, under the law at the seat of arbitration or under the 
applicable law, but Omani law requires it to be enforceable under the law at the seat of 
arbitration.202  
It should be mentioned that Qatar203 has a similar regulation. The UAE goes 
further than the need for the enforceability of a foreign arbitral award,204 and requires 
that the foreign arbitral award must have been granted leave to enforce at the seat of 
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196 Al-Siyabi (n 8) 259. 
197 Al-Siyabi (n 8) 250. 
198 Sultani Decree 29/2002 (Oman), art 353. 
199 New York Convention, art V(2)(a). It must be kept in mind that the Shari’a impacts the applicability of 
this law as the Shari’a sets out rules on the non-arbitrability of disputes. 
200 Al-Siyabi (n 8) 261. 
201 Sultani Decree 29/2002 (Oman), art 353. 
202 This means that if the foreign arbitral award is made in another country under the law of a third 
country, it cannot be enforced in Oman, unless it is enforceable in the country where it is made. This 
imposes an extra restriction on enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Oman. The enforceability 
condition may amount to the need for double enforcement, at the seat of arbitration as well as in the 
enforcing country. 
203 Qatari Law No 13 of 1990 on Civil and Commercial Procedures, art 380(c). 
204 Dubai Court of Cassation Judgment 267/99 (November 1999); Dubai Court of Cassation Judgment 
17/2001 (3 October 2001). 
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arbitration.205 On the other hand, Bahraini law does not specify enforceability under the 
law of the seat of arbitration as a condition for enforcing the foreign arbitral award in 
Bahrain. In this respect, Bahraini law is more facilitative of enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards than Omani law. 
Article 352 (a) of Sultani Decree 29/2002 requires that a foreign arbitral award 
is final at the country of origin to be enforceable in Oman. While this provision reflects 
Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention, the Omani law is more strict than the New 
York Convention, which only requires a binding arbitral award.206  
It is common practice in the GCC states207 and under the New York Convention 
to not enforce a foreign arbitral award that violates the enforcing state’s public policy. 
As such, Article 532(4) of Sultani Decree 29/2002208 is not unique in requiring that a 
foreign arbitral award must not contain anything contrary to the public policy or rules of 
conduct and morality in Oman.209 An important feature of Omani law on public policy, 
as well as its equivalents in most other GCC states, is that they emphasize the rules of 
morality and conduct as separate from public policy. Oman makes no distinction 
between Omani public policy and international public policy. Moreover, it is not clear 
whether the Omani court, when considering enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, 
takes into account international public policy or otherwise.210  
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205 El-Ahdab (n 14). 
206 Al-Siyabi (n 8) 263-264. According to Al-Siyabi, “some types of interim awards, particularly 
conservatory measures, if they are considered to be binding, can be enforced under the Convention, but 
not under Omani law.” 
207 Bahraini Law No 12 of 1971 on Civil and Commercial Procedures, art 252; Qatari Law of Civil and 
Commercial Procedures, art 380(d); UAE Civil Procedures Code, art 235(1)(e). 
208 Sultani Decree 29/2002 (Oman), art 532(4). 
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and Tunisia, with the effect of not enforcing foreign awards that violate international public policy. See 
El-Ahdab (n 14); Mohammed Aboul-Enein, ‘Egypt’ in Jan Paulsson (ed), International Handbook on 
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 4.3.2. Challenges to the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the UAE 
 
 The UAE rules for the enforcement of domestic arbitral awards mirrors that of 
Oman’s rules for domestic arbitration, discussed previously. There are two main 
differences, however, between Oman and the UAE. First, the UAE only gives 60 days 
or two months time limit, as opposed to Oman’s and Egypt’s 90 days or three months 
time limit, to file an application to set aside the arbitral award. However, the arbitration 
deadline could be extended.211 Second, the UAE does not have a separate statute 
covering the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, relying primarily on the New York 
Convention for such matters. In the UAE, therefore, the enforcement of a foreign 
arbitral award may be challenged according to the grounds provided by the New York 
Convention, and if the President of the Court finds one of the following: 
(1) that the arbitral award contradicts a judgment previously rendered by the 
courts on the Emirates on the subject matter of the dispute; 
(2) that the arbitral award violates the public policy of the UAE; or 
(3) that the parties against whom the arbitral award was rendered was not 
properly notified.  
In the UAE, an arbitration clause that is incorporated by reference raises 
concerns and must make the reference explicit or it stands the chance of being 
challenged for invalidity. Such challenge to the validity of the arbitration agreement is 
consistent with Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention.212 The Dubai Court of 
Cassation, however, has upheld such an arbitration clause incorporated by reference in a 
bill of lading to a charter party terms because the reference in the bill of lading was 
explicit.213   
Under Article 235 of the UAE Civil Procedures Code, a foreign judgment, and 
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211 Dubai Court of Cassation, Annulment No 322 of 2004, Commercial Annulment, Hearing held 11 April 
2005. 
212 See Section 4.2.1.1 above. 
213 Robert Karrar-Lewsley and Zane Anani, ‘Dubai Court of Cassation judgment: incorporation of arbitral 
clause by reference in bill of lading’ (Lexology, 19 November 2013) 
!http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4bbf018d-6a18-4ae7-afe4-e5134e335f57" accessed 15 
January 2014; Anshuman Singh, ‘Incorporation of dispute resolution clauses in bills of lading - is UAE 
law closing the gap to the predominant English law?’ (Lexology, 3 February 2014) 
!http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1f2fa147-3144-4dff-9f6f-1d2dfebecd60" accessed 24 
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therefore a foreign arbitral award, may be ratified, if UAE courts did not have 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute, and the foreign court had jurisdiction, 
according to the rules of international legal jurisdiction in the country where the 
judgment is made. 214 A foreign arbitral award must not conflict with a domestic court’s 
judgment previously made in the UAE. 215 Like in Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain, this rule 
follows the Egyptian rule, and therefore gives priority to prior domestic court judgments 
over foreign arbitral awards. Under Article 235(2)(d) of the UAE Civil Procedures 
Code, a foreign arbitral award must be final under the law of the country of origin to be 
enforceable.216 Like in Oman and Bahrain, this rule is stricter than the New York 
Convention, which only requires a binding arbitral award. However, cases such as the 
Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation, Petition No 679/2010217 and the Dubai Court of Appeal, 
Petition No 531/2011218 have held that the conditions of Article 235 of the UAE Civil 
Procedure Code do not apply to foreign arbitral awards.  
Furthermore, the UAE has required that UAE rules of procedure must be 
followed when enforcing a foreign arbitral award which means that the UAE requires 
that due process must have been followed for a foreign arbitral award to be 
enforceable.219 The UAE in this regard, according to Al-Siyabi, is comparable to Oman 
and other GCC states.220  Article 235(2)(c) of the UAE Civil Procedures Code uses the 
same wording as the Omani law requiring due process for enforcement of a foreign 
arbitral award. However, the UAE Supreme Court of Cassation upheld a ruling by the 
Sharjah Court of Appeal that upheld a decision by the Sharjah Court of First Instance to 
enforce a judgment made in France. The Court of Cassation ruled that the procedural 
law of the country where a case is heard must govern the court proceedings, unless such 
a law is contrary to public policy in the enforcing state.221 It has been said, nevertheless, 
that on occasions the UAE courts went beyond this, and required that the UAE Civil 
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214 Al-Siyabi (n 8) 257. 
215 Al-Siyabi (n 8) 257. 
216 Dubai Court of Cassation Judgment 267/99 (November 1999); Dubai Court of Cassation Judgment 
17/2001 (3 October 2001). 
217 Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation, Petition No 679/2010, Judgment of 16 June 2011. 
218 Dubai Court of Appeal, Petition No 531/2011, Judgment of 6 October 2011. 
219 See however, Dubai Court of Cassation, Petition No 132/2012, Judgment of 22 February 2012. 
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221 Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation, ‘Enforcement of Foreign Judgments,’ GCC Commercial Arbitration 
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Procedures Code must also be complied with in making a foreign arbitral award that is 
going to be enforced in the UAE.222 However, in the Dubai Court of Cassation, 
Recourse No. 351 of 2005, Commercial Recourse (1 July 2006),223 the petitioner 
claimed that the arbitrator violated due process by holding a hearing without informing 
any of the two parties, but the court rejected the petition to annul the foreign arbitral 
award because the two parties had agreed and signed the court’s direction to submit 
their memoranda and to set a hearing within fifteen days.  
As will be discussed in Chapter Six, the grounds for setting aside a foreign 
arbitral award in the UAE follows the grounds set forth in the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
which in turn mirrors the grounds for challenging the enforcement of a foreign arbitral 
award under the New York Convention. Thus, by adopting the New York Convention 
to govern the enforcement challenge of foreign arbitral awards and the UNCITRAL 
Model Law to govern the setting aside of arbitral awards, the UAE has largely followed 
the international arbitration norms. Nevertheless, the UAE ought to adopt a federal 
arbitration law that would make the arbitration laws in the UAE much clearer and easier 
for UAE courts to follow. The lack of a federal arbitration law in the UAE have led 
courts to arrive at different and often conflicting decisions about the applicability of the 
New York Convention, leading some courts to erroneously apply the UAE Civil 
Procedure Code (which ought to be applicable only to domestic arbitral awards) to 
foreign arbitral awards.224 
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222 Essam Al Tamimi, Practitioner's guide to arbitration in the Middle East and North Africa (JurisNet 
LLC, 2009) 46. See also Mark Hoyle, ‘Topic in focus: demystifying UAE arbitration law’ (Lexology, 8 
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 4.3.3. Challenges to the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the KSA 
 
The KSA recently issued the Saudi Arbitration Law of 2012 by Royal Decree 
No. M/34.225 This Saudi law changed the landscape of arbitration law and enforcement 
in the KSA significantly, as it put the KSA more in line with the other GCC states and 
with international arbitration norms.226 This does not mean, however, that the principles 
of the Shari’a no longer apply, as the Saudi Arbitration Law of 2012 still defers to the 
Shari’a, and states in Article 5 that the rules to which the arbitration is submitted must 
be applied without prejudice to the Shari’a.227 Whereas there was an absence of 
provisions prior to the Saudi Arbitration Law of 2012 governing the grounds for 
challenging the enforcement of an arbitral award, the KSA like the other GCC states has 
set out provisions for both the grounds for non-enforcement228 and for setting aside an 
arbitral award.229  
Like other GCC states, Article 55 of the Saudi Arbitration Law of 2012 sets 
forth three grounds under which an arbitral award may be refused enforcement upon 
verification of the court as follows: 
(1) that the arbitral award does not contradict an arbitral award or decision 
rendered by a court, committee, or board having jurisdiction over the 
settlement of disputes in the KSA; 
(2) the arbitral award does not violate the Shari’a and public policy in the KSA; 
and 
(3) the party against whom the arbitral award has been rendered has been 
properly notified. 
The three grounds above are similar to the grounds provided by Oman, the 
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UAE, and Qatar.230 The only difference is that the KSA expressly prohibits the violation 
of the Shari’a, which in effect also applies in all the GCC states regardless of express 
mention. Harb commented that “while the new Saudi arbitration law can be said to 
significantly advance the position of arbitration in the Kingdom, the local Saudi courts 
and local law will still play an important role in the challenge or enforcement of any 
such awards in the Kingdom.”231 
Additionally, the KSA had passed an Enforcement Law in 2007, which took 
effect on March 2013, changing the landscape of enforcement of arbitral awards in the 
KSA.232 In the old system, a party aiming to enforce a foreign arbitral award in the KSA 
had to apply for enforcement with the Board of Grievances, which undertook a full 
review of the merits, determination of the foreign arbitral award’s compliance with the 
Shari’a, and requiring submission of documents as outlined in Chapter Three as 
conditions to enforcement.233 According to Giansiracusa and others, citing the Jadewal 
v. Emaar234 case, “[p]arties seeking the enforcement of foreign judgments or awards 
thus faced significant delays and were exposed to a retrial of the dispute on the merits 
by the Board.”235 The Enforcement Law of 2007 created an Enforcement Judge236 to 
enforce and monitor the enforcement of judgments and arbitral awards237 in a more 
expedient manner.238 Also, the Enforcement Law of 2007 expressly mentions “arbitral 
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awards” as falling within its scope under Article 12,239 as opposed to the old system that 
only mentions “foreign judgments.”240 
Under Article 11 of the Enforcement Law of 2007,241 the Enforcement Judge 
may enforce an arbitral award, including foreign arbitral awards, if the party seeking 
enforcement establishes the following: 
(1) KSA courts do not have jurisdiction with regards to the dispute; 
(2) the arbitral award was rendered following proceedings in compliance with 
the requirements of due process; 
(3) the arbitral award is in final form as per the law of the seat of the arbitration;  
(4) the arbitral award does not contradict a judgment or order issued on the same 
subject by a judicial authority of competent jurisdiction in the KSA; and 
(5) the arbitral award does not contain anything that contradicts KSA public 
policy. 
Article 11 also requires reciprocity for foreign arbitral awards.242 The 
Enforcement Judge’s decision, however, is subject to appeal during which the 
enforcement would be stayed.243 Overall, the Enforcement Law of 2007 and the Saudi 
Arbitration Law of 2012 are developments that make arbitration in the KSA closer to 
the international arbitration norms.  
  
 4.3.4. Challenges to the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in Kuwait 
 
 Foreign arbitral awards may be enforced in Kuwait under the New York 
Convention and under the Kuwaiti Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure. Kuwait 
made a reservation to the New York Convention that “the State of Kuwait reserves 
implementation of the convention to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards 
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made in the territory of another contracting State.”244 According to El-Ahdab, the 
reservation may have been a reaction by Kuwait to balance the position of Kuwait with 
countries that did not conclude a convention with Kuwait because even prior to joining 
the New York Convention, Kuwait enforced arbitral awards rendered against it while 
facing difficulties enforcing arbitral awards made in Kuwait’s favour.245 Like Oman, 
Kuwait has treated domestic arbitral awards differently than foreign arbitral awards, the 
latter being primarily governed by the New York Convention.  
Under the domestic arbitration rules, the President of the Court must makes sure 
that (1) there is nothing that would hinder the domestic arbitration award’s execution, 
(2) the time for any appeal has expired, and (3) the domestic arbitration award is not 
governed by summary enforcement proceedings.246  
Like Oman, Kuwait adopted the New York Convention, but created additional 
grounds for challenging the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. For foreign arbitral 
awards, Kuwait requires and thus allows challenges to enforcement based on the 
following:247 
(1) the parties must have been duly notified and represented, 
(2) the foreign arbitral award must have become res judicata [final] according to 
the law of the seat of arbitration, 
(3) the foreign arbitral award does not contradict a judgment or ruling 
previously made in Kuwait, 
(4) the foreign arbitral award must not be contrary to public policy or Kuwaiti 
good morals, 
(5) the foreign arbitral award settles a dispute that is arbitrable under Kuwaiti 
law, and 
(6) the foreign arbitral award is enforceable at the seat of arbitration. 
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Kuwait also approved the rules of the GCC Arbitration Centre.248 The Kuwait 
Court of Cassation, Commercial Circuit in Challenge No. 671/2004,249 laid out the 
procedure for challenging the arbitrators under the GCC Arbitration Centre. The 
Kuwaiti Court of Cassation stated that submitting the challenge of arbitrators directly to 
the court was a resort to a body not competent to decide the matter as the challenge of 
arbitrators had to follow the procedures of the GCC Arbitration Centre, which required 
submission of the challenge to the secretary general who shall decide the challenge 
within three days.  
In cases where the parties could not decide on an arbitrator; if the arbitrator 
recused himself or abstained from the proceedings; or if the arbitrator was dismissed; 
then the Kuwaiti Judicial Arbitration Court of Appeals, Commercial, in Case No. 24,250 
held that the court could appoint the arbitrator. The court further clarified that such 
court appointment pursuant to Article 175 of the Kuwait Pleading Law would not be 
subject to annulment. 
 
 4.3.5. Challenges to the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in Bahrain 
 
 Bahrain distinguishes between domestic and international arbitration and has 
separate laws governing each.251 Bahrain’s domestic arbitration laws cover both 
domestic arbitral awards and foreign arbitral awards, while the international arbitral 
laws cover international arbitral awards as defined under the Bahraini International 
Arbitration Act.252  
Under Bahrain’s domestic arbitration laws in Articles 252 and 253 of the Code 
of Procedure, the enforcement of an arbitral award may be challenged on the following 
grounds: 
(1) there was proper notice and representation and the order granting and 
denying enforcement was issued at the presence of the parties, 
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(2) an arbitral award made outside of Bahrain does not fall within the 
jurisdiction of Bahraini courts and does not violate any arbitration provision 
required by law, 
(3) due process was followed during arbitration, 
(4) the arbitral award is final according to the country of origin, 
(5) the arbitral award does not violate a prior Bahraini court judgment , 
(6) the arbitral award does not violate Bahraini public policy or good morals. 
The second prong deals with joint jurisdiction as mentioned earlier in 
comparison to Oman. The Bahraini court, however, has already enforced a foreign 
arbitral award despite that it was made in Egypt and Bahraini courts also had 
jurisdiction. In 1991, the Bahrain Court of Cassation ruled that a judgment made by a 
foreign court on a dispute over which the Bahraini court has joint jurisdiction can be 
enforced in Bahrain.253 Referring to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Egyptian 
Code of Civil and Commercial Procedures that contains a provision identical to the 
above Bahraini provision, the Bahraini Court of Cassation held that it is only 
contradiction with a previous judgment or order rendered by Bahraini courts, and not 
the fact that the Bahraini court has joint jurisdiction over the dispute, that may lead to 
non-enforcement of a foreign judgment.254 Al-Siyabi explains that “the determining 
factor is whether domestic courts have the exclusive jurisdiction to rule on a dispute or 
not, according to the principles of private international law. Having exclusive 
jurisdiction results in non-enforcement of a judgment or award made abroad.”255 
Likewise, the fifth prong that requires that the foreign arbitral award does not 
violate a prior Bahraini court judgment relates to the joint jurisdiction issue.256 The 
same rule exists in Oman, UAE, and Qatar. This means that in Bahrain, the prior 
judgments of a Bahraini court will have priority in enforcement over a foreign arbitral 
award.257  
In the fourth prong, Bahraini law requires that the foreign arbitral award be 
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final, which is stricter than the New York Convention’s requirement of a binding 
arbitral award to be enforceable.258 This Bahraini rule is similar to the rule in Oman and 
the UAE. It is interesting, however, that under the Bahraini International Arbitration 
Act discussed below, the international arbitral award only needs to be binding. 
The Bahraini International Arbitration Act provides for separate grounds for 
refusal of enforcement of an international arbitral award. These grounds are the same as 
the New York Convention, except that Bahrain allows application of the grounds 
irrespective of the country where it was made.259 These grounds for refusal of 
enforcement are also the same as the grounds for setting aside an arbitral award as will 
be discussed more fully in Chapter Six.260 
Bahrain restricts the grounds under which the enforcement of an international 
arbitral award may be challenged into seven reasons as follows:261 
(1) The agreement to arbitrate was not valid due to the incapacity of one of the 
parties, or the agreement was not valid under the law to which the parties 
have subjected it, or under the law of the country where the arbitral award 
was made. 
(2) A party against whom the arbitral award was made was not informed of 
arbitration proceedings. 
(3) The arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling 
within the terms of the submission to arbitration or it contains decisions on 
matters beyond the submission to arbitration. 
(4) The composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties or with the law of the country 
where the arbitration took place. 
(5) The arbitral award did not yet become binding on the parties or has been set 
aside or suspended by the court of the country in which, or under the law of 
which, the arbitral award was made. 
(6) The arbitral award is contrary to public policy. 
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258 Bahraini Law No 12 of 1971 on Civil and Commercial Procedures, art 252. 
259 El-Ahdab (n 14) 146-147. 
260 See generally Chapter Six. 
261 Bahrain International Arbitration Act, arts 35 and 36; El-Ahdab (n 14) 146-147. 
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(7) The subject matter of the dispute is not arbitrable. 
The above grounds are the same as the grounds set out in the New York 
Convention.262 As to the composition of the arbitral tribunal, Article 234 of the Bahrain 
Code of Civil Procedure requires an odd number of arbitrators, which is also required in 
the UAE.263 In a challenged based on a violation of Article 234 of the Bahrain Code of 
Civil Procedure in Court of Cassation, Second Circuit, Challenge No. 259/2009 (4 May 
2010), where there were two arbitrators, the Bahraini court nevertheless affirmed the 
award because, it reasoned, the proceeding is the type that the court handles for the 
parties and was meant to expedite the case. Analysis of challenges to enforcement of an 
international arbitral award in Bahrain should, therefore, follow the analysis under the 
New York Convention.   
 
 4.3.6. Challenges to the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in Qatar 
 
In Qatar, upon filing by a party of a challenge to enforcement, the enforcement 
proceeding will be stayed. Qatar divides its rules for enforcement of an arbitral award 
under domestic and international arbitration. In domestic arbitration, the enforcement of 
an arbitral award may be challenged on the basis of the arbitration agreement, and if 
there is any obstacle against its enforcement, namely for reasons based on Qatari public 
policy.264  
In a case before the Qatari International Centre for Arbitration, Arbitration Case 
No. 2 of 2007(9 September 2007),265 the arbitral tribunal rejected a challenge based on 
the incapacity of the party who was not the signatory in establishing the company 
before the Ministry of Interior. The Qatari arbitral tribunal stated that the party had 
capacity because contracts entered into by the Vice President, who was the signatory in 
the formation of the company, were binding on the company.  
In a challenge as to the capacity of the arbitrator who was not a national of 
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262 El-Ahdab (n 14) 146-147. 
263 Al Rowaad (n 20)(stating that the UAE requires an odd number of arbitrators). 
264 El-Ahdab (n 14) 588. 
265 Qatari International Centre for Arbitration, Arbitration Case No 2 of 2007(9 September 2007), 
reported in J of Arab Arb No 2 (2009) 255. 
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Qatar, the Qatar Court of Appeals in Case No. 21/1992,266 held that the Pleading Law of 
Qatar No. 13 of 1990 did not prohibit the appointment of an arbitrator holding a 
different nationality than one of the parties or of the Court to which the enforcement of 
the arbitration condition is presented. The Court of Appeals further continued and 
clarified that the parties could even choose foreign law to govern the substantive law of 
the arbitration. 
For foreign arbitral awards, Article 380 of the Code of Civil and Commercial 
Procedure governs the grounds upon which foreign arbitral awards may be challenged 
as follows: 
(1) Qatari courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute settled by 
the foreign arbitral award, 
(2) the parties to the procedure settled by the foreign arbitral award were 
regularly summoned and represented, 
(3) the judgement or foreign arbitral award has become res judicata [final] 
according to the law of the court which made it, and 
(4) the foreign arbitral award is not contrary to a prior judgment issued by a 
Qatari court and does not violate the rules of public policy and morals in 
Qatar.   
The rule prohibiting contradiction with a prior judgment by a Qatari court raises 
the joint jurisdiction issue similar to Oman, Bahrain, and UAE. As such, Qatar likewise 
gives priority to its own court judgements over foreign arbitral awards.267  
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266 Qatar Court of Appeals in Case No 21/1992, Hearing held 7 June 1992. 
267Al-Siyabi (n 8) 257 (stating that Qatar requires that the foreign arbitral award not be contrary to a 
decision made by their national court).  
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PART IV 
 
4.4. Recapitulating and Reconciling the Challenges to the Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards in the GCC States 
 
 Despite that all GCC states ratified the New York Convention, the challenges to 
the enforcement of arbitral awards in GCC states are not uniform. The differences are 
generally twofold.  
First, half of the GCC states (Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar) make a distinction 
between the enforcement of arbitral awards under domestic arbitration and international 
arbitration, thereby separating the types of challenges that may be lodged against an 
arbitral award. Though there are many similarities on the grounds for challenging an 
arbitral award under a domestic scheme versus an international scheme, namely 
regarding due process and public policy, the international scheme explicitly allows 
arbitrability as a basis to challenge the enforcement of an arbitral award, perhaps 
contemplating that other states would allow arbitration when the enforcing state would 
not. 
The other half of the GCC states (the UAE, the KSA, and Kuwait) does not 
make the distinction between domestic and international arbitration.  Kuwait, however, 
has separate and additional grounds for challenging the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards.  
The additional grounds for challenging the enforcement of a foreign arbitral 
award are the second feature that prevents uniformity among the GCC states. While all 
the GCC states follow the New York Convention rules for enforcing a foreign arbitral 
award, each GCC state has its own set of grounds additional to the New York 
Convention grounds.  
It is important to note, however, that all GCC states set out three common 
grounds for challenging the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award: (1) that the foreign 
arbitral award does not contradict a prior judgment, decision, ruling or arbitral award 
given by the court of the enforcing state, (2) that the foreign arbitral award does not 
violate the public policy of the enforcing state, and (3) that the parties have been 
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properly notified.  In this regard, there are slight variations among the GCC states 
regarding these three common grounds, though all the GCC states cover these three 
grounds. For example, with regards to public policy, it is the public policy of the 
enforcing GCC state that is of concern. The KSA is the only GCC state that specifically 
mentions the Shari’a. Additionally, with regards to notice, half of the GCC states 
(Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar) require proper notice and representation, while the other 
half (Oman, the UAE, and the KSA) only explicitly require notice.  
It is this thesis author’s suggestion that GCC states ought to agree on the three 
additional grounds for challenging foreign arbitral awards and adopt the same language 
for such three grounds, and then limit the grounds for challenge that are addition to the 
New York Convention. It is also possible, as will be discussed more fully in Chapter 
Five, for the GCC states to agree on a common definition of public policy, and therefore 
create uniformity in this regard.  
 
PART V 
 
4.5. The Survey: Reasons for Non-Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in 
GCC States 
 
In the survey, respondents were asked an open-ended question as to the most 
likely reason for the non-enforcement of a foreign arbitral award in the GCC states.268 
The question aimed to solicit ideas from respondents as to the reasons for non-
enforcement, identify the most common reasons for non-enforcement, and to compare 
whether the most common reasons for enforcement are the same or similar to those 
identified by the research and especially this chapter.  
The researcher grouped together the most common responses using textual 
analysis. The highest number of common responses is eleven.  These responses 
identified public policy as the most likely reason for non-enforcement.269 The second 
highest number of common responses had a total of six. These responses identified the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
268 Appendix II, Survey Report, II(2.3.); Appendix III. 
269 ibid. 
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judiciary’s lack of familiarity or knowledge with international arbitration, the New York 
Convention, or some form of judicial activism or hostility as the reason for non-
enforcement.270 The third highest number of common responses had five. These 
responses identified the failure of the arbitration statute as the reason for non-
enforcement.271 The fourth highest number of common responses had four. These 
responses identified jurisdictional issues as the reason for non-enforcement.272 The fifth 
highest number of common responses had three. These responses identified social or 
political reason for non-enforcement.273 The rest of the remaining nine responses varied 
and included one response, which stated that the Shari’a is the most common reason for 
non-enforcement.274 It is interesting to note that public policy was identified in the 
survey as the most common reason for non-enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, 
when public policy is a common ground among the GCC states.  
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
The New York Convention is a common thread and a point of convergence for 
the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards for the Shari’a, regional conventions, and the 
national laws of GCC states. The ICSID Convention, of course, is a different creature 
altogether, allowing only a challenge during execution of the ICSID arbitral award, but 
not during enforcement. The divergence occurs primarily when the national laws of 
GCC states allow additional grounds for challenging a foreign arbitral award.  
Interestingly, the rating by the respondents to the survey of the GCC states’ 
friendliness toward arbitration275 do not seem to match with the GCC states’ laws for 
challenges to enforcement. In other words, one might expect that Bahrain and the UAE, 
as the highest rated GCC states in the survey, would share similar grounds for 
challenges to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and that both GCC states 
would have limited grounds for challenging enforcement. However, these two GCC 
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272 ibid. 
273 ibid. 
274 ibid. 
275 Appendix II, Survey Report, II(2.2.1.). 
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states do not seem to differ significantly from the remaining the GCC states with 
regards to common features in potential challenges to the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards.  
On paper, since all GCC states ratified the New York Convention, the potential 
challenges to the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award are consistent with 
international arbitration norms. In practice, however, the GCC states like the UAE 
continue to deviate from the international practice, allowing for additional grounds for 
challenging the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards than allowed under the New 
York Convention. The Riyadh Convention likewise incorporates the Shari’a as grounds 
for challenging the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. In reality, however, the 
grounds for challenging the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under the Shari’a do 
not become a significant factor for whether a foreign arbitral award will be enforceable.  
Instead, the majority of successful challenges to foreign arbitral awards are 
based on the national legislation of the each GCC state and the practice employed by 
courts inexperienced with the New York Convention. A lesson from this chapter is that 
the GCC states could improve their mechanisms for enforcing foreign arbitral awards if 
they create a Uniform GCC Arbitration Law that is consistent with their existing 
obligations under the New York Convention while keeping in mind the Shari’a.  
While this chapter discussed the challenges to the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral award in the GCC states, a complete analysis of the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards in the GCC states remains incomplete without a discussion of public 
policy. The next chapter, Chapter Five, therefore, will examine the effect of public 
policy on the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN 
ARBITRAL AWARDS IN THE GCC STATES 
 
5.0. Introduction 
 
“Public policy (ordre public) is a classic reason for excluding the application of 
foreign laws by domestic courts. It represents the superiority of basic value choices of 
the local community over the technical application of conflict of law rules.”1 In Loucks 
v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, Justice Cardozo explained the role of courts with 
regards to balancing of the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and the protection of 
public policy as follows: 
 
... the courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the 
pleasure of the judge, to suit the individual notion of expediency or 
fairness. They do not close their door unless help would violate some 
fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good 
morals, some deep-rooted tradition of common weal. 2 
 
“The interpretation of ‘public policy’ as used in the New York Convention is 
neither defined nor settled law.”3 It also remains largely undefined and unsettled in the 
Shari’a and the domestic arbitration laws of all GCC states.4 The ICSID Convention has 
avoided the issue by excluding public policy entirely from its purview.  
Public policy is an issue that has sparked debate within and among the countries 
that are signatories to the New York Convention.  A continuing debate looms on what 
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1 Christoph Schreuer and others, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (CUP 2009) 568. 
2 Loucks v Standard Oil Co of New York, 224 NY 99 at 111 (1918). 
3 Mark Wakim, ‘Public Policy Concerns Regarding Enforcement of Foreign International Arbitral 
Awards in the Middle East’ (2008) 21 NY Int’l L Rev 1, 50. The notion of public policy in private 
international law is not always identical to that in the field of arbitration. Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, ‘Public 
Policy as a Limit to Arbitration and its Enforcement’ in IBA Journal of Dispute Resolution, Special Issue, 
The New York Convention -50 Years, 11th IBA Arbitration Day and New York Arbitration Day (IBA 
2008) 123; Obaid Busit, ‘The system of arbitration in the UAE: problems and prospects’ (DPhil thesis, 
Durham University 1991).   
4 Public policy is a common provision found in the New York Convention and national legislation. Ariel 
Ezrahi, ‘Arbitration in the Arab Middle East, a Snapshot’ (2005) 20-11 Measley’s Int’l Arb Rep 17, 5. 
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exactly the phrase “public policy” means, not only in the English language, but its 
subtle difference in other languages as well.5 Indeed, many terms are used to express the 
same or similar concept, including such terms as ordre public, international public 
policy, transnational public policy, public interest, public order, public morals and 
order, and simply, public policy.6 Perhaps, the difficulty in arriving at an agreed 
definition for public policy is because its legal contours are normally shaped by the 
context of a national concern.7 As Wakim states, “the construction of ‘public policy’ by 
national courts turns on legal interpretation as much as it does on political, sociological, 
and even religious matters.”8 
While the meaning of public policy remains elusive, its effect on arbitration and 
the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is glaringly clear. It can affect arbitration in 
three aspects:9 (1) it can shape the rules relating to arbitrability, (2) enforcement may be 
denied on the basis of public policy,10 and (3) a foreign arbitral award may be set aside 
on the basis of public policy.11 Potentially, the public policy of at least two countries 
must be met when dealing with foreign arbitral awards: at the place where the foreign 
arbitral award was made, and any other country where it is sought to be enforced. 
It is necessary to devote a separate chapter on public policy as it has often been 
cited as the culprit for the non-enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states. 
This chapter argues that it is not the Shari’a per se that is the source of the non-
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states based on the public policy 
defence, but the domestic legislation and policies of individual GCC states and 
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5 Distinctions have been made between ordre public in French and public policy in English. See 
generally, Bernard Hanotiau and Olivier Caprasse, ‘Public Policy in International Commercial 
Arbitration’ in Emmanuel Gaillard and Domenico Di Pietro, Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and 
International Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention in Practice (Cameron May 2009) 787. 
6 See generally, Hanotiau and Caprasse (n 5) 788. 
7 Public policy is a relative concept dependent on the judgment of the legal community and that public 
policy can change through time. See Böckstiegel (n 3) 123-124. 
8 Wakim (n 3) 50. 
9 Böckstiegel (n 3) 123. 
10 Ezrahi (n 4) 5 (stating that public policy is one of the grounds for refusal to enforce a foreign arbitration 
award). 
11 Hanotiau and Caprasse (n 5) 787. 
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unwarranted judicial interference. As Hamid and Lara explained, “it is thus not the 
requirement itself that causes concern but rather the way in which it is applied.”12 
Part I of this chapter gives a general background on the concept of public policy. 
Part II addresses the concept of public policy under the Shari’a to provide a clear 
understanding of what exactly public policy means in this context. Part III discusses 
public policy under international agreements, namely the New York Convention and the 
ICSID Convention.  Part IV discusses the different concepts of public policy in each of 
the GCC states. Part V gives a synthesis of public policy rules in the GCC states. In the 
end, this chapter shows that there are actually plenty of positive indications that, as 
stated by Ezrahi, “refusal of enforcement of foreign arbitration awards in the Arab 
world on grounds of public policy in general or the Shari’a in particular has not been a 
dominant feature of arbitration in the region,”13 and in the GCC states in particular. It 
seems that the real obstacle to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC 
states is “judicial interference with arbitration”14 cloaked as the guardian of public 
policy and the Shari’a. 
 
PART I 
 
5.1. Concept of Public Policy 
 
The concept of public policy is an ambiguous one:15 difficult to define, relative 
in scope and application according to the relevant jurisdiction, and thus leading to 
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12 Hamid Gharavi and Lara Karam, ‘Arbitration in Yemen’ (2006) 17 ICC International Court of 
Arbitration Bulletin 41, 44. 
13 Ezrahi (n 4) 7. 
14 AFM Maniruzzaman, ‘International Commercial Arbitration in the Asia Pacific: Asian Values, Culture 
and Context’ (2002) 30 Int’l Bus Lawyer 11, 508, 512 (outlining the obstacles to arbitration in Asian 
countries and referring to judicial interference on the basis of public policy); Hubco v WAPDA, Civil 
Appeal Nos 1398 and 1399 of 1999 (Pakistan), (2000) 16 Arbitration Int’l 439. 
15 The concept has been subject to debate among courts, and remains controversial. Arthur Nussbaum, 
‘Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws’ (1940) 49 Yale L J 1027; Hussam Al-
Talhuni, ‘The Effect of Public Policy on the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards’ (DPhil thesis, The 
University of Edinburgh 2002) 62; Wasim Al-Jerafi, ‘Yemen’s Ratification of the New York Convention: 
An Analysis of Compatibility and the Uniform Interpretation of Article V(1)(A) and V(2)(B)’ (DPhil 
thesis, University of Leicester 2013) 155; Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration, vol I 
(Kluwer 2009) 247; Hanotiau and Caprasse (n 5) 788. 
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different terms used to refer to it.16 No universally agreed and comprehensive definition 
of public policy has ever been offered.17 In Egerton v. Brownlow, the court explained 
the ambiguity and the difficulty in defining public policy as follows: “Public policy is a 
vague and unsatisfactory term...it is capable of being understood in different senses.”18 
It is perhaps because of the difficulty in defining public policy that the New 
York Convention never defined the term.19 There are many cases, however, like Thales 
Geosolutions Inc. (US) v. Fonseca Almeida Representações e Comércio Ltda. - FARCO 
(Brazil),20 that support the rule that a public policy violation under Article V(2)(b) 
requires proving that the foreign arbitral award is manifestly irreconcilable with a 
fundamental principle of national law.  
Public policy, therefore, can be relative according to what an enforcing state 
may consider is fundamental, and therefore may vary from one state to another.21 In 
other words, an enforcing state can give its own nuanced meaning to what constitutes 
public policy. For example, in the context of the GCC states, a definition of public 
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16 For a theoretical discussion of public policy, see Matthias Weller, ‘Mandatory Elements of the Choice-
of-Law Process in International Arbitration – Some Reflections on Teubnerian and Kelsenian Legal 
Theory’ in Eckart Gottschalk and others (eds), Conflict of Laws in a Globalized World (CUP 2007). 
17 Julian Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial 
Arbitration Awards (Oceana Publications 1978) op cit, 532; Egerton v Brownlow, 4 HLC 1, 123(1853); 
Fender v St John-Mildmay, (1938) AC 10; Janson v Driefontein Consolidated Mines Ltd, (1902) AC 484; 
Richardson v Mellish (1824) 2 Bing 228 (where Justice Burrough famously referred to public policy as “a 
very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you”); Enderby 
Town Football Club Ltd v The Football Association Ltd (1971) Ch 591, 606 (where in response to Justice 
Burrough, Lord Denning stated that “with a good man in the saddle, the unruly horse can be kept in 
control. It can jump over obstacles.”). 
18 Egerton v Brownlow, 4 HLC 1, 123(1853). The International Law Association’s proposed definition of 
public policy is that it consists of principles and regulations that pertain to justice or morality or serves 
the fundamental socio-political and economic interests of that state, a definition that is similarly shared by 
most arbitral jurisdictions. Alan Redfern and others, Law and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration (4th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2005) 497. 
19 Elana Levi-Tawil, ‘East Meets West: Introducing Shari’a Into the Rules Governing International 
Arbitrations at the BCDR-AAA’ (2011)12 Cardozo J of Conflict Resolution 609. 
20 Thales Geosolutions Inc (US) v Fonseca Almeida Representações e Comércio Ltda - FARCO (Brazil), 
(2007) XXXII YBCA 271, (Brazil Superior Court of Justice 2006). See also Construction company (UK) 
v Painting contractors (Germany), (2006) XXXI  YBCA 722, (Germany, Munich Court of Appeal 2005); 
Buyer (Austria) v Seller (Serbia and Montenegro), (2005) XXX YBCA 421 (Austria, The Supreme Court 
2005). 
21 Albert van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation (Kluwer 1981) op cit 360 (stating that “the reason why the concept of public policy is so 
difficult to grasp is that the degree of fundamentality of moral conviction or policy is conceived 
differently for every case in the various states”); Al-Talhuni (n 15) 69. 
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policy may be anchored with the Shari’a.22 On the other hand, US courts have laid out a 
narrow guideline for applying the public policy defence.23 In Parsons v. Whittemore,24 
the court held that the public policy defence should be construed narrowly and applied 
only when it would “violate the forum state’s most basic notions of morality and 
justice.”25 The public policy exception has been interpreted restrictively following the 
Parsons case.26 Still, instances of broad interpretation remain, including in GCC states 
like the KSA,27 because of state specific conception of public policy.  
Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention states that an enforcing court may 
refuse enforcement if it finds that doing so would violate the public policy of the 
country where enforcement is sought.28 In essence, the New York Convention relegates 
this very important issue to the good faith of contracting states.29 In doing so, it allows 
“a pocket of uncertainty to remain.”30 
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22 See Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab, ‘General Introduction on Arbitration in Arab Countries’ in Pieter Sanders 
(ed), International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer 1993) 12 (defining public policy as 
“based on the respect of the general spirit of the Shari’a and its sources (the The Holy Qur’an and the 
Sunna, etc) and on the principle that individuals must respect their clauses, unless they forbid what is 
authorized and authorize what is forbidden”). 
23 See generally, Anton Maurer, The Public Policy Exception Under the New York Convention (JurisNet 
2012) 64 (stating that the drafting changes in the history of the Convention supports a narrow 
interpretation). 
24 Parsons &Whittemore Overseas Co v Societe General de l’Inudstrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F2d 969 
(2d Cir 1974). See also Elisabeth Senger-Weiss, ‘Enforcing Foreign Arbitration Awards’ in Thomas 
Carbonneau (ed), Handbook on International Arbitration and ADR (American Arbitration Association, 
JurisNet LLC 2006)174; Hanotiau and Caprasse (n 5) 791 (arguing that public policy should be 
interpreted narrowly). 
25 See Waterside Ocean Navigation Co v International Ltd, 973-974 F2d 150 (2d Cir 1984); Senger-
Weiss (n 24) 173 (stating that the public policy defence have had little success in the US); Fotochrome 
Inc v Copal Ltd, 517 F2d 512 (1975). 
26 Troy Harris, ‘The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards 
Under the New York Convention’ (2007) J of Int’l Arb 24(1), 10. In Adviso NV v Korea Overseas 
Construction Corporation, (1996) 21 YB Com Arb 612, 14, the Korean Supreme Court held that Article 
V(2)(b) of the New York Convention should be construed restrictively and that due consideration should 
be given to stability of international trade. In Amaltal Corp Ltd v Maruha (NZ) Corp Ltd, (2004) WL 234 
(2d Cir Ct) 871, the New Zealand Court of Appeal referred to Parsons v Whittemore, and held that its 
function was restricted to examining issues that raised an essential principle of law and justice. 
Previously, however, the New Zealand high court had taken a liberal approach to public policy in 
Kimberley Construction Ltd v Mermaid Holdings Ltd, (2004) 1 NZLR 386 at 392. 
27 Kristin Roy, ‘The New York Convention And Saudi Arabia: Can A Country Use The Public Policy 
Defense To Refuse Enforcement Of Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards?’ (1995) 18 Fordham Int’l LJ 920. 
28 James Fry, ‘D’esordre Public International under the New York Convention: Wither Truly International 
Public Policy’ (2009) 8 Chinese J Int’l L 81, 92. 
29 Senger-Weiss (n 24) 174 (arguing that the broad interpretation of this provision undermines the 
strength and effectiveness of international arbitration.); Levi-Tawil (n 19) (stating that the “exception has 
allowed countries to retain a large amount of discretion, and has caused much confusion”). 
30 Levi-Tawil (n 19). 
! 189 
5.1.1. Role of Domestic Courts and National Public Policy 
 
It is an important limitation to the use of public policy in the New York 
Convention that the introductory sentence of Article V(2) employs the word “may,” and 
therefore does not mandate domestic courts but gives the court discretion to determine 
and apply the public policy exception.31 Within this discretionary power given to the 
domestic court of signatory states, there has been a wide range of approaches as to the 
role of the court in determining public policy, from maximum judicial review to 
minimal judicial review.32 
In most jurisdictions, the approach seems to follow the pro-enforcement bias of 
the New York Convention, and favour enforcement “in case of doubt.”33 For example, 
the Paris Court of Appeal in Intrafor Cofor v. Gagnant34 held that “a breach of domestic 
public policy, assuming that it has been established, does not provide the grounds of 
which appeal against a ruling granting enforcement in France of a foreign arbitral 
award.” On the other hand, some courts apply the public policy of the forum itself, as is 
the case in the Austrian Supreme Court.35 There may also be varying degrees of 
application within the same jurisdiction’s lower and higher courts,36 leading to delay 
and confusion as to the position of the country regarding foreign arbitral award 
enforcement and public policy. 
  
5.1.2. International and Transnational Public Policy 
 
Some countries have also made a distinction between domestic and international 
public policy.37 Some authors like Gaillard and Savage go further and argue that the 
term “public policy” under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention only refers to 
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31 Böckstiegel (n 3) 128; Maurer (n 23) 61. 
32 Böckstiegel (n 3). 
33 ibid. 
34 Intrafor Cofor v Gagnant, (1985) Rev Arb 299 (Paris Court of Appeals 1985). 
35 Not Indicated v Not Indicated, (1985) X YBCA 421, (Austria Supreme Court 1983); Sarhank Group v 
Oracle Corp, 404 F3d 657 (US Ct of App 2d Circuit 2005); Renusagar Power Co Ltd v General Electric 
Co (1995) XX YBCA 681(India Supreme Court 1993); Buyer (Austria) v Seller (Serbia and 
Montenegro), (2005) XXX YBCA 421 (Austria Supreme Court 2005). 
36 Böckstiegel (n 3) 128. 
37 Harris (n 26). 
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the “international public policy of the host jurisdiction.”38 According to Levi-Tawil, 
“the courts of most nations have chosen not to use their domestic public policies to 
refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award, and will enforce the arbitral 
award as long as it is not contrary to international public policy.”39 An exception to this 
is when a Turkish court in Ankara in Osuuskunta Matex V.S. v. T.K.K. General 
Directorate40 refused enforcement of a Swiss arbitral award because it violated Turkish 
domestic public policy when it applied Swiss procedural law. 41 
According to Sanders, international public policy is “confined to violation of 
really fundamental conceptions of legal order in the country concerned.”42 The court in 
Hebei Import & Export Corp v. Polytek Engineering Co. Ltd agrees with this 
conception when it held that the test of international public policy was whether the issue 
of public policy contravened the state’s own principles which are “fundamental to 
notions of morality and justice.”43 
Some authors have argued that there is a “transnational public policy” or a “truly 
international public policy.”44 Transnational public policy differs from international 
public policy in that transnational public policy “involves the identification of principles 
that are commonly recognized by the political and legal systems around the world.”45 
One principle that has emanated from transnational public policy46 is the Internal Law 
Principle, which prohibits a state party to an arbitration agreement to invoke its own 
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38 Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage (eds), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer 1999) 996; Hanotiau and Caprasse (n 5) 790. For cases supporting this argument, see 
also Bundersgerichtshof, 18 January 1990, (1992) XVII YB Com Arb 503 (CA Luxembourg, 24 
November 1993); Kersa Holding Co Luxembourg v Infancourtage, (1996) XXI YB Com Arb 617.  
39 Levi-Tawil (n 19); Wakim (n 3). 
40 Osuuskunta Matex VS v TKK General Directorate, File Nr 94/662, Decision Nr 95/140, unreported 4th 
Commercial Court of Ankara. 
41 This Turkish case, however, has been criticised for being a wrong decision. Al-Jerafi (n 15) 193-194.  
42 Pieter Sanders, ‘Commentary’ in 60 Years of ICC Arbitration (ICC Publishing 1984); Martin Hunter 
and Gui Conde e Silva, ‘Transnational Public Policy and its Application in Investment Arbitration’ 
(2003) 4 JWI 3. 
43 Hebei Import & Export Corporation v Polytek Engineering Company Limited, (1999) XXIV YBCA 
652, 670 (China, Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal 1999). 
44 See Pierre Lalive, ‘Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration’ in 
Pieter Sanders, Comparative arbitration practice and public policy in arbitration (ICCA Congress Series 
No 3, Kluwer 1987). See however, Hanotiau and Caprasse, viewing these concepts in the end as merely 
academic. Hanotiau and Caprasse (n 5) 796. 
45 Hunter and Conde e Silva (n 42). 
46 David Cairns, ‘Transnational Public Policy and the Internal Law of State Parties’ (2009) TDM 1 
!http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1304" accessed 22 March 2014. 
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internal law to avoid its contractual obligations.47 Cairns explained the distinction 
among domestic, international, and transnational public policy as follows: 
 
Transnational public policy does not form part of the legal orders either 
of public international law, or any national legal order. The public policy 
of individual states is divided into domestic public policy and 
international public policy, with the latter being the (more restricted) 
public policy of the state as applied to international transactions. By 
contrast, transnational public policy is the common-core the international 
public policy of many states, which by its very nature also reflects 
fundamental principles of public international law. It is the amalgam of 
the public policy of multiple forums, but is the public policy of no 
individual forum. It embodies the transnational consciousness and 
solidarity of international commercial arbitration.48 
 
In general, transnational public policy is a narrower concept than international 
public policy, but it is also more uniform in application than international public 
policy.49 Maurer, however, states that by qualifying the term public policy in Article 
V(2)(b) with the phrase “of that country” means that the New York Convention did not 
aim for a transnational meaning of public policy.50 
In the end, as noted by Sanders in his definition of transnational public policy, 
the courts of a given “country concerned” will determine what constitutes public policy 
under Article V(2)(b), and they can take into account international public policy norms. 
This thesis author believes that it may be helpful for courts in the GCC states, if the 
GCC states were to issue a statement, and/or add to a regional convention a statement, 
that clarifies what constitutes basic domestic, regional, transnational, and/or 
international public policy among the GCC states. 
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47 Cairns (n 46). 
48 ibid; Gaillard and Savage (n 38) s16447-1648; Lalive (n 44). Another way of expressing the idea of 
transnational public policy is that it is the body of “general principles of morality” accepted by civilized 
nations. Hunter and Conde e Silva (n 42). 
49 Hunter and Conde e Silva (n 42). 
50 Maurer (n 23) 53; Redfern and Hunter (n 18) 541. 
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5.1.3. Mandatory Rules and Public Policy in International Arbitration 
 
Parties to a contract will generally have the freedom to determine the governing 
law. Such freedom, however, may be limited by mandatory rules.51 While there are 
numerous definitions of mandatory rules,52 Mayer defined mandatory rules or loi de 
police, “as an imperative provision of law which must be applied to an international 
relationship irrespective of the law that governs that relationship. To put it another way: 
mandatory rules of law are a matter of public policy (ordre public) and moreover reflect 
a public policy so commanding that they must be applied even if the general body of 
law to which they belong is not competent by application of the relevant rule of conflict 
of laws.”53 Unlike public policy in general, however, mandatory rules enforce only 
policies that are deemed to be so strong that national rules must take precedence over 
foreign law that govern the contract.54 
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51 Weller (n 16) 244. 
52 According to Maniruzzaman, the existence of mandatory rules is well recognized in the legal literature, 
and emanates from the sovereignty of the state and jus cogens [compelling law or peremptory norm]. The 
applicability of mandatory rules have been acknowledged by the European Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations of 19 June 1980, European Parliament and Council Regulation 
(EC) 593/2008 (June 17, 2008), the ICC, UNCITRAL, Institut de Droit International, and the American 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (1971). See generally, AFM Maniruzzaman, 
‘International Arbitrator and Mandatory Public Law Rules in the Context of State Contracts: An 
Overview’ (1990) 7 J of Int’l Arb 3, 52, 62-63  [hereinafter “Maniruzzaman, ‘Mandatory Public Law’”]; 
Jan Kleinheisterkamp, ‘The Impact of Internationally Mandatory Laws on the Enforceability of 
Arbitration Agreements’ (2009) 3 World Arb & Med R 2.  
53 Ann Mayer, ‘Law and Religion in the Muslim Middle East’ (1987) 35 Am J Comp L 127, 274-275; 
Maniruzzaman, ‘Mandatory Public Law’ (n 52). For a basic overview of mandatory rules, see Thomas 
Guedj, ‘The Theory of Loi de Police, A Functional Trend in Continental Private International Law – A 
Comparative Analysis With Modern American Theories’ (1991) 39 Am J Comp L 661. See also, Marc 
Blessing, ‘Mandatory Rules versus Party Autonomy in International Arbitration’ (1997)14 J Int’l Arb 23; 
Thomas Carbonneau, ‘The Exuberant Pathway to Quixotic Internationalism: Assessing the Folly of 
Mitsubishi’ (1986)19 Vand J Transnat’l 265; Andrew Guzman, ‘Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling 
Arbitration and Mandatory Rules’ (2000) 49 Duke LJ 1279; Philip McConnaughy, ‘The Risks and 
Virtues of Lawlessness: A “Second Look” at International Commercial Arbitration’ (1999) 93 NW U L 
Rev 453; Eric Posner, ‘Arbitration and the Harmonization of International Commercial Law: A Defense 
of Mitsubishi’ (1999) 39 Va J Int’l L 647. 
54 Kleinheisterkamp (n 52). Examples of mandatory rules include competition laws, bribery and 
corruption, taxation laws, import-export rules, securities regulation, foreign exchange regulations, 
environmental laws, expropriation, nationalisation and confiscation, and embargos. Vladimir Pavic, 
‘Bribery and International Commercial Arbitration - The Role of Mandatory Rules and Public Policy’ 
(2012) 43 VUWLR. Maniruzzaman, ‘Mandatory Public Law’ (n 52); Philip Landolt, Modernised EC 
Competition Law in International Arbitration (Kluwer 2006) 6-02; Nathalie Voser, ‘Mandatory Rules of 
Law as a Limitation on the Law Applicable in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1996) 7 Am Rev 
Int’l Arb 319, 336; Mayer (n 53); Born (n 15), 2178; Daniel Hochstrasser, ‘Choice of Law and “Foreign” 
Mandatory Rules in International Arbitration’ (1994) 11 J Int’l Arb 1, 57-68. 
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It is worth noting that scholars55 like Lew56 and Mistelis57 hold party autonomy 
in highest regard and reject the existence of mandatory rules.58 Their position reflects a 
vision articulated by the US Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth¸ where it stated that: 
 
The international arbitral tribunal owes no prior allegiance to the legal 
norms of particular states; hence it has no direct obligation to vindicate 
their statutory dictates. The tribunal, however, is bound to effectuate the 
interests of the parties...59 
 
Party autonomy was also recognized in VRG Linhas Aereas S.A. v. 
MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners,60 where the court stated that while a 
court must answer the initial question of who decides the question of arbitrability using 
a “clear and unmistakable standard,” 61 the parties may choose to commit to the 
arbitration panel any questions about the arbitrability of particular disputes.62 
According to Lew, “other than that of the chosen applicable law there is no 
mandatory law for international arbitration.”63 Mistelis states “there is no basis for a 
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55 According to Barraclough and Waincymer, “there is significant academic support...for an approach that 
would apply no mandatory rules…” Andrew Barraclough and Jeff Waincmyer, ‘Mandatory Rules of Law 
in International Commercial Arbitration’ (2005) 6 Melb J Int’l L 205, 207-208. 
56 Julian Lew, Loukas Mistelis and Stefan Kröll (eds), Comparative International Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer 2003) 1-11. 
57 Loukas Mistelis, ‘Mandatory Rules in International Arbitration: Too Much Too Early or Too Little Too 
Late?’ in George Bermann and Loukas Mistelis (eds), Mandatory Rules in International Arbitration 
(Juris 2011) 291, 294. 
58 Bernard Hanotiau, ‘What Law Governs the Issue of Arbitrability?’ (1996) 12 Arb Int’l 391, 397 
(stating that numerous arbitrators remain strongly opposed to the application of [foreign mandatory rules] 
in the field of arbitrability…).  
59 Mitsubishi Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc, 473 US 614 (1985). See generally, Weller (n 
16) (arguing that a tribunal’s application of mandatory rules will depend on the tribunal’s understanding 
of legal theory and those that follow the Kelsenian theory would likely favor party autonomy in a 
decentralized legal order). 
60 VRG Linhas Aereas SA v MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners, No 12-593-CV (2d Cir 
2013). 
61 First Options of Chicago, Inc v Kaplan, 514 US 938 (1995); Oracle America v Myriad Group AG, 
Case No 11-17186 (9th Cir July 26, 2013).  
62 David Zaslowsky and Grant Hanessian, ‘Arbitration. Arbitrability’ (Lexology, 27 September 2013) 
!http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8178317d-e1da-48da-806e-6f03ed4d7ea5" accessed 14 
October 2013; David Zaslowsky and Grant Hanessian, ‘Who decides arbitrability?’ (Lexology, 30 
November 2012) !http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c4a9dadf-8b80-4ed5-81f4-
c9ba50a35d21" accessed 14 October 2013. 
63 Lew (n 17). 
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tribunal to ignore the express choice of the parties because it determines that there is a 
contrary mandatory rule in one of the national laws.”64  
Contrary to Mistelis’ view, however, English courts have at times nullified the 
choice of parties because of some mandatory rules. For example, in The Morviken (The 
Hollandia) case,65 the House of Lords held that the parties’ choice of law clause was 
null and void because the court would not give effect to a choice of law clause that 
would lower the carrier’s liability than that dictated by the Hague/Visby Rules. The 
court in Boissevain v. Weil66 (1950) also refused to enforce a contract that violated the 
UK Exchange Control Act of 1947.67 
Mandatory rules, according to Bower, “reflect the premise that all legal systems 
require mechanisms to restrain the potential excesses of free will,” or party autonomy.68 
Maniruzzaman justifies mandatory rules based on the sovereignty of states that continue 
to have responsibility over the public interest or public policy of the state,69 as 
demonstrated in the Kuwait v. Aminoil case, where the tribunal stated that “the general 
principles of law recognize the right of the State in its capacity of supreme protector of 
the general interest.”70 Mandatory rules, however, could emanate from the arbitral seat 
or the state other than the forum as provided for in Article 7(1) of the Rome 
Convention71 and Article 187(2) of the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws.72 In one 
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64 Mistelis (n 57). 
65 The Morviken (The Hollandia), [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1, [1983] 1 AC 565; Francis Mann, ‘Uniform 
Statutes in English Law’ (1983) 94 L Q Rev 376-406. 
66 Boissevain v Weil [1950] AC 327, [1950] 1 All ER 728. 
67 ibid 341. In this case, Lord Radcliffe, stated that “when the transaction by which the money has 
reached the respondent is actually an offence by our laws, the matter passes beyond the field in which the 
requirements of the individual conscience are the determining consideration.” 
68 Charles Brower, ‘Arbitration and Antitrust: Navigating the Contours of Mandatory Law’ (2011) 59 
Buffalo L Rev 5. 
69 Maniruzzaman, ‘Mandatory Public Law’ (n 52). 
70 Kuwait v Aminoil, 21 ILM 976 (1982), para 99. 
71 The application of these mandatory rules are not mandatory as can be seen by the language of Article 
7(1) of the Rome Convention, which provides that “effect may be given to the mandatory rules of the law 
of another country with which the situation has a close connection, if and in so far as, under the law of the 
latter country, those rules must be applied whatever the law applicable to the contract.” Rome 
Convention, art 7(1).  
72 Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 187(2) (1971). The Restatement requires a “materially greater 
interest” instead of a “close connection” under Article7(1) of the Rome Convention. 
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ICC case, the tribunal stated that it ought to consider both Swiss contract law and 
Turkish mandatory law even if Turkey was not a designated country.73 
Bowers further argues that mandatory rules may prevail over party chosen laws, 
not because mandatory rules have peremptory status but because of conflict of law rules 
that validate their application in a specific case.74 As stated by Maniruzzaman, while 
party autonomy in a contract is basic to conflict of law rules, mandatory rules, 
especially “of a public nature, follow their own conflict of laws principles.”75 The 
application of mandatory rules, therefore, may be affected by the choice of arbitral 
seats, the relevant conflict of law rules, and the institutional rules applicable to the 
particular case,76 making the parties’ choice of these elements a key factor in the 
application of mandatory rules. 
According to Maniruzzaman, the determination of which mandatory rules apply 
may be determined by (1) the place where the contract is to be performed, (2) the place 
of enforcement, or (3) where there is a close contact between the state and the contract, 
or parties.77 The determination of the applicability of mandatory rules, specifically in 
balancing the intent of the parties and the state’s interest in protecting its public policy, 
has been controversial, as illustrated in German and Belgian cases.78 In Belgium, the 
Court of Cassation in Von Hopplynus Instruments SA v. Coherent Inc., in reversing the 
lower court’s denial of mandatory rules based on the New York Convention’s Article 
II(3), created a rule relating to the Belgian Act of 1961, where “if the arbitration 
agreement is...subject to foreign law, the judge requested to decline its jurisdiction must 
exclude the arbitration if, by virtue of the lex fori [law of the forum], the dispute cannot 
be subtracted from the state courts’ jurisdiction.”79 In Germany, the Oberlandesgericht 
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73 Final Award in ICC Case No 8528, (2000) XXV YB Comm Arb 341, 348 (requiring “close 
connection” before applying foreign mandatory law). 
74 Brower (n 68). See, however, Anne-Sophie Papeil, ‘Conflict of overriding mandatory rules in 
arbitration’ in Franco Ferrari and Stefan Kröll (eds), Conflict of Laws in International Arbitration  
(Sellier International Publishers 2011) 344 (stating that the choice of the parties can be an obstacle to the 
application of mandatory rules because of the contractual nature of arbitration). 
75 Maniruzzaman, ‘Mandatory Public Law’ (n 52). 
76 Brower (n 68). 
77 Maniruzzaman, ‘Mandatory Public Law’ (n 52). 
78 See generally, Kleinheisterkamp (n 52). 
79 Von Hopplynus Instruments SA v Coherent Inc, 2007 Revue Belge de Droit Commercial 889 (Cass, 16 
November 2006). 
! 196 
Munich80 reversed the lower court’s (Landgericht Munich) enforcement of the 
arbitration clause after it rejected the defendant’s argument that the mandatory rule 
would affect only choice of law issues and not jurisdictional issues. The German rule is 
that disputes can be decided by arbitrators, unless it cannot be reasonably expected that 
German international mandatory provisions designed to govern the claim will be 
applied.81 In the end, as stated by Maniruzzaman, an arbitral tribunal “should exercise 
its freedom to determine the applicable conflict of laws rules according to guidelines 
derived from general principles which are common to the developed conflict of laws 
systems.”82 
 
PART II 
 
5.2. Public Policy Under the Shari’a 
 
 Only a limited number of authors like Saleh83 and Wakim84 have expressly 
discussed the impact of the Shari’a on public policy. The question, as aptly stated by 
Saleh, is “what does public policy mean in [the Shari’a] context?”.85  
In the GCC states context, a discussion of Shari’a public policy does not end the 
inquiry as to what public policy means to each of the GCC states. As Wakim stated, 
“[i]t would be a mistake, however, to homogenize the political values of the Middle 
East or equate Islam with Arabic culture.”86 A discussion of public policy under the 
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80 Oberlandesgericht Munchen [Superior Regional Court], 17 May 2006, 2006 Wertpapier Mitteilunger 
1556, 2007 Praxis des InternationalenPivat- und Verfahrensrechts 322 (FRG); Landgericht Munchen 
[Lower Regional Court], Docket no 15 HKO 23703/04, 5 December 2005 (unreported, summarized in the 
appellate decision in Oberlandesgericht); Kleinheisterkamp (n 52). 
81 Kleinheisterkamp (n 52). 
82 Maniruzzaman, ‘Mandatory Public Law’ (n 52). 
83 Samir Saleh, ‘The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the States of the Arab 
Middle East’ (1985) 1 Arab L Q 19, 26 (one of the earliest discussion of Islamic public policy). 
84 Wakim (n 3) 45 (reiterating Saleh’s discussion on Islamic public policy). 
85 Saleh (n 83) 26. 
86 According to Wakim, “each Middle Eastern country’s public policy values should be assessed in light 
of the variety of factors influencing its government systems. It is therefore important to adjust the context 
of the following issues when they are assessed at the national level.” Wakim (n 3) 40-41; Roger Scruton, 
‘The Political Problem of Islam’ (2002) The Intercollegiate Rev 1 
!http://www.mmisi.org/ir/38_01/scruton.pdf" accessed 21 March 2014; Ali Gheissari, ‘Doing Business 
in the Middle East: A Guide for US Companies’ (2004) 34 Cal W Int’l LJ 273, 276-78 (illuminating the 
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Shari’a, therefore, is only the starting point for any discussion of public policy in the 
GCC states, and a separate discussion of the public policy of each of the GCC states 
will be made towards the end of this chapter.  
 
 5.2.1. General Concept of Public Policy Under the Shari’a 
 
According to Wakim, “the Islamic criterion for public order is that of general 
interest”87 also known as maslahah [public interest].88 Shari’a scholars often reiterate 
the Shari’a maxim that “Muslims must comply with contractual provisions except for 
those which authorize what is forbidden or forbid what is authorized.”89 This maxim 
was emphasized by the Abu Dhabi Court of Appeals in A.A Commercial Co. v. S. 
Motors Ltd Co. and D. Industrial Ltd Co.90 El-Ahdab adds, however, that “a Muslim 
judge can only set aside foreign arbitration awards if the award is deemed to be 
‘contrary to Moslem good morals’ or ‘contains a flagrant injustice.’”91 Muslims place a 
great importance on avoiding haram [that which is forbidden], a conceptualization that 
tends to give great credence to the public policy defence in the Islamic world; while 
Western practice has considered public policy as a last resort exception to the rule.92 As 
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differences between Middle Eastern countries, including the impact of religion, imperialism, nationalism, 
oil, ethnic and linguistic diversities, and how individual states were formed). 
87 Wakim (n 3) 41. 
88 Arthur Gemmell, ‘Commercial Arbitration in the Islamic Middle East’ (2006) 5 Santa Clara J of Int’l L 
169; Faisal Kutty, ‘The Shari’ah Factor in International Commercial Arbitration’ (2006) 28 Loy LA Int’l 
& Comp L R 565, (2009) 4 J of Arab Arb 63; Al-Jerafi (n 15)170. The maslahah [public interest] is the 
overriding objective of the Shari’a and covers six objectives that include “preservation of life, property, 
family, religion, honour or dignity, and al aql [reason of knowledge].” 
89 Wakim (n 3) 41; Kutty (n 88) 610 (stating the rule in the Shari’a that “anything is permitted which is 
valid and that only which is forbidden or set aside by one of the texts or the Qiyas is forbidden”); Khaled 
El-Fadl, ‘The Place of Ethical Obligation in Islamic Law’ (2004) 4 UCLA J Islamic & Near E L 1, 8 
(showing that contracts under the Shari’a must be free from coercion, fraud, deception, or 
misrepresentation and parties must honour their promises in good faith).  
90 AA Commercial Co v S Motors Ltd Co and D Industrial Ltd Co, No 10007/1981 unpublished (UAE, 
The Abu-Dhabi Court of Appeal 1981). 
91 Ezrahi (n 4) 5; Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab and Jalal El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (3rd 
edn, Wolters Kluwer 2011). 
92 Richardson v Melish, (1824) 2 Bing 228 (252) (Court of Common Pleas, England), where the court 
stated that public policy “is never argued at all but when other points fail.” See also Dirk Otto and Omaia 
Elwan, ‘Article V(2)’ in Herbert Kronke, Patricia Nacimiento, Dirk Otto and Nicola Port (eds), 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Global Commentary on the New York 
Convention (Kluwer 2010) 365 (stating that “most international conventions contain a public policy 
clause as a last resort to prevent unwanted effects”). 
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El-Ahdab noted, what is taken into account are the prohibitions and authorizations 
contained in the Shari’a.93  
Notably, however, “there are countless controversies and subtle distinctions 
between the different schools.”94 But while Shari’a schools may differ on some issues, 
“a general Islamic public policy is evident to a degree relevant to international 
commercial transactions.”95 
According to Saleh and Wakim, Shari’a public policy can be generally divided 
into two types: procedural and substantive.96 Neither Saleh nor Wakim gives full 
treatment and explanation to the concept of procedural public policy97 and they deem 
substantive public policy to arise only in two scenarios: riba [interest] and gharar 
[uncertainty].  
 
5.2.2. Procedural Public Policy Under the Shari’a 
 
Saleh and Wakim discuss three fundamental rights covered by Shari’a 
procedural public policy: the right to equal treatment of the parties, the right to be 
heard, and the right to present a case or defence.  The three fundamental principles “are 
not necessarily found in the Quran or Sunna but ... constitute the immutable rules of 
Islamic judicial law.”98 Wakim adds that these rules became part of Shari’a procedural 
public policy as a function of history.99 Saleh stated these three fundamental principles 
as follows:“(1) the strictly equal treatment of the parties to the judicial or arbitral action; 
(2) the prohibition against a judge or arbitrator deciding a dispute without hearing both 
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93 El-Ahdab (n 91) 45. 
94 Saleh (n 83) 29. Thus far, Saleh’s article in 1985, one of a limited few articles that discusses the issue, 
has given the clearest summary of public policy under the Shari’a in the English language, one that has 
been relied upon by subsequent scholars. 
95 Wakim (n 3) 41, citing Gemmell (n 88) 169, 173-176, 188, 192 (detailing the different Islamic schools 
of interpretation); Roy (n 27) 945-946 (identifying the different Islamic fiqh). 
96 Saleh (n 83) 26; Wakim (n 3) 45(stating that “the features of Islamic public policy may be divided into 
two categories: those of a procedural nature and those of a substantive nature”); see also Richard Harding, 
‘An Introduction to Arbitration in the Middle East’ Mondaq Bus Briefing (London, 8 June 2005) 
A1!http://www.keatingchambers.co.uk/resources/publications/2004/rah_intro_arb_middleeast.aspx" 
accessed 23 March 2014 (explaining that the two elements of law applicable to arbitration are substantive 
law and procedural law). 
97 Both covered only the right to equal treatment, the right to be heard, and the right to present a case and 
defence. 
98 Saleh (n 83) 27, followed by Wakim (n 3) 45. 
99 Wakim (n 3) 45 (adding the term “historically” to describe the advent of the three principles). 
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plaintiff and defendant; (3) the prohibition against a judge or arbitrator making his 
judgment or award without giving the parties the opportunity to submit their evidence, 
pleas, and defences.”100  
These Shari’a procedural principles, as it turns out, are consistent with the New 
York Convention’s “universal norms of due process and fairness.”101 According to 
Wakim, “the procedural concerns of Islamic law are well addressed by the New York 
Convention.”102 The Shari’a procedural public policy requiring the right to be heard, 
and the right to present a case or defence, is consistent with Article V(1)(b) of the New 
York Convention, requiring proper notice and the ability to present a case.103 Wakim 
goes further to say that the Shari’a procedural principle of strict equal treatment of the 
parties may be consistent with Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention,  dealing 
with the capacity of the parties and the validity of their arbitration agreement.104 Though 
Wakim argues that Article V(1)(a) “may allow for the same type of exception to exist as 
contemplated by the Islamic principle”105 it remains unclear, due to the absence of cases 
on the matter, whether Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention has the same scope 
as the Shari’a “strict equal treatment” requirement. It is this thesis author’s view that the 
Shari’a seems to require a more literal equality in the procedural treatment of the 
parties, since the Shari’a has separate conditions for the capacity of parties106 and a 
valid arbitration agreement.107 
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100 Saleh, however, gave no further elaboration on the three fundamental principles of procedural public 
policy under the Shari’a. Saleh (n 83) 27; Wakim (n 3) 45.  
101 Wakim (n 3) 45, citing El-Ahdab (n 91) 45 (stating the fundamental principles of arbitral proceedings 
are due process and fairness); Jennifer Amundsen, ‘Membership Has Its Privileges: The Confidence-
Building Potential of the New York Convention Can Boost Commerce in Developing Nations’ (2003) 21 
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102 Wakim (n 3) 45. 
103 Andrés Jana, Angie Armer, Johanna Kranenberg, ‘Article V(1)(b)’ in Herbert Kronke, Patricia 
Nacimiento, Dirk Otti and Nicola Port (eds), Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: 
A Global Commentary on the New York Convention (Kluwer 2010) 231-256; James Gaitis, ‘International 
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art V(1)(b)); Wakim (n 3) 45. 
104 Wakim (n 3) 45. 
105 ibid. 
106 El-Ahdab (n 91); Essam Alsheikh, ‘Court Intervention in Commercial Arbitral Proceedings in Saudi 
Arabia: A Comparative Analytical Study of Shari’a Based Statutes and International Arbitral Practices’ 
(DPhil thesis, University of Portsmouth 2011). 
107 For a discussion of the Shari’a requirements for a valid arbitration agreement, see Chapter Three. 
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Overall, what the Shari’a requires in terms of procedural public policy, seems to 
be consistent with international notions of due process and fairness; and there does not 
seem to be a substantial difference in procedural public policy. In discussing public 
policy within the context of “violation of procedural laws,” for example, Otto and 
Elwan, state that “in countries that strictly apply certain Islamic legal principles, the 
concept of what violates basic principles as well as public morals may differ 
substantially from such concepts in other parts of the world.”108 Such is not the case, 
however, in regards to procedural public policy under the Shari’a. 
 
5.2.3. Shari’a Substantive Public Policy 
 
Shari’a substantive public policy concerns mainly with two prohibitions that will 
likely affect the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards:109 the prohibition on riba 
[interest]110 and the prohibition on gharar [aleatory or uncertain obligations].111 These 
two prohibitions under Shari’a substantive public policy differ from Shari’a procedural 
public policy because they “are deeply rooted in the scriptural sources, the Holy 
Qur’an.”112 
 
5.2.3.1. Riba 
 
The Shari’a prohibition on riba [interest], otherwise known in the West as 
usury,113 derives from the basic notion that the use of interests by lenders is inherently 
unfair or unjust114 to the borrower and is a “morally reprehensible”115 exploitation by 
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108 Otto and Elwan (n 92) 390. 
109 Saleh (n 83) 27; Wakim (n 3) 45. 
110 Haider Hamoudi, ‘Muhammad’s Social Justice or Muslim Can’t?: Langdellianism and the Failures of 
Islamic Finance’ (2007) 40 Cornell Int’l LJ 89 111-113 (explaining that the many interpretations of riba 
can be attributed to multiple Hadith [tradition] on the subject).  
111 Hamoudi (n 110) 409, 420 (2007) (labeling investments in futures as gharar and illegal). 
112 Saleh (n 83) 27; Wakim (n 3) 45. 
113 Saleh (n 83) 27.  
114 Fatima Akaddaf, ‘Application of the United Nations Convention to Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods (CISG) to Arab Islamic Countries: Is the CISG Compatible with Islamic Law Principles?’ 
(2001) 13 Pace Int’l L Rev 1, 48-49 (explaining that the Qur’an prohibits riba because it is unjust); see 
also Kutty (n 88) 604 (stating that riba is prohibited because it is an unlawful or unjustified gain). 
115 Wakim (n 3) 45 (Wakim calls the riba “morally reprehensible”). 
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one who has money over one who has none.116 According to Saleh, the scriptural basis 
of the prohibition on the riba is “unimpeachable.”117 The Holy Qur’an, Al-Imran 3:130, 
Yussuf Ali Translation, states as follows: “O ye who believe! Devour not usury, 
doubled and multiplied; but fear Allah; that ye may (really) prosper.”118 The views, 
however, of each of the schools of thought of the Shari’a, though in agreement with the 
prohibition, differ as to the degree of strict adherence to the prohibition on the riba.119 
The Hanbalis traditionally apply the prohibition of the riba strictly,120 and view 
the prohibition as extending “beyond the geographical boundaries of Islam.”121 So, 
GCC states such as KSA122 and Qatar123 that generally follow the Hanbali School, 
strictly prohibit the riba.124 However, Oman and Qatar do not strictly enforce the riba in 
practice.125 Further, in the KSA, some banks do pay and charge interest and place their 
funds in investments where interest will be earned.126 Also, liquidated damages as well 
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116 See Natasha Affolder, ‘Awarding Compound Interest in International Arbitration’ (2001) 12 Am Rev 
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117 Saleh (n 83) 27; Chetan Phull, ‘The Concept of Riba in Islamic Banking Law: An Introduction’ (2011) 
10 JIBLR 405. 
118 The Holy Qur’an, Al-Imran 3:130, Yusuf Ali Translation, see also The Holy Qur’an, Al-Baqara 2:275-
276, Yusuf Ali Translation; The Holy Qur’an, An-Nisa 4:161, Yusuf Ali Translation; The Holy Qur’an, 
Ar-Rum 30:39, Yusuf Ali Translation.  
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methodological (i.e. linguistic interpretation) or on the practical application of the prohibition on the riba. 
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and riba al-fadl (involving excess in counter value). The fiqh or schools are divided on the application of 
these two types of riba. See Abdullah Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest: A Study of the Prohibition of 
Riba and Its Contemporary Interpretation (Brill 1999) 35. 
120 Saleh (n 83) 27; Wakim (n 3) 45; Hasanuddeen Abdulaziz, ‘My Say: Taking Another Look at BBA 
Contracts’ The Edge (Malaysia, 20 February 2006) A1 (showing how the Hanbali school rejected a 
contract, rationalizing it was a way to cheat God and induce riba). 
121 Saleh (n 83) 27. 
122 Saudi Arabia Court of Grievance, Commercial Circuit, Case No 1767/2/J of 1422 AH, Ruling No 
183/C/C/9 of 1425 AH (stating that usury is prohibited under the Shari’a). 
123 According to Saleh, Saudi Arabia and Qatar follow Hanbali teaching. Saleh (n 83) 27. 
124 Wakim (n 3) 45. 
125 Kent Gravelle, ‘Islamic Law in Sudan: A Comparative Analysis’ (1998) 5 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 1, 
19. 
126 Mayer (n 53) 167; see however, John Donboli and Farnaz Kashefi, ‘Doing Business in the Middle 
East: A Primer for US Companies’ (2005) 38 Cornell Int’l LJ 413, 424 (noting Saudi Arabian banks 
provide interest-free funding). 
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as compensation for inflation are permitted in the KSA.127 A Saudi arbitral tribunal in 
Final Award No 7063 (1993) has also upheld an arbitral award that included interest, 
stating that the doctrine of the riba under Saudi law did not bar all arbitral awards of 
reasonable compensation for financial loss.128  
The tawarruq,129 a method of circumventing the prohibition against the riba 
where an asset initially bought on a deferred payment is sold for cash to a third party at 
a lower price than the initial deferred purchase to create liquidity,130 may have even 
been acceptable to the Hanbali School.131 Seniawski stated that the founder of the 
Hanbali School, Ibn Hanbal, considered only one form of riba as prohibited beyond a 
doubt in the Shari’a, the view of riba as pay or increase, and that other types of increase 
or income derived are not as clearly prohibited under the prohibition on the riba and 
were acceptable to Ibn Hanbal.132 Regardless, the Hanbali School is likely to refuse 
enforcement of an arbitral award that includes interests in the damage computation as 
violating Shari’a public policy.133  
The Hanafis have treated the prohibition on the riba less rigidly, and invented 
legal mechanisms134 or hiyal135 to circumvent the prohibition on the riba.136 The Shafi’s 
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127 Naif Al-Shareef, ‘Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Saudi Arabia: Grounds for Refusal 
under Article V of the New York Convention’ (DPhil thesis, University of Dundee 2000) 83. 
128 Final Award No 7063 (1993), (1997) 22 YB Comm Arb 87, IADR Ref No 112 (Saudi Arabia). But see 
Dr M Islam Khaki & Others v Syed Muhammad Hashim & Others, PLD 2000 SG 225, 760, 770 
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129 See Asyraf Dusuki, ‘Commodity Murabahah Programme (CMP): An Innovative Approach to 
Liquidity Management’ (2007) 3 J of Islamic Econ, Banking and Fin 1, 16. 
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131 Walid Hegazy, ‘Islamic Business and Commercial Law: Contemporary Islamic Finance: From 
Socioeconomic Idealism to Pure Legalism’ (2007) 7 Chi J Int’l L 581, 597. 
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134 Saleh (n 83) 27 (calling them “legal tricks”). 
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also accept the use of hiyal [legal devices].137 One example of this hiyal is the 
murabaha,138 which allows certain interest-based transactions as an exception to the 
prohibition on the riba and where a bank purchases an item for a customer in exchange 
for an agreement that the customer will buy back the item from the bank at a set higher 
price. The Hanafi definition of riba has allowed the use of interest in certain 
situations.139 For example, in Egypt, where Hanafi doctrine is the majority, the riba 
only applies to transactions between two Muslims, and therefore, according to Klein, a 
Muslim may engage in riba with a non-Muslim in Egypt.140  
Further, the Hanafis do not prohibit some forms of “accrued interest” as they do 
not deem it as riba, and a loan bearing interest is not automatically void as riba.141 
Some Shari’a scholars even believe that the riba does not prohibit all forms of interest 
on loans142 or all forms of compensation awards.143 According to Wakim, “the doctrine 
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when the arbitrator acted as an amiable compositeur). In an arbitration award rendered by Cairo Regional 
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Challenges for US Financial Institutions’ (2005) 24 Ann Rev Banking & Fin L 487, 490. 
143 Akaddaf (n 114) 47. 
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of riba does not bar all interest-related awards, especially where a party experiences a 
financial loss due to the withholding of a monetary award to which he or she is 
otherwise entitled.”144 As for arbitral awards, in countries that follow the Hanafi view of 
the riba, like Egypt145 and the UAE,146 an arbitral award that includes interest in the 
damage computation would likely be enforceable.  
Modern practices have for the most part circumvented the prohibition on the 
riba through various methods that allow the charging of interest.147 In Egypt, Article 
226 of the Civil Code148 specifically mentions interest, in addition to payment to the 
claimant, as part of the obligation to pay; a provision that according to Akkadaf violates 
the Shari’a.149 A challenge before the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court led to a 
dismissal of the challenge.150 Additionally, in Morocco, the legislator created a legal 
fiction whereby the prohibition on the riba is applicable to persons or personnes 
physiques while it is not applicable to artificial or legal entities or personnes morales 
like corporations, banks, and public agencies.151 The Dubai Court of Cassation has also 
ruled that a “creditor may collect a fifteen percent interest in a delayed payment 
pursuant to a contract for the sale of goods.”152 In the UAE, the Federal Supreme Court 
in Petition No 831, 23rd Judicial Year153 held that although interest is contrary to the 
Shari’a, the constitutional circuit of the Federal Supreme Court allows interest when it 
is proportionally less than the amount of the transaction. 
These new ways to circumvent the prohibition on the riba signals that perhaps 
the prohibition is not as strong as it once was, and will not likely impede in the 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award with interest.  
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The survey conducted by this research also asked respondents whether interest 
should be allowed in an arbitral award. The question was asked in the survey to 
determine how those in the field of arbitration in the GCC states view interests in an 
arbitral award.  
The majority of respondents, amounting to a total of 77.42% answered that 
interest should be allowed, while only a total of 22.51% answered that interest should 
not be allowed. Those who were in favour of allowing interest, however, differed three 
ways as to the extent to which interest ought to be allowed. Of those who are in favour 
of allowing interest in an arbitral award, 29.03% favoured interest according to the 
contract, 25.81% favoured interest but limited to a certain percentage, and 22.58% are 
in favour of interest without limitations.  
 
5.2.3.2. Gharar 
 
The second Shari’a substantive public policy prohibition is the gharar, or the 
existence of future disputes involving speculation and uncertainty.154 The prohibition on 
gharar originated directly155 from the Holy Qur’an, Al-Baqara 2:188156 as follows: 
 
And do not eat up your property among yourselves for vanities, nor use it 
as bait for the judges, with intent that ye may eat up wrongfully and 
knowingly a little of (other) people’s property. 
 
Further, the Holy Qur’an, An-Nisaa 4:29,157 states as follows: 
 
O ye who believe! eat not up your property among yourselves in vanities: 
but let there be amongst you traffic and trade by mutual good-will: nor 
kill (or destroy) yourselves: for verily Allah hath been to you Most 
Merciful. 
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These verses from the Holy Qur’an, along with the Sunna of the Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH), have been interpreted by Shari’a scholars as prohibitions on the 
gharar. One of the basic conditions for an arbitral clause or an arbitration agreement to 
be enforceable under the Shari’a is for the dispute to “have already arisen.”158 This 
basic requirement is aimed directly at the prohibition on gharar. According to Wakim, 
the Holy Qur’an requires that parties to a contract “must be fully aware of their 
obligations at the time they enter into the contract.”159 Therefore, according to Wakim, 
“contract clauses calling for the arbitration of future disputes are technically 
unenforceable.”160 Uncertainty in a contract means that there was a lack of consent 
between the parties to an agreement, and this unfairness is what the prohibition on 
gharar aims to eliminate.161 
Because of the prohibition on gharar, certain types of agreements involving 
uncertainty or an element of risk will be deemed void under the Shari’a, including 
gambling and insurance.162 Under the prohibition on gharar, the object of the 
transaction must be identified, and those objects of a sale or rental that have an 
uncertain existence163 (i.e. unharvested crops)164 would be void. The same applies to the 
price, which must be fixed at the time of the agreement.165 According to Saleh, there 
are, of course, exceptions to the prohibition on the gharar, including the “production 
and supply of materials not in existence at the time the contract is made (e.g., 
construction).”166 
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With regards to arbitration, the Shari’a prohibition on gharar ought to render 
void agreements to arbitrate future disputes.167 Yet, according to Wakim, “arbitration 
takes place in the Middle East, based on clauses calling for arbitration of future 
disputes.”168 Today, all the GCC states “allow arbitration agreements for both present 
and future disputes.”169 Even in KSA, as stated by Roy, the government adopted 
regulations that made a contractual provision regarding the resolution of a future 
dispute, otherwise void under the prohibition on gharar, enforceable.170 In Bahrain, the 
GCC Arbitration Centre’s recommended standard arbitration clause includes future 
statements about uncertain disputes.171 In general, a large exception has been made to 
the prohibition on gharar with regards to arbitration, so agreements to arbitrate future 
disputes are enforced in the GCC states, including KSA mainly because arbitration 
clauses are “necessary to a contract.”172  However, according to Wakim, “arbitral 
awards upholding aleatory contracts or aleatory clauses, other than the arbitration clause 
itself, may be considered contrary to public policy.”173 
 
5.2.4. The Effect of Shari’a Public Policy on Arbitrability 
 
What is not arbitrable under the Shari’a is generally of consensus and uniformity 
amongst the majority of GCC states, subject only to slight differences. 174 Generally 
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speaking, a dispute that cannot be the subject of sul’h [conciliation]175 is not arbitrable 
under the Shari’a.176 In Bahrain, the Supreme Court in Challenge No. 75/2007 (7 Jan 
2008), rejected a challenge to the arbitral award because the court did not consider the 
case a dispute falling within the scope of purely personal status disputes which may not 
be subject to conciliation or to arbitration, but relates to the financial status of the 
partners and consequently are subject to arbitration. The scope of arbitration under the 
Shari’a is the same as that of sul’h.177 The question is what disputes generally cannot be 
the subject of sul’h under the Shari’a.178 
To begin with, arbitration that deals with actions or products that are haram 
[prohibited] are not arbitrable.179 Additionally, rights falling within the jurisdiction of 
religious courts are not arbitrable.180 As Alsheikh puts it, “to be valid it must concern 
the rights of human beings and not the rights of Allah, [hadd, or] Tazeers.”181 This 
category would include the hadd, or the penalties fixed by the Prophet Muhammad 
[PBUH] for theft, adultery, consumption of pork or alcohol, among others.182 It is, 
however, always possible to arbitrate on the financial consequences of offences other 
than hadd.183 As for the arbitrability of matters relating to personal status such as 
marriage, affiliation, divorce and the guardianship of minors, this area is subject to 
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controversy among the Shari’a schools.184 While each Islamic country might take a 
slightly different approach,185 as a general rule,186 questions of personal status and 
criminal acts are not arbitrable.187 Overall, it is clear that “all cases relating to religious 
law, hadd and any arbitration concerning haram goods are absolutely prohibited.”188 
Commercial disputes are another matter, and create a wider divergence of 
positions and rules among Islamic countries. Going back to the general prohibition on 
gharar [uncertainty], there are divergent views on the scope of this prohibition with 
regards to arbitration. According to Saleh, “future disputes between commercial 
agents/distributors cannot be made the subject of an arbitration clause in certain States 
but can be submitted to arbitration after the dispute has arisen (e.g., Lebanon). The same 
applies to an arbitration clause inserted in the printed terms of an insurance contract 
which the Libyan Civil Code renders null and void.”189 There are also different views as 
to the arbitrability of subject matters that are not expressly addressed under the Shari’a. 
There are, for example, different views as to the arbitrability of intellectual property190 
and bankruptcy. 
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Overall, the Shari’a has expanded the scope of arbitration to cover, not only 
property disputes, but also family disputes.191 Such a view leaves open the possibility of 
a more flexible interpretation of arbitrability or the scope of arbitration under the 
Shari’a that is compatible with international arbitration norms. With regards to 
arbitrability in the GCC states, it is necessary to discuss the peculiarity of each GCC 
state in the latter part of this chapter.192 
 
5.2.5. The Effect of Shari’a on the Public Policy Defence  
 
The limited scope of Shari’a public policy is puzzling when contrasted with the 
extent to which Western scholars and practitioners193 have criticized Islamic countries 
for refusing enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. As Al-Jerafi rightly observed, these 
criticisms are “only superficial and lack careful analysis.”194 For example, Shari’a 
procedural public policy, as explained above in Section 5.2.2., is largely consistent with 
the New York Convention. As Wakim puts it, “[p]erhaps because of their appeal to 
universal norms of due process and fairness, Islamic arbitration procedural concerns 
overlap well with the New York Convention.”195 Viewing Shari’a procedural public 
policy as consistent with international arbitration norms, what remains are concerns 
with the riba [interest] and gharar [uncertainty].  
Yet, as explained above in Section 5.2.3.2., the gharar has not been strictly 
enforced with regards to arbitration and all GCC states allow an arbitration agreement 
to apply to future disputes. Also, the riba has been strictly applied arguably only in 
KSA, and has largely been circumvented with exceptions that in essence allow the riba. 
One scholar even goes as far as to state that the majority of Muslims are attempting to 
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limit or to eliminate the prohibition on the riba.196 In short, a closer look at Shari’a 
substantive public policy reveals two prohibitions that have been largely limited by 
most Islamic courts. The criticisms regarding Shari’a public policy as the biggest 
obstacle to foreign arbitral award enforcement in the GCC states, if only aimed at the 
riba and gharar, seem overly exaggerated given the discussion above. There seems to 
remain some other reason why public policy is deemed to be an obstacle to the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Islamic countries, but Shari’a public policy 
seems to play a limited role, regardless if in practice courts in GCC states refuse 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards based on a sweeping claim of “public policy.” 
 
PART III 
 
5.3. Public Policy Under International Agreements 
 
 5.3.1. Public Policy Under the New York Convention 
 
  5.3.1.1. Overview of Public Policy Under the New York Convention 
 
 Generally speaking, the New York Convention makes an express reference to 
“public policy” only in Article V(2)(b),197 where the New York Convention provides as 
follows: 
 
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if 
the competent authority in the country where recognition and 
enforcement is sought finds that: 
(b) the recognition of enforcement of the award would be contrary to the 
public policy of that country. 
 
Article V(2)(b), however, is not the only source for the application of public 
policy in the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award.198 Other provisions of the New 
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York Convention imply the existence of the public policy defence in those provisions as 
well.199 In this regard, the overall public policy scheme of the New York Convention 
looks similar to that of the Shari’a200 since public policy under the New York 
Convention, taking into account all the relevant provisions affecting public policy, can 
also be classified into two aspects: (1) procedural public policy201 and (2) substantive 
public policy.202 The basic notion of public policy under the New York Convention is 
generally viewed to be consistent with that of civil law systems, where public policy 
“encompass[es] substantive as well as procedural obligations.”203 The New York 
Convention’s procedural public policy falls within the ambit of Article V(1)(b), 
covering due process;204 while the substantive public policy falls within multiple 
provisions, mainly Article V(2)(b), expressly referring to public policy, and  Articles 
V(1)(a), II(3), and V(2)(a) dealing with arbitrability. 
 
A. Procedural Public Policy 
 
Article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention states that the enforcement  of a 
foreign arbitral award may be refused when “the party against whom the award is 
invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the 
arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case.”205 This Article on 
due process pertains to public policy,206 as it is generally agreed among commentators 
like van den Berg that the due process requirements of the New York Convention are 
also covered by the public policy exception.207 Most cases that allege a due process 
violation fall under Article V(1)(b) relating to the right to be heard, but many courts 
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assume that the right to be heard simultaneously falls under Article V(2)(b)’s public 
policy defence.208 
Under Article V(1)(b), each party must be able to fully present his case, 
arguments, or defence (right to be heard)209 and to answer all the submissions of its 
adversary.210 According to van den Berg, this article “is concerned with the fundamental 
principle of fair hearing and adversarial proceedings, known also as audi et alteram 
partem [“hear the other side too”].”211 It is important to note that according to Parsons 
& Whittemore, “this provision essentially sanctions the application of the forum state’s 
standard of due process.”212  
Van den Berg more specifically articulated four categories of due process 
violations under Article V(1)(b) wherein courts have refused to enforce a foreign 
arbitral award.213 The first type deals with cases involving lack of notice or when there 
is a failure to inform a party about the arbitration, referred to as “ghost arbitration,”214 
which may result from not properly locating the uninformed respondent.215 In Sesostris 
SAE v. Transportes Navales SA and M/V Unamuno,216 the US District Court of 
Massachusetts refused enforcement of a foreign arbitral award because the bank had not 
received proper notice of the arbitration proceeding. Refusal to participate in the 
arbitration after having been duly notified, however, constitutes a waiver.217 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
208 Otto and Elwan (n 92) 388, fn 195, citing Oberlandesgericht [Court of Appeal] Hamburg, 1988 (2004) 
YB Comm Arb XXIX  663 (Germany); Oberlandesgericht [Court of Appeal] Jena, 8 August 2007 (2008) 
YB Comm Arb XXXIII 534 (Germany); Shen Zhong Fa Jing Er Chu Zi Di, Shenzen Intermediate 
People’s Court, 2001, Decision No 104 (China). 
209 Otto and Elwan (n 92) 387. 
210 This right, however, does not mean the arbitral tribunal has to agree. Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee 
Corp v Banque Arabeet Internationale d’Investissements SA, (1998) YB Comm Arb XXIII 644, 650 
(Courd’Appel de Paris, 1997). 
211 Albert van den Berg, ‘New York Convention of 1958: Refusals of Enforcement’ (2007) ICC Int’l Ct 
of Arb Bulletin, vol 18, No 2, 7 [hereinafter ‘Refusals’]. 
212 Parsons &Whittemore Overseas Co v Societe Generale de L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F2d 
969 (2d Cir 1974), (1976) YB Comm Arb I 205 (US No 7). 
213 van den Berg, ‘Refusals’ (n 211) 7. 
214 ibid (using the term “ghost arbitration”); Danish Buyer v German Seller, Oberlandesgericht [Court of 
Appeal], Cologne, 10 June 1976, (1979) YB Comm Arb IV 258-260 (Germany No 14). 
215 Russian Seller v German Buyer, Bayern Oberlandesgericht [Court of Appeal of Bavaria] 16 March 
2000, (2002) YB Comm Arb XXVII 445-450 (Germany No 53). 
216 Sesostris SAE v TransportesNavales SA and M/V Unamuno, (1991) YB Comm Arb XVI 640-645 (US 
No 108) (US Dist Ct Mass, 28 Dec 1989). 
217 Italy Supreme Court Judgment No 78, Sub 3, (1985)10 YB Comm Arb 385 (“no review of the merits 
of the arbitral award is permitted under the Convention [New York Convention of 1958] even if the 
award is made in the absence of a party who was duly notified of the arbitration and did not participate”). 
! 214 
Likewise, the court in Parsons & Whittemore,218 a case involving a US company 
that abandoned a construction project in Egypt following the severance of US-Egyptian 
diplomatic relations in 1967, rejected the public policy defence of the US company 
which claimed a due process violation when the arbitrators refused to postpone a 
hearing because one of the witnesses could not be present due to a prior commitment.  
The second type of violation appears in cases that involve failure to inform a 
party of what the other party has submitted to the arbitrator or tribunal, thus denying the 
uninformed party of the proper right to a defence.219 The third type of violation involves 
cases where there is insensitivity by arbitrators to accommodate a party who is therefore 
denied of a meaningful participation in the arbitration and to present a proper case and 
defence.220 Finally, the fourth type of violation involves cases where an arbitral tribunal 
or arbitrator puts a party on the wrong track by misleading the party as to procedural 
requirements of the case.221 
Additionally, one could include Article V(1)(c), (d), and (e) as part of the 
procedural public policy.222 There may also be a due process challenge covering a 
party’s right to support its claims with evidence and an opportunity to present such 
evidence,223 including the right to call a witness.224 It should be noted, however, that a 
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simple breach of mandatory rules of the applicable arbitration law at the place of 
arbitration and at the place of enforcement are not sufficient to establish a breach of 
public policy.225 
 
B. Substantive Public Policy 
 
The New York Convention’s substantive public policy, like the Shari’a, covers 
both a general public policy requirement and the concept of arbitrability, which could 
be viewed as two sides of the same coin.226 According to van den Berg, the concept of 
public policy may encompass arbitrability,227 but for historical reasons the drafters of 
the New York Convention addressed public policy and arbitrability in separate clauses 
under Article V(2).228 This section refers to Article V(2)(b) as the provision on express 
substantive public policy, and the articles on arbitrability under Articles V(2)(a), II(3), 
and V(1)(a) as implied substantive public policy. 
 
i. Express Substantive Public Policy Exception  
 
Prior to the New York Convention, its precursor, the Geneva Convention on the 
Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Geneva Convention)229 under its Article I stated 
that “the recognition or enforcement of the award is not contrary to the public policy or 
to the principles of the law of the country in which it is sought to be relied upon.”230 
The New York Convention intentionally dropped the phrase “principles of law” in 
Article V(2)(b),231 which has been interpreted to mean that the New York Convention 
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intended to limit the scope of the public policy exception to those that are fundamental, 
and not to cover a mere violation or incompatibility with local laws.232 
Importantly, courts and writers often emphasize the pro-enforcement bias of the 
New York Convention.233 This pro-enforcement bias itself is a matter of public 
policy.234 It is also well established235 international law since the decision in the 
Parsons & Whittemore case that the grounds for refusing enforcement under Article 
V(2)(b) are to be construed narrowly.236 In this regard, while the public policy provision 
under Article V(2)(b) seems to be a popular fall-back defence, the vast majority of 
courts faced with such an argument proceed with enforcement.237 The public policy 
defence should therefore be permitted only when enforcement of the foreign arbitral 
award would violate “the enforcing state’s most fundamental notions of morality and 
justice,”238 including constitutional rights and fundamental principles of civil law.239 
The International Law Association Committee on International Arbitration (hereafter 
“ILA-CIA”) proposes a limitation on the application of public policy that goes even 
further: “the application of international policy narrowly defined should mean that 
public policy is rarely a ground for refusing enforcement of international arbitral 
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awards.”240 Finally, it is the public policy of the country where enforcement is sought 
that applies under Article V(2)(b).241  
 
ii. Implied Substantive Public Policy or Arbitrability 
 
Aside from the express public policy provision under Article V(2)(b), 
substantive public policy is also implied under Articles V(2)(a), II(1) and (3), 
and V(1)(a). These articles in essence deal with the concept of arbitrability.242 
Article V(2)(a) states as follows: 
 
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if 
the competent authority in the country where recognition and 
enforcement is sought finds that: 
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the law of that country  
 
This provision, like Article V(2)(b), is to be determined by the enforcing state. 
As stated by Afrazadeh, arbitrability reflects a specific interest of the enforcing state 
that particular issues are to be decided by domestic courts.243 As such, “arbitrability is 
part of public policy.”244 However, “very few cases rendered under the [New York] 
Convention have led to the refusal of recognition or enforcement of an award on the 
basis of an alleged inarbitrability.”245 
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While Article V(2)(a) deals only with the law of the enforcing state, Article II(1) 
and (3) of the New York Convention covers arbitrability at the place of arbitration in an 
action for a court to either set aside the arbitral award or refuse to recognize an 
arbitration agreement.246 Unlike Article V, however, Article II provisions are made at 
the request of the parties and not by the courts, sua sponte. Article II(1), otherwise 
known as the arbitrability condition,247 requires that the agreement concern a “subject 
matter capable of settlement by arbitration.”248 Under Article II(3), the court of a 
Contracting State “shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to 
arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed.”249 Arbitrability, though not expressly stated in Article 
II(3), can be read implicitly into the provision because of its reference to an agreement, 
which is subject to Article II(1), and the term “null and void,” both of which imply the 
issue of arbitrability.250 Likewise, the word “null and void” implies the substantive 
public policy of the New York Convention.251 Article II(3) also allows a court in any 
state where litigation is commenced to continue litigation proceedings if it finds that the 
arbitration agreement is incapable of being performed, which includes the question of 
arbitrability.252 
Finally, Article V(1)(a), which deals with the refusal to enforce a foreign arbitral 
award if the parties to the agreement were under some incapacity or if the said 
agreement is not valid, raise a limited public policy concern regarding incapacity 
whenever the issue is the capacity of public entities to enter into an arbitration 
agreement.253 According to Böckstiegel, the difference between objective arbitrability 
under Article V(2)(a) and subjective arbitrability under Article V(1)(a), covering 
capacity, is that arbitrability deals with the question of what can be arbitrated while 
capacity deals with the question of who can submit to arbitration.254 There seems to be 
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an international consensus that public entities have the capacity to enter into arbitration 
agreements.255 With respect to the GCC states, however, one has to keep in mind that 
KSA does not allow public entities to enter into arbitration agreements.256 
 
 5.3.2. Public Policy Under the ICSID Convention 
 
 “The [ICSID] Convention does not permit the review of an arbitral award on 
grounds of public policy.”257 By design, there would be no “domestic legal system 
which would provide the standard for public policy.”258 
Articles 53 and 54, covering recognition and enforcement of an ICSID arbitral 
award, do not provide for a public policy exception to the obligation of states to enforce 
arbitral awards.259 Additionally, public policy is not listed as a ground for annulment 
under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention.260 Nor is it listed anywhere else in the ICSID 
Convention. This was an intentional omission of the public policy defence. “A proposal 
for an exception to the obligation to enforce an ICSID award under Article 54 on public 
policy grounds was rejected by a large majority of states (25 in favour of rejection; 9 
against) negotiating the ICSID Convention.”261 This is the main advantage of the ICSID 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
255 Hanotiau and Caprasse (n 5) 800. 
256 Belal Al-Ghazzawi, Meriel Buxton and Tammam Kaissi, ‘Saudi Arabia’ (2010) The European and 
Middle Eastern Arbitration Review !http://ghazzawilawfirm.com/files/EMEAR%202010%20report%20-
%20Saudi%20Arabia.pdf" accessed 15 January 2013 (explaining that the Aramco case “led the Saudi 
government in 1963 to prohibit all Saudi public entities from entering into arbitration agreements unless 
explicitly authorised by the government, and this remains the case today. Article 3 of the Act that 
provides for that rule can only be amended by the Council of Ministers. However, if a dispute has already 
arisen and the concerned public entity wishes to arbitrate that dispute, it can prepare a memo for the 
prime minister (the king) explaining the dispute and the reasons behind its wish to arbitrate. In all cases 
the Council of Ministers shall be notified of all the arbitration awards where one of the parties is a 
government entity.”). 
257 RSM Production Corp v Grenada, ICSID Case No ARB/05/14, 29 Oct 2009 (Washington DC ICSID), 
par 15, fn28. 
258 Schreuer (n 1) 568. 
259 Moshe Hirsch, The Arbitration Mechanism of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (Springer 1993) 127; Schreuer (n 1) 568 (stating that “reliance on the ordre public of another 
State in which an ICSID award may have to be enforced, would be equally unwarranted”). 
260 Mohamed Al-Siyabi, ‘A Legal Analysis of the Development of Arbitration in Oman with Special 
Reference to the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards’ (DPhil thesis, University of Hull 2008) 
285. 
261 RSM Production Corp (n 257), citing ICSID Convention: History vol II, 903. 
! 220 
Convention, which is that it is largely self-contained,262 and leaves very little room for 
state and enforcing courts to review the ICSID arbitral award. 
Schreuer illustrated the ineffectiveness of a public policy argument under the 
ICSID Convention. According to Schreuer, “a State, after having consented to the 
subjection of a loan agreement to French law, could not argue that the obligation to pay 
interest is contrary to the public policy of its religiously inspired domestic law.”263 This 
is so because “a host State’s reliance on its own ordre public on the face of an agreed 
choice of law pointing to another system of law is simply a breach of the undertaking to 
make the chosen law controlling.”264 
The only possible public policy argument to be made in the ICSID Convention 
context are those involving “certain basic international tenets which may be described 
as the public policy of the international community,”265 including peremptory rules of 
international law.266 The limited list, according to Schreuer, would include “the 
prohibition of slavery, piracy, drug trade, terrorism and genocide, the protection of basic 
principles of human rights and the prohibition to prepare and wage an aggressive 
war.”267 The application of international public policy would have to extend to 
arrangements which violate binding Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, even where the resolutions have not been made controlling by a 
domestic system of law chosen by the parties. In instances268 involving a violation of 
any of these basic international tenets, ICSID Tribunals would have no choice but to 
refuse to enforce the disputed arrangements.269 
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Further, Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention states that “the Tribunal shall 
decide a dispute in accordance with such rules as may be agreed by the parties. In the 
absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State 
party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of 
international law as may be applicable.”270 Since most investment arbitrations arise 
from dispute resolution and substantive provisions of international treaties, arbitral 
Tribunals cannot ignore the fundamental interests protected by international law, and 
must consider public policy issues that arise.271 
In this regard, Hunter and Conde e Silva argue that ICSID Tribunals in state 
party investment disputes must also consider both substantive and procedural 
transnational public policies. For example, as discussed earlier, the Internal Law 
Principle272 under transnational public policy would prohibit state parties to a contract 
from avoiding arbitration “either through the reliance on pre-existing mandatory 
provisions of its domestic law, or the ex post facto use of its legislative, executive or 
judicial powers for this purpose.”273 The Cairo Court of Appeals in Organisme des 
Antiquitiés v. G. Silver Night Company, in interpreting Egyptian Law No. 27/1994,274 
concerning Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters, stated that “State or public 
law entities may not reject an arbitration clause contained in their contracts by invoking 
legislative restrictions, even if they are genuine.”275 In Société des GrandsTravaux de 
Marseille v. EPIDC,276 Bangladesh aimed to avoid its contractual obligation as a state 
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party by dissolving the state entity that is subject to the arbitration and by abolishing the 
subject matter of the arbitration. The Swiss arbitral tribunal held that the dissolution of 
the entity was in breach of Bangladesh’s obligations under international law, and the 
abolition of the subject matter violated Swiss public policy.277 
 
PART IV 
 
5.4. Public Policy According to the GCC States 
 
 5.4.1. General Concept of Public Policy in the GCC States 
 
Public policy in the GCC states, though always linked to the Shari’a, is not 
solely based on Shari’a concepts and for most GCC states remain undefined.278 The 
concept of public policy, for example, could be found in modern laws that were not 
expressly covered by the Shari’a, such as “exchange control, the protection of tenants, 
illegal activities such as arms traffic, [terrorism, money laundering] and counterfeit 
currency, and in the statutory provisions which reserve to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
their national courts matters concerning labour law, commercial agencies and cases 
relating to immovable property including oil wealth.”279 
The Shari’a, however, is ever present. Even in GCC states that do not expressly 
mention the Shari’a in their rules for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards but 
simply uses the term “public order” or “public morals,” which is the case for most GCC 
states, the Shari’a still forms part of the law or even the constitution of that state. The 
same question was posed by Ezrahi, as to whether generally accepted notions of public 
order applies in the absence of an express reference to the Shari’a in the domestic 
legislation for the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, and Ezrahi explains that 
“although a national legislation may refer to public morals or order in general or public 
morals or order of the specific country, the Shari’a may form a part of the laws of that 
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country and enter the equation by that route.”280 Additionally, the Riyadh Convention, 
which expressly incorporates the Shari’a in arbitral award enforcement, would allow a 
GCC state to refuse enforcement under the Shari’a “even if public order in the enforcing 
country would authorise such provision.”281 
The term public order or public morals may carry different meanings among the 
GCC states, even in light of or regarding the Shari’a.282 One example of this scenario, 
discussed in the beginning of this chapter, is the diverse treatment of the riba among 
Islamic countries and among Shari’a schools, even though the riba is universally 
deemed to be haram [prohibited]. Public order in Egypt and Morocco, therefore, would 
not necessarily prohibit the riba, while public order in the KSA and Kuwait would 
strictly prohibit it. One approach suggested by scholars is to partially enforce the 
portion of the arbitral award that is Shari’a compliant and refuse enforcement only of 
the portion that violates the Shari’a, for example the portion relating to riba.283 
It is worthwhile now to proceed with a closer examination of the specific public 
policy legislation of each of the GCC states in relation to the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards.284 The closer look reveals an approach by GCC states that are in reality 
more sensible than one may expect.285 It is also interesting to note at the outset that 
“Albert Jan van den Berg in his article on the few cases where awards were refused 
enforcement under the New York Convention of 1958 does not mention a single Arab 
court case where for public policy reasons a foreign arbitration award was refused 
enforcement.”286 
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 5.4.2. UAE: Public Policy and Public Order 
 
A foreign arbitral award will not be enforced in the UAE if it includes elements 
that “contradict public policy or morals.”287 Hoyle criticised the UAE for placing too 
much emphasis on public policy, stating that the “risk of course is that public policy has 
a tendency to move and grow.”288 According to El-Ahdab, “the courts of the Emirates 
are not bound to accept the decision of a foreign court if it is contrary to the public order 
of the Emirates.”289 However, according to the Abu Dhabi Court of Appeal, simply 
“referring a dispute to arbitration taking place outside the UAE does not represent a 
violation of public order.”290  
The UAE follows the same rule as that of its fellow GCC states, for example 
KSA,291 when it comes to the public policy exception. This pattern seems predictable 
within the context of the Shari’a, as interconnected as its commercial and other laws are 
to morality and public order. Article 3 of the UAE Civil Transactions Code292 defines 
public policy as follows: 
 
Are considered of Public Policy, rules relating to personal status such as 
marriage, inheritance, descent, and rules concerning governance, 
freedom of commerce, trading in wealth, rules of personal property and 
provisions and foundations on which the society is based in a way that 
do not violate final decisions and major principles of Islamic Shari’a.293 
 
According to Mechantaf, “this definition is wide enough to encompass almost 
anything that goes into ‘trading in wealth’ and ‘foundations on which the society is 
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based’, depending on the total discretion of UAE courts.”294 Further, despite the 
existence of this definition, there is yet to be a coherent judicial definition or practice of 
defining the scope of public policy under this definition,295 owing largely to the fact that 
there is no official and systematic practice of precedent and publication of decisions.296 
What is important, therefore, is how courts in Dubai and the rest of the Emirates 
will define and limit the scope of public policy in the UAE. A recent criticism by 
Blanke regarding the Dubai Court of Appeals’ overly broad interpretation of public 
policy sheds light on this issue.297 Blanke explains that in a recent ruling in Baiti Real 
Estate Development v. Dynasty Zarooni Inc.,298 the Dubai Court of Cassation set a aside 
an order to enforce a DIAC rendered domestic arbitral award made by the Dubai Court 
of First Instance and the Dubai Court of Appeals because the court misconstrued the 
limited scope of public policy under Article 3 of the UAE Civil Transactions Code. 
The Baiti court, according to Blanke, failed to take into account that the 
definition of public policy under Article 3 of the UAE Civil Transactions Code is 
limited “in such a manner as not to conflict with the definitive provisions and 
fundamental principles of the Islamic Shari’a.”299 In so doing, the Baiti court, according 
to Blanke, set a dangerous precedent for both domestic and foreign arbitral awards to be 
refused or set aside based on an overly broad standard of public policy that allows for 
application whenever the rules relate to the circulation of wealth or private 
ownership.300 Other commentators, disagree with Blanke’s outlook, viewing the 
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decision instead as limited in its scope and application, and should not affect the 
enforcement in the UAE of foreign arbitral awards.301 
The Dubai Court of Cassation had also decided a similar case in Dubai Court of 
Cassation (Case No. 180/2011) on February 12, 2012.302 In that case, the Court held as 
follows: 
 
the selling of units without compliance with the registration requirement 
as provided for in article 3 of Law No. (13) 2008 may not be the subject 
matter of arbitration simply because this sale without registration 
contravenes public policy. Therefore, where a dispute subject to article 3 
of Law No. (13) of 2008 is brought before an arbitral tribunal, and that 
tribunal rendered an award settling that dispute, such award is null as 
only the Court shall decide on the same dispute, at its own discretion, as 
it is a matter which relates to public policy.303 
  
The arbitral award in the said case was a DIAC arbitral award, affirmed by the 
Dubai Court of First Instance and Dubai Court of Appeals, which had rendered a sale 
agreement between the parties to be null and void in light of article 3 of Law No. (13) 
of 2008 Regulating the Interim Real Estate Register in the Emirate of Dubai.304 What 
makes this case notable, according to Mechantaf is that the Court of Cassation had set 
aside a DIAC arbitrator’s ruling that nullified a sale agreement for not meeting the 
requirements of article 3 of Law No. (13) of 2008, a ruling which in effect does not 
violate any public policy since it only applies Dubai law.305 
In regards to public policy, therefore, the Dubai Court of Cassation has recently 
favoured a broad interpretation. On the other hand, recent trends in cases in the UAE 
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show courts favouring enforcement and disregarding technical requirements.306 
Additionally, Luttrell proposed that when a foreign investor takes advantage of the 
DIFC, one could split the lex arbitri [law of the place where arbitration is to take place] 
by choosing the DIFC as the seat while at the same time applying transnational 
procedures like the UNCITRAL Model Law, a choice that according to Luttrell could 
theoretically maximise the prospect that an enforcing court would apply an international 
or transnational standard of public policy and minimise the likelihood that UAE courts 
will refuse to ratify a foreign arbitral award.307 
In one case, implying the UAE’s less stringent adherence to the prohibition of 
the riba, the Dubai Court of First Instance, though ultimately refusing enforcement on 
evidentiary grounds because the claimant failed to prove the finality of the arbitral 
award, dismissed the argument relating to the unlawfulness of an arbitral award that 
ordered a UAE entity pay the amount owed plus 7.75% interest.308 This case is an 
example of where the reason for non-enforcement was a condition to enforcement and 
not a violation of public policy. 
As regards arbitrability, the UAE follows the general rule that what cannot be 
subject to sul’h [conciliation] cannot be arbitrable.309 Under Article 203 of the UAE 
Civil Procedures Code, arbitration is only permitted in matters capable of conciliation. 
In this regards, each Emirate may have its own peculiar rules on arbitrability. For 
example, “statutes in Dubai and Sharjah require that the dispute concerns the payment 
of a sum of money for it to be arbitrable.”310 In Court of Cassation, Case. No. 123/2009, 
hearing dated 15 March 2010,311 the court held that as a matter of public policy, the 
rights of employees under Articles 5-7 of the Work Regulation Law, are not arbitrable 
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since the legislature established specific litigation procedures for labour law and since 
the rights of employees are not subject to conciliation. Also, in Abu Dhabi Court of 
Cassation, Petition No 814/2011,312 the court held that disputes arising out of 
commercial agency agreements that are registered in the Commercial Agencies Register 
cannot be subject to arbitration under Law No 18 of 1981, as amended by Law No 14 of 
1988. 
 
 5.4.3. Oman: Public Order or Good Morals 
 
 Article 120 of Chapter VII, regarding the rules governing the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards of Oman, states that “the judgment or award must not be 
contrary to the laws in force in the Sultanate of Oman. It must not be against Omani 
public order or good morals.”313 
In Oman, there is always a possibility that the Shari’a will be applied to refuse 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. As Jarvin noted in reference to Oman, “here as 
in many Islamic jurisdictions...there can never be any guarantee that in any particular 
proceedings the Shari’a will not be applied.”314 Jarvin, however, also pointed to a 1985 
Omani ICC arbitration case, where a Dane, British, and Dutchman, all non-Muslims, 
rendered an arbitral award, which included accrued interests on a promissory note, in 
favour of an English claimant and against an Omani company.315 The Omani Authority 
for the Settlement of Commercial Dispute ordered enforcement of the ICC arbitral 
award, despite the existence of interest, that the arbitrators were non-Muslims involving 
one Muslim party, and that the basis of the Omani Constitution is the Shari’a.316 This 
case led one scholar to comment that “it is true to say that the [Omani] Authority for 
Settlement for Commercial Disputes does not at present apply Shari’a precepts.”317 
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 5.4.4. Qatar: Public Order and Good Morals 
   
The Qatari Civil Procedures Code (CPC) refers to “public order and good 
morals.” Article 207 of the Qatari CPC provides the rules for challenging an arbitral 
award and states as follows: “every interested party may move for the nullity of the 
award of the arbitrators in the following cases…if the award…contravened a rule of 
public order or good morals.”318 Article 380 of the Qatari CPC states that a judgment or 
arbitral award is enforceable if it “is not contrary to a prior judgment made by a Qatari 
court and does not breach the rules of public order and good morals in Qatar.”319  
Public policy within the context of Qatar’s fairly young arbitration jurisprudence 
is still largely influenced by the Shari’a, which prior to 1990 was the main source for 
arbitration law in Qatar.320 The definition for Qatari public order and good morals, thus, 
would closely resemble the prohibitions under the Shari’a, including “participating in 
prohibited activity, such as, for example, earning interest (riba), excessive risk-taking 
(gharar), or profiting from the sale of non-halal products, such as pork, alcohol, or 
pornography.”321  According to Alrashid and others “the prohibition on riba has 
significant implications for international arbitrations seated in Qatar, including the 
prospect of awarding of funds from interest bearing accounts in banks headquartered 
outside of Qatar.”322 In the end, while Qatari arbitration law remains unclear as to the 
limits of the public policy defence, the Qatari CPC “seems to actually mandate judicial 
review for public order and good morals compliance as a threshold question to any 
challenge to an award.”323 
With regards to arbitrability, Qatari law does not expressly provide for what can 
or cannot be arbitrable.324 Instead, the third paragraph of Article 190 of the Qatari CPC 
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states broadly that “there can be no arbitration in matters which the parties cannot settle 
amicably.”325 It is in this sense that Qatar implicitly regulates arbitrability since there is 
a divide as to matters that can and cannot be settled amicably. The language of Article 
190, however, can be a source of confusion, as Alrashid and others put it: 
 
On its face, the clause would appear, paradoxically, to ban arbitration of 
disputes in general. It may refer to criminal and family law issues which 
are more appropriately resolved by courts rather than arbitral panels. A 
narrow reading, restricting the operation of the clause to the context of 
its surrounding paragraph, would give it significance: The subject matter 
of a dispute may be determined during the proceedings, but if that 
subject matter cannot be determined amicably, then there can be no 
arbitration. Confusion over what types of disputes may be arbitrated thus 
could present a serious problem.326 
 
According to Maleh, those that cannot be settled amicably could fall into two 
categories: personal status and public policy.327 Matters relating to personal status 
include the validity or termination of marriage, filiations, incapacity, guardianship and 
inheritance.328 Public policy, on the other hand, includes, but is not necessarily limited 
to, such matters as criminal liability,329 betting and gambling, drugs, prostitution and 
other “immoral” activities.330 There are now calls for Qatar to clarify the scope of 
arbitrability by explicitly stating in legislation the requirements, and clear guidelines for 
the types of disputes that can be subject to arbitration.331 
It is especially important for Qatar to clarify the limits of arbitration in the 
context of the Shari’a.332 As stated by Alrashid and others, “in the area of arbitration, 
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Shari’a is of particular importance; the arbitration laws of many Middle Eastern 
countries, including Qatar, explicitly provide for the setting aside of arbitration clauses, 
terms, and awards when ‘public policy’ or Shari’a so require.”333 It is also important for 
Qatar to define arbitrability in relation to the jurisdiction of the Qatar Financial Centre 
(QFC), which much like the DIFC in Dubai, is a separate jurisdiction with its own laws 
within Qatar.334 The QFC has set out its own set of arbitration rules that is modeled 
after the UNCITRAL Model Law.335 
 
 5.4.5. Kuwait: Public Order or Kuwaiti Good Morals 
 
With regards to public policy, the Kuwait Code of Civil and Commercial 
Procedure,336 under Article 199-200, states that a foreign arbitral “award must not be 
contradictory with a judgment or ruling previously made in Kuwait and it must not be 
contrary to public order or Kuwaiti good morals.”337 In one arbitration case in Kuwait, 
the First Arbitral Tribunal338 stated that “pursuant to the provision of Article 173/3 of 
the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure [Kuwait], that ‘arbitration is not 
permissible in matters in which conciliation is not allowed’ and whereas Article (554) 
of the Civil Code also stipulated that ‘conciliation shall not be allowed in matters 
related to public policy but maybe allowed on financial rights incumbent thereon.’” 
Like the other GCC states, Kuwaiti public policy is largely influenced by the 
Shari’a so that a Kuwaiti court may set aside a foreign arbitral award or refuse 
enforcement if the foreign arbitral award violates the general principles of Shari’a 
and/or its sources.339 Further, the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards are 
comparatively simpler if the matter in dispute is arbitrated according to Kuwaiti law, 
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provided it does not contradict mandatory provisions or constitutes criminal conduct 
under Kuwaiti law.340 Under Article 200 of the Kuwait Code of Civil and Commercial 
Procedure, the courts of Kuwait will enforce the foreign arbitral award, without retrial 
or examination of the merits of the case, if the subject matter of the foreign arbitral 
award is capable of settlement by arbitration under Kuwaiti law, the foreign arbitral 
award is enforceable in the jurisdiction in which it was rendered and certain procedural 
requirements have been satisfied.341 Article 200, thus, refers to arbitrability but without 
explicitly listing what disputes are not capable of settlement by arbitration under 
Kuwaiti law.  
Kuwaiti courts have shown a tendency toward rigid rules with regards to 
arbitration and public order. An example is a Kuwaiti Court of Cassation case,342 where 
the court held that failure to render the foreign arbitral award “in the name of the Amir” 
pursuant to Article 16 of the Amiri Decree No. 19 of 1959 on the Regulation of 
Judiciary Law rendered the foreign arbitral award void “with regard to public order.”343 
The Kuwaiti court, in Kuwait Court of Appeals, Request for Arbitration No. 16/2001 (8 
May 2006),344 also annulled an arbitral award for violation of Kuwaiti economic public 
policy stating that “the imperative provisions regarding the trading of stocks related to 
the public policy and are closed linked to the national economy which is one of the 
State pillars; therefore, they should not be violated or consensually agreed to be. The 
consequence of such violation is the annulment which the court may rule on its own 
motion without being requested to do so.” 
  
 5.4.6. Bahrain: Public Order or Ethics, or Public Policy 
 
The enforcement of both domestic and foreign arbitral awards are governed in 
Bahrain under Articles 252 and 253 of Law No. 12 of 1971 on Civil and Commercial 
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Procedure.345 According to Al-Baharna, the rules for the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards in Bahrain are very similar to that in Kuwait. Article 252 prescribes that no 
enforcement order can be passed in Bahrain unless the following conditions are also 
complied with: “...(4) that the court judgment is in no way inconsistent with any 
judgment or order previously passed by the Bahrain courts and does not provide for 
anything which constitutes a breach of public order or ethics.”346 Additionally, Article 
36 of the Bahraini International Arbitration Act covers causes for refusing enforcement, 
and states that “enforcement may be refused for the following reasons: ... (7) the award 
is contrary to public policy.”347 The Bahraini International Arbitration Act allows for an 
application to the Bahraini Civil High Court of Appeal to set aside the award as long as 
the applicant shows that the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the law of Bahrain or the foreign arbitral award is in conflict with the 
public policy of Bahrain.348 
But what exactly is the public order or public policy of Bahrain cannot just 
simply be listed, but ought to be developed by courts. One decision issued by the 
Bahraini court in Merrill Lynch v. Abdul Falil Behbehani349 at least helps in establishing 
that the conditions for enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under Bahraini law is the 
same or similar as the conditions for enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under 
English law. The Bahraini Civil High Court of Appeals further stated as follows: 
 
The conditions contained in Article 252 of the Bahraini Law of Civil and 
Commercial Procedures applicable to the admissibility of adopting an 
order for enforcing a foreign judgment are the same conditions required 
by English law for recognising a foreign judgment. Such conditions are 
that a judgment shall have been passed by an overseas court of 
competent jurisdiction, the rules of court procedures have been complied 
with as regards the appearance of the litigants ensuring for the defendant 
to make his defence and the judgment shall be a final one and shall not 
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345 Kuwaiti Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, art 252-253 (Kuwait); Al-Baharna (n 284) 332-
344. 
346 Kuwaiti Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, art 252 (Kuwait). 
347 Bahrain International Arbitration Act, art 36; Ezrahi (n 4) 5. 
348 Hassan Radhi, ‘Bahrain: Recent Developments, International Commercial Arbitration Law’ (1995) 10 
Arab LQ 385. 
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be inconsistent with the rules of public order and morals in accordance 
with the law of the country where it is being enforced.350 
 
The Bahraini Civil High Court suggests in its decision that the Bahraini courts 
are charged with determining the scope and application of Bahraini public policy. In the 
end, according to Al-Baharna, national laws and procedures do still have a bearing on 
the enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards, and especially on the 
determination of what falls under the realm of public policy.351 According to the same 
case, foreign arbitral awards must relate to matters which are arbitrable under Bahraini 
law.352 With regards to arbitrability, Article 253 states that no foreign arbitral award can 
be enforced in Bahrain unless it was in respect of a question that is subject to arbitration 
in accordance with Bahraini law.353 
 
 5.4.7. KSA: Shari’a and Public Policy 
 
 KSA’s legal system is deeply rooted in the Shari’a, and the Shari’a therefore 
constitutes the public policy with regards to the enforcement of a foreign arbitral 
award.354  Article 3 of the Circular of Grievance Board of KSA makes clear that “‘it is 
not possible in any case to grant execution of any foreign award that violates any 
general principle of Shari’a.”355 In the Saudi Arbitration Law of 2012, Article 55 states 
that “the order to execute the arbitration award under this Law shall not be issued 
except upon verification of the following …the award does not violate the provisions of 
Sharia and public policy in the Kingdom.”356 
Alassaf and Zeller warn that in the KSA, “the question of public policy is ever 
present” even in the Saudi Arbitration Law of 2012.357 In the end, the “interpretation of 
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the principles of public policy remains in the hands of Saudi legal authorities,” as stated 
by Balouziyeh as follows: 
 
Interpreting and predicting how a Saudi judge or arbitrator will apply 
the Shari’a remains difficult and somewhat evasive. Whereas some 
Shari’a principles are well-established principles rooted in tradition, 
others are subject to a judge’s individual view or considerations as to fair 
application under equity.358  
 
Therefore, the Shari’a public policy enumerated in the beginning of this chapter 
is equally applicable in the KSA, in addition to any public policy rules enacted by the 
KSA government. This may even include the obligation to follow basic laws and the 
constitution of the country.359 According to Alassaf and Zeller, the concept of public 
policy “may be interpreted very broadly based on the legal culture and traditions of 
[KSA].”360 
KSA acceded to the New York Convention in 1994.361 KSA, however, has been 
criticized for having “broadly invoked the public policy exception on previous 
cases.”362 El-Ahdab stated that there are no precise grounds expressly mentioned in the 
old KSA arbitration law for refusing to enforce a foreign arbitral award, but it appears 
that the grounds were those “that are generally accepted in most laws, including public 
order, which in Saudi Arabia is constituted by the Shari’a.”363 Alassaf and Zeller 
confirm that the grounds for public policy and arbitrability in KSA “have not been 
identified.”364 This implies that what public policy means in the KSA, aside from the 
Shari’a public policy discussed at the beginning of this chapter, could well be 
interpreted narrowly or broadly depending on the personal analysis and understanding 
of every single Saudi judge.365 
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However, as Al-Jerafi stated, not every violation of the Shari’a would 
necessarily amount to a public policy violation in KSA as long as it is not a violation of 
a fundamental principle of the Shari’a.366 Further, Saudi courts have made a distinction 
between violations of Shari’a fundamental principles that violate public policy and 
violations of Shari’a general rules that would not constitute a public policy violation.367  
 
PART V 
 
5.5. Synthesis of Public Policy Rules in the GCC States 
 
It can be said with certainty that there is currently no uniformity among the GCC 
states as to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.368 The same goes with the public 
policy defence. Even Al-Sanhouri, the principal drafter of the Egyptian Civil Code and 
who attempted369 to reconcile French law and the Shari’a,370 described public policy 
broadly as representing “good morals, the essential rules of the country and its public 
interests.”371  
Al-Baharna explained the diversity in the arbitration laws of GCC states as a 
spectrum.372 On one end are states that have enacted a comprehensive arbitration law 
like Bahrain and Kuwait, and on one end are states like Oman and Qatar that have yet to 
pass an arbitration law.373 In the middle are KSA, which recently passed the Saudi 
Arbitration Law of 2012 based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the UAE, which, 
because of its federal system, poses a complicated landscape with its own diverse sets 
of arbitration jurisprudence according to the relevant Emirate either lacking an 
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arbitration law or having a well developed set of jurisprudence as in the case of 
Dubai.374 The diversity in the arbitration laws among the GCC states in turn has created 
a diverse set of rules and interpretation of what constitutes public policy with regards to 
foreign arbitral award enforcement. 
To create predictability among the GCC states as to the scope of the public 
policy defence, it would be necessary to propose a set of rules relating to enforcement in 
a Uniform GCC Arbitration Law, wherein GCC states would have to negotiate on an 
agreed scope of public policy within the framework of the Shari’a. Such an idea is not 
novel and has been put into the works by the Qatar International Centre for Arbitration 
(QICA), which proposed the “Draft Unified Law for Arbitration in States of [the] Gulf 
Cooperation Council” [“QICA Draft Unified Law”] in 2009.375 The QICA Draft 
Unified Law, however, failed to move closer towards the international arbitration norm 
of interpreting public policy. Instead, the QICA Draft Unified Law, while clarifying the 
role of the Shari’a, expanded the grounds upon which foreign arbitral awards may be set 
aside based on public policy.376 Article 50 of the QICA Draft Unified Law, for example, 
mandates that “[t]he court seized with the action for nullity shall rule sua sponte for the 
annulment of the [foreign] arbitral award if its contents violate public policy and the 
Islamic Shari’a.”377 According to Alrashid and others, Article 50 goes beyond the Qatari 
arbitration law.378 
While a proposed unified law on the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and 
a unified approach to public policy in the GCC state must incorporate aspects of the 
Shari’a,379 it should strike a balance and aim to harmonise the Shari’a with international 
arbitration norms. As explained by Al-Jefari, that KSA as a contracting Islamic country 
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intends to take into account international public policy in relation to the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards; international public policy, henceforth, does not contradict 
fundamental Shari’a principles.380 Further, this thesis author agrees with scholars who 
view that the “Shari’a can be interpreted in a way that will make it compatible with 
international arbitration norms.”381 As Al-Jerafi puts it, “there is no valid reason that 
prevents Shari’a from accommodating contemporary developments in any field of law, 
particularly arbitration.”382 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
 
Any sort of proposals to improve the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in 
the GCC states has to take into account public policy. While it seems, at first glance, 
that the public policy of GCC states ought to be the same because all GCC states adhere 
to Shari’a public policy, a closer look reveals a landscape that is just as fraught with 
nuances over the concept of public policy as any part of the world. While there are large 
patches of commonality, each GCC state does differ at one point or another as to what 
constitutes public policy.  
This chapter examined the effect of public policy on the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards in the GCC states. A common thread appears as to the division between 
procedural and substantive public policy under the Shari’a, international agreements, 
and the jurisprudence of each of the GCC states. There seems to be more in common 
among the Shari’a, international agreements, and even each of the GCC states with 
regards to procedural public policy, which is largely concerned with fairness and due 
process. It is with substantive public policy that a substantial divergence in the concept 
of public policy begins to emerge. This is true with regards to both express substantive 
public policy and implied substantive public policy, or arbitrability.  
While there are differences in the concept and scope of public policy among the 
Shari’a, international agreements, and the jurisprudence of each of the GCC states, the 
difference that stem from the Shari’a could be narrowed to a very limited set of cases 
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that when viewed in totality constitute a minute portion of arbitration cases. In this 
sense, what becomes the source for the obstacles to enforcement under the umbrella of 
public policy is whether a GCC state’s judiciary applies public policy narrowly or 
broadly. In the context of the GCC states, there is a tendency for judges, whenever the 
Shari’a is invoked, to cast a wide net in favour of public policy. There are, however, 
signs that such an approach is not necessarily the only path under the Shari’a, as is 
currently being demonstrated by recent cases coming from UAE courts. It is ultimately 
possible for all GCC states to balance the Shari’a and international arbitration concepts 
of public policy. As Wakim suggests, however, to arrive at this balance, “all this 
requires government function and public policy value judgments to be open and 
accessible.”383 
The survey also shows a sign that many arbitration practitioners are aware of the 
balance that must be made between public policy and the Shari’a. Respondents were 
asked when judges or arbitrators should apply the Shari’a when determining whether 
public policy has been violated.384 The majority of the respondents at 48.93% want 
judges or arbitrators to apply the Shari’a when determining whether public policy has 
been violated only when a violation of a fundamental Shari’a principle has been 
established.385 Still, some respondents at 35.48% voted that the Shari’a should “Never” 
be applied when determining whether public policy has been violated.386 These two 
competing views on the role of the Shari’a in determining public policy may also 
indicate the divide among the judiciary when faced with a public policy challenge based 
on the Shari’a.   
After discussing public policy as a potential source for challenging the 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, it is now necessary to discuss the setting aside 
of an arbitral award in Chapter Six. In discussing the setting aside of an arbitral award 
in the next chapter, however, it is important to keep in mind how the public policy 
defence can arise at either the enforcement stage or at the setting aside stage.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
SETTING ASIDE THE ARBITRAL AWARD WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF 
THE GCC STATES 
  
6.0. Introduction 
 
After the arbitrator(s) or the arbitral tribunal has rendered an arbitral award 
pursuant to an arbitration agreement, the party against whom the arbitral award was 
made cannot appeal the arbitral award, but is left with the sole recourse at the seat of 
arbitration of asking the court to set aside (also called annul, vacate, or nullify) the 
arbitral award.1 For the majority of arbitration decisions, parties do settle or pay the 
amount ordered by the arbitral award, and setting aside is not a common practice.2 
However, a party may be left with a genuine belief that the arbitral award is flawed. It is 
largely in this context that the need for the setting aside of an arbitral award arises, and 
that the necessity for such mechanism has been defended. Van den Berg argues that 
“...exclusion of setting aside may create uncertainty about the status of an award for a 
long period of time. If an award is questionable, a party will not have the possibility of 
having the uncertainty adjudicated with finality in the courts. This may create a new 
breed of ‘ghost [arbitral] awards.’”3  Asouzu agrees with van den Berg and stated that 
“[s]ound legal policy, justice, convenience and maximum economy suggest that there 
should be an imperative opportunity to set aside an award at the place where it was 
                                                
1 Joseph Morrissey and Jack Graves, International Sales Law and Arbitration: Problems, Cases, and 
Commentary (Kluwer 2008) ch 10, 460; Ariel Ye and James Rowland, ‘Should arbitral awards that have 
been set aside be enforced in a different jurisdiction?’ (China Law Insight, 22 May 2012) 
!http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2012/05/articles/corporate/should-arbitral-awards-that-have-been-set-
aside-be-enforced-in-a-different-jurisdiction/" accessed 2 February 2014 (discussing setting aside an 
award in Mainland China and in Hong Kong). 
2 Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration: Commentary and Materials 757 (2nd edn, Kluwer 
2001). 
3 Albert van den Berg, ‘The Efficacy of Awards in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1992) 58(4) 
Arbitration 267, 273. 
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made.”4 Regardless, according to van den Berg, “it rarely occurs that an action for 
setting aside the award in the country of origin is successful.”5 
This chapter aims at examining the framework for setting aside an arbitral award 
in the GCC states within the context of international agreements and the Shari’a. In 
doing so, the chapter reveals the inseparability of setting aside an arbitral award with 
the concept of enforcing foreign arbitral awards. Finally, this chapter argues that the 
setting aside of arbitral awards remains an unsettled area of international arbitration that 
it continues to create conflicting, and certainly non-uniform, rules or application of 
rules.  
Part I of this chapter begins by providing a general overview of the scheme for 
setting aside an arbitral award. Most importantly, part I will clarify the distinction 
between setting aside an arbitral award and challenging the enforcement of a foreign 
arbitral award. It also discusses the concept of where an arbitral award may be set aside. 
Further, part I covers generally the common grounds for setting aside an arbitral award. 
Part II discusses briefly the limited rules for setting aside an arbitral award under the 
Shari’a, which seems to prohibit the practice. 
Part III discusses the limited rules in the international conventions for setting 
aside a foreign arbitral award. The ICSID Convention practically does not allow for the 
setting aside of an arbitral award by national courts. The New York Convention also 
fails to provide explicit guidelines except with reference to its enforcement rules, 
leaving the UNCITRAL Model Law with the sole express guidance and international 
consensus on the issue, assuming that it has been followed by a country. Unfortunately, 
the UNCITRAL Model Law is not yet adopted in all the GCC states. Even with the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, much remains unclear with regards to where an arbitral award 
may be set aside and the effect of setting aside an arbitral award.  
                                                
4 Amazu Asouzu, ‘The National Arbitration Law and International Commercial Arbitration: The 
Indispensability of the National Court and the Setting Aside Procedure’ (1995) 7 Afr J Int’l & Comp L 
68, 90 (arguing that parties and national courts ought not to be allowed to expressly limit in the arbitration 
agreement the ability of national courts to set aside arbitral awards). 
5 Albert van den Berg, ‘The New York Convention of 1958: An Overview’ in Emmanuel Gaillard and 
Domenico Di Pietro (eds), Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitral Awards: 
The New York Convention in Practice (Cameron May 2009) 55. 
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With unclear guidance from the Shari’a and the international agreements, part 
IV examines how the GCC states have approached the setting aside of a foreign arbitral 
award. This chapter ends with an examination of the effect of setting aside an arbitral 
award, especially in relation to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Finally, part 
V discusses the problematic effect and enforcement of annulled arbitral awards. 
 
PART I 
 
6.1. An Overview of the Scheme for Setting Aside of an Arbitral Award by Courts 
 
Before discussing of setting aside an arbitral award, it is important first to 
provide a general overview of the concept. It is especially important first to distinguish 
the concept of setting aside an arbitral award and the concept of challenging the 
enforcement of an arbitral award, two overlapping and complementary issues that are 
addressed separately in this study. It is also important to discuss where to set aside an 
arbitral award, and the grounds on which an arbitral award may be set aside common to 
the international community. This section creates the necessary background for 
understanding the layers of rules that create the GCC states’ viewpoint for setting aside 
an arbitral award.  
 
6.1.1. Setting Aside Versus Non-Enforcement  
 
At first glance, the concept of setting aside an arbitral award and challenging the 
enforcement of an arbitral award seem identical. This is especially so when one thinks 
of both concepts as a way of “challenging” the arbitral award before a court. According 
to Asouzu, “the setting aside of an award or its annulment and the recognition or 
enforcement of an award are two distinct procedures, though closely inter-related...”6 
Below are important distinctions between these two forms of challenges.  
                                                
6 Asouzu (n 4) 90. 
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First, there is a distinction as to the place where the challenge is brought. The 
setting aside of an arbitral award is usually, though not always, brought before a court at 
the place of arbitration, while the challenge to the enforcement of an arbitral award will 
always take place before the court of any country where the arbitral award is sought to 
be enforced, or the “intended place of enforcement.”7 Sometimes the place of arbitration 
and enforcement are the same, especially in domestic arbitration, but it is typically 
separate in international arbitration, where enforcement can even occur in multiple 
countries.8 According to Asouzu, “in most cases - the very common situations, an action 
to set aside and an application to recognise or enforce an award take place in different 
places (countries) and at different times.”9  
Second, there is a distinction as to who will bring forth the challenge. “They are 
pursued by different parties and for different purposes.”10 Either party may set aside the 
arbitral award at the place of arbitration.11 “While challenges [to set aside the arbitral 
award] are most often brought by the party required by the award to pay money, either 
party is entitled to [set aside] the award if it believes it has a valid basis to do so.”12 On 
the other hand, with an enforcement action, “the party entitled to receive money under 
the award will bring an enforcement action in a jurisdiction in which it believes the 
party obligated to pay money under the award has assets that can be seized or liquidated 
in payment of the award. Such an action to enforce the award may be brought before, or 
after, or irrespective of whether there has been any action by the other party to set aside 
or vacate the award in the place of arbitration. If one party brings an action to enforce 
the award, the party against whom enforcement is sought may seek to defend against 
                                                
7 Morrissey and Graves (n 1) 460. 
8 See PT First Media TBK and Astro Nusantara International BV and others [2013] SGCA 57 (holding 
that in Singapore, parties to the arbitration are equipped with choice of remedies, and have the option to 
challenge an award immediately or wait until the enforcement proceedings); Paul Starr and Justin Lo, 
Singapore Court of Appeal’s approach towards the enforceability of an arbitral award and the tribunal’s 
power to join non-parties into an arbitration (Lexology,11 February 2014) 
!http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=00c4711c-6ead-439a-8987-b999d09cad9a" accessed 23 
February 2014. 
9 Asouzu (n 4). 
10 ibid. 
11 Morrissey and Graves (n 1) 460-462. 
12 ibid. 
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enforcement, irrespective of whether this party has sought to have the award set aside or 
vacated in the place of arbitration.”13 
Third, within the same country, the law governing the setting aside of an arbitral 
award and the law governing enforcement, and the basis for non-enforcement, including 
the grounds and standards upon which each type of challenge may be brought, will 
differ even if some rules are often the same and overlapping. Morrissey and Graves, for 
example, noted the different standards for setting aside an arbitral award and for its 
enforcement in the US as follows: 
 
One example of such differences is found in the American Federal 
Arbitration Act. FAA Chapter 2 formally adopts the New York 
Convention and its standards of enforceability with respect to 
international awards. However, American courts typically apply the 
standards contained in Section 108 of FAA Chapter 1, including the 
court created “manifest disregard” standard when addressing an action to 
set aside an award. Thus, the standards in the United States for setting 
aside an award are different from the standards for enforcement. The 
potential for conflict and confusion should be evident.14  
 
Fourth, the source of the law governing the setting aside of an arbitral award 
versus the enforcement or non-enforcement of an arbitral award will typically differ, at 
least in the context of international arbitration, because the two challenges will likely 
occur in two different countries. According to Giovannini, “the grounds for setting aside 
arbitral awards are set out in the law of arbitration at the place of arbitration, the ‘seat’ 
which establishes the link between an arbitration procedure and a given legal order.”15 
While it is also possible, as set out in Section 6.1.2. on where to set aside an arbitral 
award, that an arbitral award may be set aside at the intended place of enforcement or at 
the country of the chosen applicable law, arbitral awards are often set aside at the seat 
of arbitration and even if they are not, the lex fori [law of the forum or the law of the 
state where the remedy is sought] would apply.16 Likewise, in the enforcement action, 
                                                
13 ibid. 
14 ibid 461. 
15 Teresa Giovannini, ‘The making and enforcement of the arbitral award: What are the grounds on which 
awards are most often set aside?’ (2001) Bus L Int’l 115. 
16 See, for example, Section 6.1.2. 
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the challenge to enforcement would be determined by the lex fori [law of the forum] in 
accordance with the New York Convention, as it is applicable in all GCC states. This 
means that the source of the law for setting aside would be in one country, where the 
arbitration took place, and the law for enforcement and to the challenge to enforcement 
would be in a different country or countries, wherever enforcement is sought.17 
Fifth, the effect of setting aside an arbitral award and the effect of non-
enforcement of an arbitral award differ significantly. “They achieve different results, 
with different legal implications.”18 If an arbitral award is successfully set aside, “it will 
no longer have any legal force and effect in the place of arbitration”19 and arguably 
anywhere else, with the exception of France and the US under the Hilmarton and the 
Chromalloy case, respectively.20 Hilmarton and Chromalloy aside, the setting aside of 
an arbitral award would invalidate the arbitral award globally,21 while the non-
enforcement of an arbitral award would only be effective in the country where 
enforcement was sought. Born criticised early cases like Hilmarton and Chromally for 
having little analysis when holding that arbitral awards set aside at the place where they 
were made “ceased to exist.”22 
As Asouzu stated, “[t]he effect of a decision refusing recognition and 
enforcement to an award is limited and strictly territorial. It does not also impinge on 
the award’s validity and thereby, international currency. Whereas, a decision on a 
                                                
17 Morrissey and Graves (n 1) 460-462 (noting that “in view of these two alternative, and potentially 
cumulative, forums in which the viability of the award might be addressed, one might reasonably ask 
whether the legal standards in each forum are the same or different. If they are different, then these 
differences could make the choice of forum for any challenge outcome determinative or could lead to 
inconsistent results in multiple forums. Is this a desirable effect?”). 
18 Asouzu (n 4). 
19 Morrissey and Graves (n 1) 460-462; Ye and Rowland (n 1) (stating that “most jurisdictions around the 
world are likely to refuse enforcement of an award that has been set aside in another country. However, 
this is not the universal position: courts in certain countries [i.e. France and US] have been receptive in 
the past to enforcing arbitral awards set aside elsewhere based on local annulment standards, and this 
trend may grow as international arbitration around the world becomes more transnational on character 
and less deferential towards the place of arbitration”). 
20 See generally, Section 6.5. 
21 van den Berg (n 5) 56 (stating that “the vast majority of the courts in the other Contracting States do 
not enforce arbitral awards that have been set aside in the country of origin, either under the Convention 
or otherwise”). See however, Gary Born, International Arbitration: Law and Practice (Kluwer 2012) ch 
16-17. 
22 Born (n 21) 341; AFM Maniruzzaman, ‘International Arbitration: Law and Practice by Gary B. Born 
[Book Review]’ (SSRN, 27 January 2013) !http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2207622" accessed 25 
February 2014. 
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successful application to set aside an award where it was made is pervasive. It directly 
attacks the award’s validity and currency.”23 In other words, according to Al-Siyabi, 
“what makes examining the grounds for setting aside an award even more important is 
that refusing recognition or enforcement of an award by a court is valid and effective 
only in the forum country, whereas the setting aside of an award at the seat of 
arbitration may prevent the enforcement of that award in all other countries.”24 This is, 
of course, assuming that a court does not take the liberal view that an arbitral award 
annulled at the place where it was made remains effective elsewhere.25  
 
6.1.2. Where to Set Aside an Arbitral Award 
 
Some scholars26 define the setting aside of an arbitral award as an action to 
challenge the arbitral award at the place of arbitration. Such a distinction, however, does 
not always apply because, an arbitral award may be set aside at a place other than where 
the arbitration proceedings occurred. In this instance, a question arises as to whether the 
court of the seat of arbitration or the court of the country of applicable law would be 
able to set aside the arbitral award.  
In International Standard Electric v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera,27 the 
plaintiff asked the New York District Court to set aside a Mexican arbitral award, 
applying Mexican procedural law and New York substantive law. The plaintiff argued 
that the New York Convention’s Article V(1)(e), allowing for the setting aside of an 
arbitral award by a court of the country in which, or under the law of which, it was 
made, referred to the substantive law and not to the procedural law, thereby allowing 
the setting aside under New York substantive law.28 The New York District Court 
                                                
23 Asouzu (n 4) 91. 
24 Mohamed Al-Siyabi, ‘A Legal Analysis of the Development of Arbitration in Oman with Special 
Reference to the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards’ (DPhil thesis, University of Hull 2008) 
77. 
25 Maniruzzaman, ‘Book Review’ (n 22); Born (n 21).  
26 Morrissey and Graves (n 1) 460-461. 
27 International Standard Electric v Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, 745 F Supp 172 (SDNY 1990). 
28 ibid; Koji Takahashi, ‘Jurisdiction to Set Aside a Foreign Arbitral Award, In Particular an Award 
Based on an Illegal Contract: A Reflection on the Indian Supreme Court’s Decision in  Venture Global 
Engineering’ (2008) 19 Am Rev of Int’l Arb 173. 
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disagreed and refused to set aside the arbitral award, interpreting Article V(1)(e) as 
referring to the procedural law. 
While the setting aside of an arbitral award usually occurs at the seat of the 
arbitration, thereby only invoking the law of the seat of arbitration, it is possible for the 
parties to choose the law of a country different from the country where the arbitration 
takes place. However, the agreement of the parties to allow for annulment at a place 
different from where the arbitral award was rendered must be proven. Hence, the Cairo 
Court of Appeals in Eighth Commercial Circuit, Case No. 59 of 125 (18 May 2011), 
held that it had no jurisdiction to annul a Texas arbitral award under the New York 
Convention and Egyptian Law No. 27 of 1994, though it would have otherwise been 
allowed to annul, because the condition to confer jurisdiction on Egypt to annul was not 
met as the exhibits did not include the agreement of the parties to subject the arbitration 
to annulment by Egyptian law.  
The New York Convention and most other international agreements allow for 
the court in both countries (the seat of arbitration and the country of applicable law) to 
be able to set aside the arbitral award. The setting aside of the arbitral award at the seat 
of arbitration seems obvious enough as this is the normal practice for setting aside an 
arbitral award. Strict adherents to party autonomy, however, argue that the court of the 
country of applicable law should set aside the arbitral award. This is the same position 
taken by the English court in Hiscox v. Outhwaite, where the House of Lords ruled that 
English courts were competent to review a foreign arbitral award made in Paris under 
English law.29 In this instance, a foreign arbitral award that was made in one country 
can be set aside in another country, which could at the same time be the country of 
enforcement.  
Additionally, some conventions and some countries, including the GCC states, 
have created a double system of reviewing an arbitral award. An arbitral award’s 
enforcement may be challenged, and concurrently or thereafter, the same arbitral award 
may be set aside in the same country before the same or different court for similar or 
different reasons. Interestingly, the UNCITRAL Model Law, though in essence 
                                                
29 Hiscox v Outhwaite, [1992] AC 562; Michael Prules, ‘Foreign Awards and the New York Convention’ 
(1993) 9 Arb Int’l 63. 
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allowing only the courts of the seat of arbitration to set aside an arbitral award in 
countries that have adopted it like Japan,30 still leaves room for such an occurrence. 
This issue becomes clearer in the discussion below of each of the GCC states. 
Applying the above analysis, an arbitral award may be set aside in three 
different places: (1) at the seat of arbitration, (2) in the country of applicable law chosen 
by the parties, and/or (3) at the place of enforcement, which could involve one or more 
countries. The arbitral award could also be set aside concurrently31 in two or all of these 
possible places.  
  
6.1.3. Common Grounds for Setting Aside an Arbitral Award 
 
Giovannini noted four common grounds for setting aside an arbitral award under 
the UNCITRAL Model Law and the New York Convention, namely (1) the validity as 
to the form and substance of the arbitration agreement, (2) the regularity of the 
constitution of the arbitral tribunal, (3) the arbitral tribunal’s compliance with the 
mandate conferred to it by the parties, and (4) public policy.32 Giovannini also adds the 
lack of reasoning as an additional ground for setting aside an arbitral award.33 
Giovannini concluded that the common thread for setting aside an arbitral award at the 
seat of arbitration is the concern for the right to be heard,34 which of course is one of the 
main principles of Shari’a procedural public policy as discussed in Chapter Five. 
Overall, the common grounds for setting aside an arbitral award will be discussed in 
two categories: procedural grounds and substantive grounds.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
30 See UNCITRAL Model Law, arts 1(2) and 34; Takahashi (n 28); Arbitration Act 2003 (Jap), art 3(1). 
31 Morrissey and Graves (n 1) 460-462 (stating that “the legal viability of an arbitration award may be 
addressed in: (1) a court action to set aside or vacate the award in the place of arbitration; (2) a court 
action to enforce the award in the place of enforcement; or (3) both”). 
32 Giovannini (n 15) 116. 
33 ibid 124. 
34 ibid. 
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6.1.3.1. Setting Aside an Arbitral Award on Procedural Grounds 
 
The procedural grounds for setting aside an arbitral award are generally identical 
to the procedural grounds for refusing the enforcement of an arbitral award.35 They 
usually include the following: (1) the right to be heard and the right to present or defend 
a case, (2) the competency of the tribunal, (3) the invalidity of the arbitration 
agreement, (4) coverage and scope of the arbitration agreement, and (5) arbitrability and 
public policy. This section will address each procedural ground in more detail. 
 
A. Right to be Heard and the Right to Present or Defend a 
Case  
  
The ground that immediately comes to mind under the procedural prong of the 
setting aside action is that which goes directly at the fairness and equality of the 
arbitration proceedings: the right to be heard and the right to present or defend a case. 
These rights are universally recognised fundamental or natural right, including under 
the Shari’a.36 This right is recognised in the European Convention of 1961 under Article 
IX(1)(b) which requires proper notice of the proceedings and the appointment of the 
arbitrator.37  
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) - which covers 
the right to a fair trial and includes the right to be heard - corresponds roughly with the 
ancient common law principle of “natural justice” or the duty to act fairly.38 In ABB Ltd 
v. Bam Nuttall Ltd,39 Justice Akenhead stated that “[e]ven if an adjudicator’s breach of 
                                                
35 Al-Siyabi (n 24) 81 (noting that the grounds for setting aside and refusal of enforcement in Oman are 
almost identical). 
36 See also, Section 5.3.1.1(A). 
37 European Convention of 1961, art IX(1)(b). 
38 Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘Human Rights Review 2012: Article 6: Right to a Fair Trial’ 
!http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/humanrights/hrr_article_6.pdf" accessed 5 
December 2013. 
39 ABB Ltd v Bam Nuttall Ltd, [2013] EWHC 1983 (TCC) (Claimant successfully argued that an 
adjudicator’s decision should not be enforced because there had been a material breach of the rules of 
natural justice.); Jeremy Glover, ‘Adjudication: breach of natural justice’ (Lexology, 6 August 2013) 
!http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0f142546-b0bd-
45+...feed&utm_content=Lexology+Daily+Newsfeed+2013-08-12&utm_term" accessed 5 October 
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the rules of natural justice relates only to a material or actual or potentially important 
part of the decision, that can be enough to lead to the decision becoming wholly 
unenforceable essentially because the parties (or at least the losing party) and the Court 
can have no confidence in the fairness of the decision making process.” 
It is also recognised in the UNCITRAL Model Law as consisting of right to 
equal treatment, full opportunity to present a case, right to a hearing, and the right to 
present claims, defences, and evidences.40 In Egypt, the Cairo Court of Appeals, 
Seventh Commercial Circuit Arbitration Case No 4 of 128/N,41 where the appellant 
sought to set aside the arbitral award for unequal treatment when the tribunal required 
the appellant, but not opposing party, to present proof of power of attorney, held there 
was no violation of the right to be heard because both parties were given equal time to 
review the allegations and submit their replies.42 
  
B. Improper Constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal  
 
The improper constitution of the tribunal or the tribunal’s misconduct are 
recognised grounds for setting aside an arbitral award in most conventions and laws like 
the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1961 in Article 
IX(1)(d)43 and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration in 
Article 34(2)(9a)(iv).44 The US also allows for the setting aside of an arbitral award if 
there is “evident partiality or corruption,” if the arbitral award was obtained by 
“corruption, fraud, or undue means,” or where the tribunal “exceeded their powers, or 
so imperfectly executed them.”45 In a Lebanese case, 8th Chamber of First Instance, 
                                                                                                                                          
2013; TMM Division Maritima SA de CV v Pacific Richfield Marine Pte LtdI, [2013] SGHC 186 
(Singapore High Ct, 23 September 2013) (in a challenge to set aside an arbitral award, the court had a 
duty to entertain the challenge but did not have to nit-pick every part of the award). 
40 UNCITRAL Model Law, art 18; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art 15(1); Al-Siyabi (n 24) 83. 
41 Cairo Court of Appeals, Seventh Commercial Circuit Arbitration Case No 4 of 128/N, Session Dated 7 
September 2011 (CRCICA Arbitral Award). 
42 ibid. 
43 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, done at Geneva, on 21 April 1961, 484 
UNTS 364, No 7041 (1963-64), art IX(1)(d) [European Convention of 1961]. 
44 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 with amendments as adopted in 
2006, art 34(2)(9a)(iv). 
45 US Fed Arb Act, 9 USC 10. 
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Jdeidet El Maten, Decision No 2/2011,46 the claimant sought for annulment of the 
arbitral award based on the lack of impartiality of the arbitrator, characterised by a 
contentious nature. In the GCC states, the number of arbitrators must be odd, and an 
even number of arbitrators may be a basis for challenging the arbitral award. However, 
the same Lebanese case above took a similar requirement and interpreted it less strictly, 
and therefore rejected a request to annul an arbitral award where there were only two 
arbitrators.47  
 
C. Incapacity of Party or Invalidity of Arbitration Agreement 
 
The incapacity of a party or invalidity of the arbitration agreement is a ground 
for non-enforcement under the New York Convention,48 and a ground for setting aside 
under the UNCITRAL Model Law in Article 34(2)(a)(i) and the European Convention 
of 1961 in Article IX(1)(a). The controversy regarding this ground for setting aside is 
what law governs the determination of the party’s capacity or the agreement’s validity: 
(1) is it the law designated by the parties, (2) the law of the seat of arbitration, or (3) the 
law where the arbitral award is sought to be enforced. In Civil Court of Appeal, Beirut, 
First Chamber, Decision No. 718/2011,49 the Lebanese court decided the issue of 
capacity under Article 644 and 799 of the Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure, which 
give the party who lost the arbitration case the capacity to appeal the arbitral award.  
 
D. Coverage and Scope of the Arbitration Agreement 
 
A tribunal’s excess of its jurisdiction by addressing that which is not within the 
coverage and scope of the arbitration agreement is a well recognised ground for setting 
aside an arbitral award. It is recognized by US, English and Italian laws, among others, 
as well as by Article 34(2)(a)(i) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the European 
                                                
46 8th Chamber of First Instance in Mount Lebanon, Jdeidet El Maten, Decision No 2/2011 (17 January 
2011). 
47 ibid. 
48 New York Convention, art V(1)(a). 
49 Civil Court of Appeal, Beirut, First Chamber, Decision No 718/2011 (23 May 2011). 
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Convention of 1961 in Article IX (1)(c). The European Convention captures the essence 
of setting aside an arbitral award that deals with a difference not contemplated by or not 
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on 
matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration.50 
Additionally, an arbitral award may be set aside if it failed to address substantial 
arguments put forth by either party during the arbitration process. This is the case under 
German, English, and Italian laws, among others.51 The Yemeni court in Yemen 
Supreme Court, Commercial Circuit, Commercial Challenge No 39413,52 accepted a 
challenge to an arbitral award because the lower court’s ruling exceeded the defence 
and did not settle it, making it a violation of the right to defence as the lower court 
failed to take into consideration the defence submitted.  
 
E. Arbitrability and Public Policy 
 
Perhaps, one of the most controversial and universal grounds for setting aside an 
arbitral award is for violation of public policy and the non-arbitrability of the subject 
matter.53 The public policy ground for setting aside an arbitral award is recognised by 
English law,54 by US law,55 and by all the GCC states. In Switzerland, an arbitral award 
that is contrary to Swiss international public policy can be set aside.56 The same is true 
in the European Court of Justice, which in the Eco Swiss China case has set aside an 
arbitral award that it deemed contrary to European Union public policy.57 The non-
arbitrability of a subject matter and public policy are recognised as grounds for setting 
aside an arbitral award under the UNCITRAL Model Law in Article 34(2)(b), which 
                                                
50 European Convention of 1961, art IX(1)(c). 
51 Al-Siyabi (n 24) 86; Filip  De Ly, ‘Judicial Review of the Substance of Arbitral Awards’ in Katharina 
Boele-Woelki, Comparability and Evaluation: Essays on Comparative Law, Private International Law, 
and International Commercial Arbitration (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1994) 347-349; Leo D’Arcy and 
others, Schmitthoff’s Export Trade: The Law and Practice of International Trade (3rd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2000) 489-490; Arbitration Act of 1996, s 68(2)(d).  
52 Yemen Supreme Court, Commercial Circuit, Commercial Challenge No 39413, Hearing dated 13 
March 2010. 
53 See generally Chapter Five. As discussed in Chapter Five, the two concepts are interrelated. 
54 D’Arcy (n 51) 489-490. 
55 De Ly (n 51) 352-253. 
56 ibid 345. 
57 Eco Swiss China Ltd v Benetton International NV, C-126/97, [1997] OJC 166/9. 
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states that an arbitral award may be set aside if its subject matter is not capable of being 
settled by arbitration, under the laws of the seat of arbitration, or if it violates that state’s 
public policy.58  
 
6.1.3.2. Setting Aside an Arbitral Award on Substantive Grounds 
 
Most countries and most international agreements substantially limit the ability 
of courts to review and set aside, on substantive grounds, arbitral awards. The 
substantive grounds cover questions of law and fact, and choice of law. Thus, the UK,59 
France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, among others, make it difficult to set aside an 
arbitral award based on a substantive ground, especially when such ground is mere error 
of law or fact.60 There are still, however, exceptions. 
The US is perhaps the country leading the adoption of the “manifest disregard” 
standard for setting aside an arbitral award,61 including international arbitral awards.62 
Under this standard, an arbitral award may be set aside (1) if the arbitrators knowingly 
refused to apply or ignored the law, and (2) the law is well defined, explicit, and 
applicable to the case.63 In the US state of Georgia, for example, courts require “clear 
evidence”64 in the form of a “transcript or findings of fact in the arbitrator’s award”65 
which shows that a “well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable”66 governing law was 
“communicated to an arbitrator but that the arbitrator intentionally and knowingly chose 
                                                
58 This provision is similar to the non-enforcement provision(s) of the New York Convention. 
59 K/S A/S Bill Biakh and K/S A/S Bill Biali v Hyundai Corp, (1990) XV YB Comm Arb 521 (UK).  
60 De Ly (n 51) 351; Al-Siyabi (n 24) 87. Courts have asked an arbitral tribunal to reconsider an arbitral 
award when new evidence has been found that could have a substantial impact on the arbitral award. This 
ground for setting aside an arbitral award, however, is rarely if ever successful. 
61 Al-Siyabi (n 24) 88. 
62 Robert Greig and Inna Reznik, ‘Current Development in Enforcement of Arbitration Awards in the 
United States’ (2002) 68 Arbitration 127, 129. 
63 Halligan v Piper Jaffray, Inc, 148 F3d 197 (2d Cir 1998); Montes v Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc, 
128 F3d 1456 (11th Cir 1997); Al-Siyabi (n 24) 88; Eric Dunlap, ‘Setting aside arbitration awards and the 
manifest disregard of the law standard’ (Florida Bar Journal, 1 July 2006) 
!http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-148093375.html" accessed 5 October 2013; BL Harbert 
International, LLC v Hercules Steel Company, 441 F3d 905 (11th Cir 2006) (stating that the manifest 
disregard of the law standard for setting aside an award requires that the arbitrator recognized a clear rule 
of law and deliberately chose to ignore it). 
64 America’s Home Place, Inc v Cassidy, 687 SE2d 254, 256 (Ga App 2009). 
65 First Option Mortgage, LLC v S&S Fin Mortgage Corp, A13A0483 (Ga App May 24, 2013). 
66 Hansen & Hansen Enters, Inc v SCSJ Enters, Inc, 682 SE2d 652, 655 (Ga App 2009). 
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to ignore that law.” 67 Under such a narrow standard, it is quite difficult to establish and 
succeed on a manifest disregard argument.68  
While setting aside an arbitral award is difficult and rare69 under the “manifest 
disregard” standard, at least two US cases have done so: Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc. 
and Montes v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc., 70 where the courts found in both cases 
that the arbitrator failed to explain the reason behind the arbitral award and manifestly 
disregarded the law and facts. In Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer Computer Services, 
Inc.,71 the US Court of Appeals stated that for there to be manifest disregards the error 
must be “obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average 
person qualified to serve as an arbitrator,” that the correct governing law was “well 
defined, explicit, and clearly applicable,” and that the arbitrators exhibited “willful 
inattentiveness” suggesting that they “appreciate[d] the existence of a clearly governing 
principle but decide[d] to ignore or pay no attention to it.” 
The US Supreme Court, however, seemed to have cast a doubt as to the 
continued validity of the manifest disregard standard in Hall Street Associates, LLC v. 
Mattel, Inc.,72 when it ruled that “parties cannot agree to have a court expand the 
                                                
67 First Option Mortgage, LLC v S&S Fin Mortgage Corp, A13A0483 (Ga App May 24, 2013). 
68 Terry Weiss and Andy Clark, ‘Georgia court sets high bar to vacate arbitration award for manifest 
disregard of law’ (31 May 2013) !http://www.gtlaw.com/News-
Events/Publications/Alerts/169593/Georgia-Court-Sets-High-Bar-to-Vacate-Arbitration-Award-for-
Manifest-Disregard-of-Law" accessed 14 February 2014. 
69 A review of recent cases on manifest disregard in the US, for example, shows that most courts deny the 
argument. See, for example, NYKCool AB v Pacific Fruit, Inc, No 11-4246 (2d Cir Jan 16, 2013) 
(confirming an arbitration award based on finding that defendant did not establish a “manifest disregard 
of the law”); Murray v Citigroup Global Markets, Inc, No 11-4355 (6th Cir Jan 10, 2013) (court could 
not determine whether the panel acted in “manifest disregard of the law”); Sward, LLC v Cohen, Case No 
10-03188 (CD Cal Dec 7, 2012) (arbitrator’s application of the alter ego doctrine, finding of a written 
agreement, and reliance on the same evidence presented by plaintiff for two different claims is not a 
“manifest disregard of the law” under the FAA); Ometto v ASA Bioenergy Holding AG, Case No 12-1328 
(SDNY Jan 9, 2013) (petitioners’ grounds for vacatur were without merit, including allegations that the 
tribunal acted in manifest disregard of the law); Budget Blinds Inc v Le Clair, Case No 12-1101 (CD Cal 
Jan 16, 2013) (petition to vacate did not establish “manifest disregard of the law”); Fuchs & Associates, 
Inc v Lesso, No B239246 (Cal Ct App Jan 8, 2013) (there was no “manifest disregard of the law”). 
70 Montes v Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc, 128 F3d 1456 (11th Cir 1997); Halligan v Piper Jaffray, Inc, 
148 F3d 197 (2d Cir 1998). 
71 Prestige Ford v Ford Dealer Computer Services, Inc, 324 F3d 391 (5th Cir 2003); Stephen Schwartz, 
‘“Manifest Disregard of the Law”: Does It Provide Courts a Reason to Vacate Arbitration Awards?’ 
(2009) 24 WLF Legal Backgrounder 33 !http://www.wlf.org/publishing/publication_detail.asp?id=2112" 
accessed 5 February 2014. 
72 Hall Street Associates, LLC v Mattel, Inc, 128 S Ct 1396 (2008); Schwartz (n 71). 
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grounds for vacating an [arbitral] award beyond the FAA’s express terms.”73  In Hall 
Street, the Supreme Court nonetheless failed to clarify what manifest disregard means, 
and in effect created further confusion among the lower courts as to the existence of the 
manifest disregard standard. The US First Circuit Court of Appeals in Ramos-Santiago 
v. United Parcel Serv.,74 for example, interpreted the Hall Street case to mean that the 
US Supreme Court in dicta held “that manifest disregard of the law is not a valid 
ground for vacating or modifying an arbitral award” in US Federal Arbitration Act75 
(FAA) cases. The U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Martin Marietta Materials, 
Inc. v. Bank of Oklahoma, however, disagreed with the First Circuit and stated that “the 
‘manifest disregard’ standard continues to apply.”76 The same is true for the Second 
Circuit in Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp.,77 and the Ninth Circuit in 
Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates,78 which continues to apply their pre-Hall 
Street standard for manifest disregard, therefore allowing it. The Fifth Circuit in 
Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon,79 agreed with the First Circuit that manifest 
disregard is no longer valid, but it failed to explain the position of the Sixth, Second, 
and Ninth Circuits.  
On the other hand, the UNCITRAL Model Law under Article 36 does not allow 
for setting aside when an error of law appeared or was manifest on the face of the 
arbitral award. A challenge to the constitutionality of the Australian International 
Arbitration Act of 1974, which adopted Article 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law and 
which does not allow for the setting aside of an arbitral award because of an error of 
law that was manifest on the face of the arbitral award, was rejected by the High Court 
of Australia in TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v. The Judges of the Federal 
                                                
73 Michael LeRoy, ‘Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The ‘Manifest Disregard of the Law’ Standard’ 
(2011) 52 BCL Rev 137 !http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol52/iss1/" accessed 5 February 2013 
(discussing the history of the manifest disregard standard before and after the Hall Street case). 
74 Ramos-Santiago v United Parcel Serv, 524 F3d 120, 124 n3 (1st Cir 2008) 
75 US Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USC § 1-14. 
76 Martin Marietta Materials, Inc v Bank of Oklahoma, 304 F App’x 360, 362-363 (6th Cir 2008) 
(unpublished).   
77 Stolt-Nielsen SA v AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp, 548 F3d 85 (2d Cir 2008). 
78 Comedy Club, Inc v Improv West Associates, 553 F3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir 2009).  
79 Citigroup Global Markets, Inc v Bacon, 562 F3d 349 (5th Cir 2009). 
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Court of Australia,80 because there were other grounds upon which to set aside the 
arbitral award, including on the basis of public policy. Another example is when an 
arbitral award is sought to be set aside because the arbitrator did not take into account 
specific grounds that complainant wanted it to address. The Lebanese court in Beirut 
Civil Court of Appeals, First Chamber, Decision No 313/2011 (3 Mar 2011), stated that 
one cannot force the arbitrator to adopt specific grounds or defences, and if the 
arbitrator adopted some specific grounds, that does not constitute a breach of the right 
to defence. The position of the Lebanese court seems to contradict the manifest 
disregard position. 
Public policy, of course, is always a last resort. As previously stated in Chapter 
Five, which deals with public policy in more detail, the international consensus on 
public policy is that it ought to be interpreted narrowly. Yet, even in countries that 
follow this narrow interpretation, there are cases where an arbitral award has been set 
aside based on public policy, including two US cases: Warburg LLC81 and Cavalier 
Manufacturing, Inc.82 One should also keep in mind, as stated in Chapter Five, that 
public policy always could fall under the procedural rules, and may be determined by 
the law of the state where the setting aside is sought. 
 
PART II 
 
6.2. Setting Aside Under the Shari’a 
 
It is important to point out, as did Alshiekh, that the majority of Shari’a jurists 
are in agreement that a judge may not set aside an arbitral award rendered under proper 
legal rules and principles, and “such an [arbitral] award shall be enforceable and not 
subject to cancellation, even if it is contrary to the opinion of the judge.”83 This is the 
                                                
80 TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v The Judges of the Federal Court of Australia (2013) HCA 
5 (Australia High Ct). 
81 Warburg LLC v Auerbach, Pollak & Richardson, NY Sup Ct (Oct 2001). 
82 Cavalier Manufacturing, Inc v Jackson, No 1000391, 2001 WL 1177028 (Ala Oct 5, 2001). 
83 Essam Alsheikh, ‘Court Intervention in Commercial Arbitral Proceedings in Saudi Arabia: A 
Comparative Analytical Study of Shari’a Based Statutes and International Arbitral Practices’ (DPhil 
thesis, University of Portsmouth 2011) 52. 
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majority view of the Malikis, Shafi’i, Hanbali,84 and even some Hanafi85 scholars. 
However, according to Alshiekh, Imam Abu Hanifah and some Hanafis hold the 
opposite view, treating the arbitration as binding only upon the parties and not the 
judge, and therefore allowing the judge to cancel the arbitral award if the judge 
disagrees with it.86  
El-Ahdab also supports the idea of setting aside an arbitral award if it is 
inconsistent with the Shari’a.87 According to El-Ahdab, the setting aside of an arbitral 
award “is the sole means of recourse ever envisaged by the commentators” of the 
Shari’a.88 The Majalla89 under Article 1849 states that “[i]f the arbitral award is referred 
to the judge appointed by the Sultan, and if it complies with the law, the judge will 
approve it else he shall set it aside.”90 This article expressly suggests that setting aside 
an arbitral award is a proper means of recourse. Further, El-Ahdab argues that the 
“contractual nature of the award adopted by the Majalla tends to suggest that an award 
may be set aside on the same grounds as a contract.”91 El Kadi and El Ahdab, who 
support the jurisdictional nature of the arbitral award, support a setting aside of the 
arbitral award only when there is “an error on the face of the award.”92 Such error could 
arise if the arbitrator was incapable, granted more than what was requested, failed to 
address a claim presented before it, made the arbitral award based on a void or invalid 
                                                
84 Muhamman Al-Mabghrabi, Mawahib Al-Jaleel, vol 6 (2nd edn, Dar Al-Fikr 1978) 113; Muhammad 
Al-Ghazali, Al-Awasit, vol 7 (Dar As-Salam1997) 50; Muhammad Ash-Shirbini, Mughni Al-Muhtaj Ela 
Marifat maani Al-Minhaj, vol 4 (Mustafa Al-Halabi Printing Press 1985) 379; Ahmed Al-Asqlany, 
Fathul Al-Bari Bi Sahr’h Sahih Al-Bukhari, vol 6 (Dar Al-Ma’rifah 1979) 165; Muwaffaq Ibn Qudamah, 
Rawdhat An-Nather, vol 10 (3rd edn, Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University 1983) 50. 
85 Zainuddeen Ibn Nujaim, Bahr ur-Ra’iq, vol 7 (Dar Al-Ma’rifah nd) 25. 
86 Alsheikh (n 83). 
87 Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab and Jalal El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (3rd edn, Wolters 
Kluwer 2011). 51. See also Radwa Elsaman, ‘Factors to Consider Before Arbitrating in the Arab Middle 
East: Religious and Legislative Constraints’ (2011) 3 Geo Mason J Int’l Com L 1, 62-63 (citing El-Ahdab 
for the same proposition and giving the riba as an example of a basis for setting aside an award). 
88 El-Ahdab (n 87) 51. 
89 The Majalla is an early codification of the Shari’a enacted in the Ottoman Empire in the late 1800’s, 
though some have noted that it was strongly influenced by French civil law. A Smolik, Comment, The 
Effect of Shari’a on the Dispute Resolution Process Set Forth in the Washington Convention, 2010 J Disp 
Resol 151 (2010) 157, fn 82; F Griffel, Introduction,  in Shari’a: Islamic Law in the Contemporary 
Context (A Amanat & F Griffel eds, 2007) 8-9; J Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (1st edn 1964) 
37.     
90 Al Majalla, art 1849; El-Ahdab (n 87) Annexes, 900-901. 
91 El-Ahdab (n 87) 51. 
92 Omar El-Kadi, ‘L’Arbitage International entre le Droit Musulman et le Droit Francais et Egyptien’ 
(DPhil thesis, University of Paris 1984); El-Ahdab (n 87). 
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agreement, made an arbitral award that contravenes public policy, the Shari’a or 
contains a flagrant injustice, if the parties were not entitled to arbitration, or if there was 
no fair hearing.93 
 
PART III 
 
6.3. Setting Aside a Foreign Arbitral Award Under International Agreements 
 
6.3.1. Setting Aside an Arbitral Award Under the New York Convention 
 
On its face, the New York Convention does not govern the setting aside of an 
arbitral award.94 The setting aside of an arbitral award, however, is explicitly mentioned 
in Article V(1)(e)95 of the New York Convention as follows:  
 
Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request 
of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the 
competent authority proof that: 
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been 
set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in 
which, or under the law of which, the award was made. 
 
Article V(1)(e) allows, but does not require, the court at the place of 
enforcement to refuse enforcement of a foreign arbitral award that has been set aside by 
either a court at the seat of arbitration or a court at the country of the chosen applicable 
law. The New York Convention, thus, through Article V(1)(e) recognises the 
international consensus that the law of the seat of arbitration96 governs the setting aside 
of a foreign arbitral award, and the court in a Contracting State “may only decide under 
the Convention whether or not to grant enforcement of the award within their 
                                                
93 El-Kadi (n 92) 261; El-Ahdab (n 87). 
94 van den Berg (n 5) 42. 
95 New York Convention, art V(1)(e). 
96 Pieter Sanders (ed), ICCA’s Guide to the Interpretation of the 1958 New York Convention: A Handbook 
for Judges (ICCA 2011) 102 (describing the seat of arbitration as having “supervisory” or “primary” 
jurisdiction over the award, while the enforcement state as having “enforcement” or “secondary” 
jurisdiction over the award). 
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jurisdiction.”97  Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention, thus, is the source of the 
extraterritorial effect of setting aside a foreign arbitral award among Contracting 
States.98 
Perhaps, an even more significant impact of the New York Convention to the 
law governing the setting aside of a foreign arbitral award, despite its lack of explicit 
provisions governing the procedure, is if a country adopts “all or almost all of the 
grounds for refusal of enforcement set forth in Article V of the Convention as grounds 
for setting aside arbitral awards made within its jurisdiction.”99 Van den Berg points to 
the UNCITRAL Model Law, discussed more fully in Section 6.3.2. below.100 Overall, 
the New York Convention’s lack of regulation regarding the setting aside of a foreign 
arbitral award and its permissive language regarding the non-enforceability of a foreign 
arbitral award that has previously been set aside, has created an unsettled and 
unpredictable post-arbitral award jurisprudence.101  
 
6.3.2. Setting Aside Under the UNCITRAL Model Law 
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law is the only source for a uniform system for setting 
aside an arbitral award with explicit provisions on the grounds for setting aside, albeit 
adopted from the New York Convention. It is necessary to reiterate at the outset that 
only Oman, Bahrain, and the KSA have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law, and so 
the UNCITRAL Model Law would only govern the setting aside rules of these three 
GCC states.  
Article 34(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law102 sets forth the limited grounds 
under which an arbitral award may be set aside. Article 34(2) states in pertinent part as 
follows: 
                                                
97 van den Berg (n 5) 42; Sanders (n 96) 102. 
98 van den Berg (n 5) 42. 
99 ibid. 
100 ibid. 
101 Robert Bird, ‘Enforcement of Annulled Arbitration Awards: A Company Perspective and an 
Evaluation of a “New” New York Convention’ (2011-2012) 37 NCJ Int’l L & Com Reg 1013 (stating 
that “not surprisingly, the result has led to a conflicted body of decisions that attempts to grapple with 
these provisions.”). 
102 UNCITRAL Model Law, art 34(2). 
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An arbitral award may be set aside ... only if: 
 (a) the party making the application furnishes proof that: 
(i) a party to the arbitration agreement ... was under some 
incapacity; or the said agreement is not valid under the law to 
which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication 
thereon, under the law of this State; or 
(ii) the party making the application was not given proper notice 
of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings 
or was otherwise unable to present his case; or 
(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not 
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or 
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission 
to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted 
to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only 
that part of the award which contains decisions on matters not 
submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or 
(iv) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral 
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the 
parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of 
this Law from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such 
agreement, was not in accordance with this Law; or 
(b) the court finds that: 
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement 
by arbitration under the law of this State; or 
   (ii) the award is in conflict with the public policy of this State. 
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law limits the recourse against an arbitral award to a 
setting aside application.103 The UNCITRAL Model Law separates the grounds into two 
categories: those that a party must prove under (1)(a) and those that a court may 
consider on its own initiative.104 The grounds to setting aside the arbitral award are 
stated in Article 34(2), which “mirrors” the grounds in Article 36(1) for a refusal of 
enforcement.105 In turn, Article 36(1) “mirrors” the grounds for refusal of enforcement 
in Article V of the New York Convention, where Article 36(1) was taken from. 106 
According to van den Berg, Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law states that “a 
                                                
103 UNCITRAL Model Law, art 34(1).  
104 UNCITRAL, ‘Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration as amended in 2006’ 
!http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf" accessed 25 
February 2014 [hereinafter “UNCITRAL, ‘Explanatory’”]. 
105 ibid 35. 
106 ibid. 
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court of a country that has adopted the Model Law may set aside an arbitral award 
rendered under that Law (as implemented) on grounds that are virtually identical to the 
grounds for refusal of enforcement listed in Article V of the [New York] Convention 
(except for ground (1)(e)).”107 Thus, while the New York Convention does not govern 
the setting aside of a foreign arbitral award, it does so vicariously through the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, assuming a state adopts both the New York Convention and 
the UNCITRAL Model Law.  
Interestingly, in a recent case in Singapore, PT First Media TBK v. Astro 
Nusantara International BV & others,108 the court of appeal held that under the scheme 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law as applied in Singapore, a party has a choice of 
remedies to challenge an arbitral award on the grounds of jurisdiction: actively, by 
seeking to set aside the arbitral award under Article 16(3) of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, or passively, as a defence to enforcement under Section 19 of the IAA which 
allows for a refusal to enforce an international arbitral award issued in Singapore. 
 
6.3.3. Setting Aside Under the ICSID Convention 
 
While the ICSID Convention has significantly curtailed domestic court 
interference with the arbitration process and enforcement, one of its significant features 
under Article 52 is the remedy for the annulment or setting aside of an arbitral award, 
whether in whole or in part.109 Under Article 52(1), an ad hoc committee has 
jurisdiction to review and annul an arbitral award when either party requests 
                                                
107 ibid 35-36; van den Berg (n 5).  
108 PT First Media TBK v Astro Nusantara International BV & others [2013] SGCA 47 (Singapore); Lin 
Shumin, ‘Court of Appeal clarifies that parties have a “choice of remedies” in challenging a domestic 
international award: PT First Media Tbk v Astro Nusantara International BV & Ors [2013] SGCA 57’ 
(Lexology, 28 November 2013) !http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5cdea230-4fb7-4a59-
8414-1b2290459243" accessed 15 January 2014. 
109 Lucy Reed, Jan Paulsson and Nigel Blackaby, Guide to ICSID Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer 2010)162. 
The application for annulment is submitted to a new three-member ad hoc committee constituted for the 
sole purpose of determining the annulment application. 
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annulment110 of the arbitral award by written application to the Secretary-General111 on 
one or more of the following grounds that: 
(1) the Tribunal was not properly constituted; 
(2) the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; 
(3) there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; 
(4) there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or  
(5) the arbitral award has failed to state the reason on which it is based.112 
As for the fifth ground for setting aside an ICSID arbitral award, in Mitchell v. 
The Democratic Republic of Congo,113 an ad hoc committee set aside an ICSID arbitral 
award because the ICSID Tribunal failed to state its reasons for the arbitral award.114 
Interestingly, public policy cannot be a ground for annulment under the ICSID 
Convention.115 It is important to note that the ICSID annulment system was designed to 
protect the integrity of the ICSID Convention116 proceedings and not the outcome of the 
proceedings.117 Therefore, the committee cannot review the merits of the original 
arbitral award in any way. Additionally, a successful annulment invalidates the arbitral 
award in whole or in part, but it can never revise or amend the arbitral award, such 
proceeding being covered under Article 51.118  
While the arbitral award is subject to the annulment proceeding, its enforcement 
may be stayed pending resolution under Article 53(1), which states that “[e]ach party 
shall abide by and comply with the terms of the award except to the extent that 
enforcement shall have been stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of this 
Convention.”119 The stay will be granted at the discretion of the committee, except 
                                                
110 It must be made within 120 days of rendering the award and not more than three years after the 
issuance of the award. ICSID Convention, art 52. 
111 Al-Siyabi (n 24) 285 (noting that in most international conventions an annulment or setting aside of an 
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112 ICSID Convention, art 52. 
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when a party requested a stay at the time of filing of the application.120 The stay then 
terminates after the committee is constituted, but a party may request for a continuation 
of the stay subject to a hearing.121   
In SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Paraguay,122 
however, an ICSID Convention ad hoc annulment committee denied respondent 
Paraguay’s request to stay enforcement of an arbitral award while the application to set 
aside the arbitral award was pending after SGS sought for the lifting of the provisional 
stay under ICSID Convention Arbitration Rule 54(2) or to require Paraguay to post a 
bond as security. The committee agreed with SGS’s argument and held that the plain 
language of Article 52 of the ICSID Convention and ICSID Convention Arbitration 
Rules 52 to 54 states that a stay of enforcement is not automatic and should be the 
exception rather than the rule subject to the committee’s discretion.  The committee 
further took into consideration Paraguay’s history of non?compliance with payment of 
ICSID Convention obligations and arbitral awards and weighed such history against 
continuance of a stay, and held that Paraguay had not established that the circumstances 
of the case allowed the continuation of the stay of enforcement. 
According to Reed, Paulsson and Blackaby, the most common grounds for 
annulment under the ICSID Convention are Article 52 (b) the Tribunal manifestly 
exceeding its powers, Article 52(d) a serious departure from a fundamental rule of 
procedure, and Article 52(e) failure to state the reason on which the arbitral award was 
based.123 An arbitral award can also be reviewed and reduced based on the principle of 
proportionality, as the ICSID Tribunal demonstrated in Occidental Petroleum Corp. 
Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador124 
(hereinafter “OEPC” case). The OEPC Tribunal held that under Ecuadorean law, 
                                                
120 Reed, Paulsson and Blackaby (n 109) 176. 
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122 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No ARB/07/29 (22 
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administrative acts must be in accordance with the principle of proportionality.  In 
respect of investment arbitration law, the ICSID Tribunal indicated that “the obligation 
for fair and equitable treatment has on several occasions been interpreted to import an 
obligation of proportionality.”125  
 
PART IV 
 
6.4. Setting Aside a Foreign Arbitral Award in the GCC States 
 
While the majority view under the Shari’a does not allow for the setting aside of 
an arbitral award, the GCC states in practice have nevertheless allowed for the setting 
aside of an arbitral award, both domestic and foreign. This section will examine the 
position and rules of each of the GCC states regarding the setting aside of a foreign 
arbitral award.  
GCC states are all signatories to the New York Convention, the Riyadh 
Convention, and the ICSID Convention. However, only the New York Convention 
expressly allows for the setting aside of a foreign arbitral award. The New York 
Convention, however, does not expressly provide for the grounds for setting aside of a 
foreign arbitral award, as it does for the grounds for refusing enforcement of a foreign 
arbitral award. As stated by Al-Siyabi, “[t]he New York Convention, as the single 
important convention on enforcement of arbitral awards...do not specify the grounds for 
vacating arbitral awards, and leave the issue at the discretion of national law of the seat 
of arbitration.”126 One could assume, as does Al-Siyabi127 and other scholars, that the 
grounds for setting aside a foreign arbitral award under the New York Convention 
would be the same as the grounds for enforcing a foreign arbitral award.  
                                                
125 ibid. As of September 2010, there were 40 annulment applications, of which 22 decisions were 
publicly available and from which only 10 were granted annulment, whether partially or in whole. Reed, 
Paulsson and Blackaby (n 109) 174; Dany Khayat, ‘Enforcement of awards in ICSID arbitration’ 
(Lexology, 16 December 2011) !http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ea90bf75-ee44-43be-
9c4c-272124661401" accessed 14 October 2013. 
126 Al-Siyabi (n 24) 79. 
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Maniruzzaman rightly pointed that while the UNCITRAL Model Law aligns the 
grounds upon which a foreign arbitral award may be set aside with the New York 
Convention’s grounds for non-enforcement, the UNCITRAL Model Law marks an 
improvement: 
 
Undoubtedly, the Model Law provides an improvement on the New 
York Convention 1958 on this matter. As the latter has no provision on 
setting aside an arbitral award and the matter is left to the arbitration law 
of the country of origin of the award, ‘the grounds for refusal of 
enforcement of the Convention may indirectly be extended (i.e. 
under Article V(1)(e) of the Convention) by the grounds for setting aside 
contained in the arbitration law of the country of origin.’ The New York 
Convention has thus left open this floodgate of grounds for setting aside 
arbitral awards to be compounded with those for refusal of recognition 
and enforcement creating an uncertainty of the fate of an award. The 
Model Law thus attempts to harmonize the grounds for setting aside and 
for recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.128 
 
The only remaining guidance for the setting aside of a foreign arbitral award 
would come from the UNCITRAL Model Law and the unique arbitration centres in 
each of the GCC states. However, only Bahrain, Oman, and the KSA have adopted the 
UNCITRAL Model Law.129  
 
6.4.1. Setting Aside in the UAE 
 
The grounds for setting aside a foreign arbitral award in the UAE are restrictive 
and limited130 to the grounds set forth in Article 216(1) of the UAE Civil Procedure 
                                                
128 AFM Maniruzzaman, ‘The New Law of International Commercial Arbitration in Bangladesh: A 
Comparative Perspective’ (2003) 14 The Am Rev of Int’l Arb 166. 
129 UNCITRAL, ‘Status: 1958-Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards’ <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html> 
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accessed 24 March 2014. 
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Code,131 and those relating to public order.132 The same is true for the Draft UAE 
Federal Arbitration Law under Article 53 and 54, which follows the approach of the 
Egyptian Arbitration Act in Articles 52-54. Setting aside is the only means of recourse 
against the foreign arbitral award, and a foreign arbitral award may only be set aside 
during the ratification process133 in “very determined cases where the defects in the 
award are so serious.”134 As stated by the Dubai Court of Cassation in Civil Challenge, 
Case No. 265/2007 (3 Feb 2008), “when the arbitral award is granted res judicata 
[finality], an action for annulment may be filed against it if the proper conditions are 
present.”135 The Dubai Court of Cassation further stated that “when granting recognition 
of the arbitral award, the Court does not have the right to examine the merits of the case 
and the extent of its conformity with the law...”136  
Article 216(1) of the UAE Civil Procedure Code provides the grounds for 
setting aside an arbitral award. This provision has been interpreted to allow the setting 
aside of an arbitral award in six categories137: (1) that the arbitral award was made 
without a valid arbitration agreement (including the situation where either party had no 
capacity to enter into the arbitration agreement) or with a void, voidable, expired 
arbitration agreement;138 (2) failure to observe due process including lack of notice, the 
right to be heard, and the right to present a case or defence;139 (3) the constitution of the 
tribunal or the appointment of arbitrators violated UAE law or the parties’ agreement;140 
(4) the arbitral award deals with matters beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement 
or the arbitrator or tribunal exceeded its mandate;141 (5) the arbitral award or 
                                                
131 Federal Law No (11) of 1992, UAE Civil Procedure Code, art 216 (1). 
132 Karrar-Lewsley (n 130). 
133 ibid; Gordon Blanke and Karim Nassif, ‘Arbitration in the UAE 2011’ 
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proceedings are affected by other “procedural irregularities”142 or violated a UAE 
law,143 including the UAE Civil Procedure Code; and (6) the arbitral award is against 
UAE public policy or the subject of the arbitral award is non-arbitrable.144  
The Dubai Court of Cassation in Commercial Challenge No 148/2008 (16 Sept 
2008),145 also set out grounds for annulment under Article 216 of the UAE Civil 
Procedure Code and gave eight grounds, showing that despite Article 216, courts may 
enumerate a different number of grounds for annulment, though mostly similar. It 
should also be noted that the Dubai Court of Cassation, Petition No 146/2008, judgment 
dated 09 November 2008,146 has ruled that public policy is not one of the grounds for 
setting aside an arbitral award because Article 216 does not explicitly state public order 
as a ground for annulment, but domestic public policy should be taken into account at 
the enforcement stage 
Though Article 216(1) of the UAE Civil Procedure Code does not seem to 
address all of these six categories, the language of Article 216 (1)(c) allows for a 
broader interpretation of potential grounds for setting aside an arbitral award. The 
Dubai Court of Cassation in two cases147 actually regrouped148 the listed grounds into 
two general categories: grounds linked to the arbitration agreement149 and grounds 
linked to the arbitral proceedings.150 The Dubai Court of Cassation’s categorisation adds 
                                                
142 Blanke and Nassif (n 133). Examples of procedural irregularities include failure by the arbitrators to 
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two additional categories: the issuance of the arbitral award by a truncated tribunal with 
no authorisation to do so and failure to define the dispute in the arbitration agreement. 
UAE courts have stated that it will not consider the legal merits of the dispute 
since the setting aside of an arbitral award only deals with challenges to the 
proceedings.151 The Dubai Court of Cassation in Civil Challenge, Case No. 265/2007 (3 
Feb 2008),152 clarified that the grounds for annulment relate only to the arbitral 
proceedings, to a nullity occurring in the arbitral award or to a nullity in the proceedings 
that affect the arbitral award. In other words, the court is limited to examining the 
essential rules of procedure such as the right to a defence, due process, and the 
procedures agreed upon between the parties.153  
While an arbitration agreement is void if it is not in writing, the Dubai Court of 
Cassation in Civil Challenge No. 103 of 2011 (20 November 2011), reversed the 
appellate court’s annulment of an arbitral award stating that the contested decision 
misapplied the law regarding the inclusion of the arbitration agreement. Instead, the 
Court of Cassation stated that Article 212(5) does not provide that the arbitral award 
should initially contain the entire arbitration agreement but should only mention its 
content.  
An arbitral award, however, may be set aside for violation of due process if 
there is lack of notice to either party of the appointment of arbitrator(s) and of the 
arbitration proceedings.154 Due process may also be violated if there is a violation of a 
party’s right to be heard and the right to present a case and submit a defence. 
Additionally, the parties must be treated equally, and bias by the court in favour of one 
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151 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Cassation, Recourse No 56, Commercial Cassation, Judicial Year 27, 21 
May 2006, (2009) Int’l J of Arab Arb 1, 511; Dubai Court of Cassation, Recourse No 4, 173; Dubai Court 
of Cassation, Recourse No 95/2008, 25 May 2009, (2009) Journal of Arab Arb 4, 182; Dubai Court of 
Cassation, Petition No 403/2003, Judgment of 13 March 2004; Federal Supreme Court, Petition No 32, 
23rd Judicial Year, Judgement of 8 June 2003; Federal Supreme Court, Petition No 831, 25th Judicial 
year, Judgment of 23 May 2004; Federal Supreme Court, Petition No 67, 26th Judicial Year, Judgment of 
23 May 2004. 
152 Dubai Court of Cassation, Civil Challenge, Case No 265/2007 (3 February 2008). 
153 Dubai Court of Cassation, Commercial Cassation, Recourse No 351/2005, 1 July 2006, (2009) Int’l J 
of Arab Arb 4, 159; Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Cassation, Recourse No 556, Judicial Year 24, 19 Apr 
2005,  (2010) Journal of Arbitration 6, 264; Dubai Court of Cassation, Recourse No 537/1999, 23 Apr 
2000, (2010) Journal of Arbitration 6, 269. 
154 El-Ahdab (n 87) 822. 
269 
!
party against the other would be grounds for setting aside an arbitral award.155 It is 
worth noting that these are the same grounds set forth under the Shari’a. In Dubai Court 
of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, Action No 268 of 2007 (19 February 2008), a case 
involving allegation of forgery of court admitted documents, the court, before rejecting 
the appeal, explained that “the failure to afford the parties due process violate the right 
to be heard.”156 
Once a party becomes aware of an arbitrator’s conflict of interest or any conduct 
or position that would shed doubt on the tribunal’s independence or impartiality, then 
the party could ask the court to set aside the arbitral award.  In Abu Dhabi Court of 
Cassation, Petition No 980/2010, the court held that the independence and impartiality 
of an arbitrator is fundamental and pertain to public order, and therefore set aside an 
arbitral award because the arbitrator appointed by the respondent worked for the 
respondent’s legal representative.157 An arbitral award may also be challenged if there is 
an even number of arbitrators because UAE law, like all GCC states, requires that there 
must be an odd number of arbitrators.158 According to the Dubai Court of Cassation in 
Petition No 75/2007,159 an arbitral award may also be annulled if the arbitration 
proceedings continues despite a pending motion for recusal of an arbitrator as such 
recusal is a legal or actual impediment.  
The most common basis in the UAE for setting aside an arbitral award in 
practice is that it is beyond the scope of the agreement.160 It is possible that only those 
portions that exceed the mandate may be partially set aside. For example, the Dubai 
Court of Cassation in Case No. 282/2012, Real Estate Cassation,161 partly affirmed the 
enforcement of a DIAC arbitral award and partly set aside the award of attorney fees 
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156 Dubai Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, Action No 268 of 2007 (19 February 2008). 
157 Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation, Petition No 980/2010, Judgment of 23 February 2011.  
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because no specific power to award such costs has been granted to the arbitration 
tribunal under the DIAC rules or under the arbitration agreement.162  
An arbitral award may also be set aside if a procedural irregularity has a 
substantial effect on the arbitral award. According to Blanke and Nassif, procedural 
irregularities may also include failure to administer oaths before hearing oral 
evidence,163 and failure by the arbitrators to sign both the reasoning and the disposition 
of the arbitral award, which was indicated by the Dubai Court of Cassation, Petition No. 
233/2007.164 In Dubai Court of Cassation, Petition No 9/1996, the arbitral award was set 
aside or annulled because time for issuance of the arbitral award expired and the period 
of issuance of extension must be uninterruptedly linked to the previously set period.165 
In Dubai Court of Cassation, Petition No 503/2003,166 the court held that arbitrators 
shall require witnesses to take the oath before the witnesses provide testimonies 
regardless of whether or not the parties requested or agreed to such a procedure since 
Article 211 of the UAE Civil Procedure Code requires such an oath.  
Finally, an arbitral award can be set aside for violating public policy “as 
understood in the UAE.”167 As a recent example, the Dubai Court of Cassation in Case 
No. 180/2011, Judgment of 12 February 2012,168 set aside an arbitral award that 
nullified a sale and purchase agreement in the off-plan real estate sector on the basis 
that the underlying property had not been properly registered in accordance with Article 
3 of Law No. 13 of 2008, Regulating the Interim Real Estate Register in the Emirate of 
Dubai. This decision means that Article 3 of Law No. 13 of 2008 falls within the 
meaning of public policy in the UAE.169 
 
 
                                                
162 Gordon Blanke, ‘Dubai Court of Cassation finds against recoverability of Counsel fees in DIAC 
arbitration’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 23 June 2013) 
!http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/06/23/dubai-court-of-cassation-finds-against-recoverability-
of-counsel-fees-in-diac-arbitration-2/" accessed 14 October 2013. 
163 Blanke and Nassif (n 133). 
164 ibid; Dubai Court of Cassation, Petition No 233/2007, Judgment of 13 January 2008 
165 Dubai Court of Cassation, Petition No 9/1996, Judgment of 13 July 1996. 
166 Dubai Court of Cassation, Petition No 503/2003, Judgment of 15 May 2004.  
167 Karrar-Lewsley (n 130). 
168 Dubai Court of Cassation, Case No 180/2011, Judgment of 12 February 2012. 
169 Karrar-Lewsley (n 130). 
271 
!
6.4.2. Setting Aside in Oman 
 
In Oman, Article 54(1) of Sultani Decree 47/97 allows a party to request the 
setting aside of an arbitral award.170 According to Al-Siyabi, however, “it can be 
assumed that it is possible to request the nullification of only those [arbitral] awards that 
are made under Omani law, whether in Oman or outside of it.”171 The limitation of only 
setting aside arbitral awards rendered under Omani law largely results in not allowing a 
setting aside of a foreign arbitral award that is being enforced in Oman that must then 
follow the enforcement scheme in Oman largely covered by the New York Convention. 
This does not mean, however, that setting aside can only be applied for domestic 
arbitral awards because Omani law can be applicable to (1) foreign arbitral awards 
when the seat of arbitration is outside of Oman but the foreign court applied Omani law 
pursuant to the choice of law of the arbitration agreement or arbitral clause, and (2) 
international arbitral awards.172  
In Oman, the Buraimi Court of Appeal in Appeal No. 32 T/s/2003, Commercial 
Circuit (3 May 2011),173 considered a request to set aside an international arbitral award 
under the grounds for setting aside set forth in Article 53 of Omani Arbitration Law No. 
47/1997, in a case involving an Omani owner of a rock crushing site in Oman and an 
Emirate licensee with a principal place of business in Abu Dhabi. The Buraimi Court 
held that it had no jurisdiction ratione materia [subject matter jurisdiction] as a matter 
of public order under Article 54/2 9 of the Omani Arbitration Law because the 
arbitration is international in nature under Article 2 and Article 3 of the Omani 
Arbitration Law since it involved parties from different countries.174  
The current Omani arbitration law is pro-enforcement and has restricted the 
grounds on which arbitral awards can be set aside. The Omani Supreme Court in Case 
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173 Buraimi Court of Appeal in Appeal No 32 T/s/2003, Commercial Circuit (3 May 2011), (2013) 5 Int'l 
J of Arab Arb 1. 
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No. 1/2002,175 has made clear that the grounds for setting aside an arbitral award are 
exclusively provided in Article 53 of the Omani Arbitration Law, and may not be 
developed by analogy despite that they differ from the grounds provided for the setting 
aside of judicial decisions. The Omani Supreme Court has refused to set aside an 
arbitral award on grounds not provided for under Article 53 of the Omani Arbitration 
Law, and held by the Oman Supreme Court in Case No 2002/1,176 that failure to appoint 
an expert or to mention the nationality, titles, and qualifications of the arbitrators do not 
constitute grounds for setting aside under Article 53, which provides that “annulment 
shall not be adopted unless the law expressly provides so.”177 In Oman, the grounds for 
setting aside an arbitral award are limited to errors in the arbitration proceedings.178 
Omani courts can no longer review the facts and law of the arbitral award, and can only 
review and set aside the arbitral award for the following circumstances:179 
1. validity of arbitration agreement and a party’s incapacity, 
2.  lack of due process and defect in the arbitral award and proceedings, 
3. failure to apply the applicable law or going beyond the scope of the 
arbitration, 
4. wrong composition of the tribunal, and 
5. against public order. 
In Rotana Hotel Management Corp Ltd v. Gulf Hotels (Oman) Co. Ltd., the 
Omani Supreme Court stated that an arbitral award may be set aside in Oman if there is 
no valid arbitration agreement between the parties to refer the dispute to arbitration.180 
The Omani Court of Appeals has stated in Commercial Circuit, Appeal No. 34/2009 (27 
Apr 2009),181 that in cases involving a voidable arbitration agreement, an arbitral award 
cannot be set aside if a valid waiver was made by the party who can benefit from such 
nullity to set aside the arbitral award. Under Omani law, an agreement has to be in 
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writing, the number of arbitrators must be odd, and the subject matter must be 
arbitrable. Additionally, a party’s insanity or incapacity to enter into an arbitration 
agreement could be a ground to set aside an arbitral award.182  
Oman, however, has failed to clarify what law governs incapacity and the 
validity of the arbitration agreement: the seat of the arbitration, the law chosen by the 
parties, or Oman. There seems to be a presumption that Omani law determines both 
incapacity (and insanity) and the validity of the arbitration agreement, but that 
assumption may be thwarted if a court, applying choice of law rules, determines that the 
law at the seat of arbitration prevails despite choosing Oman as the applicable law.183 
Regardless, an Omani court could still set aside an arbitral award if a foreign court 
refused to apply Omani law to the determination of the validity of the arbitration 
agreement or of the incapacity of the parties, under Article 53(1)(4) of Sultani Decree 
47/97.184  
The Omani ground for setting aside an arbitral award because of a due process 
violation is consistent with the right to be heard and the right to present a case 
requirement under the Shari’a and the majority of international conventions. In Oman, 
an arbitral award may be set aside if a party was unable to present his defence or claims, 
even if given a chance by the tribunal, but unable to do so for reasons beyond the 
control of the deprived party.185 As such, failure to give notice to a party of the 
appointment of arbitrators or of the proceedings,186 lack of hearing,187 breach of fairness 
and unequal treatment of the parties, and preventing a party from presenting evidence 
are all grounds for setting aside an arbitral award.188 Similarly, though still remaining 
undefined by the courts,189 as to the difference with the due process grounds, Article 
53(1)(7) of Sultani Decree 47/97 states that a defect in the arbitral award or the 
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proceeding that affects the terms of the arbitral award may be a ground for setting aside 
the arbitral award. 
Oman deviates from most countries and the international arbitration norm190 
when it allows for the setting aside of an arbitral award if the tribunal did not apply or 
seriously misapplied the law agreed to by the parties.191 For example, the Oman Appeal 
Circuit in hearing session held on October 19, 1998, Case No. 2/98 Arbitration,192 held 
that the contested arbitral award was vitiated by annulment because it failed to apply the 
agreement concluded between the two parties. This ground, however, “opens the way 
for the substantive review of the arbitral award,”193 even though it restricts such review 
to the applicable law, because a court would have to review the application of the law to 
determine this ground. The High Court of Oman in Commercial Circuit, 5 Apr 2006, 
also held that an arbitral award might be set aside if it deals with matters outside the 
scope of the arbitration agreement.194  
An arbitral award may also be set aside in Oman if the constitution of the 
tribunal is contrary to the law or to the parties’ intent. This would include the setting 
aside of an arbitral award because there is an even number of arbitrators, which is a 
mandatory requirement in Oman under Article 15(2) of Sultani Decree 47/97 and which 
the parties cannot waive. It would also include the setting aside of an arbitral award if 
an arbitrator was not independent and impartial, or if the arbitrator was appointed 
contrary to the procedures set out under Omani law.  
Finally, Omani law allows for the setting aside of an arbitral award on the basis 
of public order.195 The Oman Supreme Court interpreted Article 53(2) of Sultani Decree 
47/97 to mean that “contrary to public order” is one in which the “consequences 
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contradict the basic principles of Omani law.”196 Al-Siyabi states that this provision 
does not expressly cover arbitrability as part of public order, but in light of other 
grounds, lack of arbitrability may still be a basis for setting aside an arbitral award.197 
Setting aside an arbitral award based on public order, however, must be differentiated 
from the non-enforcement of an arbitral award based on a public policy violation. In the 
setting aside context, Omani law is explicit that a court can set aside the arbitral award 
on the basis of public order, sua sponte [of its own accord].198 
 
6.4.3. Setting Aside in Qatar 
 
In Qatar, an arbitral award may be set aside under Article 207-209 of the Qatari 
Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure.199 Once a request to have the arbitral award 
set aside is submitted, the enforcement of the arbitral award is suspended, unless the 
courts decide otherwise.200   
Articles 207201 and 208202 provide that any interested party may apply to have 
the arbitral award set aside, in accordance with the rules of the courts originally having 
jurisdiction. The grounds for setting aside an arbitral award are as follows:203 
(1) the arbitral award was made in the absence of a valid arbitration agreement, 
(2) the arbitral award breaches the scope of the arbitration agreement, 
(3) the arbitral award violates rules of public policy or Qatari good morals, 
(4) the subject matter of the dispute was not determined in the arbitration 
agreement or during the arbitration proceedings, 
(5) one of the parties or arbitrators does not have capacity, 
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(6) the arbitrators who made the arbitral award were not correctly appointed or 
the number of arbitrators was not odd, or  
(7) the arbitral award was void or there were procedural flaws that affect the 
arbitral award. 
As to the absence of a valid arbitration agreement, the Qatari court in Court of 
First Instance, Civil, First Instance, Appeal, Summary, Third Circuit Doha, Case No. 
137/CDFI, Third (31 May 2011), held that the arbitral award was subject to annulment 
because the arbitral award does not contain the original or a copy of the arbitration 
agreement; and the case record does not include any agreement between the parties to 
resort to arbitration after the dispute arose. The Qatari Court of Appeals in Decision No. 
549/2002 (28 Dec 2002), set aside an arbitral award because the number of arbitrators 
was not odd under Article 207 of the Qatari Code of Civil Procedure.204 Finally, the 
Qatari Court of Cassation in Petition No 64/2012 (12 June 2012),205 a dispute regarding 
the value of assigned shares by an existing partner of a Qatari limited liability company, 
set aside an arbitral award rendered under the Qatar International Centre for 
Conciliation and Arbitration (QICCA) because the arbitral award was not rendered in 
the name of His Highness The Emir of Qatar.  
 
6.4.4. Setting Aside in Bahrain 
 
The grounds for setting aside an international arbitral award in Bahrain are set 
out in Article 34 of the Bahraini International Arbitration Act (BIAA).206 The BIAA 
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makes clear that setting aside is the only recourse against an arbitral award.207 The 
grounds for setting aside an international arbitral award are as follows:208 
(1) the party was under some incapacity, 
(2) the arbitration agreement is invalid, 
(3) lack of notice as to the appointment of arbitrator or of the proceedings, 
(4) inability to present a case, 
(5) the arbitral award exceeds the scope of the arbitration agreement, 
(6) invalid composition of the tribunal or invalid arbitral procedure, or 
(7) non-arbitrability and public policy. 
First, an international arbitral award may be set aside for invalidity of the 
arbitration agreement if the international arbitral award violates “the Bahraini 
International Arbitration Act, or any provision of law adopted by the Bahraini Supreme 
Court of Appeals, whether those provisions relate or domestic or international law.”209 
Second, international arbitral awards that are subject to setting aside because it exceeds 
the scope of the arbitration agreement may be partially set aside only for the portion that 
exceeded its scope.210 Third, an arbitral award may be set aside for invalidity of the 
constitution of the arbitral tribunal if such constitution violates the parties’ agreement, 
or in the presence of the parties’ agreement, such constitution violates a mandatory rule 
set forth by Bahraini law or provisions adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeals, 
whether applying to international or domestic arbitration. According to El-Ahdab, if the 
parties did not agree as to the constitution of the tribunal, a mere violation of Bahraini 
law would permit setting aside an international arbitral award.211 Finally, the 
international arbitral award may be set aside, upon request or sua sponte [on its own 
accord], if the subject matter is non-arbitrable under the lex fori [law of the forum], or 
the law of the Bahraini Supreme Court of Appeals; or if the international arbitral award 
violates Bahraini public policy.  
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According to El-Ahdab, the grounds listed in Article 34 are similar to the 
grounds for refusing enforcement of the arbitral award under Articles 35 and 36 of the 
same Act.212 It is also similar to Articles V(1) and VI of the New York Convention.213 
One difference noted by El-Ahdab from the provisions on non-enforcement is that an 
arbitral award may not be set aside unless it has become binding on the parties or has 
been set aside in another country. Interestingly, the UNCITRAL Model Law as adopted 
via Article 34 does authorise the appointed court in Bahrain to set aside an arbitral 
award made outside of Bahrain.214 In other words, Bahrain’s adoption of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law has allowed it to set aside an arbitral award not only when 
Bahrain is the seat of the arbitration, but also when it is the place of enforcement 
because Bahrain applies the grounds for setting aside at the lex fori [law of the forum], 
or the law of the state (here Bahrain) and not the law of the country of origin.215 
Additionally, under Article 36 of the Bahraini International Arbitration Act, the 
enforcing court may adjourn its decision upon the filing of an application to set aside 
the arbitral award, but at the same time may ask for security from the party filing the set 
aside application.  
 
6.4.5. Setting Aside in Kuwait 
 
The setting aside of an arbitral award in Kuwait is covered under Articles 186-
188 of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure. Article 186 of the Code of Civil 
and Commercial Procedure includes a very short provision for the grounds for setting 
aside of an arbitral award. Article 186 states in pertinent part as follows: 
 
Final arbitral awards may be subject to setting aside in the following 
cases even if the parties agreed otherwise before making of the award: 
(1) if the award was made on the basis of a void arbitration 
agreement, outside the scope of the agreement or without an 
arbitration agreement; 
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(2) in all cases where a rehearing (of a court judgment) would be 
possible; and 
(3) if the award is void or a nullity in the proceedings affected the 
award. 
 
Under Article 187, a request for setting aside is made before the court originally 
having jurisdiction over the dispute, and must be made within 30 days following 
notification of the arbitral award. Finally, Article 188 states that a request for setting 
aside does not stay enforcement, although the court may grant the stay if serious 
damage would result without the stay and the setting aside is likely to be granted.  
In Kuwait Court of Cassation, Second Commercial Circuit,216 the court held that 
a contract for the sale of company shares and investment portfolios in real estate which 
were not registered with the Kuwait Market for Financial Instruments violated public 
policy. Therefore, the court held that the contract was null and resulted in the setting 
aside of the arbitral award.  
Further, an arbitral award generally may be set aside in Kuwait for failure to 
state its factual reasons, but the Kuwaiti Court of Cassation in Court of Cassation, Case 
No 9/91, Commercial Circuit, 10 Jan 1993, stated that an arbitral award cannot be set 
aside if it nevertheless states general reasons or if the basis for setting aside is error in 
legal reasoning. Further, if the arbitration is governed by the rules of an arbitral 
institution like the GCC Arbitration Centre, the grounds for setting aside would be 
limited to the rules of the arbitral institution.217  
 
6.4.6. Setting Aside in the KSA 
 
Under Article 49 of the Saudi Arbitration Law of 2012,218 an arbitral award is 
final and not appealable.219 However, a proceeding to set aside the arbitral award may 
be initiated within 60 days from notification of the arbitral award.220 
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Article 50 of the Saudi Arbitration Law of 2012221 sets out the criteria and 
grounds upon which an arbitral award may be set aside:222 
(1) lack of or invalidity of the arbitration agreement, 
(2) lack of capacity of one of the parties to the arbitration agreements, 
(3) lack of notice, 
(4) exclusion of rules that the parties have agreed upon in the arbitration 
agreement, 
(5) improper appointment of arbitrators, 
(6) the tribunal exceeded its scope under the arbitration agreement,  
(7) irregularity in the arbitration proceedings, and 
(8) the arbitral award violates the Shari’a, Saudi public policy, the arbitration 
agreement, or is not arbitrable.  
Additionally, the Saudi Arbitration Law of 2012 requires that the arbitrator have 
a university degree in Shari’a, the lack of which can now be grounds for an annulment 
of the arbitral award.223 Under Article 50, courts considering a challenge to set aside an 
arbitral award must limit the analysis to the annulment criteria set out under Article 50 
and cannot revisit the facts or subject matter of the dispute.224  
As stated previously in Chapter Five, public policy in KSA consists primarily of 
the Shari’a, although there are also additional KSA public policies like the prohibition 
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on governmental entities to enter into an arbitration agreement. As such, the grounds for 
setting aside under the Shari’a ought to be the same grounds for setting aside in KSA, 
including the prohibition on the riba [interest] and the gharar [uncertainty]. As stated 
above, however, the majority of Shari’a jurists, including the Hanbalis, view that the 
Shari’a does not allow the setting aside of an arbitral award. This may partly be the 
reason for the absence of a setting aside provision in KSA in the 1983 Arbitration Law. 
However, this does not mean that Saudi courts have not set aside arbitral awards, 
especially since there is a minority view in the Shari’a that allows for the setting aside 
of an arbitral award. In Jadawel International (Saudi Arabia) v. Emaar Property PJSC 
(UAE),225 the Board of Grievances declined to enforce the arbitral award and reversed it 
because it was not Shari’a compliant.226 
The Saudi Arbitration Law of 2012 eliminated the Board of Grievance system 
for arbitral award enforcement and instead created the Enforcement Judge, which is 
relatively new.227 Enforcement Judge is defined under Article 1 as “the Chairman and 
Judges of the Enforcement Circuit, the Enforcement Circuit Judge, or the Judge of the 
Single Court.”228 
Article 50(2) provides that a state court may raise annulment ex officio [by 
virtue of the office] if the award includes provisions that violate Shari’a and public 
policy in the KSA; violate the agreement of the parties, or where the subject of the 
dispute is not permitted to be arbitrated under the arbitration law.229 Interestingly, 
Article 54 states that a challenge seeking to set aside the arbitral award does not result 
in an automatic stay of enforcement, but rather the competent court may stay 
enforcement if the claimant’s request is based on “serious reasons.” The Saudi 
Arbitration Law of 2012 does not define what would constitute a “serious reason,” 
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229 John Balouziyeh and Amgad Husein, ‘Saudi Arabia’s New Arbitration Law Sees More Investors 
Opting for Arbitration in Saudi Arabia’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 29 May 2013) 
!http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/author/johnbalouziyeh/" accessed 31 May 2013. 
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although according to Harb, “serious reasons” under Article 54 likely means a violation 
of the Shari’a or KSA public policy.230 
 
6.4.7. Synthesis: Setting Aside of Foreign Arbitral Awards in GCC States 
 
While the grounds for setting aside an arbitral award in each of the GCC states 
might look similar at first glance, there are numerous grounds for convergence and 
divergence among the GCC states.  
The grounds where GCC states have a commonality cover five areas: (1) the 
existence of a valid arbitration agreement, (2) the lack of capacity of a party to enter 
into an arbitration agreement, (3) that the arbitrator went beyond the scope of the 
arbitration, (4) that the arbitration agreement does not violate public policy or public 
order, and (5) that there was no due process violation relating to notice and the right to 
be heard. It is not surprising that these five grounds are common to the GCC states since 
these five grounds are also covered under the UNCITRAL Model Law’s grounds for 
setting aside, which mirrors the New York Convention’s grounds for non-enforcement. 
That the New York Convention does not explicitly cover the grounds for setting aside 
an arbitral award but leaves those grounds to the discretion of the arbitral seat raises a 
problem with regards to creating uniformity. The UNCITRAL Model Law actually 
adopted the same grounds for non-enforcement. In this regard, one could say that the 
UNCITRAL Model Law does not create a distinction between the grounds for refusal to 
enforce an arbitral award and setting aside an arbitral award.  
Unfortunately, even GCC states that followed or adopted the UNCITRAL 
Model Law approach are not in complete uniformity with regards to the second half of 
the grounds for setting aside an arbitral award. Only Bahrain follows the UNCITRAL 
Model Law approach closely. The grounds relating to (1) the composition of the arbitral 
tribunal, and (2) the appointment and number of arbitrators are common to only half of 
GCC states and the UNCITRAL Model Law.  
                                                
230 Harb and others (n 219). 
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The other grounds for setting aside an arbitral award, however, seem to have 
been arbitrarily added by GCC states, except for Bahrain, for whatever legislative 
reason. Of the GCC states, Kuwait seems to have the least number of grounds to set 
aside an arbitral award, perhaps explaining Kuwait’s pro-enforcement history, while the 
UAE has the most grounds for setting aside an arbitral award, also reflecting UAE’s 
tumultuous history with regards to enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. The 
remaining grounds for setting aside an arbitral award are as follows: (1) the arbitral 
award of the arbitrators or the arbitration proceedings is void, (2) failure to define the 
dispute in the arbitration agreement, (3) failure to apply the applicable law chosen by 
the parties, (4) that the dispute is capable of settlement by arbitration or arbitrability, (5) 
going beyond the scope of the arbitrator’s mandate, and (6) the issuance of the arbitral 
award by a truncated tribunal, which is unique to the UAE. 
A careful look at the grounds for setting aside an arbitral award reveals that the 
reason for the non-uniformity among the GCC states can be attributed to the divergence 
of additional grounds for setting aside as provided by GCC states. One solution that 
would place GCC states towards a pro-enforcement policy is to follow Bahrain’s lead 
with regards to setting aside an arbitral award, which is that all GCC states ought to 
adopt completely the UNCITRAL Model Law’s grounds for setting aside an arbitral 
award. 
In the survey, the respondents gave both Bahrain and the UAE an almost equal 
rating as the friendliest of the GCC states towards the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards scoring at 7.44 out of 10 for Bahrain and 7.43 out of 10 for the UAE.231 KSA 
scored the lowest with 3.44 out of 10.232 Interestingly, Bahrain and the UAE have 
different approaches with regards to setting aside, where Bahrain follows strictly the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, while the UAE has not yet adopted the UNCITRAL Model 
Law. In other words, the survey seems to indicate that the perception of the friendliness 
of a GCC state towards the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award may not necessarily 
be dictated by the GCC state’s rules on setting aside an arbitral award. Yet, it is possible 
                                                
231 Appendix II, Survey Report, II(2.2.1.). 
232 ibid. 
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that Bahrain was rated high as to “friendliness” because of its loyal adoption of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. 
 
PART V 
 
6.5. Problematic Effect and Enforcement of Annulled Arbitral Awards 
 
 A party whose arbitral award was set aside in one country can seek to get the 
arbitral award enforced in an entirely different country.233 The New York Convention 
provides little guidance on the issue,234 and because the issue has only been raised 
occasionally,235 the answer to the question remains unsettled law.236 
Two prominent cases have allowed the enforcement of an arbitral award that has 
previously been set aside at the seat of arbitration: Hilmarton and Chromalloy. It is 
worth discussing these two cases and the problematic effect they create for the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.237    
 
                                                
233 Bird (n 101) 1013; Born (n 2) 2675-88. 
234 Bird (n 101); Mike McClure, ‘Enforcement of Arbitral Awards that have been Set Aside at the Seat: 
The Consistently Inconsistent Approach across Europe’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 26 June 2012) 
!http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/06/26/enforcement-of-arbitral-awards-that-have-been-set-
aside-at-the-seat-the-consistently-inconsistent-approach-across-europe/comment-page-1/#comment-
428906" accessed 31 May 2013. 
235 Richard Kreindler, ‘Particularities of International Financial Arbitration in the Context of Challenges 
to Arbitral Awards’ (1997) 2 YB Int'l Fin & Econ L 201 (stating that “only occasionally have contracting 
states to the New York Convention enforced an arbitral award that has previously been set aside by the 
courts in its country of origin.”). 
236 Claudia Salomon and Lilia Vazova, ‘Arbitral award enforced in the US although annulled abroad’ 
(Latham Watkins, 4 September 2013) Client Alert No 1582 (calling the issue an “ever-growing body of 
jurisprudence from courts around the world grappling with the issue of whether a national court of a 
signatory state to the New York Convention should recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award that 
has been set aside at the seat of arbitration”). Jurisdictions that are likely to enforce foreign arbitral 
awards that have been set aside at the seat of arbitration include US, France, Netherlands, Austria, Brunei, 
Croatia, Denmark, Hong Kong, Ireland, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Panama, Poland, Spain, and 
Turkey. Only the US, France, and Netherlands, however, have had occasion to consider the issue. 
Jurisdictions that are not likely to enforce foreign arbitral awards that have been set aside at the seat of 
arbitration include England, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, and Switzerland. ICC 
International Court of Arbitration Bulletin 733, ‘CC Guide to National Procedure for Recognition and 
Enforcement of Awards under the New York Convention’ (2012) v 23/Special Supplement  [hereinafter 
ICC Guide 2012]. 
237 Born (n 21) (arguing in favour of enforcing foreign arbitral awards that had previously been set aside 
at the seat of arbitration). 
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6.5.1. The Hilmarton Case 
 
In Societe Hilmarton v. Societe OTV,238 a French company, OTV, only paid half 
of the fees to a British firm, Hilmarton, which OTV had hired to help obtain a contract 
with the Algerian government.239 OTV won the Swiss arbitration proceedings. On 
appeal, the Swiss high court set aside the Swiss arbitral award.240 OTV nevertheless 
sought enforcement of the arbitral award in France, where the Paris Court of Appeals, 
relying on French law and the New York Convention’s more-favourable-right provision 
under Article VII(1), enforced the previously set aside arbitral award. 241  
In response, Hilmarton sought to enforce in France the Swiss court’s prior 
annulment of the arbitral award, and a French court recognized the Swiss court’s 
annulment.242 Meanwhile, in a resubmitted arbitration in Switzerland, Hilmarton won 
and successfully enforced the second arbitral award in France.243 There were, thus, at 
this point two conflicting arbitral awards in France: the Swiss annulled first Swiss 
arbitral award and the French enforced second Swiss arbitral award.244 In the end, the 
French courts resolved the conflicting arbitral awards by dismissing the second arbitral 
                                                
238 Societe Hilmarton v Societe Omnium de traitement et de valorisation, Cour de justice de canton de 
Geneve, judgment of 17 November 1989, (1993) Revue de l’Arbitrage 315 at 316, translated in (1994) 19 
YB Com Arb 214; Societe Hilmarton v Societe Omnium de traitement et de valorisation, Tribunale 
Federal Suisse, judgment of 17 April 1990, (1993) Revue de l’Arbitrage, 315 at 322, translated in (1994) 
19 YB Com Arb 220; Societe Hilmarton v Societe Omnium de traitement et de valorisation, judgment of 
19 December 1991, CA Paris, 1st Ch supplement, 19 December 1991, (1993) Revue de l’Arbitrage, 300 
at 301; Societe Hilmarton v Societe Omnium de traitement et de valorisation, judgment of 22 September 
1993, Tribunale Gr Inst de Nanterre 1st Ch; Societe Hilmarton v Societe Omnium de traitement et de 
valorisation, Cass civ 1st, judgment of 23 March 1994, (1994) Revue de l’Arbitrage, 327-328, translated 
in (1995) 20 YB Com Arb 663; Societe Hilmarton v Societe Omnium de traitement et de 
valorisation, CA Versailles, judgment of 29 June 1995, (1995) Revue de l’Arbitrage  639; Cour de 
cassation, judgment of 10 June 1997; Hamid Gharavi, ‘A Nightmare Called Hilmarton’ (1997) 12 
Mealeys Int’l Arb Rep 20-24 [hereinafter “Gharavi, ‘Nightmare’”] 
239 Hamid Gharavi, The International Effectiveness of the Annulment of an Arbitral Award (Kluwer 2002) 
50 [hereinafter “Gharavi, Effectiveness”]; Bird (n 233). 
240 Gharavi, Effectiveness (n 239); Bird (n 233). 
241 Jean-François Poudret, ‘Quelle solution pour en finir avec l’affaire Hilmarton?’ (1998) Revue de 
l’arbitrage 1; Societe Hillmarton v Societe OTV, Paris Court of Appeals, Dec 19, 1991, (1993) Revue de 
l’arbitrage 2; Societe Hillmarton v Societe OTV, Court of Cassation, Mar 23, 1994, (1994) Revue de 
l’arbtirage 2.  
242 Gharavi, Effectiveness (n 239); Gharavi, ‘Nightmare’ (n 238) 20-24; Bird (n 233). 
243 Gharavi, Effectiveness (n 239); Gharavi, ‘Nightmare’ (n 238); Bird (n 233). 
244 Gharavi, ‘Nightmare’ (n 238) 20-24. 
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award in favour of Hilmarton.245 Meanwhile, one arbitral award remained in force in 
England where it was granted enforcement by England’s High Court.246  
The Paris Court de Grande Instance reaffirmed the Hilmarton rule in Maximov 
v. NLMK, where the court recognized an arbitral award, rendered in Russia and later set 
aside by a Russian court on the grounds of non-arbitrability, because the Russian court’s 
annulment was not sufficient to refuse enforcement of the arbitral award in France.247  
 
6.5.2. The Chromalloy Case 
 
In Chromalloy Aeroservices v. The Arab Republic of Egypt,248 an arbitral award 
rendered in Egypt was later set aside by the Cairo Court of Appeals. As a 
background,249 Chromalloy contracted with Egypt to provide maintenance of air force 
helicopters. Thereafter, Egypt terminated the contract and Chromalloy initiated and won 
the arbitration proceedings. Chromalloy took the arbitral award to the US for 
enforcement. Meanwhile, Egypt appealed the arbitral award to the Cairo Court of 
Appeal, which was asked to examine the proper application of Egyptian law by the 
arbitral tribunal.250 The Court of Appeal nullified the arbitral award because the arbitral 
tribunal should have applied Egyptian administrative law rather than civil law.251 The 
US court, despite the annulment by the Egyptian court granted leave for enforcement 
under Article V and Article VII of the New York Convention. 252  
                                                
245 ibid. 
246 Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation SA v Hilmarton Ltd, [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 222 (Eng). 
247 Salomon and Vazova (n 236). 
248 Ministry of Defence v Chromalloy Aeroservices Co, Cairo Court of Appeal, 5 December 1995, (1998) 
Rev Arb 723; (1995) 2 YB of Isl and M E Law 585. 
249 For a more detailed discussion of Chromalloy, see Kenneth Davis, ‘Unconventional Wisdom: A New 
Look at Articles V and VII of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards’ (2002) 37 Tex Int’l LJ 43, 55. 
250 Chromalloy Aeroservices v The Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F Supp 907, 909 (DDC 1996), (1996) 
Mealey’s Int’l Arb Rep, August, C-54; Kreindler (n 235) (stating that “it was on the basis of Article 
53(1)(d) of the 1994 Arbitration Law that the Cairo Court of Appeal undertook its examination of the ICC 
final award entered by the arbitral tribunal in Chromalloy”). 
251 Kreindler (n 235). 
252 Chromalloy Aeroservices v The Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F Supp 907, 909 (DDC 1996), (1996) 
Mealey’s Int’l Arb Rep, August, C-54; Hamid Gharavi, ‘The Legal Inconsistencies of Chromalloy’ 
(1997) 12 Mealey's Int’l Arb Rep 21-24; Jan Paulsson, ‘Rediscovering the NY Convention: Further 
Reflections on Chromalloy’ (1997) 12 Mealey’s Int’l Arb  Rep 20-35; Hamid Gharavi, ‘Chromalloy: 
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The Chromalloy decision caused a stir in the international arbitration 
community. Three cases that followed Chromalloy, however, refused to enforce a 
previously annulled arbitral award.253 
In Baker Marine (Nig) Ltd v. Chevron (Nig) Ltd,254 the Second Circuit refused to 
enforce an arbitral award that was previously annulled by a Nigerian court because 
according to the Baker Marine court, there was no sufficient reason to override the 
judgment of the Nigerian Federal High Court. In Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica SpA,255 
a US court likewise refused to enforce an annulled arbitral award because the Italian 
court set aside the arbitral award on the basis that the arbitrators exceeded their powers, 
which is also a valid ground under the US Federal Arbitration Act. 
Finally, in TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P.,256 the US Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia declined to enforce an annulled arbitral award, a ruling that 
did not overrule Chromalloy, but distinguished it on several grounds.257 The TermoRio 
court stated that to be overturned on public policy grounds, a foreign arbitral award 
would have to be “repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the 
State where enforcement is sought.”258 Some commentators view the TermoRio case as 
the correct result, which was arrived at with a comprehensive and in depth view of the 
policies underlying Article V(1)(e) and Article VII of the New York Convention.259  
                                                                                                                                          
Another View’ (1997) 12 Mealey’s Int’l Arb Rep 21-27; and Gary Sampliner, ‘Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards After Annulment in Their Country of Origin’ (1996) 11 Mealey’s Int’l Arb Rep 22-29. 
253 For other cases refusing to enforce an annulled award, see Baker Marine (Nig) Ltd v Chevron (Nig) 
Ltd, 191 F3d 194 (2d Cir 1999) (refusing to enforce award annulled by a Nigerian court because there 
was no sufficient reason to override the judgment of the Nigerian Federal High Court); and Spier v 
Calzaturificio Tecnica SpA, 77 F Supp 2d 405 (SDNY 1999) (refusing to enforce annulled award because 
the Italian court set aside the award on the basis that the arbitrators exceeded their powers, which is also a 
valid ground under the US Federal Arbitration Act). 
254 Baker Marine (Nig) Ltd v Chevron (Nig) Ltd, 191 F3d 194 (2d Cir 1999). 
255 Spier v Calzaturificio Tecnica SpA, 77 F Supp 2d 405 (SDNY 1999). 
256 TermoRio v Electranta SP, 487 F3d at 938 (DC Cir 2007). 
257 The TermoRio court distinguished itself from Chromalloy on the fact there that the connections were 
with Colombia and that there was no finality clause precluding judicial review. Linda Silberman, ‘The 
New York Convention After Fifty Years: Some Reflections on the Role of National Law’ (2009) 38 GA J 
Int’l & Comp L 25, 31, fn 26; Bird (n 233). 
258 TermoRio, 487 F3d at 938. 
259 Bird (n 233); Pedro Martinez-Fraga, The American Influence on International Commercial 
Arbitration: Doctrinal Developments and Discovery Methods (CUP 2009) 180-186; Jonathan Blackman 
and Ellen London, ‘Respecting Awards Annulled at the Seat of Arbitration: The Road from Chromalloy 
to TermoRio’ (2008) 63 Disp Resol J 70, 75. 
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The latest of these series of cases decided very recently seems to harmonise US 
case law. In Corporacion Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral v. PEMEX-Exploracion 
y Produccion260 [hereinafter COMMISA], the Southern District Court of New York 
[hereinafter SDNY] upheld an ICC arbitral award that had previously been set aside at 
the seat of arbitration in Mexico. In COMMISA, a case involving a contract for the 
construction of natural gas platforms, the SDNY court previously confirmed the ICC 
arbitral award, but PEMEX appealed and concurrently sought to set aside the arbitral 
award in Mexico City. After three failed attempts at setting aside the arbitral award in 
Mexico, PEMEX succeeded based on a new Mexican law prohibiting the arbitration of 
administrative rescissions. The Second Circuit remanded the case to the SDNY after the 
arbitral award was set aside in Mexico.261 The SDNY enforced the arbitral award stating 
that the Mexican court “violated basic notions of justice” when it set aside the arbitral 
award because the Mexican law was applied ex post facto [from after the fact] and 
because setting aside the award would leave COMMISA without a forum to litigate its 
claims.  The COMMISA case seems to harmonise US case law regarding the 
enforceability of arbitral awards previously set aside at the place of arbitration, 
especially between the Chromalloy case which enforced an arbitral award that had been 
set aside at the seat of arbitration and the Termo Rio case, which refused to enforce an 
arbitral award previously set aside at the seat of arbitration because it did not violate 
basic notions of justice. The COMMISA case revived Chromalloy, while retaining the 
basic notions of justice or fundamental fairness standard of Termo Rio.262 
While the COMMISA case seems to put the US in line with the French position 
in Hilmarton, what differentiates the two positions is that US courts will enforce an 
arbitral award that has been set aside at the seat of arbitration only within the 
framework of a fundamental fairness inquiry regarding the proceedings in the foreign 
                                                
260 Corporacion Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S de RL de CV v PEMEX-Exploracion y 
Produccion, Case 1:10-cv-00206-AKH (US SD New York, 27 Aug 2013); Laurence Shore, Mildred Ojea 
and Robert Rothkopf, ‘US district court confirms arbitral award against Pemex that was nullified at its 
seat’ (Lexology, 18 September 2013) !http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=730cacb8-d61e-
4ba4-a430-003f15ac62aa" accessed 14 October 2013; Salomon and Vazova (n 236). 
261 Although the COMMISA case was based on the 1975 Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration (Panama Convention), Article V of the Panama Convention is virtually identical 
to Article V of the New York Convention. Salomon and Vazova (n 236). 
262 Salomon and Vazova (n 236). 
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court, while French courts will likely enforce a previously set aside foreign arbitral 
award at the seat of arbitration absent such an inquiry.263  
Belgium has also been viewed by some commentators as allowing the 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award that has been set aside at the place of arbitration 
because of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Brussels in Sonatrach v. Ford 
Bacon Davies.264 Matray notes, however, that Sonatrach is an isolated and outdated 
case and that no other case law supports such view of Belgium’s enforcement of a 
foreign arbitral award that has previously been set aside.265 In Sonatrach, the Belgian 
court denied the plaintiff’s motion to oppose enforcement of the foreign arbitral award, 
which had been previously set aside by an Algerian court because at the time the setting 
aside was made, Algiers had not yet become a signatory to the New York Convention. 
The Belgian court found that no ground for setting aside had been invoked by the 
plaintiff that could fall under the Belgian Code of Civil Procedure, nor any other ground 
allowing for setting aside in Belgium.266  
Dutch courts, on the other hand, seem to follow the US approach and have in 
two instances enforced foreign arbitral awards that were previously set aside at the seat 
of arbitration.  In 2009, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal in Yukos Capital S.A.R.L. v. 
OAO Rosneft267 held that a foreign arbitral award rendered in Russia but later set aside 
by a Russian court was nevertheless enforceable in the Netherlands because the setting 
aside of the foreign arbitral award was not based on an impartial and independent 
judicial process. However, in a more recent case, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal in 
Maximov v. NLMK268 held that the judgment of a Russian court to set aside an arbitral 
award that was rendered in Russia should be respected unless the party can show that 
the setting aside was based on an unfair trial. Like US courts, Dutch courts examine the 
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264 Sonatrach v Ford Bacon Davies (Brussels Court of First Instance). 
265 Gautier Matray, ‘Belgium Adopts a New Law on Arbitration’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 4 July 2013), 
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fairness of the proceedings to determine whether a foreign arbitral award ought to be 
enforced despite its having been set aside at the seat of arbitration.  
 
6.6. Conclusion  
 
This chapter examined the setting aside of foreign arbitral awards in the context 
of the GCC states. The research suggests that setting aside of foreign arbitral awards 
remains an unsettled area of international arbitration, that continues to create 
conflicting, and certainly non-uniform rules or application of rules, not only for GCC 
states but also for countries like France and the US. In the midst of this muddled 
jurisprudence, GCC states strive to strike a balance of embracing the international 
arbitration norm, while trying to remain consistent with the Shari’a and protect national 
interests. 
The Shari’a itself only provides a general rule for the setting aside of an arbitral 
award. What remains are the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law at 
one hand and the national arbitration laws of each of the GCC states on the other hand. 
It seems that since the GCC states are all signatories to the New York Convention, and 
lacking any substantial difference between the New York Convention and the Shari’a 
on setting aside, GCC states ought to uniformly replace the grounds for setting aside 
under its national laws with the grounds under the UNCITRAL Model Law, which 
follows the New York Convention. Such an approach would be simple and achievable 
for GCC states to arrive at a uniform system for enforcing foreign arbitral awards.  
After discussing the setting aside of foreign arbitral awards in this chapter and 
keeping in mind the discussions in earlier chapters, the last chapter that follows will 
discuss how the research questions have been addressed by the study, and then propose 
a set of rules to improve the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states.  
! !
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS 
 
7.0. General Observations 
 
The GCC states, in a journey to transform towards an economically diverse and 
internationally competitive region, unanimously embraced international commercial 
arbitration by acceding to the New York Convention and the ICSID Convention. 
Accession is one thing, however, while practice is another. While some GCC 
states have long been signatories to the New York Convention, only recently has there 
been a positive outlook that the GCC states are eager to embrace the New York 
Convention’s pro-enforcement policy.  The recent passage of the Saudi Arbitration Law 
of 2012,1 the increase in the number of arbitration centres in the region, and recent pro-
enforcement decisions in the UAE all seem to signal that GCC states are working 
towards an arbitration friendly environment consistent with international arbitration 
norms. 
Yet, it may be too soon to celebrate. Concerns and criticisms remain as to the 
procedures for enforcing foreign arbitral awards in most GCC states that frustrate the 
very purpose of the New York Convention.  Reliance on outdated and incomplete 
enforcement procedures has led courts in the GCC states to refuse enforcement on 
technical grounds, delay enforcement proceedings, or deny enforcement on unclear 
public policy reasoning.  
This research compared and analysed the different potential sources for 
challenges to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states. It examined 
the scope of domestic, foreign, and international arbitral awards within the framework 
of the GCC states in Chapter Two; the conditions for the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards in the GCC states in Chapter Three; the potential challenges to the 
enforceability of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states in Chapter Four; the effect of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Saudi Arbitration Law of 2012, Royal Decree No M/34 dated 24/5/1433H (corresponding to 16 April 
2012). The Saudi Arbitration Law of 2012 makes enforcement of arbitral awards in the KSA in line with 
other GCC states and the New York Convention. 
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public policy on the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states in Chapter 
Five; and the setting aside of arbitral awards within the framework of the GCC states in 
Chapter Six. These chapters aimed to answer the research questions set out in the 
introduction and discussed more fully in Section 7.1. Part I discusses the research 
questions and explains how the research has answered the questions supported by the 
literature review and the survey. Part II proposes a set of rules relating to enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards in a Uniform GCC Arbitration Law. Finally, part III explains 
the research’s contribution to the literature.  
 
PART I 
 
7.1. The Research Questions 
 
This study set out in the introduction to answer six research questions regarding 
the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states, with the overarching goal 
of identifying the challenges to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC 
states, whether these challenges can be overcome, and to then propose a set of rules to 
govern the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states that reconciles the 
requirements of the Shari’a, regional and international agreements, and the national 
laws of each of the GCC states. Additionally, a survey was conducted to determine the 
perception of practitioners in the field of arbitration regarding arbitration and the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states.2 The overall results of the 
survey strengthened many of the conclusions made by the research based on the review 
of existing literature. The survey was also used as a tool to test the six rules relating to 
the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in a Uniform GCC Arbitration Law proposed 
in this chapter.3 The results of the survey, therefore, will be discussed throughout this 
chapter. This section discusses the answer to each of the six questions that this research 
set out to investigate. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 See generally, Appendix II, Survey Report.  
3 Appendix II, Survey Report, I(1.0.). 
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7.1.1. Question One: How have arbitration and foreign arbitral awards 
been applied and developed in the GCC states? 
 
As regards arbitration in general, the Holy Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH) recognized the validity of arbitration as a mechanism for dispute 
resolution. Regardless, arbitration in the GCC states somehow failed to develop and 
reconcile itself with modern and international arbitration despite that “Bahrain has been 
an international commercial-arbitration centre long before Paris and London.”4 
Arbitration, especially public international arbitration or arbitration between Islamic 
countries or their nationals and non-Islamic parties, has had a long and often troubled 
history in the GCC states. In most GCC states, modern international arbitration has long 
been viewed with doubt and scepticism,5 though the recent developments in the GCC 
states seem to show a trend towards acceptance of modern international arbitration, as 
will be discussed below.6 Historically, GCC states have had national legislations that 
have been unfavourable to international arbitration, especially as to the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards, and GCC states’ courts all too often impermissibly interfere 
with international arbitration cases and foreign arbitral awards.7 
The Holy Qur’an gives general guidelines regarding arbitration and the 
enforcement of arbitral awards in Islamic countries. Therefore, GCC states adopted 
secular laws that set out the specific rules for arbitration and the enforcement of arbitral 
awards under their respective codes of civil procedures. These laws primarily applied to 
domestic arbitral awards. As GCC states acceded to the New York Convention, the 
ICSID Convention, and the Riyadh Convention, however, courts in GCC states 
continued to apply domestic arbitration rules and procedures to the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. For some time, Bahrain and Oman were the only two GCC 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Charles Brower and Jeremy Sharpe, ‘International Arbitration and the Islamic World: The Third Phase’ 
(2003) 97 AJIL 643. 
5 Brower and Sharpe (n 4). 
6 Despite this trend toward acceptance of international arbitration, there also seems to be a call for a more 
fundamental Shari’a based legal system. Essam Alsheikh, ‘Court Intervention in Commercial Arbitral 
Proceedings in Saudi Arabia: A Comparative Analytical Study of Shari’s Based Statutes and International 
Arbitral Practices’ (DPhil thesis, University of Portsmouth 2011) (stating that there are “increasing calls 
from GCC countries to return to Shari’ah as a source of jurisdiction in all aspects of life. The most 
significant of these calls concerns individuals, properties and trade”). 
7 Brower and Sharpe (n 4). 
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states that enacted a statute based on the UNCITRAL Model Law with a separate 
enforcement procedure and rules for international arbitral awards. Recently, the KSA 
enacted the Saudi Arbitration Law of 2012, which does not separately cover 
international awards, but is largely modelled after the UNCITRAL Model Law.8 The 
other three GCC states (Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE) have not yet enacted an 
arbitration law based on the UNCITRAL Model Law and continue to rely on their civil 
procedure code for the enforcement of arbitral awards, both domestic and foreign. 9 
The adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law is usually seen as a positive sign, 
as discussed in the literature. In the survey, the majority of respondents viewed that the 
adoption by Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE of the UNCITRAL Model Law would be 
beneficial. The results were similar for the three states when asked whether adopting the 
UNCITRAL Model Law would be beneficial for each of these GCC states with 
respondents stating that it would be 8.42 out of 10 or 84.2% beneficial to Qatar, 8.67 
out of 10 or 86.7% beneficial to Kuwait, and 8.82 out of 10 or 88.2% beneficial to the 
UAE.10 These results confirm the conclusion and the proposal by the research that all 
the GCC states ought to adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law and a Uniform GCC 
Arbitration Law. 
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8 Waleed Al-Nuwaiser, ‘Reform of Saudi Arbitration Law’ (White & Case Alert, September 2012) 
!http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/fd1aa9cb-0056-431d-8069-
b0245df2a9ac/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1102c6a3-7a03-41e7-ba01-bcdbf1550954/alert-
Reform-Saudi%20-Arbitration-%20Law.PDF" accessed 16 February 2014. 
9 For comparison, see Zain Sharar, ‘‘Does Qatar Need to Reform its Arbitration Law and Adopt the 
UNCITRAL Model Law for Arbitration? A Comparative Analysis’ (2011) 3 Int’l J of Arab Arb 2 (stating 
that  “the arbitration system in the Arab world may be classified as follows: a) Systems modernizing their 
laws by adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration [e.g. Jordan, Bahrain, and Oman], b) 
Systems modernizing their laws by adopting the trends in the new French law [e.g. Lebanon and Algeria], 
c) Systems adopting Islamic Law [e.g. Saudi Arabia and Yemen], d) Systems considering or 
reconsidering amending their laws or issuing new legislations on arbitration [e.g. Qatar]”); Zara 
Merali, Sharif Hamadeh and Adam Peters, ‘Kuwait to open representative office of GCC Commercial 
Arbitration Centre’ (DLA Piper, 26 September 2013) ! http://www.dlapiper.com/kuwait-to-open-
representative-office-of-gcc-commercial-arbitration-centre/" accessed 14 Oct 2013. 
10 Appendix II, Survey Report, II(2.2.3.). 
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7.1.2. Question Two: To what extent does the Shari’a affect the enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states, and does the Shari’a apply to 
domestic, foreign, and international arbitral awards? 
 
 One can examine the procedural and substantive rules for the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards to see whether GCC states judges could refer to the Shari’a as a 
basis for non-enforcement or the setting aside of a foreign arbitral award. In other 
words, one can look at the areas in the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, where 
the Shari’a overlaps with the New York Convention and the ICSID Convention. In this 
context, this research identified that the Shari’a can affect the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards, whether or not it has been chosen by the parties as the governing law: 
(1) by the determination of whether an arbitral award is domestic or foreign under the 
Shari’a, (2) by conditions set forth by the Shari’a prior to enforcing a foreign arbitral 
award, (3) by the potential challenges the Shari’a provides against the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards, (4) by the grounds upon which the Shari’a may be raised as a 
public policy defence, and (5) by the grounds upon which a foreign arbitral award may 
be set aside under the Shari’a. 
As to the first factor, the research reveals that the Shari’a does indeed have an 
approach to the definition of domestic and foreign arbitral awards that at first glance 
seems inconsistent with the New York Convention and the ICSID Convention. A closer 
look, however, shows that the Shari’a is largely consistent with the New York 
Convention, and the ICSID Convention for that matter. As one respondent to the survey 
aptly put it, “in my opinion, there is no conflict between the New York Convention and 
Shari’a principles.”11  
The extent to which the Shari’a influences rules on the enforcement of domestic 
arbitral awards depends on a specific country, an issue that is also touched upon in 
Question Three. As a rule of thumb, courts in GCC states that apply the Shari’a as the 
source of law will tend to define domestic arbitral awards as those involving at least one 
Muslim party. On the other hand, courts in GCC states that apply the Shari’a, as the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Appendix IIa, Survey Results, Q20, p 20/38. 
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primary source of law will tend to define domestic arbitral awards as those that took 
place within an Islamic country, the majority view in the GCC states.  
As regards foreign arbitral awards, although the word “foreign” under 
international arbitration norms refers to arbitral awards made outside of a country where 
the arbitral award is being enforced, the definition of “foreign” arbitral award under the 
Shari’a can become more complicated in its jurisdictional reach because of the religious 
aspects of the Shari’a. According to El-Kadi and El-Ahdab, “as soon as a Muslim 
becomes a party to the contract, Islamic Law governs the contract and one must take 
into account such rules of Islamic law.”12 In other words, under the Shari’a, a “foreign” 
arbitral award is an arbitral award that is not governed by the Shari’a. The applicability 
of the Shari’a, however, arguably follows the person’s religion. A Muslim could 
potentially remain governed by the Shari’a regardless of physical location. This is a key 
distinction between the jurisdictional applications of the Shari’a as opposed to the 
jurisdictional reach of secular laws that normally follow the geographically defined 
borders of a sovereign. To determine whether an arbitral award is “foreign” under the 
Shari’a, the first concern is whether the arbitration, and hence the arbitral award, took 
place within or outside an Islamic country.13 
Courts in the GCC states will have to determine whether an arbitral award is 
domestic or foreign and in so doing will likely be influenced by the Shari’a. In 
addressing the definition of “foreign” under the Shari’a, one is able to clarify the 
Shari’a distinction between domestic and foreign, as expressed by different scholars, 
whether from the Maliki, Hanbali, and Shafi’i or Hanafi schools. While at first glance 
the Shari’a distinction between foreign arbitral awards made within or outside an 
Islamic country may seem inconsistent with the New York Convention. However, the 
New York Convention’s definition of “foreign” and non-domestic arbitral awards is 
ultimately compatible with the Shari’a position on “foreign” arbitral awards. 
As to the second factor, the Shari’a could potentially affect the enforcement of a 
foreign arbitral award based on conditions to enforcement required by the Shari’a but 
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12 Omar El-Kadi, ‘L’Arbitage International entre le Droit Musulmanet le Droit Francais et Egyptien’ 
(DPhil thesis, University of Paris 1984) 327. 
13 This is the same approach taken by El-Ahdab. Abdel Hamid El-Ahdab and Jalal El-Ahdab, Arbitration 
with the Arab Countries (3rd edn, Wolters Kluwer 2011). 
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not required by the New York Convention, the ICSID Convention, or even the national 
law of a GCC state. There are conditions in the Shari’a like the content requirement, the 
validity of the arbitration agreement, and the summary of claims that are inconsistent 
with the New York Convention. Whenever these conditions are raised as an issue, the 
question that must be addressed is whether the Shari’a conditions will prevail in light of 
regional and international agreements, and the domestic legislation of each of the GCC 
states. The answer to this question is not simple. At the outset, it is important to begin 
that the New York Convention will likely prevail in the GCC states, or one should aptly 
say should prevail.  
In the survey, for example, the respondents were asked whether the New York 
Convention or the Shari’a would prevail if ever there were a conflict between the two, 
and the respondents were largely divided on the question with 53.13% correctly stating 
that the New York Convention would prevail, while 46.88% stated that the Shari’a 
would prevail.14 Answering the question is quite tricky, as it requires knowledge of both 
the New York Convention and the Shari’a, especially the Shari’a. After a review of the 
literature, this thesis concludes that the Shari’a and the New York Convention would 
not actually conflict since the New York Convention allows for the public policy 
defence under which the Shari’a would qualify. Further, the Shari’a requires all 
Muslims to honour their contract, which the majority of Shari’a scholars have 
interpreted to mean that Muslims have an obligation to follow international agreements. 
Whether the New York Convention actually prevails in practice is another 
matter, and the split among practitioners in the GCC states on the same question is a 
sign that there will be instances when GCC states judges would ignore the New York 
Convention for fear of violating the Shari’a. While there have been recent trends, for 
example in the UAE, to apply the New York Convention without resorting to the 
conditions of the Shari’a, it remains to be seen whether the trend will continue. 
As to the third factor, the Shari’a plays a limited role in the potential challenges 
to the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award because the grounds for which to 
challenge the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under the Shari’a have largely 
been overshadowed by the New York Convention and the national laws of GCC 
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14 Appendix II, Survey Report, II(2.6.1.). 
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states.15 In practice, a party challenging the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award 
would do so under the grounds listed in the New York Convention; and a party 
challenging the enforcement of a domestic arbitral award would do so under the 
national arbitration legislation of GCC states. This is especially true because the Shari’a 
had not explicitly stated grounds under which to challenge the enforcement of a foreign 
arbitral award.  
As to the fourth factor, the Shari’a does affect the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards with regards to the public policy defence. In the survey, the respondents 
were asked an open-ended question as to the most likely reason for the non-enforcement 
of a foreign arbitral award.16 The highest number of common responses is eleven (11), 
identifying public policy as the most likely reason for non-enforcement.17 This research 
reveals, however, that a closer look at the public policy under the Shari’a shows more 
compatibility than differences with the public policy under international and regional 
agreements and the public policy of each of the GCC states. There is, therefore, 
something else going on behind the application of the public policy defence, and this 
research shows that judicial activism is the culprit behind the use of the Shari’a to deny 
enforcement based on public policy, even when there is no public policy violation. The 
issue of public policy is discussed more fully in Chapter Five and Section 7.1.5. Suffice 
it to say that while Shari’a public policy could be harmonised with international 
arbitration norms, save for very specific fundamental18 issues under the Shari’a such as 
those which are haram [prohibited], there seems to be a practice among courts in the 
GCC states to refuse enforcement of foreign arbitral awards based on Shari’a public 
policy, which is confirmed by experienced arbitration practitioners in GCC states 
through the survey. In this sense, the Shari’a does indeed affect the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards.  
As to the fifth factor, the Shari’a, generally speaking, does not affect the setting 
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15 Mohamed Al-Siyabi, ‘A Legal Analysis of the Development of Arbitration in Oman with Special 
Reference to the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards’ (DPhil thesis, University of Hull 2008) 
57. 
16 Appendix II, Survey Report, II(2.3.). 
17 ibid. 
18 A majority of respondents to the survey with 48.39% view that judges or arbitrators should apply the 
Shari’a when determining whether public policy has been violated only when a violation of a 
fundamental Shari’a principle has been established. Appendix II, Survey Report, II(2.6.2.). 
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aside of foreign arbitral awards. The Shari’a actually does not allow, as a general rule, 
for the setting aside of an arbitral award. What is left, thus, is the New York Convention 
and the UNCITRAL Model Law on one hand, with the grounds listed therein for non-
enforcement and setting aside of an arbitral award, and on the other hand, the domestic 
arbitration laws of each of the GCC states with provisions on setting aside an arbitral 
award, some of which already follow the UNCITRAL Model Law. Since GCC states 
are all signatories to the New York Convention, and lacking any substantial difference 
between the New York Convention, the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the Shari’a, GCC 
states ought to actually adopt the mechanisms and grounds for setting aside as set forth 
in the UNCITRAL Model Law and the New York Convention. 
 
7.1.3. Question Three: Are there differences in interpreting the Shari’a 
among the GCC states, and how would these differences, if any, affect the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards? 
 
The interpretation of the Shari’a will depend largely on the Shari’a school19 and 
how an Islamic country expressed the Shari’a as the “source of law” or the “primary 
source of law.” In the GCC states, for example, KSA follows the Shari’a as the source 
of law under the Hanbali School, while the UAE follows the Shari’a as the primary 
source of law. Accordingly, in the KSA, all laws must strictly follow the Shari’a. As to 
legislatively enacted rules regarding the enforcement of arbitral awards, the Shari’a is 
incorporated into the enacted rules. In the UAE, on the other hand, the Shari’a acts as a 
guiding principle for enacting rules on the enforcement of arbitral awards. Once the 
legislature has consulted the Shari’a as a primary source of law and enacted a set of 
rules governing, say, the enforcement of arbitral awards, the enacted laws are able to 
stand on their own. 
It is not disputed, however, that while “arbitration differs from one 
jurisprudence school to another,”20 all four schools of the Sunni branch recognize 
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19 The different views of the schools of thought of Islam are discussed in more detail in Chapter Two. 
20 Alsheikh (n 6) 23.  
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arbitration as a means of dispute resolution.21 In the survey, the respondents were asked 
which Shari’a school22 of thought or fiqh is followed by the majority of judges and 
lawyers in their respective GCC state. The majority of the respondents at 30% stated 
that Maliki is followed by the majority, followed by 17.50% for Hanbali, 15% for 
Hanafi, and 2.5% for Shafi’i.23 
Differences in the interpretation by Shari’a schools affect the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. This can be seen in numerous instances. In the conditions for 
enforcement, the Shari’a requires the same contents of the arbitral award, and there is a 
difference in the view of the majority of Shari’a scholars and some Shafi’i scholars as to 
whether arbitrators or arbitral tribunals are required to state the rationale of the arbitral 
award. Differences among the schools also arise relating to the form and content of the 
arbitral award. In the writing requirement, only three schools, the Hanafis, Shafi’i, and 
Hanbali, are clear that an arbitral award must be attested to in court or testified by two 
just witnesses. Further, while Shari’a scholars in all schools agree that an arbitral award 
is final, there are differences in interpreting when the arbitral award or how the arbitral 
award becomes final. There is even a divide among Shafi’i scholars on this issue. A 
clearer difference emerges among the schools when it comes to arbitrability, an issue 
that will directly affect the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. The four schools in 
the Sunni branch disagree as to the scope of arbitration in the Shari’a. Thus, the 
arbitrability of a dispute may also change among the GCC states depending on the 
Shari’a school a GCC state follows.  
There are also differences among the schools as to the potential challenges to 
enforcement or grounds for non-enforcement, which under the Shari’a is also the same 
as the grounds for setting aside an arbitral award. The schools differ on whether a non-
Muslim can be an arbitrator whenever a Muslim is a party to a dispute. While the 
majority of Shari’a scholars so requires, there are different viewpoints as to when a non-
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21 Rodney Smith and Omar Ibrahem, ‘Arbitrating at the Crossroads of East and West: An Overview of 
Prominent Arab National Arbitration Laws’ (SSRN, 5 May 2008) !http://ssrn.com/abstract=1654008" 
accessed 10 February 2014. 
22 See Alsheikh (n 6) ch 2, fn 9 (stating that Muslims today “belong to one of four Islamic Schools, which 
are the most important at present – Hanafi’h, Malaki’h, Shafi’h and Hanbali’h”). The Sunni branch has 
four major schools of thought that interpret the Shari’a, each varying in its doctrinal approach to dispute 
resolution: the Maliki School, the Hanafi School, the Shafi’i School, and the Hanbali School.   
23 Appendix II, Survey Report, II(2.1.7.). 
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Muslim can become an arbitrator over a dispute involving a Muslim, some like Al-
Siyabi, stating that Muslims can consent to it. The same issue discussed earlier in the 
conditions for enforcement with regards to arbitrability also arises in the challenge to 
the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. 
Lastly, there are differences among the Sunni schools in interpreting the riba 
[interest] prohibition. The views of each of the schools of thought in the Sunni branch, 
though in agreement as to the prohibition, differ as to the degree of strict adherence to 
the prohibition on the riba [interest]. Generally, the Hanbali and Maliki views are 
stricter, while the Hanafi and Shafi’i views are less strict.  
 
7.1.4. Question Four: Do international agreements like the New York 
Convention and the ICSID Convention harmonise the various arbitration 
principles of different legal systems? 
 
 GCC states are required to meet their treaty obligations under the New York 
Convention and the ICSID Convention, an obligation that is also imposed by the 
Shari’a.24 Still, the true measure for success for an international arbitration convention 
is the extent to which it can bring together different legal systems and harmonise them 
under the banner of international arbitration norms. With regard to the GCC states, this 
research has shown that the New York Convention and the ICSID Convention are to a 
large extent succeeding at harmonising the arbitration principles of GCC states. While it 
is too early to tell the extent to which optimal harmonisation is achieved, what can be 
said is that there are promising signs towards complete integration and harmonisation, 
especially the efforts by the UAE to embrace a pro-enforcement policy and the adoption 
by the KSA of a Saudi Arbitration Law of 2012 that is closer to the international 
arbitration norm. Additionally, a comparative analysis of the arbitration rules under the 
Shari’a, the New York Convention, ICSID Convention, and the national legislation of 
GCC states, shows that further harmonisation is very possible.  
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24 The Holy Qur’an states, “O you who believe, commit to your contracts”, which requires Muslims to 
commit to fulfilling their contractual obligations. The Holy Qur’an, Al-Ma’ida 5:1, Yusuf Ali 
Translation. See generally, Section 2.4.1. 
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In regards to the ICSID Convention, that the framers of the ICSID Convention 
made it difficult for states to interfere with the arbitration process and the enforcement 
of arbitral awards goes a long way in harmonising the arbitration of state investment 
disputes. It is through this approach that the ICSID Convention has succeeded, at least 
at the enforcement stage, in comparison to the New York Convention. Unlike the New 
York Convention, under the ICSID Convention domestic courts are not empowered to 
review ICSID arbitral awards even during the enforcement process.25 Domestic courts 
cannot even review the arbitral award based on public policy,26 unlike Article V(2)(b) 
of the New York Convention. The ICSID Convention’s arbitration process is insulated 
from domestic court interference from commencement up until the enforcement of the 
arbitral award, where an enforcement order is granted. Because of the ICSID 
Convention’s insulated framework, it has been successful at harmonising state 
investment arbitration. 
In regards to the New York Convention, harmonisation of the arbitration 
principles of different legal systems becomes possible so long as international 
arbitration norms emerge regarding the interpretation and application of the New York 
Convention. With that said, international arbitration norms have emerged that make it 
more possible to harmonise arbitration principles. One key principle is the pro-
enforcement policy of the New York Convention. This principle, on its own, serves as a 
vision for signatories to the New York Convention, and in a way, as a litmus test for 
whether a signatory to the New York Convention follows the international arbitration 
norms. In this sense, the New York Convention has achieved harmonisation. As to the 
GCC states, harmonisation under the New York Convention may indeed be possible as 
shown by the analysis in this research.  
The New York Convention can harmonise the definition of foreign arbitral 
award. The first and second approaches to defining a “foreign” arbitral award under the 
Shari’a contradict with the New York Convention since the New York Convention, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Ivar Alvik, Contracting with Sovereignty: State Contracts and International Arbitration (Hart 2011) ch 
3. 
26 Christoph Schreuer, ‘Interaction of International Tribunals and Domestic Courts in Investment Law, 
Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation’ in Arthur Rovine (ed), Contemporary 
Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation (The Fordham Papers 2010) 
!http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/interactions_int_tribunals_domestic.pd" accessed 11 
March 2014. 
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according to van den Berg, defines a foreign arbitral award as an arbitral award “made 
in any other State”27 without regard to nationality or religion, while the first and second 
view in the Shari’a considers an arbitral award domestic whenever it occurs outside of 
an Islamic country and one or both of the parties to the arbitration are Muslims. Arbitral 
awards made in another state but considered as domestic in the enforcing state 
according to van den Berg, however, remain foreign under the New York Convention’s 
non-domestic criterion. Van den Berg clarified this point when he stated that “the rule 
that the New York Convention is always applicable to the recognition and enforcement 
of an arbitral award made abroad applies even if the award made in the other country is 
considered domestic by the enforcing court.”28 Likewise, even if Shari’a scholars were 
to apply the first and second view as to the definition of a “foreign” arbitral award, they 
must apply the New York Convention regardless because the determination that an 
arbitral award was made outside of an Islamic country, in other words in another state, 
remains within the purview of the New York Convention’s definition of “foreign” 
arbitral award.   
While the New York Convention has not yet succeeded in doing so, 
harmonisation will also be possible in the GCC states with regard to the conditions for 
enforcement. Currently, the conditions placed by each of the GCC states are much more 
restrictive and more of an impediment to enforcement than the Shari’a and the New 
York Convention. In this regard, the additional conditions placed by GCC states are 
likely the reason for the non-enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. When domestic 
courts look to the New York Convention as a guide to enforcement, instead of focusing 
solely on the domestic legislation, there seems to be more success in enforcement. On 
the other hand, failure by domestic courts to adhere to the pro-enforcement bias of the 
New York Convention, but rather to take a protectionist stance in favour of domestic 
concerns lead to non-enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 
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27 Albert van den Berg, ‘When is an Arbitral Award Nondomestic Under the New York Convention of 
1958?’ (1985) 6 Pace L Rev 25. 
28 van den Berg (n 27), referring to Law of Mar 15, 1961, § 2, Bundesgesetzblatt  [BGBI] II, 121 (W Ger) 
(van den Berg used as an example the West German law which applies the New York Convention to an 
award made abroad even if it would have been deemed domestic for having employed German procedural 
law).  
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The New York Convention has also succeeded in harmonising the potential 
challenges to enforcement in the GCC states. On paper, since all GCC states have 
ratified the New York Convention, the potential challenges to the enforcement of a 
foreign arbitral award are consistent with international arbitration norms. In practice, 
however, courts in GCC states like the UAE continue to deviate from the international 
practice, allowing for additional grounds for challenging the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards than allowed under the New York Convention.  
The New York Convention, however, has largely lagged in harmonising the 
rules on public policy and the grounds for the setting aside of arbitral awards. As a 
caveat, however, the lack of harmonisation is not only limited to the GCC states, but for 
all New York Convention signatories. There is an ongoing debate as to the definition 
and scope of the public policy defence under the New York Convention. The drafters of 
the New York Convention may have intentionally left the issue of public policy largely 
undefined as seen in the inherent vagueness in the concept. For now, the majority of 
New York Convention signatories seem to follow the rule created by Parsons & 
Whittemore in favour of a narrow interpretation of public policy.  
Finally, harmonisation has also seemed difficult as to the setting aside of arbitral 
awards. Setting aside remains an unsettled area, especially in light of Hilmarton and 
Chromalloy, and it continues to create conflicting, and certainly non-uniform rules or 
application of rules, not only for GCC states but also for countries like France and the 
US. In the midst of this muddled jurisprudence, GCC states strive to strike a balance of 
embracing the international arbitration norms, while trying to remain consistent with the 
Shari’a and protect national interests. 
 
7.1.5. Question Five: How does public policy affect the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states? 
 
Any sort of proposal to improve the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in 
the GCC states has to take into account public policy. While the public policy of GCC 
states ought to be the same because all GCC states adhere to the Shari’a, a closer look 
reveals a landscape that is just as fraught with nuances over the concept of public policy 
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as any part of the world. While there are large patches of commonality among the GCC 
states, stemming largely from the Shari’a concepts of public policy and arbitrability, 
each GCC state does differ at one point or another as to what constitutes public policy. 
The starting point for the difference could be the differences in the doctrinal 
interpretation and application of the Shari’a. 
An examination of the effect of public policy on the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards in the GCC states reveals that there seems to be more in common among 
the Shari’a, regional and international agreements, and even each of the GCC states 
with regards to procedural public policy, which is largely concerned with fairness and 
due process. It is with substantive public policy that a substantial divergence in the 
concept of public policy begins to emerge. This is true with regards to both express 
substantive public policy and implied substantive public policy, or arbitrability.  
Overall, what ultimately becomes the source for the obstacles to enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards under the umbrella of public policy is how a GCC state’s 
judiciary approaches the application of the public policy defence: whether narrowly or 
broadly. In the context of the GCC states, there is a tendency for judges, whenever the 
Shari’a is invoked, to cast a wide net in favour of public policy.29 There are, however, 
signs that such an approach is not necessarily the only path under the Shari’a, as is 
currently being demonstrated by cases coming from UAE courts. In other words, it is 
ultimately possible for all GCC states to balance the Shari’a concepts of public policy 
with the concept of public policy as espoused by the international arbitration norms 
under the New York Convention. As Wakim suggests, however, to arrive at this 
balance, “all this requires government function and public policy value judgments to be 
open and accessible.”30 
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29 Interestingly, judges in the GCC states are trained to give a strict interpretation to written words, 
though they tend to give a liberal interpretation when it comes to public policy. See Mark Hoyle, ‘Topic 
in focus: demystifying UAE arbitration law’ (Lexology, 8 November 2013) 
!http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=fc4ff6d6-cafb-4063-8dc1-f20fc1544c9e" accessed 15 
January 2014 (stating that “the training of the judges [in the UAE] is to scrutinize the written words 
…rather than assume implied terms, there is a strict approach”). 
30 Mark Wakim, ‘Public Policy Concerns Regarding Enforcement of Foreign International Arbitral 
Awards in the Middle East’ (2008) 21 NY Int’l L Rev 1, 51. 
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7.1.6. Question Six: What are the major challenges to the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states, and what are their sources? 
 
This research shows that there remain challenges to the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards in the GCC states. In the survey, respondents were asked what they 
thought were the most likely reason for the non-enforcement of a foreign arbitral 
award.31 The highest number of common responses is eleven (11) out of 38, identifying 
public policy as the most likely reason for non-enforcement.32 The second highest 
number of common responses had a total of six (6) out of 38, identifying the judiciary’s 
lack of familiarity or knowledge with international arbitration, the New York 
Convention, or some form of judicial activism or hostility as the reason for non-
enforcement.33 The third highest number of common responses had five (5) out of 38, 
identifying the failure of the arbitration statute as the reason for non-enforcement.34 The 
fourth highest number of common responses had four (4) out of 38, identifying 
jurisdictional issues as the reason for non-enforcement.35 The fifth highest number of 
common responses had three (3) out of 38, identifying social or political reason for non-
enforcement.36 The rest of the remaining nine (9) out of 38 responses varied and 
included one response, which stated that the Shari’a is the most common reason for 
non-enforcement.37 The result of the survey gives us a more detailed picture of possible 
sources for non-enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. Overall, the survey supports 
the literature review, which shows that many practitioners are concerned with public 
policy as a source of challenge to enforcement and that perhaps the source for 
overreliance on public policy is judicial activism and lack of knowledge by the judiciary 
with international arbitration norms. 
The survey asked respondents to rate the level of knowledge GCC judges have 
with regards to the New York Convention, the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the ICSID 
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32 ibid. 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid. 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid. 
37 ibid. 
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Convention.38 Respondents view judges in the GCC states as having low familiarity 
with international agreements, and especially so with the ICSID Convention, which has 
had very little history in the GCC states. Respondents gave GCC states’ judges a score 
of 3.78 out of 10 or 37.8% familiarity with the ICSID Convention, 5.86 out of 10 or 
58.6% familiarity with the New York Convention, and 4.97 out of 10 or 49.7% 
familiarity with the UNCITRAL Model Law.39 This view confirms the conclusions 
based on the review of the literature that judges are deemed to have little experience 
with international agreements, and such limited experience may be one of the main 
reasons for the non-enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 
Additionally, the GCC states should clearly define domestic, foreign, and 
international arbitral award to draw a line for arbitral awards that are covered by 
domestic arbitration laws and those that are covered by international agreements like the 
New York Convention. As of the writing of this thesis, only Bahrain and Oman 
distinguish between domestic arbitration and international arbitration; yet they too fail 
to provide a clear definition of domestic and foreign arbitral award. The remaining GCC 
states do not make such distinction. Of concern, however, is that under the Shari’a, as a 
religious based legal system, the distinction between domestic and foreign arbitral 
award can become more complicated in its jurisdictional reach because of the religious 
aspects of Shari’a. Shari’a scholars generally agree that Shari’a governs if one of the 
parties is Muslim, even if a contract or arbitration occurs outside an Islamic country. On 
the other hand, there is an equally compelling argument that the New York 
Convention’s definition of a foreign arbitral award, one that has become the 
international arbitration norm, ought to prevail. To eliminate any potential confusion 
among the judiciary, GCC states should clearly define domestic, foreign, and 
international arbitral award in their arbitration laws.  
The GCC states should not impose additional conditions to the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards than required under the New York Convention. As such, the 
GCC states should clarify that the additional conditions are only applicable to domestic 
arbitral awards and not to foreign arbitral awards. There have been numerous important 
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cases in the UAE such as the Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation, Petition No 679/2010;40 
the Dubai Court of Appeal, Petition No 531/201141; and the Dubai Court of Cassation, 
Petition No 132/2012,42 where the courts clarified that the domestic conditions do not 
apply to foreign arbitral awards and that the role of the court is to ensure compliance 
with the New York Convention. However, since cases are not published and do not 
have binding effect like in common law countries, other courts could arrive at an 
opposite decision. Domestic courts and legislation are the more likely culprit in the non-
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards through additional conditions that are 
protectionist in nature, or that are motivated by distrust of other countries’ legal systems 
and procedures. This distrust, within the context of the GCC states and the Shari’a, is 
often misguidedly blamed on the Shari’a, but a careful analysis of the specific 
conditions that each GCC state places on foreign arbitral award enforcement is too often 
unrelated to the Shari’a. Conditions placed by each of the GCC states in their respective 
arbitration rules are much more restrictive and impede enforcement than the Shari’a and 
the New York Convention. The additional conditions placed by the GCC states, and the 
strict activist approach by courts, are likely the reason for the non-enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states.  
The GCC states, on paper, are already consistent with the New York Convention 
and the international arbitration norms with regards to the grounds for challenging 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. However, the judiciary of the GCC states, in 
practice, continue to allow additional grounds for challenging the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. These additional grounds stem from judges misapplying 
domestic arbitration rules and procedures to foreign arbitral awards. An example is the 
UAE, where judges continue to require ratification of foreign arbitral awards under the 
UAE Civil Procedure Code, a practice that amounts to a double exequatur that the New 
York Convention had eliminated. The continued application of outdated and incomplete 
domestic arbitration rules to foreign arbitral awards, thus, create additional challenges 
to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Passage of an arbitration law based on the 
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40 Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation, Petition No 679/2010, Judgment of 16 June 2011.  
41 Dubai Court of Appeal, Petition No 531/2011, Judgment of 6 October 2011(enforcing a foreign arbitral 
award rendered by the Singapore International Arbitration Centre).  
42 Dubai Court of Cassation, Petition No 132/2012, Judgment of 22 February 2012 (enforcing a DIFC-
LCIA arbitral award). 
! !
! !309 
UNCITRAL Model Law like the one currently being drafted in the UAE, could help 
resolve this issue. 
An arbitration law based on the UNCITRAL Model Law could likewise be 
aided by explicitly detailing what grounds under the Shari’a, judges could rely upon for 
non-enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. In other cases, judges may rely on the 
Shari’a to create additional grounds for non-enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. 
These additional grounds that originate from the Shari’a may sometimes be expressed 
under the rubric of public policy. A closer look at the grounds for non-enforcement 
under the Shari’a, however, reveals that the grounds for challenging the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards under the Shari’a do not become a significant factor for non-
enforcement. Instead, the grounds for non-enforcement under the Shari’a are very 
similar to the grounds for setting aside an arbitral award.  A possible explanation for the 
incongruence between the Shari’a and the practice of non-enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards in the GCC states is judicial activism. 
Further, public policy should be interpreted narrowly and with the pro-
enforcement policy of the New York Convention. This issue has already been discussed 
fully in Chapter Five and Question Five. As discussed in Chapter Five, however, the 
limitations placed by the Shari’a on public policy could be narrowed to a very limited 
set of cases generally dealing with arbitrability (i.e. haram [prohibited] subject matter). 
It is, therefore, possible for courts in the GCC states to create a clearer set of guidelines 
for when public policy ought to be interpreted narrowly for the majority of disputes that 
are not covered by the Shari’a, and when it ought to be interpreted broadly for a limited 
number of disputes expressly falling under the Shari’a.  
Finally, the GCC states should adopt the paradigm for setting aside an arbitral 
award under the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law. Currently, the 
practice of most GCC states is to create a different set of grounds for the setting aside of 
an arbitral award, that do not exactly match the grounds listed under the New York 
Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law. As clarified in Chapter Six, the Shari’a 
plays a minimal role in the dynamics as the Shari’a generally prohibits setting aside. 
Instead, the current paradigm for most GCC states is the remnant of arbitration laws that 
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were enacted prior to the accession to the New York Convention and that require 
updating to be consistent with the UNCITRAL Model Law.  
As the above major challenges to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in 
the GCC states have been identified, the next section will propose a way forward for 
GCC states to create a uniform rule for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the 
GCC states.  The next section, therefore, will discuss this thesis author’s proposal for a 
set of rules for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in a Uniform GCC Arbitration 
Law in the GCC states.  
 
PART II 
 
7.2. Proposed Set of Rules Relating to Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in 
a Uniform GCC Arbitration Law  
 
7.2.1. Overview of the Proposed Drafts for a Uniform GCC Arbitration 
Law  
 
 There have been numerous calls in the GCC states for a uniform arbitration law, 
and efforts have been made to propose a draft Uniform GCC Arbitration Law.43 In the 
survey, the respondents were asked whether they were in favour or against a Uniform 
GCC Arbitration Law, and 81.25% were in favour while only 18.75% were against it.44 
The survey shows that there is a large support among the GCC states arbitration 
practitioners for creating uniformity in the arbitration laws of the GCC states. Judge 
Moussa Ben Salem Alzeri, President of the Court of First Instance in Bidbid, Oman 
recommends that “unifying the rules that organize arbitration on the GCC level is 
important, as is the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law by all states.” 45 
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43 These efforts have been led by the Chamber of Commerce of the six GCC states.  
44 Appendix II, Survey Report, II(2.4.).  
45 Moussa Alezri, ‘The Role of the Omani Judiciary in Supporting Arbitration’ (2010) 2 J of Arab Arb 26 
(Judge Alzeri makes numerous other recommendations with regards to improving arbitration in the GCC, 
including reviewing laws and regulations that impede the development of international commercial 
arbitration.); Amr Elattar, Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards: A Comparative Study 
between Egypt, USA, and the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries (LAP Lambert Academic Publishing 
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On November 27, 2007, representatives of the six GCC states’ chambers of 
commerce met in Dubai to discuss the need for a Uniform GCC Arbitration Law.46 By 
April 24, 2008, the same group assigned Ahmed Mohamed Abdel Badih Sheta (Sheta) 
of the Qatar Chamber of Commerce and Industry, to write a draft Uniform GCC 
Arbitration Law (“Sheta Draft”), which was then submitted by Sheta to the GCC states’ 
chambers of commerce in Kuwait.47 Thereafter, the same group formed a working 
committee to review the Sheta Draft, and the working group approved the Sheta Draft 
with suggestions and recommendations from the GCC states’ chambers of commerce 
and referred the Sheta Draft to the Secretary General of the GCC states.48 
In the Sheta Draft, which supposedly requires an arbitral award to be issued 
within three months,49 the law applies to all arbitrations occurring within the GCC states 
between public or private legal entities regardless of the nature of the legal relationship 
and subject of the dispute, unless limited by a special provision or the arbitrability rules 
of a GCC state. It can also apply to international arbitration occurring outside the GCC 
states if agreed by the parties.  One advantage of the Sheta Draft is that recourse to 
annulment of the arbitral award does not stay its execution. However, the court can 
order stay of execution upon a claimant’s request that is based on serious grounds. 
Further, if the court sets aside the arbitral award, then the parties’ arbitration agreement 
shall remain valid despite the above annulment, unless they agree otherwise.50 
On January 19, 2011, the legal officials of the GCC states’ chambers of 
commerce met again to review the final procedures of the draft Uniform GCC 
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2013) 398-399 (proposing that Kuwait and Qatar should adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law and should 
revise their rules on the finality if awards under each country’s Civil Procedures law).  
46 Ahmed Sheta, ‘GCC Unified Arbitration Draft Law’ (2009)1 J Arab Arb 92, 93; El-Ahdab (n 13) 573; 
Meriam Alrashid and others, ‘International Arbitration in the Middle East: A Case Study of Qatar’ The 
International Dispute Resolution News (Fall 2009) vol 1, No 1, 13; Nadim Kawach, ‘Gulf states plan 
single arbitration law’ (Emirates Business 24/7, 22 August 2009) 
!http://www.emirates247.com/eb247/economy/uae-economy/gulf-states-plan-single-arbitration-law-
2009-08-22-1.30548" accessed 20 February 2014. 
47 Sheta (n 46) 573; Alrashid and others (n 46); Kawach (n 46). 
48 Sheta (n 46); El-Ahdab (n 13) 573; Alrashid and others (n 46); Kawach (n 46); Arabian Business, 
‘Unified GCC commercial law within two months’ (Arabian Business, 19 February 2009) 
!http://arabic.arabianbusiness.com/society/politics-economics/2009/feb/19/16632/#.UQIEKx2ce8D" 
accessed 20 June 2013 (Ahmed Almutawa tr). 
49 Arabian Business (n 48). 
50 Ahmed Sheta, ‘Meshru’a Al-Qanoon Al-Mowahad lil Takheem le Duwal Majlis Al-Taawan Al-Khaliji, 
Majelat Al Takheem’ [‘Uniform GCC Arbitration Act’] (2009) 1 J of Arb 701-720 (Ahmed Almutawa tr) 
[hereinafter Sheta, ‘Meshru’a Al-Qanoon’]; Sheta (n 46). 
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Arbitration Law.51 By December 5, 2012, Magdi Ibrahim Qassem, Executive Director 
of the Abu Dhabi Centre for Conciliation and Arbitration, announced that said Centre 
had finished a draft for Uniform Commercial Arbitration of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (“Abu Dhabi Draft”), which had been submitted to the Secretary General of the 
GCC states.52  
 
7.2.2. A Comparison of the Sheta Draft and the Abu Dhabi Draft 
 
A review of the Arabic version of the Abu Dhabi Draft, as reported by Al-Anba 
News on December 9, 2012,53 and the Arabic version of the Sheta Draft54 as reported by 
Sheta in the Journal of Arbitration shows substantial similarity between the two drafts. 
There are minor differences, however. One difference is in Article 31.4, where the 
Sheta Draft states that it is not necessary for a lay witness or an expert witness to take 
an oath when testifying before a tribunal, whereas the Abu Dhabi Draft states in the 
same Article 31.4 that the tribunal has the right to hear witnesses and experts if 
necessary.55  
Further, in Article 32.2, the Sheta Draft states that if the Defendant fails to 
provide a defence memorandum in accordance with Article 28, the tribunal shall 
continue with the proceedings without being deemed to have recognized the defendant’s 
defence to the prejudice of the plaintiff, unless the parties agree otherwise.56 The Abu 
Dhabi Draft eliminates the phrase “unless the parties agree otherwise” in Article 32.2.57 
In Article 34.4, which deals with the tribunal’s expert report submitted to the tribunal, 
and which report the tribunal can either decide upon or allow the parties an additional 
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51 Al Wasat Bahraini Newspaper, ‘Review of the Final Procedure for Unified GCC Arbitration Law’ (Al 
Wasat, 19 January 2011) !http://www.alwasatnews.com/3057/news/read/521969/1.html" accessed 20 
June 2013 (Ahmed Almutawa tr).  
52 Ahmed Yousef, Secretariat countries ‘cooperation’ in connection with the adoption of the draft 
Unified GCC arbitration, (Al Anba News, 5 December 2012) !http://www.alanba.com.kw/ar/economy-
news/344434/05-12-2012" accessed 20 June 2013 (Ahmed Almutawa tr). It remains unclear whether the 
Abu Dhabi Draft is a continuation of the work by the GCC Chamber on the Sheta Draft or whether it is an 
altogether new draft. 
53 Yousef (n 52). 
54 Sheta, ‘Meshru’a Al-Qanoon’ (n 50). 
55 Yousef (n 52); Sheta, ‘Meshru’a Al-Qanoon’ (n 50). 
56 Sheta, ‘Meshru’a Al-Qanoon’ (n 50). 
57 Yousef (n 52). 
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hearing to submit their own expert(s) opinion, the Sheta Draft adds the phrase “unless 
the parties agree otherwise” to the entire clause, and the Abu Dhabi Draft eliminates the 
said phrase.58  
In Article 41.1, which states that an arbitral award must be signed by a majority 
of the arbitrators, where there are multiple arbitrators, the Sheta Draft requires those 
arbitrators that did not sign to give the reason(s), in the arbitral award, for not-signing, 
whereas the Abu-Dhabi Draft eliminates the requirement for providing an explanation 
for not signing by non-signatory arbitrators.59 The Abu Dhabi Draft also eliminates 
Article 41.3, which is present in the Sheta Draft, dealing with the requirement of the 
arbitral award, if so required, to state the names, address, nationalities, and designation 
of arbitrators; the arbitration clause between the parties; the relief sought by the parties; 
testimonies and documents by the parties during the arbitration proceedings; the verdict 
of the tribunal; the date and place of issue of the arbitral award; and the reasoning of the 
arbitral award.60  
Also, Article 46.1 (C), under the Sheta Draft, allows the tribunal for any other 
reason to end the arbitral proceedings if there is no use to continue the proceedings or it 
is otherwise impossible.61 The Abu Dhabi Draft retains the same Article 46.1(C), but 
adds that the tribunal can only do so based on sufficient reasons that are justified and 
legitimate.62 Article 47.1, under the Sheta Draft, allows a party to seek clarification of 
any part of the arbitral award within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the 
judgment, while the Abu Dhabi Draft removes the time limitation for requesting 
clarification.63 Additionally, the Sheta Draft in Article 47.4 allows the court to intervene 
under Article 7 in case the tribunal is unable to convene regarding a party’s request for 
clarification; and this article was eliminated in the Abu Dhabi Draft.64 Article 49.1-49.2 
of the Sheta Draft, which allows the parties to request within 15 days upon receipt of 
the judgment to request for judgment on additional matters that the tribunal failed to 
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58 Yousef (n 52); Sheta, ‘Meshru’a Al-Qanoon’ (n 50). 
59 ibid. 
60 Sheta, ‘Meshru’a Al-Qanoon’ (n 50). 
61 ibid. 
62 Yousef (n 52). 
63 ibid; Sheta, ‘Meshru’a Al-Qanoon’ (n 50). 
64 Sheta, ‘Meshru’a Al-Qanoon’ (n 50). 
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address, was completely eliminated in the Abu Dhabi Draft.65 Article 53.1 (A) of the 
Abu Dhabi Draft and Article 54.1 of the Sheta Draft are similar except that the Sheta 
Draft states “an original copy or a copy signed by it” whereas the Abu Dhabi Draft 
states “an original copy or a copy signed by the arbitral tribunal.”66 
Finally, in Article 55 of the Sheta Draft and Article 54 of the Abu Dhabi Draft, 
which does not allow a stay of execution upon an application to annul the arbitral award 
but allows the court to order a stay of execution upon an application to annul the arbitral 
award based on serious reasons, both drafts allow the arbitration agreement between the 
parties to remain in effect after the order of the court to annul the arbitral award, but the 
Sheta Draft states that it remains in effect unless the parties agree otherwise, while the 
Abu Dhabi Draft states that it remains in effect unless the parties agree otherwise and if 
the arbitration agreement was rendered void by the court.67  
  
7.2.3. Proposals for Improving the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards in the GCC States  
 
 The Abu Dhabi Draft of the Uniform GCC Arbitration Law follows 
international arbitration norms with regards to the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards.68 According to Maita, arbitral awards under the Abu Dhabi Draft are “valid 
from their issuance and courts are required to recognize and enforce them except for 
limited public policy reasons.”69 Further, the setting aside of an arbitral award is 
allowed for the following reasons under Article 50(1) and (2) of the Abu Dhabi Draft:70  
(1) Lack of an arbitration agreement, 
(2) Incompetence of a party, 
(3) Inability to present a defence due to procedural defect, 
(4) The arbitral tribunal refused to apply a law that the parties agreed to, 
(5) Improper formation or appointment of the arbitral tribunal, 
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65 Sheta, ‘Meshru’a Al-Qanoon’ (n 50). 
66 Yousef (n 52); Sheta, ‘Meshru’a Al-Qanoon’ (n 50). 
67 ibid. 
68 Aida Maita, Development of a Commercial Arbitration hub in the Middle East: Case Study - The State 
of Qatar (SJD Dissertation, Golden Gate University School of Law 2013) 115-116. 
69 ibid. 
70 ibid. 
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(6) Arbitral tribunal exceeded the scope of the agreement, 
(7) The arbitral award was nullified after the ruling, or 
(8) The arbitral award is contrary to public order, public morals, and the Shari’a. 
This thesis author believes that there is vast room for improvement in making 
the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states more consistent with the 
international arbitration norms while harmonising the arbitration rules with the Shari’a. 
This thesis author does not find the Shari’a as an obstacle towards achieving 
harmonisation with the international arbitration norms. Instead, what this thesis author 
has discovered is the revelation that the Shari’a is actually, as stated by many scholars 
before, a flexible legal system that can become harmonised with the needs of modern 
international arbitration. While there are a handful of issues where the Shari’a might be 
seen as strict, these limited issues should not affect the landscape of international 
arbitration in the GCC states. In this regard, this thesis author proposes that the GCC 
states ought to consider the following proposals into a Uniform GCC Arbitration Law 
for the improvement of the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states.  
 
7.2.3.1. Create Specialized Courts for Enforcement of Domestic and 
Foreign Arbitral Awards 
 
 According to Pouget, specialized courts that are high-level, or specially 
designated, and with the capacity and experience to handle commercial arbitral awards 
have been very effective in various jurisdictions,71 and it is a growing practice in 
various jurisdictions.72 This thesis author agrees that GCC states ought to consider 
establishing such a specialized court, especially under a Uniform GCC Arbitration Law 
regime, even in fact requiring such a specialized enforcement court in each GCC state. 
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71 Sophie Pouget, ‘Arbitrating and Mediating Disputes: Benchmarking Arbitration and Mediation 
Regimes for Commercial Disputes Related to Foreign Direct Investment’ (The World Bank, October 
2013) Policy Research Working Paper 6632 !http://www-
wds.wordlbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2013/10/02/000158349_20131002150
412/Rendered/PDF/WPS6632.pdf" accessed 14 January 2014. 
72 Harout Samra, ‘Courts of International Arbitration: The Arbitrationization of Litigation?’ (Kluwer 
Arbitration Blog, 5 February 2014) !http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/02/05/courts-of-
international-arbitration-the-arbitrationization-of-litigation-2/" accessed 24 February 2014 (discussing 
national courts dedicated to the oversight of international arbitration issues). 
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The survey conducted in this research supports the view that many judges in the GCC 
states are not as knowledgeable as they ought to be with the New York Convention, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, and the ICSID Convention.73 Such lack of sufficient 
knowledge and experience about international arbitration could be curtailed under a 
specialized arbitral award enforcement court.  
 
7.2.3.2. Provide Clear Definitions for Domestic, Foreign, and 
International Arbitral Awards 
 
The GCC states should enact a rule, whether or not to be incorporated into a 
Uniform GCC Arbitration Law such as the one proposed by the Sheta Draft and the 
Abu Dhabi Draft, that clearly defines domestic arbitral award, foreign arbitral award, 
and international arbitral award. Such definitions would eliminate any potential 
misconceptions and/or confusion as to the applicability of regional or international 
agreements in the enforcement of arbitral awards. Additionally, according to Pouget, the 
World Bank’s AMD indicators find that “when an economy provides for two distinct 
regimes for domestic and international arbitration...international arbitration laws are less 
restrictive than domestic arbitration laws.”74 The rule should be uniform and passed by 
all the GCC states, whether as part of their national legislation or as part of a Uniform 
GCC Arbitration Law. This thesis author proposes the following definitions: 
 
A domestic arbitral award refers to an arbitral award not falling under 
the definition of a foreign arbitral award, unless otherwise expressly 
stated by these arbitration rules and/or any legislation. The New York 
Convention shall not apply to the enforcement of a domestic arbitral 
award.  
 
A foreign arbitral award is an arbitral award that was made in the 
territory of a State, such state being a signatory to the New York 
Convention if required by a GCC state,75 other than the State where the 
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73 See Appendix II, Survey Report, II(2.2.2.). 
74 Pouget (n 71). 
75 The phrase “such state being a signatory to the New York Convention if required by a GCC state” was 
included since GCC states like Kuwait, KSA and Bahrain claimed the Reciprocity Reservation when 
acceding to the New York Convention. Therefore, foreign arbitral awards from a non-New York 
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recognition and enforcement of such an arbitral award is sought, and 
arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. 
The New York Convention shall apply to the enforcement of all foreign 
arbitral awards, including the interpretation of this provision. 
 
An arbitral award is international76 when  
(1) the parties to the arbitration have places of business in 
different states;  
(2) the location of one of the party’s places of business is in a 
state, other than the state where the recognition and enforcement 
of such arbitral awards are sought;77  
(3) at least one of the party’s business is located in a state 
different from the place where a substantial part of the 
commercial relationship’s obligations was performed;78 or  
(4) the parties agree that the subject matter of the arbitration 
agreement relates to more than one state.   
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Convention state would not be enforceable in Kuwait, KSA or Bahrain. See UNCITRAL, ‘Status: 1958-
Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards’ 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html> accessed 3 
May 2013. It would be much easier, of course, if all GCC states were to allow the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards under the New York Convention regardless of whether the arbitral award was made in a 
non-signatory state. 
76 Points (1) and (4) of the proposed definition are not controversial and generally covers situations where 
the arbitral award was rendered at the same place where it is being enforced, making it otherwise a 
domestic arbitral award. However, since the parties to the arbitration agreement have places of business 
in different states, or since the parties have agreed that the subject matter of the arbitration agreement 
relates to more than one state, then the arbitration is international in nature. In point (1), for example, the 
parties could be a UAE national with a place of business in the UAE and an Omani national with a place 
of business in Oman, who enter into an arbitration agreement in the UAE, arbitrate the dispute in the 
UAE which results in an arbitral award rendered and enforced in the UAE. Since the Omani party’s 
business is in Oman, then the arbitral award in this case would fall under the definition of an international 
arbitral award. In point (2), for example, the parties to the arbitration agreement could both be nationals 
of the UAE and both having a place of business in the UAE, but the parties agree that the arbitration 
agreement relates to a subject matter that relates to more than one country (i.e. the UAE and China). An 
arbitral award resulting therefrom would be international.  
77 Point (2) could also cover the same scenario covered by point (1). However, point (2) covers additional 
scenarios. For example, different from the example in point (1) at footnote 76, if the arbitration was 
entered into in the UAE, and the arbitral award was rendered and is being enforced in the UAE, but both 
parties are from the KSA and have places of business in the KSA but are engaged in a tourism business 
requiring both parties to enter into the arbitration agreement in the UAE. Such a situation would not be 
covered by point (1) since the parties have places of business from the same state, but would be covered 
by point (2) since the arbitral award is being enforced in the state where enforcement is being sought 
(UAE) is different from the place of business of one or both of the parties.  
78 Point (3) covers the scenario where a party’s place of business is different from the place where the 
contract is being performed. Both parties, for example, could have places of business in the UAE, but 
enter into an agreement regarding the harvesting and delivery of fruits from Lebanon to the UAE border. 
The parties’ places of business are in the same state, but a substantial portion of the contract is being 
performed in another state. This scenario would fall under the definition of an international arbitral 
award.  
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In the survey, the respondents were asked to consider the above three 
statements separately and were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with 
each entire statement.79 As to the statement relating to the definition of a 
domestic arbitral award, 80.65% (25 out of 31) agreed with the statement, while 
19.35% (6 out of 31) disagreed with it. As to the statement relating to the 
definition of a foreign arbitral award, 67.74% (21 out of 31) of respondents 
agreed with the statement while 32.26% (10 out of 31) disagreed with it. Finally, 
as to the statement relating to the definition of an international arbitral award, 
68% (17 out of 31) agreed with the statement while 32% (8 out of 31) disagreed 
with it.  
 
 7.2.3.3. Clarify the Conditions for Enforcement 
 
 The GCC states should make clear that the conditions to the enforcement of a 
domestic arbitral award do not apply to the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. The 
GCC states like the UAE that continue to require a ratification process for both 
domestic and foreign arbitral awards, for example, would benefit from such a 
clarification. Such a clarification must be adopted uniformly by all GCC states whether 
under a Uniform GCC Arbitration Law or under the legislation of all the GCC states. 
This thesis author proposes the following rule:  
 
The conditions to the enforcement of a domestic arbitral award shall not 
apply to a foreign or international arbitral award. 
 
In the survey, the respondents were asked to consider the above statement and 
were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the entire statement regarding 
conditions for enforcement.80 The majority of respondents agreed with the statement at 
77.42%  (24 out of 31) while 22.58%  (7 out of 31) disagreed with the statement.81    
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79 Appendix II, Survey Report, II(2.7.). 
80 ibid. 
81 ibid. 
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7.2.3.4. Limit the Ability of Judges to Impose Additional Grounds 
for Non-Enforcement or Annulment 
 
 The GCC states must expressly state that judges cannot impose additional 
grounds for non-enforcement or annulment of a foreign or international arbitral award. 
Most GCC states are already consistent with the New York Convention on this regard. 
Yet, judges in the GCC states continue to refuse enforcement or to set aside a foreign 
arbitral award based on grounds not stated in the New York Convention. 
Even if the GCC states individually or as a council passes a Uniform GCC 
Arbitration Law, such new law would thrive only in the hands of the judiciary and the 
judiciary’s ability to practice judicial restraint. An example is what happened in Syria 
after the passage of Syria’s Arbitration Law No. 4 of March 2008, which moved Syria 
away from the civil code based arbitration like that in the UAE and into a more modern 
arbitration regime. However, four years later, court decisions rendered with respect to 
the new arbitration law remained relatively limited since its enforcement, especially 
because of the restricted scope of the law and some ambiguities in drafting the law, 
caused the courts to often continue to apply the old provisions even under the regime of 
the new law. Judges, therefore, ought to be explicitly limited in finding sources for 
judicial activism. This thesis author proposes the following rule: 
 
A court may only refuse enforcement of a foreign arbitral award or 
annul a foreign arbitral award on the grounds stated in the New York 
Convention and pursuant to the rule relating to the interpretation of 
public policy as a ground for non-enforcement or annulment of an 
arbitral award. A court that refuses to enforce a foreign arbitral award 
or annuls a foreign arbitral award on grounds not listed under the New 
York Convention or based on public policy must provide to the parties, 
in a written judgment, an explanation of its reasoning and decision, 
including the specific legislative or case law source of such grounds or 
public policy.   
 
The above statement received the most agreement from respondents in the survey. The 
respondents were asked to consider the above statement and were asked whether they 
agreed or disagreed with the entire statement regarding grounds for non-enforcement or 
! !
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annulment.82 The overwhelming majority of respondents agreed with the statement at 
90.32% (8 of 31) while only 9.68% (3 out of 31) disagreed with the statement.83     
 
  7.2.3.5. Clarify the Grounds for Public Policy 
 
 The GCC states should clarify the grounds upon which courts can raise public 
policy as a ground for refusal to enforce a foreign arbitral award or as a ground to set 
aside a foreign arbitral award. The GCC states should mandate a narrow interpretation 
of public policy whenever the Shari’a is not invoked. GCC states could perhaps take 
note of the steps taken by the Higher Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation on 
April 2013,84 when it published Information Letter No 156, approving the Review of 
Abitrazh Court in Practice in Applying the Public Policy Ground for Refusal to 
Recognize and Enforce Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards (hereinafter 
“Review”).85 The Review aligned Russian courts, where like GCC state courts the 
public policy defence was seen as an overused mechanism to avoid enforcement86 under 
the New York Convention standards for public policy. The Review provides a narrower 
definition of public policy, which is to be applied only in exceptional cases. Further, the 
Review clarifies that there can be no violation of public policy “merely on the basis that 
Russian law does not have norms identical to those of the applicable foreign law.”87 
Though it remains to be seen whether the Review would dramatically decrease the 
number of foreign arbitral awards that are denied enforcement based on public policy, 
the Review and the adoption of it by the Russian Arbitrazh Court serve as an example 
of a step that GCC states can take to address the perception that courts in GCC states 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 ibid. 
83 ibid. 
84 The letter is actually dated 26 February 2013 but published on April 2013. 
85 Alyona Kucher, Alexey Yadykin and Anton Asoskov, ‘Presidium of Higher Arbitrazh Court provides 
guidance on the concept of public policy’ (Lexology, 10 April 2013) 
!http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=793f7e46-4fcb-4808-b7b9-83502e9b8aae" accessed 01 
June 2013; Dmitry Kurochkin and Francesca Albert, ‘The Supreme Arbitrazh Court clarifies Russian 
public policy’ (Lexology, 24 May 2013) !http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bf8077ed-
8ab0-4fed-9f9d-4b18cf643309" accessed 01 June 2013. 
86 Kurochkin and Albert (n 85) (stating that in Russia, “the public policy defence has traditionally been 
widely invoked when trying to resist enforcement of foreign arbitral awards” under the New York 
Convention). 
87 Kucher, Yadykin and Asoskov (n 85) at 4. 
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rely too heavily on the public policy defence for the non-enforcement of a foreign 
arbitral award. 
Likewise, GCC states should encourage a limited or narrow application of 
Shari’a public policy only for those (1) that are expressly stated as haram [prohibited]; 
(2) that a majority of Shari’a jurists agree upon as fundamental to the Shari’a;88 and (3) 
that whenever there is no clear consensus among Shari’a scholars on the public policy, 
then to interpret public policy to be most consistent with the New York Convention. 
The goal, therefore, is to create a balance that interprets public policy narrowly, but 
harmonises the Shari’a whenever it must.  Shari’s public policy that remains without a 
clear consensus should be weighed against the requirement under the Shari’a to abide 
by international agreements. The discretionary powers of courts in GCC states to apply 
the Shari’a should accordingly be limited.89 This thesis author proposes the following 
rule: 
 
Courts must interpret public policy narrowly. Public policy should only 
be granted as a defence, ground for the non-enforcement of an arbitral 
awards, or ground for setting aside an arbitral award, if it concerns an 
essential or fundamental state interest. The Shari’a shall qualify as an 
essential or fundamental state interest for purposes of public policy, but 
only those public policy which are 
(A) embodied by the Shari’a that are expressly stated in the Holy 
Qur’an, Sunna, Qiyas, or Ijma,  
(B) haram, and 
(C) stated as fundamental to the Shari’a by a majority of the 
Shari’a scholars.  
Whenever there is no clear consensus as to a public policy under the 
Shari’a, the court shall weigh the determination of the existence of such 
public policy in favour of enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under 
the New York Convention.    
 
 The respondents were asked to consider the above statement and were asked 
whether they agreed or disagreed with the entire statement regarding public policy.  The 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88 Elattar (n 45) 401 (proposing that “refusing enforcement should be only limited to violations of 
fundamental rules of the Shari’a”); Al-Siyabi (n 15) 234 (stating that “a rule is considered fundamental, if 
it is absolute in the method in which it is proven and in the meaning that it purports”). 
89 Elattar (n 45) 400 (suggesting that “Gulf countries, which their public policy is influenced by Islamic 
Shari’a, should narrowly apply this defense in a manner which does not give the domestic courts broad 
discretionary power.”).  
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majority of respondents agreed with the statement at 70.97% while 29.03% disagreed 
with the statement.     
 Overall, the survey respondents agreed with all the statements proposed in the 
survey as a set of rules relating to enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in a Uniform 
GCC Arbitration Law. While these proposed rules are by no means perfect, they can at 
least be a starting point for discussion as possible rules to be considered for addition to a 
Uniform GCC Arbitration Law.  
 
PART III 
 
7.3. Contribution to the Literature 
 
This research contributes to the field of knowledge by being the first to analyse 
the challenges to the enforcement of foreign arbitral award in the GCC states by 
comparing the overlapping rules, procedures, and policies that govern arbitration in the 
GCC states, mainly the Shari’a, the regional and international agreements, and the 
national legislation of each of the GCC states. The enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards is an issue that concerns to practitioners in the field of arbitration, academics, 
and potential clients weighing the advantages and disadvantages of arbitrating in the 
GCC states. This research, following the position of many scholars in the field of 
arbitration like Saleh, El-Ahdab, Wakim and Ayad, suggests that it is possible for the 
GCC states to strike a balance among these overlapping rules and to then sincerely 
incorporate the Shari’a into a unified set of rules and procedures for the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states while remaining consistent with international 
arbitration norms. Additionally, this research suggests that the source of the challenges 
to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states do not necessarily come 
from the overlapping rules and policies on arbitration, but on the inconsistent practices 
and procedures that remain largely uninformed as to the obligations that all GCC states 
have under international agreements. Judicial interference is at the heart of the non-
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states. Another contribution by the 
research into the field of knowledge is the survey conducted of those practicing in the 
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field of arbitration in the GCC states regarding their views on the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states. The survey corroborates the conclusions 
made by the research based on the literature review, and also highlights the need for 
further surveys on the matter to fully comprehend the source for the challenges to the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states.  
Limitations to the research are time and monetary constraints in conducting a 
multilingual survey involving a larger population of the GCC states arbitration 
practitioners. It is perhaps a task that could be tackled by future academic researchers 
addressing the same issue, and a task that should be undertaken from the outset of the 
research.  
A major limitation to this research is the fact that courts in all the GCC states, as 
well as arbitral tribunals as a whole, do not systematically publish their cases, making it 
hard to track the progress in terms of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 90 What 
remains to be done is to keep track of cases and developments in the GCC states, and 
perhaps for the GCC states to create an online case reporting system for publishing 
arbitration cases as they arise among all courts and arbitration centres in GCC states. 
The GCC Arbitration Centre could possibly spearhead such efforts with coordination 
from such institutions as DIFC, which already publishes its cases, rules, and regulations 
online. In publishing arbitration cases, arbitration centres will be forced to balance 
confidentiality with the need for creating a published and readily available body of 
arbitration laws.91 In doing so, arbitration centres could request, but could not require, 
parties to waive confidentiality generally, except when specifically sought by a party 
regarding specific facts; and therefore encourage the reporting of arbitration cases 
and/or arbitral awards.  Even going further, arbitration centres could make the waiver of 
confidentiality and therefore publication, the default rule instead of the exception.92  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90 Published arbitration cases from institutional arbitration tribunals may be hard to obtain because of 
arbitral rules that specifically prohibit the publication of an award without the consent of all the parties in 
dispute. See for example Abu Dhabi Centre for Conciliation and Commercial Arbitration Rules, art 28.7. 
Khalil Mechantaf, ‘Abu Dhabi Arbitration Centre Issues its New List of Arbitration Rules’ (Kluwer 
Arbitration Blog, 10 September 2013) !http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/09/10/abu-dhabi-
arbitration-centre-issues-its-new-list-of-arbitration-
rules/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+KluwerArbitrationBlog
Full+%28Kluwer+Arbitration+Blog+-+Latest+Entries%29" accessed 13 October 2013. 
91 See also Section 3.1.2.2. 
92 Mechantaf (n 90). 
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SURVEY ON ARBITRAL AWARD ENFORCEMENT  
IN THE GCC STATES!
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I. SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
 
1.0. Introduction 
 
A survey was conducted to determine the perception of practitioners in the field 
of arbitration regarding arbitration and the enforcement of arbitral awards in the GCC 
states. 
The literature review reveals that after comparing the Shari’a, international 
agreements and GCC domestic laws, four main reasons emerge as the major challenges 
to the enforcement of arbitral awards in the GCC states: (1) unclear and inconsistent 
definitions of a domestic, foreign, or international arbitral award, (2) additional 
conditions to enforcement of an arbitral award placed by GCC states through their 
domestic legislation, (3) judicial activism in allowing additional grounds for 
challenging the enforcement of arbitral awards, and (4) an overly broad interpretation of 
public policy.  The literature review also reveals that judges often cloak their activism 
behind the mantle of the Shari’a when in fact the Shari’a is largely consistent with the 
New York Convention. 
The survey, therefore, aimed to test these findings from the literature review by 
measuring the perception of those with experience in the field of arbitration in the GCC 
states regarding the definition of domestic, foreign or international award in their 
respective jurisdictions. The survey also aimed to measure the perception of the same 
group on whether courts in the GCC states apply the same or different conditions to 
enforcement to domestic and foreign arbitral awards. Further, the survey aimed to 
determine the perception of the same group on what are the most likely reasons for the 
non-enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the GCC states, including the perception 
of the group on the extent to which judges in the GCC states are familiar with the New 
York Convention, the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the ICSID Convention. The survey 
also aimed to measure the perception of the same group as to the role of the Shari’a in 
determining the public policy defence. Finally, the survey aimed to measure the 
perception of the same groups regarding a proposed Uniform GCC Arbitration Law, 
and their opinion on potential language to be proposed for inclusion in the Uniform 
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GCC Arbitration Law. The survey generally aimed to complement the findings in the 
literature review, including the divergent views of Western practitioners and Arab 
practitioners with regards to the role and impact of the Shari’a on the enforcement of 
arbitral awards. 
Therefore, the primary data from the survey will be used to prove and/or verify 
some of the conclusions of the research project to the extent such conclusions answer 
the research questions, more specifically to prove the following specific points: 
 
1. the friendliness of the GCC states towards the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards; 
2. reasons for the non-enforcement of a foreign arbitral award in specific 
jurisdictions; 
3. the extent to which GCC states judges are familiar with the New York 
Convention, the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the ICSID Convention; 
4. to determine the opinion of those in the arbitration field in the GCC 
states  regarding the formation of a Uniform GCC Arbitration Law; 
5. to determine the opinion of those in the arbitration field in the GCC 
states regarding the UNCITRAL Model Law; 
6. to determine the opinion of those in the arbitration field in the GCC 
states on the status of the Shari’a in international arbitration; 
7. to determine the opinion of those in the arbitration field in the GCC 
states as to the applicability of the Shari’a in determining a GCC 
state’s public policy as it pertains to the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards; 
8. to determine the opinion of those in the arbitration field in the GCC 
states regarding the definition for domestic, foreign, and international 
arbitral awards; 
9. to determine the opinion of those in the arbitration field in the GCC 
states on whether domestic and foreign arbitral awards should have 
the same or different conditions for enforcement; and 
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10. to determine the opinion of those in the arbitration field in the GCC 
states as to specific rules proposed by the thesis for addition into a 
Uniform GCC Arbitration Law. 
 
Upon receiving ethical approval from the Portsmouth University Business 
School Ethics Committee, a pilot study of the survey was conducted, after which the 
survey was disseminated to potential participants online through Survey Monkey 
(www.surveymonkey.com). Below are further explanations of the survey methodology, 
the procedures, and the analysis of the survey data. 
 
1.1. Ethical Consideration and Ethical Approval 
 
Pursuant to the University of Portsmouth policy, the survey was submitted to the 
University Ethics Committee prior to the commencement of the survey. The Ethics 
Committee granted approval on December 12, 2013 and assigned the survey a reference 
number: E271. 
Consistent with the University of Portsmouth’s policies on research, potential 
participants were given “An Overview and Agreement to Participate in the Research 
Study,” a “Participant Information Sheet and Procedures,” and a “Participant Consent 
Form” prior to commencing the survey. The data shows that all participants ticked all 
the boxes required under the Participant Consent Form prior to commencing the survey. 
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Potential participants were advised, among others, of the purpose of the study, 
the criteria used for selecting participants, that there are no known risks to the 
participants, that participation is voluntary and not compensated, that all the evaluation 
materials is anonymised, and that all data are kept confidential. 
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1.2. Participants 
 
The participants in the survey, only one survey population, consisted of 
individuals who engage in, or practice law in, the field of international arbitration in the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. The estimated potential size of the population 
ranged from 30 to 300. The estimated number of potential participants was based on the 
number of individuals who engage in, or practice law in, the field of international 
arbitration in the GCC states, and whose contact information (primarily email) is 
publicly available on the Internet. In the end, the survey was sent to a total of 321 
potential participants. Of this number only 41 participated in the survey, 11 more than 
the 30 respondents originally anticipated by the researcher. A larger sample population 
could not be achieved by the researcher due to time and monetary constraints. 
The sample size does not consist of the entire relevant population, as there are 
practitioners who practice international arbitration in the GCC states whose contact 
information are not publicly available. However, the survey was also disseminated to 
some groups including the International Islamic Centre for Reconciliation and 
Arbitration, the GCC Arbitration Centre, and DIAC, which were requested to send the 
survey to their mailing list. It is recognized, however, that many of the potential 
participants are attorneys and arbitrators with very busy schedules and may not have the 
time to participate in the study. 
The survey assumed that five (5) individuals from each of the six GCC states 
would, at minimum, respond to the survey, giving the sample survey population a 
minimum of 30 to 40 participants. If more than five (5) individuals from each of the six 
GCC states responded to the survey, then the researcher expected to obtain more than 
30 participants. The researcher sent an email of the survey via Survey Monkey, using 
the researcher’s university email address, to individuals who engage in, or practice law 
in, the field of international arbitration in the GCC states, and whose contact 
information is publicly available on the Internet.  
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1.3. Survey Design 
 
The Survey Questions totaled 31 questions for a 10 minutes survey. The 
questions were divided into four parts. Part I asked for General Background 
Information. Part II asked participants to give a scaled rating with a range of zero “0” to 
ten “10”. Part III asked participants to provide a short answer, to choose from multiple 
choices and provide a short answer, and to choose from multiple choices. Finally, part 
IV asked participants to read a statement and to state whether they agreed or disagreed 
with the statement. Those who disagreed were asked to state their reasons in paragraph 
format why they disagreed with the statement.   
 
1.4. Question Design 
 
There are generally four types of survey questions: (1) open ended; (2) multiple 
choice; (3) ranking; and (4) scaled. An open ended question allows the participant or 
respondent to state a full range of answers in his or her own words, allowing for further 
or in-depth insight into the perceptions of the participant. An open-ended question, 
however, requires careful analysis of text, requires more time to complete for a 
participant, and complicates data summary and analysis. Its advantages, however, are to 
provide detail and depth, to clarify the participants’ ideas, and to generate new ideas 
about a topic. 
A multiple choice question simply asks the participant to choose from one or 
more answers, and is therefore useful in gathering demographic data and/or data on a 
range of issues. Multiple-choice questions allow for asking many questions in a short 
amount of time and can assess attitudes when the issues are clear. Multiple choice 
questions can be either close-ended or partial open-ended. A close ended multiple 
choice question is fast and easy to complete for the participant and enables easy data 
entry and data analysis for the researcher. However, the responses lack detail and depth 
and are limited to the options provided. The partial open-ended multiple-choice 
question allows for the participant to choose an “Other” choice when the participant is 
not satisfied with the choices provided. So, the partial open-ended takes the advantages 
!"
" "
of a close-ended multiple-choice question while allowing the participant to provide 
more in-depth or detailed answers. The disadvantage of a partial open-ended question is 
that it complicates data analysis.  
A ranking question asks the participant to put in order or rank a series of choices 
or to choose from a set of ordered choices. In other words, it asks the participant to 
determine the relative important of various choices. A ranking question, however, can 
be difficult to answer and limits the response choices for the participant. 
A scaled question determines the degree of a response, opinion or position by 
asking the participant to choose from an interval or scale of numbers. The scaled 
question can allow for a more precise determination of a degree rather than by asking a 
simple yes or no, while still remaining easy to complete for the participant and for easy 
data entry and data analysis for the researcher. 
In this survey, the open ended question, close ended multiple choice question, 
partial open ended multiple choice question, and the scaled question were employed. 
Close ended multiple choice questions were employed for both demographic questions 
and for specific questions. An example of a multiple-choice question is the following: 
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The partial open-ended multiple-choice question was also used whenever the potential 
answer could result in unforeseen choices that would be important for the participant. 
An example of a partial open-ended multiple-choice question is the following: 
 
 
The open ended question was also used to solicit additional and in-depth insight that 
could determine whether the conclusion the researcher found in the literature review 
generally matched that of the sample population. An example of an open-ended 
question is as follows: 
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Finally, the scaled question was employed to rate the degree to which 
participants viewed friendliness to arbitration, extent of knowledge, degree of benefit, 
and degree of satisfaction. A 10-point scale was used so that the data could easily be 
converted to a percentage. For example, an answer of 5 is equivalent to 50%. Also, a 
study has shown that a scale with 5-7 point scales tend to produce higher mean averages 
than a scale with a 9 or 10 point scale.1 An example of this question is as follows: 
 
 
######################################## ####################
1 J Dawes, ‘Do Data Characteristics Change According to the Number of Scale Points Used?: An 
experiment using 5-point, 7-point and 10-point scales’ (2008) Int’l J of Market Research 50, 61-77. 
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Another question type used is a mixed version of the multiple-choice question 
with an open-ended question that follows. The question asked the participant to read a 
statement and asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement. The close 
ended multiple-choice question is easy to answer and east for data entry and data 
analysis. Meanwhile, whenever the answer is “Disagree”, the participant is then asked 
an open-ended question by asking for their reasons for disagreeing. The purpose of the 
follow-up open-ended question is to solicit new ideas and to gain in-depth insight into 
the participant’s objection to the statement. An example of this type of question is as 
follows: 
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The researcher aimed at short and simple questions, whenever possible. 
Additionally, leading questions were avoided. Most of the questions were close-ended, 
but the researcher opted for partial-open ended and open-ended questions whenever it 
was necessary to solicit a more in-depth or detailed answer from the participant. The 
researcher also aimed at giving few or limited answer choices to make it easier for the 
participant to complete the survey. The scaled questions, however, could not be made 
short, and researcher noticed partially complete surveys that ended right before the 
scaled questions. The scaled questions, however, were necessary as the completed 
surveys yielded very valuable data from the scaled questions. Finally, the research 
aimed to make the survey easy to take, and so the research made sure to give a logical 
order to the survey and made the survey neat orderly.  
 
1.5. Pilot Testing 
 
The survey was pilot tested before dissemination to uncover errors in the survey 
design and to fine tune the questions and uncover potential flaws and potential causes of 
confusion, such as misleading questions. The pilot survey was sent to a few colleagues 
who made informal comments and suggestions about the survey. The comments from 
the pilot study, for example, helped in rearranging the design of the survey and to group 
certain questions that have similar formats or designs. The pilot testing also resulted in 
eliminating some answer choices in favor of a partial-open ended multiple choice to 
make the list of choices shorter. Finally, the pilot testing helped determine that the time 
to conduct the survey took approximately 10 minutes.  
 
1.6. Online Distribution of Survey Through Survey Monkey 
 
The survey was distributed through www.surveymonkey.com, a commonly used 
tool for conducting academic and non-academic online surveys. The Survey Monkey 
system allows for the creation of an email message, which was then sent to potential 
participants. The addresses of potential recipients had to be uploaded to Survey 
Monkey, which could then track and note if the message to a recipient had bounced. 
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Further, Survey Monkey allowed the message to post a link for recipients to opt-out of 
receiving any future solicitations from Survey Monkey.  
Here is the email message sent via Survey Monkey: 
 
Survey Monkey also allowed for dissemination of the survey via a web link or 
an Internet address that could be customized and then shared to potential participants 
via social media like Facebook and via email as a link. The web link was used to share 
the survey to groups of participants in a “lists serve” or an electronic list of emails with 
the help of groups like the DIAC, the International Islamic Centre for Reconciliation 
and Arbitration in Dubai, and the list serve of law firms. The web link address for the 
survey was as follows: http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/GCCarb/. 
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1.7. Data Analysis 
 
Data analysis was facilitated with the Survey Monkey data analysis online 
software. The data analyzed by Survey Monkey shows the data in both summary and 
chart format. The data analysis also shows how many participants answered each 
question, and how many skipped each question. The data analysis shows the total 
number of respondents for each question. The questions can also be analyzed by 
comparison to other answer options. Therefore, those who practiced arbitration 
primarily in the United Kingdom could be looked at separately than those who practiced 
arbitration primarily in the GCC states. 
The data collected from the survey were twofold: numerical and textual. The 
numerical data and the textual data were compared with the findings in the literature 
review.  This process of triangulation between qualitative and quantitative data was 
used to confirm and validate the findings. For example, scaled question answers to 
questions 10-12 resulted in numerical data as to the extent to which judges were 
familiar with the New York Convention, the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the ICSID 
Convention. This numerical data was then analysed in light of the answers to the open-
ended question in question 19, which asked for the most likely reasons for the non-
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. Further, the numerical data and textual data are 
analysed with the conclusions reached from the literature review. 
The interplay between induction and deduction, in other words between data 
collection and interpretation, was another process of validation of findings but also part 
of the theory development. In what is known as a process of abduction, the 
interpretation of observed data to the best explanation helps to form a tentative theory, 
which then needs to be confirmed or disconfirmed with help of further data collections 
and analysis. The findings from empirical data were compared to the reviewed 
literature, as described in the conclusion chapter, which then led to conclusions and 
recommendations. 
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II. SURVEY RESULTS 
 
2.0. Introduction 
 
The overall results of the survey strengthened some of the conclusions made by 
the research from the literature review, while also confirming that further study need to 
be made with a larger survey population and with statistically significant conclusions 
about the relationships between variables. As stated previously, time and monetary 
constraints limited the size of the population sample, though the survey exceeded the 
expected number of participants. Additionally, the researcher made no observations 
regarding the statistically significant relationships between two variables. Regardless, 
some direct observations or conclusions can be made from the survey results. Below are 
the results of each question, followed by a discussion of direct observations or 
conclusions reached by the research based on the survey results. 
 
2.1. BACKGROUND OF RESPONDENTS 
 
There were a total of 41 respondents from the more than 321 survey invitations 
sent via email and web link. These are the breakdown of the respondents: 
 
2.1.1. Profession of the Respondents 
 
Those involved in arbitration could come from a variety of fields, though most 
come from the legal profession. Respondents were asked to choose from four types of 
professions most commonly found among those with experience in arbitration in the 
GCC states: Attorney (47.5%), Arbitrator (42.5%), Legal Consultant (35%), and Judge 
(0%). Respondents who did not belong to these four professions could choose the 
“Other” option and specify the profession (25%). Ten respondents chose the “Other” 
option and specified the following occupations or professions: Expert witness and 
ACCA, procurement and contract manager/engineer, Engineer, Architect, Quantity 
Surveyor, Engineering Expert, Manager/Support Services of Arbitration Centre, Vice 
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President of Operations, “DR”, and Teacher. Here is the breakdown by the pre-specified 
professions: 
 
 
2.1.2. Arbitration Practice 
 
Respondents were asked whether they practiced in the field of arbitration. There 
were 87.5% who practice in the field of arbitration. Here is the breakdown of the 
respondents: 
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2.1.3. Experience 
 
About 80% of the total respondents have more than 5 years of experience in the 
field of arbitration. There were 60% of respondents with 10 or more years of experience 
in arbitration and 20% with 5-10 years of experience. 
 
 
 
2.1.4. Language 
 
The majority of respondents (95%) are fluent in English, almost half (45%) are 
fluent in Arabic, while some (20%) are fluent in French. Here is the breakdown of 
respondents by language: 
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2.1.5. Country of Practice 
 
Respondents were also asked in what countries they primarily practiced their 
profession. Many respondents practiced in more than one country: regionally (in more 
than one GCC state) or internationally (in Europe, the Middle East, and/or the GCC). 
Here is the breakdown of countries: 
 
 
2.1.6. Experience in the GCC States 
 
The majority of respondents (87.5%) had experience in the field of arbitration in 
one or more of the GCC states.  
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2.1.7. Shari’a School of Thought or Fiqh 
 
The literature review explained that the Islamic School of Thought impacted the 
interpretation of the Shari’a. To determine whether the majority of the school of thought 
influenced the enforcement of arbitral awards in a jurisdiction, the respondents were 
asked what School of Thought or Fiqh is followed by the majority of judges and 
lawyers in their country. Those who were not from an Islamic jurisdiction or who did 
not primarily practise in an Islamic jurisdiction or any of the GCC states were given the 
opportunity to so state with a “Not Applicable” choice.  
 
 
2.2. RATING 
 
Respondents were asked to rate a series of issues including (1) how they viewed 
the friendliness of each of the six GCC states towards enforcement of a foreign arbitral 
award; (2) the familiarity of judges in the GCC states with the New York Convention, 
the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the ICSID Convention; (3) whether the adoption of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law would benefit Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE; and (4) how 
satisfied were the respondents with regards to their country’s definition of “domestic 
award”, “foreign award”, and “international award.” 
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2.2.1. Friendliness of GCC states towards foreign arbitral award 
enforcement 
 
Of the six GCC states, Bahrain and the UAE were viewed as the friendliest with 
a similar score of 7.44 out of 10 and 7.43 out of 10, respectively. The KSA, despite the 
recent passage of the Saudi Arbitration Law of 2012, hailed to bring the KSA in line 
with international arbitration norms, was still viewed as the least friendly toward 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards with the lowest score of 3.44 out of 10. Here is 
the breakdown of the result: 
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2.2.2. Familiarity of Judges in the GCC states with international 
agreements  
 
Respondents view judges in the GCC states as having low familiarity with 
international agreements, and especially so with the ICSID Convention which has had 
very little history in the GCC states. Respondents gave GCC judges a score of 5.86 out 
of 10 or 58.6% familiarity with the New York Convention, 4.97 out of 10 or 49.7% 
familiarity with the UNCITRAL Model Law, and 3.78 out of 10 or 37.8% familiarity 
with the ICSID. This view confirms the conclusions based on the review of the 
literature that judges are deemed to have little experience with international agreements, 
and such limited experience may be one of the main reasons for the non-enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. Here is the breakdown of how the respondents viewed the 
familiarity of judges in the GCC states with the three main international agreements: 
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2.2.3. Benefit of adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law 
 
The adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law is usually seen as a positive sign, 
as discussed in the literature. In the GCC states, only three of six states (Bahrain, Oman, 
and the KSA) have adopted some version of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Qatar, 
Kuwait, and the UAE have not yet adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the 
majority of respondents viewed that the adoption by these three GCC states of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law would be beneficial. These results confirm the conclusion and 
the proposal by the research that all the GCC states ought to adopt the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, and possibly through a Uniform GCC Arbitration Law. Here is the 
breakdown of the data: 
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2.2.4. Definition of foreign, domestic, and international award 
 
Respondents were also asked to state their satisfaction with their country’s 
definition of foreign, domestic, and international arbitral award. Though the majority of 
respondents were generally somewhat satisfied with their country’s definition of foreign 
and domestic arbitral award, the majority of respondents were not as satisfied with their 
country’s definition of international arbitral award with a lower score of 6.16 out of 10 
or a 61.6% satisfaction rating. Here is how the data breaks down: 
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2.3. REASONS FOR NON-ENFORCEMENT OF A FOREIGN ARBITRAL 
AWARD 
 
Respondents were asked an open-ended question as to the most likely reason for 
the non-enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. The question aimed to solicit ideas 
from respondents as to the reasons for non-enforcement, identify the most common 
reasons for non-enforcement, and to compare whether the most common reasons for 
enforcement are the same or similar to those identified by the research from the 
literature review.  
The researcher grouped together the most common responses using textual 
analysis. The highest number of common responses is eleven (11) responses identifying 
public policy as the most likely reason for non-enforcement. The second highest 
number of common responses had a total of six (6) responses identifying the judiciary’s 
lack of familiarity or knowledge with international arbitration, the New York 
Convention, or some form of judicial activism or hostility as the reason for non-
enforcement. The third highest number of common responses had five (5) responses 
identifying the failure of the arbitration statute as the reason for non-enforcement. The 
fourth highest number of common responses had four (4) responses identifying 
jurisdictional issues as the reason for non-enforcement. The fifth highest number of 
common responses had three (3) identifying social or political reason for non-
enforcement. The rest of the remaining nine (9) responses varied and included one 
response, which stated that the Shari’a is the most common reason for non-enforcement. 
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2.4. A UNIFORM GCC ARBITRATION LAW? 
 
One of the key elements of the thesis is to propose a set of rules for the Uniform 
GCC Arbitration Law. The research, however, wanted to clarify whether a Uniform 
GCC Arbitration Law had support from arbitration practitioners and experts in the GCC 
States. The research reveals that the majority of respondents at 81.25% are in favour of 
a Uniform GCC Arbitration Law. Here is how the numbers break down: 
 
 
2.5. CONDITIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 of the study discussed the distinction between domestic and 
foreign arbitral awards and the conditions for enforcement, respectively. One of the 
common criticisms found by the research in the review of the literature is that states like 
the UAE continue to apply domestic arbitration rules in the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards. Courts in the GCC states may, for example, require conditions for 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards that should only be applicable to domestic 
arbitral awards, and therefore leading to the non-enforcement of an arbitral award. 
Respondents were asked two sets of questions regarding the conditions for enforcement. 
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2.5.1. Whether domestic or foreign arbitral awards should have the same 
or different conditions for enforcement. 
 
The majority of respondents at 62.50% viewed that domestic and foreign arbitral 
awards ought to have the same conditions for enforcement. This was not the expected 
answer, but perhaps respondents viewed the question to address the equal treatment of 
domestic and foreign awards. Here is the breakdown of the answers: 
 
2.5.2. Whether conditions for enforcement for domestic arbitral awards 
equally apply in practice to foreign arbitral awards. 
 
Consistent with their answer to the previous question, the majority of 
respondents at 75% viewed that the conditions for enforcement of domestic and foreign 
arbitral awards were not equally applied. 
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2.6. THE EFFECT OF THE SHARI’A 
 
One of the central themes in the research was to determine the impact of the 
Shari’a on the enforcement of arbitral awards. The research concludes from the review 
of the literature that the Shari’a is actually more consistent with the New York 
Convention as viewed by Western practitioners. The survey was then used to determine 
how those practicing in the field of arbitration view the role of the Shari’a in the 
enforcement of arbitral awards, specifically with regards to public policy and whether 
riba [interest] ought to be allowed in arbitral awards. In this regard, three questions 
were asked from respondents. 
 
2.6.1. Conflict between the New York Convention and the Shari’a 
 
Respondents were asked about their knowledge as to the interplay between the 
New York Convention and the Shari’a. Answering the question is quite tricky, as it 
requires knowledge of both the New York Convention and the Shari’a, especially the 
Shari’a. After a review of the literature, the research concludes that the Shari’a and the 
New York Convention would not actually conflict since the New York Convention 
allows for the public policy defence under which the Shari’a would qualify. Further, the 
Shari’a requires all Muslims to honour their contract,2 which the majority of Islamic 
scholars have interpreted to mean that Muslims have an obligation to follow 
international agreements.3 Regardless, when asked whether the New York Convention 
or the Shari’a would prevail in a conflict, the respondents were split with 53.13% who 
stated that the New York Convention would prevail, while a staggering 46.88% stated 
that the Shari’a would prevail. There were those who explained further their choice, and 
only two comments correctly stated that there ought to be no conflict between the New 
York Convention and the Shari’a. Here is how the numbers break down: 
 
 
######################################## ####################
2 The Holy Qur’an, Al-Ma’ida 5:1, Yusuf Ali Translation. 
3 Saudi Arabia v Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), 27 ILR (1958) 117; Kuwait v Aminoil, 21 
ILM 976 (1982).#
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2.6.2. Shari’a and public policy 
 
One of the main issues addressed by the research was the extent to which the 
Shari’a ought to apply in determining public policy. A review of the literature reveals 
that the concerns of the Shari’a with regards to public policy were largely consistent 
with the New York Convention, and would only seem to deviate from international 
arbitration norms with regards to a few substantive Shari’a public policies that are 
fundamentally considered haram [prohibited].  Public policies under the Shari’a related 
to procedures were largely consistent with international arbitration norms. The research, 
therefore, concluded that the Shari’a ought to be applied only when the arbitral award 
concerned a fundamental Shari’a principle, largely limited to the prohibitions on the 
riba [interest] and gharar [uncertainty] and when the subject of the agreement deals 
with alcohol and/or pork. In this regard, the respondents were asked when the Shari’a 
ought to apply when determining public policy. The majority of respondents at 48.39% 
answered that the Shari’a ought to apply when a violation of a fundamental Shari’a 
principle has been established, a view that supports the conclusion reached by the 
research. Here is a breakdown of the numbers:  
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2.6.3. When should interest be allowed? 
 
The survey also sought to determine how those in the field of arbitration in the 
GCC states view interests in an arbitral award. The views by respondents on the subject 
of interest are diverse, only finding commonality among those who do not speak Arabic 
and who do not primarily practise in the GCC states. Here is the breakdown of the 
numbers: 
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2.7. TESTING THE PROPOSED RULES 
 
The survey was also used as a tool to test whether the proposed rules to the 
Uniform GCC Arbitration Law made by the thesis were reasonable. Therefore, the 
language of the six proposed rules were stated in the survey, and respondents were 
asked whether the agreed or disagreed with the entire statement. The majority of 
respondent agreed with the six statements for the proposed rules. Here are the results 
for each of the proposed rule: 
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TEXTUAL ANALYSIS AND CATEGORIZED BREAKDOWN OF 
RESPONSES TO SURVEY QUESTION NUMBER 19!
!
1 
!
QUESTION 19: What is the most likely reason for the non-enforcement of a 
foreign arbitral award in your jurisdiction? 
 
Public Policy (11) 
 
#2. Noncompliance with Public Policy 1/25/2014 9:34 AM 
#8. Public policy & non signatory to NY CONVENTION. 1/22/2014 12:23 PM 
#10. Public policy 1/21/2014 7:54 AM 
#14. !"#$" !"%&$" '()#* (' +$,-!$" [the problem is in the definition of “public order”] 
1/19/2014 5:00 AM 
#18. Public policy 1/15/2014 5:34 AM 
#20. Contrary to public policy 1/15/2014 4:43 AM 
#24. Public policy - non reciprocity 1/13/2014 11:28 PM 
#26. Public policy reasons 1/13/2014 1:44 AM 
#28. Public policy exception 1/13/2014 12:47 AM 
#29. Vague reasons linked to “policy” 1/12/2014 
#32. Public policy 1/12/2014 5:59 AM 
 
Judiciary’s Lack of Familiarity or Knowledge with International Arbitration (6)  
 
#4. Judges lack of knowledge with the developments of enforcement practices in world 
and judges bias towards arbitration in general 1/24/2014 6:41 AM 
#22. The weak of knowledge of the judges 1/15/2014 2:34 AM 
#24. Lack of awareness of the terms of NY convention 1/13/2014 11:28 PM 
#25. Lack of understanding of New York Convention 1/13/2014 4:55 AM 
#30. The enforcement judge allows the ambiguities of the local law to take precedence 
over the jurisdiction’s treaty obligations 1/12/2014 8:57 PM 
#33. Judicial hostility to arbitration. Judges do not want to lose their jobs to arbitrators 
12/27/2013 5:30 AM 
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!
Failure of Arbitration Statute (5)  
 
#12. Challenge or appeal under ss. 203-210 of the Civil and Commercial Procedural 
Code (Law 13 of 1990) 1/20/2014 1:07 AM 
#17. The most likely reason for non-enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is the 
multiple litigation procedures are requested to enforce the arbitral award 1/15/2014 9:18 
PM 
#19. Challenge under local law 1/15/2014 5:22 AM 
#24. Lack of independent Arbitration legislation 1/13/2014 11:28 PM 
#25. Lack of clear procedural guidelines in domestic legislation 1/13/2014 4:55 AM 
 
Jurisdictional Issue (4)  
 
#1. Jurisdictional issues 2/9/2014 1:54 AM 
#9. Lack of jurisdiction 1/22/2014 5:02 AM 
#15. Competing jurisdiction clause 1/18/2014 11:43 PM 
#13. Respondent not being domiciled in the UAE and so courts claiming not to have 
jurisdiction 1/19/2014 5:46 AM 
 
Social/Political Reasons (3) 
 
#7. Disagreement with the verdict as the one who is the losing party in the arbitration is 
a powerful local individual /company 1/22/2014 8:55 PM 
#23. Variety of reasons: 1. Contradicting the Sharia Law of the country. 2. Local 
political / social considerations particularly when the case awarded is against a 
governmental or semi-governmental entity or establishment. Where there could be 
influence by the entity on the verdict being against the government interests. 3. Lack of 
exposure to international laws by local authorities and contractors alike. 1/15/2014 2:09 
AM 
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!
Other Reasons (9) 
 
#1. Contradicting the sharia law of the country 2/9/2014 1:54 AM 
#3. LACK OF READILY ACCEPTED FOREIGN AWARDS 1/24/2014 7:18 AM 
#5. Conflict with laws of the land 1/24/2014 3:37 AM 
#6. Any award that does not fall under “Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
1/23/2014 4:49 AM 
#11. Not having a Bilateral agreement 1/20/2014 8:52 AM 
#16. Violation of due process 1/16/2014 3:54 AM 
#21. AUTHORITY TO ARBITRATE 1/15/2014 3:38 AM 
#27. Lack of reciprocal agreement 1/13/2014 1:27 AM 2014 10:17 PM 
#31. Extensive variety of grounds 1/12/2014 5:37 PM 
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